Kazakhstan Featurees - The Times Of Central Asia

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Bilateral Trade

West2West: Kazakhstan Adds a Regional Dimension to Trade with Afghanistan

In late September, a Kazakhstani official and business delegation led by Yerkin Tukumov, the Special Representative of the President of Kazakhstan for Afghanistan, visited Herat. The delegation included trade officials, representatives of the Mangystau and West Kazakhstan regions, and businesses. Officials called the new approach West2West, meaning cooperation between Kazakhstan's western regions and western Afghanistan. Kazakhstan and Afghanistan have held several business forums and exhibitions in recent years. However, the choice of Herat and the attempt to shift some cooperation from the intergovernmental to the interregional level make this initiative different. Since 2021, Kazakhstan’s economic dialogue with Afghanistan has developed mainly from the top down. The two governments set ambitious trade targets and sought to turn political engagement into commercial deals. The results looked impressive on paper. In October 2024, the two countries adopted a road map to raise mutual trade to $3 billion. In April 2025, documents worth $140 million were signed in Kabul, followed by 15 documents worth $303 million in Shymkent that October. Actual trade, however, grew much more slowly. In 2024, it totaled $545.2 million, while in 2025 it slipped slightly to $541.6 million. The $3 billion target remains more of a strategic benchmark than a near-term goal. According to official data from Kazakhstan, trade reached $581.1 million in January-July 2026, exceeding the total for the entire previous year. Kazakhstan’s exports accounted for $572.9 million, while imports from Afghanistan were just $8.2 million. Trade is therefore growing rapidly, but remains overwhelmingly one-sided. West2West is partly an attempt to broaden that relationship. Herat's Strategic Location Herat is one of Afghanistan’s main industrial and commercial centers, situated near several important transport routes. To the north is Torghundi, a rail border crossing with Turkmenistan. To the west runs the Khaf-Herat railway, which connects Afghanistan to Iran’s railway system. Herat could eventually become part of longer routes toward Kandahar and Pakistan, although much of the necessary infrastructure remains at the planning stage. During the September visit, officials opened a 43-kilometer section of the Khaf-Herat railway. Afghan sources estimate its cost at approximately $58 million. The section was built with the involvement of Kazakhstani company Integra Construction KZ. In August 2026, freight transported along the Khaf-Herat line totaled approximately 137,700 metric tons. Discussions have also focused on increasing its monthly capacity to 150,000 metric tons. Together with Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan has begun working on the Central Asia–South Asia railway project, which envisages a trans-Afghan connection to Pakistan’s ports. So far, the parties have agreed to conduct technical and economic studies, and no final route has been approved. The route through Turkmenistan is developing separately. Ashgabat views Torghundi-Herat as a joint project with Afghanistan linked to the expansion of the Serhetabat-Torghundi crossing and other infrastructure in western Afghanistan. Kazakhstan’s interest in Herat predates West2West. In 2023, Astana announced plans to establish a Kazakhstan Trade House in Afghanistan, with its main office in Herat. It opened in May 2024. Arman Yessentayev, its head, described Herat in 2023 as a...

Book Launch

Farewell to Russia: An Interview with Joe Luc Barnes on Central Asia’s Changing Role

