Our People > Stephen M. Bland

Stephen M. Bland

Managing Editor and Head of Investigations

Stephen M. Bland is a journalist, author, editor, commentator, and researcher specializing in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Prior to joining The Times of Central Asia, he worked for NGOs, think tanks, as the Central Asia expert on a forthcoming documentary series, for the BBC, The Diplomat, EurasiaNet, and numerous other publications.

His award-winning book on Central Asia was published in 2016, and he is currently putting the finishing touches to a book about the Caucasus.

Articles

Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be discussing the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway with special guest, Almaty-based journalist for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Chris Rickleton.

3 days ago

U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations

Rubio Meeting Highlights Kazakhstan’s Growing U.S. Agenda

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s April 15 meeting with senior Kazakh officials in Washington gave fresh visibility to a relationship that both sides increasingly frame in economic as well as diplomatic terms. At a time when Washington is trying to give its Central Asia policy more practical shape, Kazakhstan is a key U.S. partner in the region. Rubio met President Tokayev’s Special Representative for Negotiations with the United States, Erzhan Kazykhan, and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy, Serik Zhumangarin. The talks covered ways to expand economic ties between the United States and Kazakhstan, as well as Kazakhstan’s role in peacemaking and regional initiatives. Rubio also welcomed Kazakhstan’s participation in the C5+1 platform and reaffirmed U.S. support for the country’s “sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.” In a post on X, Rubio said the talks focused on strengthening commercial ties and advancing regional cooperation. That language put trade, investment, and regional economic coordination at the center of the meeting. Launched in 2015, the C5+1 began as a diplomatic framework linking the United States and the five Central Asian states. It later broadened into a more structured platform, with working groups on trade, energy, and the environment, and with growing emphasis on logistics, diversification, supply chains, and investment. The rise of the B5+1 reinforced that shift by giving business a more formal place in the relationship. By late 2025, the format placed more emphasis on deliverables, including infrastructure, funding mechanisms, and cooperation on mineral processing and research. That shift has also been visible in Kazakhstan’s own dealings with Washington. During President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to the United States in November 2025, the Kazakh delegation signed 29 bilateral agreements worth about $17 billion, including a memorandum on critical minerals cooperation and major commercial deals in aviation, agriculture, and mining. The same visit underlined how closely economic diplomacy and strategic supply concerns are now tied together. Kazakhstan has attracted roughly $100 billion in cumulative U.S. investment since independence, and critical minerals have moved closer to the center of the relationship as Washington looks for secure supply chains beyond China and Russia. Kazakhstan has attracted over $151 billion in net foreign direct investment since independence. Rubio’s talks with Zhumangarin and Kazykhan came after months of stronger U.S.-Kazakhstan economic contact. Kazakhstan has a larger economic profile than any other Central Asian state, and its role in energy, critical minerals, investment, and transit gives it a prominent place in Washington’s regional thinking. That makes Astana a natural focus for any U.S. push to deepen commercial ties in Central Asia. The sovereignty language in the U.S. readout was also not incidental. For Kazakhstan, public backing from Washington on sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity carries political weight in a region where questions of borders, pressure, and strategic dependence remain sensitive. Astana’s multi-vector foreign policy is built on preserving room for maneuver among larger powers. High-level engagement in Washington supports that strategy and signals that closer U.S. ties can sit alongside Kazakhstan’s broader balancing act. The Washington...

