• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10134 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 343

Lenin Falls in Osh: Central Asia Redefines Its Soviet Legacy

The recent removal of a towering 23-meter-tall monument to Vladimir Lenin in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, has ignited heated debate both domestically and abroad. While many are surprised the monument remained in place for more than three decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, its dismantling is part of a broader regional trend of de-Sovietization, a complex process involving the renaming of cities, removal of Soviet-era symbols, and the reassertion of national identity across Central Asia. A Symbol Removed, A Debate Ignited [caption id="attachment_32769" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Lenin Monument in Osh, October 2024; image: TCA, Jonathan Campion[/caption] On June 7, Osh authorities dismantled what was once the tallest Lenin statue in Central Asia. Originally installed in 1975, the monument is to be relocated to a city park, according to the local government. Officials stressed the move was intended to improve the city’s architectural landscape, not to make a political statement, and have warned against "politicizing" the issue. Despite official reassurances, the move has sparked sharp reactions on social media and in the press, with Russian media outlets characterizing the relocation as an anti-Russian gesture. Generational divides have become apparent: younger residents tend to support the removal, while older citizens have expressed dismay over what they see as the erasure of history. “It’s a shame. It was more than a monument, it was part of our lives,” Elena, a local schoolteacher told The Times of Central Asia. “We joke that Lenin crossed the ‘red line’ and got demolished.” Irina Bayramukova, a 68-year-old public figure, called the decision a mistake. “The Lenin monument by Nikolai Tomsky was not only artistically significant, it represented an era. Removing it is like declaring war on those who identify with that past,” she told TCA. Kyrgyzstan, like other Central Asian republics, has been distancing itself from its Soviet legacy since gaining independence in 1991. One of the earliest symbolic moves was the renaming of the capital, once called Frunze after a Bolshevik military leader, back to Bishkek, a modified version of its pre-Soviet name. A Museum to Mikhail Frunze still stands in Bishkek, where the thatched-roof hut of his boyhood was purportedly transported brick by brick. A supporter of Stalin’s rival Zinoviev, when forced to undergo routine surgery by Uncle Joe in 1925, Frunze “mysteriously” died of chloroform anesthetic poisoning. Redefining History [caption id="attachment_32778" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Lenin Monument in Bishkek; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Originally erected in 1984 in the Central Square of Bishkek, a Lenin statue was relocated behind the State Historical Museum in 2003. As previously reported by TCA, earlier this year a debate on removing the monument altogether flared up. In 2022, the National Historical Museum of the Kyrgyz Republic in Bishkek finally reopened its doors after being closed in 2016 for renovations which were planned to take less than a year but ended up taking six years. Several government officials were charged with misappropriating funds designated for the renovations, with former Prime Minister Sapar Isakov sentenced to 18 years in prison. Reportedly, over...