In Moscow, before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Joe Luc Barnes met residents who distrusted their government but believed its assurances that war was not coming. The shock that followed opens his book, Farewell to Russia: A Journey Through the Former USSR. Barnes, a journalist, editor and contributor to The Times of Central Asia, has visited all 15 former Soviet republics since February 2022. His book explores how people have built their lives since independence, and how deeply Russia remains woven into them. Speaking to TCA, Barnes recalls meeting rural residents in Central Asia who were more supportive of Russia than their urban, Russian-speaking counterparts. He also reflects on why Russia remains a destination for young people seeking opportunities, despite the discrimination many face there. TCA: At the start of the book, you describe Muscovites’ conviction that Russia would not invade Ukraine. What sustained that certainty, and how did people respond when events shattered it? Joe Luc Barnes: I think it was mainly down to people not wanting to believe it. The amazing thing is that Muscovites (and Russians at large, in my experience) are fully aware that their government is full of crooks whom they wouldn’t trust with anything, but simultaneously most of them are in lockstep with the Kremlin’s foreign policy position. The war started just as Russia was trying to get the country vaccinated against Covid. In the end, the government struggled to persuade even 50% of people to have a single dose of the vaccine, but meanwhile those same people were sure the Kremlin was telling the truth when it said that its soldiers were massing on Ukraine’s borders as part of “routine exercises”. When the war did begin and that illusion collapsed, the main reaction was shock. For the first few days, there was a kind of numbness over the city. Many people had friends or relatives in Ukraine; others were stunned that something they had been denying had actually come to pass. Many in their 20s or 30s were disgusted with their government and began to look for a way out of the country. But people were generally focused on looking after themselves – worrying about things like finances, getting money out of their bank accounts, things like that. I think there was also a belief among many that it would be a short war. When I left Russia in March 2022, I don’t think I, or anyone around me, expected the war to still be raging four and a half years later. [caption id="attachment_58058" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Lenin still stands in Bishkek, though not on his original plinth. Image: Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] TCA: Your title suggests a departure from Russia. Where in Central Asia did that feel most real, and where did everyday life complicate the idea? Joe Luc Barnes: I think in urban Central Asia, you can often feel like you’re in a Russian city. People speak Russian, you get around using Yandex Taxi, your mobile provider is Beeline, and architecturally you still...

Espionage

German Spy Scandal Puts Central Asian and Caucasus Espionage Cases in Focus

The arrest of former German intelligence chief August Hanning has drawn attention to Azerbaijan. German journalists reported that he allegedly had contacts with Azerbaijan's intelligence service. Baku rejected the allegations, while German prosecutors have not confirmed any Azerbaijani involvement. In recent years, citizens of Central Asia and the South Caucasus have repeatedly been implicated in espionage and treason cases. The accused and suspects include former intelligence chiefs, military personnel, officials, scientists, and foreign nationals. Some have received lengthy prison sentences, while others remain under investigation. In many cases, information about alleged foreign intelligence connections is limited to media reports. German Scandal and Ties to Baku On October 6, 2026, the German authorities detained 80-year-old August Hanning, who headed the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) from 1998 to 2005. Former BND employee Manfred D. was also taken into custody. Hanning is suspected of attempted treason, obtaining state secrets, and acting on behalf of a foreign intelligence service. Manfred D. is suspected of assisting in the alleged offenses. Both were placed in pretrial detention on October 7. According to federal prosecutors, in the spring of 2010, Hanning reached an agreement with his former subordinate to obtain intelligence documents in exchange for money. By June 2022, Manfred D. had allegedly provided him with approximately 2,000 documents, including classified materials. By then, Hanning was working as a private consultant and, investigators believe, used the information for commercial purposes. According to German media reports, the documents included materials on Iran's nuclear program, Russia's armed forces, and information received from partner intelligence agencies. Investigators also allege that Hanning prepared an analytical memorandum for an officer of a foreign intelligence service. It remains unknown whether the intended recipient received it. Der Spiegel reported alleged contacts between Hanning and a representative of Azerbaijani intelligence. The investigative outlet CORRECTIV examined his longstanding ties to Baku, including his participation in the German-Azerbaijani Forum. German prosecutors have not identified the foreign intelligence service involved in the investigation. Azerbaijan rejected reports of its involvement and warned of damage to relations with Berlin. An Azerbaijani official also claimed that German intelligence representatives had assured Baku that the investigation was unrelated to Azerbaijan, although this has not been publicly confirmed by the German authorities. The classified documents were discovered during a separate investigation. In September 2025, police searched Hanning's premises in connection with the alleged abduction of the children of German businesswoman Christina Block from Denmark. The discovery led to a separate criminal investigation opened in May 2026. Hanning's lawyer acknowledged that his client possessed confidential documents, but rejected allegations he had passed on information to Germany's detriment or received payment for doing so. Kazakhstan’s Espionage and State Secrets Cases In Kazakhstan, one of the best-known treason cases of recent times involved the prosecution of China expert Konstantin Syroyezhkin, who worked for many years at the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the president. Syroyezhkin was detained in February 2019 and sentenced to ten years in prison in October. The trial was held behind closed...