4 days ago

China

Beyond the Belt and Road: China’s New Playbook in Central Asia

In the Kyzylorda Region, near the town of Shieli, the silos and conveyor belts of a Chinese-backed plant rise out of the fine brown dust that dominates the landscape. It is the kind of project the Belt and Road was supposed to deliver in Central Asia: heavy industry, fixed capital, and a visible mark on the landscape. But it is also a reminder that China’s role in the region has become narrower, more contested, and less sweeping than the old rhetoric suggested. In photographs, the Gezhouba Cement Plant looks like a self-contained industrial island on the steppe. For nearby villagers, it became something else: a source of jobs and local prestige for some, but also of years of complaints about dust clouds and whether the state was quicker to defend a flagship Chinese-backed project than the people living beside it. Projects like the plant in Shieli also help explain why views of China across Central Asia remain mixed. Beijing is seen as a source of trade, investment, and technology, but that promise is tempered in some places by concerns over transparency, environmental costs, and who really benefits when a project arrives. China has become Central Asia’s dominant trading partner, but investment has not kept pace with the surge in commerce. The gap says a lot about how Beijing now works in the region: with a sharper focus on sectors that matter to its long-term influence. In 2025, trade in goods between China and the five Central Asian states reached $106.3 billion, up 12% year on year. Chinese exports to the region totaled $71.2 billion, while imports from Central Asia reached $35.1 billion. Trade has grown fast enough to reshape the region’s external balance, but long-term investment has been far more selective. Over 2005–2025, the five Central Asian states accounted for about 3% of China’s global overseas investment and construction total. The picture changes once direct investment is separated from trade and construction contracts. China’s FDI stock in the five Central Asian states stood at about $36 billion by mid-2025. Roughly 90% was concentrated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The structure of that capital has also changed. Extractive industries still accounted for 46% of the portfolio, but manufacturing and energy together made up more than one third, and greenfield projects rose from 43% to 60%. China has not poured money into Central Asia on the scale once implied by early Belt and Road rhetoric. Instead, it has invested in sectors that strengthen its industrial position. Kazakhstan remains at the center of this relationship. It is China’s biggest commercial partner in Central Asia, and the main destination for Chinese capital in the region. Kazakhstan-China trade reached $43.8 billion in 2024. The country’s portfolio of projects with Chinese participation includes 224 ventures worth about $66.4 billion. Some are still at the planning stage, but the range of projects is telling. Recent developments have included a hydrogen energy technology innovation center in Almaty and a large wind farm with electricity storage. Kazakhstan still sells...

5 days ago

Hungary

Central Asia Holds Back on Hungary Election as Orbán Era Ends

Central Asian governments have still yet to issue public statements on Hungary’s election, which brought an end to Viktor Orbán’s 16-year tenure. Hungary’s National Election Office published official updates after the April 12 vote, with Orbán conceding defeat after preliminary results indicated a landslide victory for Péter Magyar’s Tisza party. European leaders responded quickly, but no comparable messages have appeared on the main official channels in Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, or Ashgabat. The absence is not a breach of diplomatic protocol. Governments often wait for formal certification or initial contacts before issuing congratulations after parliamentary elections. Yet Hungary occupies a distinct place in Central Asia’s external relations. It is an observer in the Organization of Turkic States, and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev attended the informal OTS summit in Budapest, where Viktor Orbán hosted regional leaders and promoted closer ties. Hungary has presented itself as a bridge between Central Asia and the European Union, with regular high-level exchanges and expanding economic links. Recent precedent underscores the contrast. Following Hungary’s 2022 election, Kazakhstan’s Akorda said Kassym-Jomart Tokayev sent Viktor Orbán a congratulatory telegram on April 4, the day after the vote, and Uzbekistan reported that President Shavkat Mirziyoyev phoned Orbán on April 14, 2022 to offer his congratulations. No similar outreach has been made public so far in 2026. The delay reflects a period of adjustment rather than a clear shift. Orbán’s government had cultivated close personal and political ties with Central Asian leaders, and Budapest played an active role in advancing cooperation through the Turkic framework. A new Hungarian administration may recalibrate those priorities as it seeks to strengthen relations within the EU, creating uncertainty for partners that had relied on Hungary as a consistent advocate in Europe. For now, the silence signals caution. Central Asian governments appear to be waiting for the formal transition in Budapest and for early indications of the new government’s foreign policy. If statements follow in the coming days, the current pause will look procedural. If it continues, it will carry more weight as a sign of recalibration in a relationship that had been unusually close.