President Tokayev Dismisses Ministers of Defense and Transport

Kazakhstan’s political landscape has undergone a significant shift as President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced the dismissal of two key cabinet members, Ruslan Zhaksylykov, Minister of Defense, and Marat Karabayev, Minister of Transport. The decision marks a reshuffling within the country’s leadership as the administration seeks to address critical challenges in defense and infrastructure. Defense Minister Zhaksylykov Removed, Kosanov Appointed Ruslan Zhaksylykov’s removal as Minister of Defense comes during a time of heightened scrutiny over Kazakhstan’s military readiness and regional security. While the government has not disclosed specific reasons for the dismissal, defense analysts suggest it is tied to concerns about military efficiency, resource management, and preparedness in a challenging geopolitical environment. Criticism has mounted regarding the state of the country’s defense capabilities, with insiders pointing to inefficiencies in handling resources and gaps in modernization efforts. Zhaksylykov's departure aligns with President Tokayev’s broader drive to reform and modernize the armed forces, aiming for greater accountability and effectiveness. During Zhaksylykov’s time in office, the ministry faced frequent criticism over tragic incidents within the army, including fatal injuries and servicemen suicides, which sparked widespread public outrage. The administration has moved swiftly in appointing Dauren Kosanov as Zhaksylykov’s successor, with the President instructing him to enhance the army’s combat readiness, expand special operations forces, and modernize military infrastructure. A seasoned military leader, Kosanov has previously held key positions including commander of the Air Force and director of the Military Institute of Air Defense Forces. Transport Minister Marat Karabayev Dismissed After Short Tenure Simultaneously, Marat Karabayev has been relieved of his duties as Minister of Transport, a position he had held since September 2023 when the ministry was established. His term was marked by escalating challenges in the transport and logistics sector, culminating in mounting criticism from the President himself. Earlier this year, President Tokayev issued Karabayev an official reprimand for his unsatisfactory performance. The dismissal comes following a Security Council meeting chaired by the President during which Karabayev and other officials faced criticism for the state of the transport sector. Tokayev highlighted systemic issues, including delays in transit projects, bottlenecks at border crossings, and inadequate infrastructure at checkpoints. The President also condemned the lack of progress in fulfilling key plans designed to boost the country’s capabilities as a transit hub. Karabayev’s dismissal underscores the urgent need for reforms in the transport sector. President Tokayev stressed the importance of modernizing infrastructure to position Kazakhstan as a competitive player in international trade. He pointed to strategic initiatives such as establishing "green corridors" for streamlined border trade, improving transit volumes, and ensuring reliable aviation fuel supplies. Implications and Broader Context The twin dismissals demonstrate President Tokayev’s resolve to address inefficiencies and push forward with ambitious reforms. Both defense and transport are critical sectors for Kazakhstan’s future, given the country’s strategic geographical position. The defense ministry is facing growing pressure to modernize in response to regional security tensions, while the transport sector is vital for integrating Kazakhstan into global supply chains.

Opinion: In Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Race, Financial Muscle Will Decide the Winner

The most closely watched development in Kazakhstan this June is the decision over which foreign company will be awarded the contract to build the country’s first nuclear power plant. According to earlier announcements, the Kazakh Atomic Energy Agency is expected to make its decision by the end of the month. Bidders from South Korea, France, Russia, and China remain in contention, although recent expert commentary suggests that earlier assumptions favoring Russia’s Rosatom may no longer hold. Competing Interests Beneath the Surface In Kazakhstan, there appears to be an internal struggle between two strategic camps with opposing visions for the project’s future. Each faction has its own backers, deeply embedded in the country’s nuclear ambitions. One group, primarily composed of financial officials and economic policymakers, is advocating for the least expensive option. Their preferred bidder is China's China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), which is offering the lowest project cost, backed by Chinese bank financing. This group is influenced not only by CNNC’s competitive pricing but also by China’s broader economic leverage over Kazakhstan. The second group consists of nuclear professionals, scientists, engineers, and technicians, who prioritize reliability and operational familiarity. Their preference leans toward Rosatom, given Russia’s historical involvement and established presence in Kazakhstan’s nuclear sector. This technical camp is widely viewed as a de facto ally of the Kremlin, as Rosatom’s participation would extend Moscow’s long-term strategic influence in Central Asia. Given the 50-60-year operational lifespan of such reactors, this influence would be enduring. Though this tension remains speculative, patterns observed over the past decade suggest a real and ongoing tug-of-war. No Thermal Power, No Nuclear Power? At the end of May, media in Kazakhstan reported that Russia might not fulfill its commitments under a 2023 memorandum signed during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Astana. The agreement with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev concerned the construction of three coal-fired thermal power plants (TPPs) in Kokshetau, Semey, and Ust-Kamenogorsk, with Russian energy giant Inter RAO designated as the turnkey builder. The total cost was estimated at $2.8 billion. However, in April 2024, First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar acknowledged financial hurdles. While design and preliminary work continue, difficulties remain in subsidizing equipment interest rates. Sklyar noted that a change in investor may be considered, and the situation could be resolved within a month. Oil and gas expert Olzhas Baidildinov has speculated that the nuclear power plant project may be bundled with the thermal plants as a “social burden”, a condition that CNNC might accept more readily than Rosatom. “If CNNC is chosen to build the nuclear power plant, the thermal plants could follow as part of the package,” Baidildinov suggested via his Telegram channel. Sergey Agafonov, head of the Kazakhstan Association of Energy Supply Organizations, also sees the nuclear and thermal plant projects as interconnected, particularly with regard to financing. Debunking the Price Myth The technical community has responded swiftly to growing narratives about CNNC's supposedly unbeatable offer to construct the nuclear plant for $5.5 billion, a claim spread via Chinese sources. Nuclear...