Migrants in Russia

They Went to Russia for Work and Ended Up at War: How Central Asians Enter the Russian Military

Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. Relatives of other young Kazakh men say they had taken jobs at a sausage factory and a poultry farm. But according to reports aired in early October on Kazakhstan’s KTK television channel, the men later ended up in or near the combat zone in Ukraine. Some appeared in videos wearing Russian military uniforms and asked Kazakhstan to help bring them home. On October 7, relatives of Kazakh citizens who had reportedly ended up in Russia’s military visited the Foreign Ministry in Astana to seek help bringing them home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied the families, said his list had grown from eight to 21 people as more relatives contacted him. The same day, ministry spokesperson Zhanbolat Ussenov said officials were checking appeals and would send Russia a list of citizens after verification. Negotiations over their return were underway, he said. Exactly how the men ended up in the Russian military remains unclear. One family said their relative had already been wounded, while KTK reported that the circumstances surrounding the signing of the military contracts have not been independently established. For now, much of what is known comes from the men themselves and their relatives. Their stories raise a broader question that neither Moscow nor the capitals of Central Asia have fully answered: how many people from the region have ended up in the Russian military, and under what circumstances did they get there? Nearly 13,000, According to a Ukrainian Database Russia does not publish comprehensive statistics on foreign contract soldiers. Central Asian governments have only fragmented data from criminal cases, consular appeals, and reports from relatives. The most detailed country-by-country breakdown comes from the Ukrainian government project I Want to Live. By May 2026, the project said it had identified 12,919 citizens of the five Central Asian states who had signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense: 4,955 citizens of Uzbekistan, 3,489 of Tajikistan, 2,420 of Kazakhstan, 1,474 of Kyrgyzstan, and 581 of Turkmenistan. These figures cannot be regarded as complete or independently verified. I Want to Live operates within Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and Ukraine is a party to the war. In addition, 12,919 is a cumulative figure, not the number of Central Asians currently at the front. Some may have been killed or captured, completed their service, returned home, or obtained Russian citizenship. Another major estimate comes from the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Truth Hounds, and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law. Their report estimates that Russia recruited at least 27,000 foreign nationals from more than 130 countries after February 2022. More than 10,000 of them, according to the study, came from Central Asia. The study is based on open sources, consultations with Ukrainian authorities and experts, and interviews with 16 prisoners of war and former Russian servicemen. There are no comparable publicly available Russian statistics, meaning it is impossible to...

U.S.-Central Asia Engagement

Central Asia Looks to a Possible Trump Visit

U.S. President Donald Trump has expressed an interest in visiting Uzbekistan, according to one of his special envoys, raising the possibility that Central Asia could eventually receive its first visit by a sitting American president. Paolo Zampolli, Trump’s Special Envoy for Global Partnerships and long-time Trump associate, made the comment in an interview with Uzbekistan 24 while visiting the country. “I know that he wants to come to Uzbekistan,” Zampolli said, adding that Trump had personally told him he wanted to make the trip. Zampolli said he was encouraging the idea, but gave no timetable, and there has been no announcement that a visit is being scheduled. Trump had already publicly indicated that he may visit Kazakhstan. Asked during the November 2025 C5+1 summit if he might become the first U.S. president to visit the country, Trump replied, “I think it’s very possible that we’ll do that.” The comments come as U.S. engagement with Central Asia is accelerating. Trump hosted all five Central Asian presidents at the White House in November 2025. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has invited him to Kazakhstan, while Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has also invited him to Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio is reported to be planning a mid-October visit to Samarkand for a C5+1 ministerial, with a delegation expected to include representatives of more than 100 U.S. companies. Sergio Gor, Trump’s Special Envoy for South and Central Asia, has also been involved in Washington’s engagement across the region. In Uzbekistan, he co-chairs the American-Uzbek Business and Investment Council with Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of the presidential administration. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan bring different economic and strategic profiles to Washington’s expanding engagement with Central Asia. Why Kazakhstan Matters Kazakhstan is Central Asia’s largest economy. Its GDP reached about $306 billion in 2025, accounting for more than half of the combined economy of the five Central Asian states. Its share of accumulated foreign investment is even larger, with Kazakhstan holding roughly two-thirds of the region’s inward FDI stock, according to The Times of Central Asia’s Central Asia Balance Sheet. Its strategic importance extends beyond those measures. Kazakhstan produces close to 40% of the world’s uranium and is a major oil producer and exporter, supplying primarily European markets. It also holds substantial critical mineral resources and occupies a central position on the Middle Corridor connecting China and Europe. Recent U.S.-Kazakh commercial agreements include several large transactions. Wabtec has a $4.2 billion locomotive agreement, while Tau-Ken Samruk and Cove Capital have signed transaction documents for at least $1.1 billion in tungsten development. Other agreements cover agricultural machinery, air-traffic management, and additional Boeing aircraft. Kazakhstan also has a distinct diplomatic role in Trump’s engagement with the Muslim world. In November 2025, Kazakhstan joined the Abraham Accords, becoming the first Central Asian and first non-Arab Muslim-majority country to join the framework. Why Uzbekistan Matters With about 39 million people, Uzbekistan is the most populous country in Central Asia. It is also the only state that borders all four of the other...