6 days ago

Iran

Central Asia Recalculates as the Iran War Enters a New Phase

Central Asia’s first response to the Iran war was public and urgent. Governments organized evacuations, welcomed a ceasefire, and watched the Strait of Hormuz because the region’s trade routes, fuel costs, and food prices were already under pressure. The next phase looks different. Following the April 12 collapse of U.S.-Iran talks in Islamabad, Washington moved to block maritime traffic entering and leaving Iranian ports. That step does not formally close Hormuz to all shipping, but it pushes the crisis into a more serious phase for any country or company still treating Iran as a viable corridor. That distinction is important in Central Asia because the region does not need a formal legal closure of Hormuz to feel the shock. It only needs insurers, banks, freight forwarders, airlines, and traders to decide that the southern option has become too risky for routine planning. That process was already underway. The route through Iran had come under strain in southern corridor traffic, food systems, and in the wider pricing of regional connectivity. A U.S. move against Iranian ports is likely to reinforce that view. Official statements across Central Asia still reflect the ceasefire moment more than the latest escalation. On April 8, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev welcomed the truce and said he hoped it would support global trade and prosperity. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the ceasefire and praised efforts to reduce tensions. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry did the same, calling the truce an “important step toward de-escalating tensions,” and stressing that it should serve as a pathway to a broader political settlement. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the ceasefire agreement between Iran and the United States. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, had already taken a practical line, saying on March 4 that it was keeping all international checkpoints open and providing passage for foreign citizens, vehicles, and rail stock across the Turkmen-Iranian border. Since then, public messaging has lagged behind the latest escalation. By April 13, Qazinform’s foreign news flow had shifted to the failed Islamabad talks and Trump’s blockade order, while the latest publicly visible official positions elsewhere in the region still reflected the April 8 ceasefire. That does not mean backchannel diplomacy has stopped, but it does suggest that Central Asian governments prefer caution in public as the conflict shifts from direct strikes to pressure on shipping and trade. For the region, the economic logic is now clearer than the politics. Approximately 20% of global oil supplies and one-third of global fertilizer trade move through the Strait of Hormuz, while urea prices surged by almost 46% between February and March 2026. The World Bank’s April Europe and Central Asia Economic Update said growth in the developing economies of Europe and Central Asia is expected to slow to 2.1% in 2026, down from 2.6% in 2025, as the Middle East conflict, wider geopolitical tension, and trade fragmentation weigh on the region. Those pressures were already significant. The collapse of the main post-ceasefire diplomatic effort, followed by oil rising back above $100 a barrel, has made them harder...

7 days ago

Middle East Crisis

Central Asia Welcomes Ceasefire, Urges Talks as Energy Risks Persist

Central Asian governments have cautiously welcomed the two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran, describing it as a necessary pause in a conflict that has already begun to affect regional stability, trade, and energy flows. Across the region, official statements struck a consistent balance: support for the truce, alongside calls to translate it quickly into negotiations rather than allow it to become a temporary pause in hostilities. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev described the agreement as a “ceasefire and truce” reached through international mediation, including efforts involving Pakistan’s leadership. According to the presidential press service, Tokayev said that “this agreement became possible due to the goodwill and wisdom of the President of the United States, Donald Trump, and the senior leadership of Iran, as well as all countries involved in the military conflict.” Tokayev went on to express his hope that the agreement would prove sustainable and contribute to global trade and economic stability. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry described the ceasefire as an “important step toward de-escalating tensions” and stressed that it should serve as a pathway to a broader political settlement. Tashkent called for “all parties to exercise restraint, [and] refrain from actions that could further escalate the situation, warning that further escalation risks widening the conflict and undermining regional stability. The statement reaffirmed Uzbekistan's “unwavering position on the need to resolve conflicts exclusively by peaceful means in strict accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the agreement, expressing hope that the ceasefire would open the way to a comprehensive and long-term peace. Dushanbe emphasized that the conflict has “no military solution and its continuation will only worsen the already difficult situation in the Middle East and cause colossal damage to all countries in the region.” The statement urged all parties to “abandon the use of force” and use political and diplomatic mechanisms in accordance with international law and the UN Charter. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry said it “welcomes the achievement of a ceasefire agreement in the Middle East,” highlighting the role of Pakistan’s mediation efforts in reducing tensions. Bishkek reaffirmed that disputes must be resolved exclusively through political and diplomatic means on the basis of the UN Charter and international law, and expressed its “hope for achieving sustainable and long-term peace in the region.” Turkmenistan had not issued an official public statement on the ceasefire at the time of publication, in line with its longstanding policy of neutrality and cautious approach to external conflicts. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the “announced ceasefire” and praised the efforts of mediators who helped broker the agreement. Baku called on all parties to “engage in productive dialogue aimed at resolving existing problems and strengthening mutual trust” and signaled its readiness to “support initiatives aimed at strengthening lasting peace, security, and cooperation in the region.” The convergence in tone reflects more than diplomatic routine. The conflict has already spilled into Central Asia’s political and humanitarian agenda, prompting coordination on evacuations, aid deliveries, and contingency planning....