President Tokayev: Kazakhstan Charts Its Own Course

In a rare, candid interview with Al Jazeera, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan projected a steady, pragmatic vision for his country’s future, portraying it as a stabilizing force amid turbulent global currents. Tokayev explained how his government is navigating complex pressures at home and abroad, from economic modernization and digital transformation to balancing ties with Russia, China, Europe, and the United States. The message was one of controlled ambition: Kazakhstan will not be rushed, but rather steer a measured course of reform and integration, balancing domestic stability with global engagement. Tokayev opened the interview by acknowledging the obstacles facing Kazakhstan’s domestic reforms, notably the global pandemic and the war in Ukraine. These external shocks, he explained, have tested the country’s resilience and delayed the delivery of the “New Kazakhstan” that he promised three years ago. Yet he remained firm in his commitment to a gradual but determined path forward. “We must be frank, we must be pragmatic, but at the same time we need to be very much bold,” he said. Domestically, Tokayev defended his record on political reform, including the legalization of opposition parties and the introduction of a one-term presidency of seven years. “I have already announced that I will step down” in 2029, he said, adding that this was “a demand of my people.” This latter move is unprecedented in the region. Tokayev characterized Kazakhstan’s laws as “quite democratic,” dismissing criticisms from organizations like the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and Human Rights Watch as biased and detached from the country’s political and historical context. "I don't believe that we should follow recommendations of human rights organizations nowadays," he said, also mentioning foreign funders behind certain NGOs, which he left unnamed. Acknowledging the need for further reforms, particularly in media freedom and civil liberties, Tokayev made clear that stability remains the overriding priority. “Without stability, there will be no reforms, no modernization, no transformation of our society,” he said. Tokayev emphasized Kazakhstan's commitment to a “law and order” strategy to promote greater stability, where the laws fully comply with international standards. Tokayev's remarks on measured progress typify his leadership style, which admits the complexity of transformation while setting pragmatic goals. His program of a “fair and just Kazakhstan” reflects his awareness of domestic discontent with wealth disparities that simmer beneath the surface of economic expansion. The country's economy remains dominated by hydrocarbon fuels, which account for over half of exports. Tokayev’s vision of transforming Kazakhstan into a “non-hydrocarbon country” by 2060 strikes a pragmatic note. “Coal in our domestic energy balance accounts for 73%. We cannot give up coal just overnight,” he said, signaling both realism and the limits of immediate energy transition. The diversification of transport routes — including the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (the Middle Corridor) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline — aligns with his goal of mitigating overdependence on Russia and ensuring economic security amid global uncertainty. Tokayev’s foreign policy strikes a careful balance between continuity and adaptation. While acknowledging Kazakhstan’s reliance on...