Asset Recovery

Kazakhstan Ratifies European Legal Assistance Convention as Asset Recovery Push Expands

Kazakhstan has ratified the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, in a step that could strengthen a long-running effort to obtain evidence and pursue assets held across foreign jurisdictions. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed the ratification law on October 6. The 1959 Council of Europe convention requires participating states to assist in criminal cases, including gathering evidence, transmitting records, serving judicial documents, and executing certain search and seizure requests. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers invited Kazakhstan to join on June 18, 2025. Kazakh prosecutors have said accession would provide a common legal channel with European states where no bilateral agreement exists. Deputy Prosecutor General Galymzhan Koigeldiyev told lawmakers that Kazakhstan had been pursuing accession since 2001. Kazakhstan’s Kurultai approved the ratification law on September 23. Search and seizure requests can be carried out only when the conduct is an offense in both countries and is punishable under Kazakh law. The Supreme Court will handle requests concerning cases already before the courts, while the Prosecutor General’s Office will handle other requests. Under Council of Europe rules for non-member states, Kazakhstan must deposit its instrument of accession with the Council of Europe Secretary General. Accession then takes effect 90 days later. The effort to recover wealth from abroad predates Tokayev’s current campaign by many years. The clearest example is former BTA Bank chairman Mukhtar Ablyazov. After BTA was nationalized in 2009, the bank pursued him through the English courts in a sprawling series of asset recovery cases. The UK Supreme Court later recorded default judgments totaling about $4.6 billion amid allegations that Ablyazov concealed assets through a network of companies. In one of the English proceedings, Lord Justice Maurice Kay said: “It is difficult to imagine a party to commercial litigation who has acted with more cynicism, opportunism and deviousness towards court orders than Mr Ablyazov.” Ablyazov has denied the allegations and has long maintained that the cases against him are politically motivated. The litigation has spread across jurisdictions and family networks. BTA later pursued Ablyazov’s son-in-law, Ilyas Khrapunov, alleging he helped dissipate and conceal assets despite worldwide freezing orders. Khrapunov is the son of former Almaty mayor Viktor Khrapunov, who has also faced claims over allegedly misappropriated city property. The Times of Central Asia previously detailed how funds linked to the cases moved through shell companies and foreign property deals. Viktor Khrapunov has also rejected the accusations as politically motivated. Those disputes continued in the United States. In 2024, a New York jury awarded BTA Bank and the city of Almaty more than $32 million in litigation over money and property linked to the wider case. The need to pursue separate cases in Britain, Switzerland, the U.S., and elsewhere highlights a recurring problem: a Kazakh investigation or judgment does not automatically provide access to evidence or assets held overseas. Following the unrest of January 2022, Tokayev made asset recovery a more formal part of state policy. Kazakhstan adopted its asset recovery law in 2023, giving the Prosecutor General’s...