2 weeks ago

Official Visit

Astana–Israel Talks Span Technology, Trade, and Holocaust Remembrance

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar in Astana on January 27, marking the first official visit by an Israeli foreign minister to Kazakhstan in almost 16 years, and underscoring Astana’s stated interest in deepening economic and technological cooperation with Israel as it continues to recalibrate its foreign policy. According to the Kazakh presidential administration, the talks focused on expanding bilateral relations across trade, investment, science, and technology, with both sides emphasizing practical areas of cooperation. The visit came as Kazakhstan seeks to diversify its economy beyond hydrocarbons and strengthen partnerships with countries at the forefront of applied innovation. Tokayev said the visit demonstrated Israel’s commitment to strengthening comprehensive cooperation with Kazakhstan, while discussions highlighted concrete sectors for collaboration, including artificial intelligence, agrotechnology, water resource management, and digital governance. These areas align closely with Kazakhstan’s national development priorities, particularly its focus on digital transformation, public-sector reform, and productivity-driven growth. Economic cooperation featured prominently throughout the visit. A Kazakh-Israeli business forum was held alongside the high-level talks, aimed at translating diplomatic engagement into commercial outcomes. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry said the forum is expected to support new investment partnerships and initiate joint projects in high-value sectors, with a focus on technology transfer and localized projects. Kazakh officials said bilateral trade reached $162.4 million between January and November 2025, with exports totaling $92.1 million and imports $70.3 million. While modest in absolute terms, the figures were cited as evidence of untapped potential, particularly in non-resource sectors where Israeli companies have global expertise. As part of the discussions, Kazakhstan invited Israeli firms to participate in national digital transformation initiatives, including projects related to e-government, data-driven public services, and digital infrastructure. Officials cited Kazakhstan’s recent progress in digital governance and public-sector innovation as a foundation for expanded cooperation. Kazakhstan and Israel established diplomatic relations in 1992, shortly after Kazakhstan gained independence. Israel opened its embassy in Almaty in 1996, while Kazakhstan inaugurated its embassy in Tel Aviv in 2000, laying the groundwork for steady but largely low-profile bilateral ties. Political relations have traditionally been pragmatic, with cooperation focused on trade, agriculture, healthcare, and education rather than formal alliances. Bilateral trade has remained modest, reflecting limited commercial engagement beyond specific sectors such as agrotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and water management. In recent years, Astana has shown growing interest in Israel’s applied innovation ecosystem, particularly in areas aligned with Kazakhstan’s domestic reform agenda, including digital governance, artificial intelligence, and public-sector modernization. Israeli firms have previously participated in pilot projects and advisory initiatives in Kazakhstan, though large-scale joint ventures have been limited. Kazakhstan has also positioned itself as a neutral diplomatic actor in the Middle East, maintaining relations with Israel while emphasizing interfaith dialogue and mediation. Beyond economic ties, the talks also addressed regional and international issues, including developments in the Middle East and Kazakhstan’s diplomatic positioning in support of the objectives underpinning the Abraham Accords framework. Sa’ar welcomed Kazakhstan’s engagement, describing it as a constructive contribution to dialogue and cooperation between Israel and Muslim-majority countries. Sa’ar...