Baikonur Fallout: Russia’s Cosmic Legacy Leaves Scars on Kazakhstan

“Every time there’s a rocket launch at Baikonur, you can’t see for days. The sand comes up off the ground, and doesn’t shift for a good while,” a waiter in Aralsk, a one-time fishing town on what was once the shore of the shriveled Aral Sea told The Times of Central Asia. Upon entering Baikonur, Russia’s gateway to outer space on the Kazakh steppe, the first thing you see is a billboard proudly displaying Vladimir Putin shaking hands with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Beneath the façade, however, Russia’s presence here has spurred major economic inequalities and environmental degradation. Backwater to the Cosmos [caption id="attachment_32232" align="aligncenter" width="1512"] "Here on January 12, 1955, the first group of military engineers arrived, who laid the foundation for the creation of Baikonur Cosmodrome;” image: Thomas Hodgson[/caption] Stepping off the train at Töretam, the closest town to Baikonur proper, there is very little sense of occasion to be found. The only reference to the existence of rockets in the immediate vicinity is a tucked-away, red-starred plaque on the platform bearing the inscription: “Here on January 12, 1955, the first group of military engineers arrived, who laid the foundation for the creation of Baikonur Cosmodrome.” In 1961, Yuri Gagarin launched from Baikonur to become the first human being in outer space, propelling the complex’s status in history from an obscure backwater to a legendary, top-secret star city. ​In reality, “Baikonur” was a decoy name given by the Soviets to a town 300 kilometers away from the real launch site at Leninsk. Western newspapers reinforced the false story, and Baikonur entered the global popular consciousness. Kazakhstan’s government chose to sell the myth, finally renaming the actual cosmodrome settlement from Leninsk to Baikonur in 1995. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia found overnight that its primary spaceport was in a foreign power’s possession. By 1994, Moscow struck a deal with the nascent Kazakh Republic to lease Baikonur at a rate of 7 billion rubles per year ($110 million). As of 2024, the Kazakh state has pulled in over $3 billion in revenue from the scheme. Living in the Shadow of Russia [caption id="attachment_32233" align="aligncenter" width="1512"] Image: Thomas Hodgson[/caption] The extent of Russia’s grip over the area, even outside of the “ring,” is clear in all aspects of daily life. In nearly every shop in Töretam, the ruble is accepted alongside the Kazakh tenge. This poses problems for the local economy, with the circulation of rubles effectively pricing out anyone who doesn’t receive a ruble salary from jobs in Baikonur itself. The Russian language is likewise used in tandem with Kazakh, even though the surrounding Kyzylorda region is less than 2% ethnically Russian and, by all appearances, overwhelmingly favors Kazakh. Poverty is widespread here, juxtaposed markedly with the hordes of affluent “space tourists” from around the world who head through Töretam into the “ring” every day. Tour agencies charge upwards of $1,000 per day for access to Baikonur, yet reinvestment in communities surrounding the “ring” seems non-existent,...

A Resolution to Kyrgyzstan’s Last Border Problem?

In April, Kyrgyzstan signed a border delimitation agreement with southern neighbor Tajikistan, ending a long-running and at times violent feud along the two countries’ frontier. Now Kyrgyzstan is taking steps to resolve its border disagreements with its northern neighbor Kazakhstan. The Joint Project Representatives from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan met in Bishkek on May 22 to discuss the impending construction of an industrial transport-logistics complex on their border. Kazakhstan is building similar complexes along its borders with other neighboring countries (China, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan). The idea for the Kazakh-Kyrgyz facility was approved in May 2024, and work is scheduled to start next year. Economically, it is not a huge project, but symbolically, it could be a breakthrough ending years of aggravation connected to the country’s border crossings. The aim of the complex is “to jointly produce, store and sell medicines, textiles, as well as dairy, meat, and vegetable products.” In itself, the venture is laudable, but the location of the complex is what is interesting. This trade and logistics complex will occupy 3.6 square kilometers of territory in Kazakhstan and 4 square kilometers in Kyrgyzstan at a place not far from the Ak-Tilek (Kyrgyzstan) - Karasu (Kazakhstan) border crossing. Kyrgyzstan’s Ak-Tilek and the other four border crossings with Kazakhstan have been in the news for more than seven years due to long lines of trucks on the Kyrgyz side waiting to cross into Kazakhstan. This has become a sore point in what have usually been good relations between the two countries. The Legacy of Almazbek Atambayev Ever since the Soviet Union disintegrated in late 1991 and the five Central Asian states became independent, relations between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been the best among any two states in Central Asia. This was evident along their border, which compared to the others among the Central Asian states remained lightly guarded and relatively easy to cross. That changed in autumn 2017, due to an incident that was unrelated to the actual Kazakh-Kyrgyz border. Kyrgyzstan was preparing for a presidential election scheduled for October 15, 2017. The president at the time, Almazbek Atambayev, was leaving office, in accordance with the country’s constitution that permitted a president only a single term. Atambayev had picked a successor, Sooronbai Jeenbekov. The leading opponent was popular businessman Omurbek Babanov, who was polling ahead of Jeenbekov in the run-up to the election. In mid-September, Babanov visited Kazakhstan and met with then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Atambayev was furious. On October 7, he said that the “Kazakh authorities want to force their candidate on us.” Atambayev criticized the way Kazakhstan spent revenue, hinting that average Kazakh citizens did not seem to enjoy the fruits of the vast wealth of the country. On October 10, without warning, Kazakhstan closed its crossing points to traffic from Kyrgyzstan. Later, Kazakhstan’s security service said the restrictions were part of a planned border operation and claimed to have registered 112 violations in less than 48 hours. As the line of trucks grew on the Kyrgyz side of...