3 months ago

U.S.-Uzbekistan Relations

Uzbekistan Deepens U.S. Partnership Through New Investment Council and National AI Strategy

Uzbekistan is advancing a broad effort to strengthen its relationship with the United States through new economic, diplomatic, and technological initiatives. A presidential decree establishing the Uzbekistan–U.S. Business and Investment Council, alongside a major artificial intelligence partnership with NVIDIA, underscores the country’s strategy to draw investment and accelerate digital development. A New Platform for Economic Engagement The creation of the Uzbekistan–U.S. Business and Investment Council follows President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s recent participation in the C5+1 Summit, where regional connectivity and U.S.–Central Asia cooperation were central topics. The council will be jointly led by the Head of the Presidential Administration and a representative appointed by the U.S. administration, giving both sides a formal mechanism to coordinate investment priorities and oversee major projects. Uzbekistan expects the platform to support initiatives involving institutions such as the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Asian Development Bank. Officials have framed the council as part of a longer-term effort to expand trade, encourage U.S. private-sector engagement, and diversify the country’s investment base. Expanding Diplomatic Reach The government is preparing to significantly widen its diplomatic network in the United States. A new Adviser-Envoy will be assigned to the embassy in Washington beginning in 2026 to coordinate investment initiatives linked to the council. Plans are also underway to open additional consulates in Philadelphia, Chicago, Orlando, and Seattle, reflecting both the size of the Uzbek diaspora and growing interest in regional outreach. Uzbekistan’s shift toward deeper engagement includes a visa-free regime for U.S. citizens starting January 1, 2026, which will allow 30-day stays and support increased travel for business and education. Updates on foreign policy and consular matters are regularly published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Expanding the National AI Ecosystem Alongside diplomatic and economic reforms, Uzbekistan is pursuing ambitious plans to grow its artificial intelligence capacity. During a recent visit to the United States, Digital Technologies Minister Sherzod Shermatov held discussions with leaders at NVIDIA on infrastructure development, AI governance, and workforce training. The ministry has positioned the partnership as a key step toward integrating international expertise into Uzbekistan’s digital transformation strategy. The cooperation includes the development of an AI Excellence Center powered by NVIDIA technology and supported by training programs from the company’s Deep Learning Institute. The center will provide training for educators and specialists, while universities begin preparing to introduce AI-focused academic programs and certification pathways. A Nationwide Investment in Digital Infrastructure Uzbekistan plans to deploy two national AI clusters by 2026 with a combined computing capacity of up to one megawatt. One cluster will support academic and research institutions, while the second will focus on public-sector systems and industrial projects, including automation, healthcare analytics, and digital government services. Funding is in place for NVIDIA-powered supercomputers that will be installed at leading universities, with procurement scheduled for late 2025. The government is also creating an Industrial AI Excellence Center backed by a $3 million investment. The facility is expected to begin operating in 2026 and will concentrate on...

5 months ago

Aral Sea

Kazakhstan Urges Regional Cooperation to Save the Aral Sea

Kazakhstan has intensified its efforts to restore its portion of the former Aral Sea, calling on neighboring Central Asian states to increase their participation in regional environmental cooperation. Once the world’s fourth-largest lake, the Aral Sea has become a symbol of ecological catastrophe. Experts warn that international efforts remain inadequate. How the Sea Died Straddling the border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the Aral Sea began to shrink in the 1960s when large-scale irrigation projects diverted water from its two main tributaries, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, to support cotton production and agriculture. A growing regional population added further strain. By 1989, the sea had split into the Northern (Small) and Southern (Large) Aral Seas. In 2014, the eastern basin of the Southern Aral Sea dried up completely. Today, the Aralkum Desert occupies much of what was once open water. Kazakhstan has since focused on restoring the Northern Aral Sea. [caption id="attachment_37684" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] A ship stranded in the desert, Moynaq, Uzbekistan; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] The restoration of the Northern Aral Sea has already yielded visible environmental and social benefits. Rising water levels have lowered salinity, allowing several native fish species to return. Local fisheries, once thought lost, are now active again in communities such as Aralsk. According to the Ministry of Ecology, the annual fish catch in the North Aral has risen more than tenfold since the early 2000s, reviving local employment and boosting food security. Experts note that even small ecological gains have had a profound psychological impact on residents who once witnessed the sea’s disappearance. Call for Renewed Efforts On October 15, Kazakhstan called for expanded international cooperation to protect both the Aral and Caspian Seas. First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yerzhan Ashikbayev, speaking at the International Astana Think Tank Forum-2025, emphasized Kazakhstan’s contribution to the global climate agenda. He noted that a regional climate summit, set to be held in Astana in 2026, would provide a platform for coordinated strategies and joint decision-making among Central Asian nations. “Astana also calls for increased international participation in solving environmental problems and preserving the water resources of the Aral and Caspian Seas,” Ashikbayev said. Earlier, on October 10, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov met with senior officials from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan during the second meeting of the Board of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), chaired by Kazakhstan. The event highlighted the need for a united regional approach, noting that restoration of the Aral Sea can be achieved through collective action. Bektenov acknowledged the challenges of the recent growing season, but said regional cooperation had helped maintain a stable water regime in the basin. “Each country has its own national interests, and we are obliged to defend them and will always do so. But I am convinced that our common strategic, long-term priority is good neighborly relations. In solving everyday short-term tasks, we must not undermine long-term priorities. I think that we will take joint measures to ensure that issues are always...

6 months ago

Sanctions

Kyrgyz President Denounces “Politicized” Sanctions on Banks

President Sadyr Japarov has sharply criticized the United States and United Kingdom for imposing what he has called unfounded sanctions on Kyrgyz financial institutions, urging Western leaders to stop “politicizing the economy.” In an interview with state news agency Kabar, Japarov defended two state-owned banks – Keremet Bank and Capital Bank – against allegations that they helped Russia skirt international sanctions, insisting that no evidence of violations has been presented. Neither the UK nor the U.S. has provided a single fact of violation… such facts simply do not exist,” Japarov said, dismissing the sanctions as politically motivated. UK and U.S. Target Kyrgyz Banks for Russia Sanctions Evasion Japarov’s comments come after a new wave of Western measures targeting Kyrgyzstan’s banking and crypto sectors for purported links to Russian sanctions evasion. On August 20, London sanctioned Kyrgyzstan-based Capital Bank – along with its director, Kantemir Chalbayev – alleging the bank was being used by Moscow to pay for military goods as part of a “convoluted scheme” to evade sanctions. The British authorities also blacklisted two Kyrgyz cryptocurrency exchanges - Grinex and Meer - that ran the infrastructure for a new rouble-backed crypto coin called A7A5, which moved an estimated $9.3 billion in just four months and was “intentionally created to evade sanctions.” The UK’s sanctions minister, Stephen Doughty, warned that “laundering transactions through dodgy crypto networks” would not soften the blow of Western sanctions. These steps followed a U.S. Treasury designation in January 2025 against Keremet Bank, a mid-sized Kyrgyz lender, for creating a hub for trade payments that helped Moscow evade restrictions. U.S. officials allege that Keremet Bank facilitated cross-border transactions for Russia’s sanctioned Promsvyazbank and even sold a controlling stake to a firm linked to a pro-Kremlin oligarch – moves Washington viewed as part of a secret channel to re-export dual-use goods and finance Russia’s defense sector. Those actions marked one of the first instances of Western “secondary sanctions” against Central Asian entities – penalties on third-country institutions accused of abetting a sanctioned nation’s activities. Kyrgyz Government’s Defensive Measures President Japarov contends that Kyrgyzstan has been proactive in compliance and that the West’s suspicions are misplaced. He noted that 21 banks operate in Kyrgyzstan, and authorities deliberately limited all Russian rouble transactions to just two state-controlled banks to shield the rest of the financial sector from any inadvertent sanctions breach. “To prevent any of them from falling under sanctions, we decided that only the state-owned Keremet Bank would work with the Russian rouble… All operations are under state control, and the income goes directly to the state treasury,” Japarov stated. Earlier this year, the government expanded this approach by channeling rouble remittances and payments through Capital Bank, which was brought under 100% state ownership in April. The National Bank of Kyrgyzstan ordered that all cross-border transfers in roubles – including the billions of roubles sent home by Kyrgyz migrant workers each day – be processed exclusively via Capital Bank. Kyrgyz officials argued this centralization was meant to “ensure transparency of...

8 months ago