Kazakhstan - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 3597

Green Hydrogen

South Korea’s YPP Considers $2 Billion Green Ammonia Project in Kazakhstan

South Korea’s YPP Corporation is considering building a green hydrogen and ammonia complex in the East Kazakhstan Region at an estimated cost of $2 billion. The project, outlined in a memorandum signed during President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to South Korea, could produce up to 55,000 metric tons of green hydrogen or 310,000 metric tons of green ammonia annually. Green ammonia is made by combining nitrogen with hydrogen produced using renewable electricity. Most ammonia is currently used to make fertilizer, but it is also being developed as a low-carbon fuel and as a way of transporting hydrogen, which is more difficult and expensive to move over long distances in its pure form. For South Korea, which depends heavily on imported energy, ammonia is part of a wider effort to reduce emissions from power generation and industry. Its latest electricity plan envisages clean hydrogen and ammonia supplying 6.2% of electricity generation by 2038. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy, the regional authorities, and YPP signed a memorandum covering cooperation on the Green Energy Complex project. It envisages around 1 GW of renewable generation, including wind and solar power. The Ministry of Energy says the project would proceed if it proves economically viable. YPP, a South Korean energy engineering company, signed a framework agreement with Kazakh Invest to develop the Green Energy Complex in July 2025. The project was initially conceived on a larger scale. A 2025 proposal envisaged investment of up to $3.1 billion and 2 GW of renewable power, with annual hydrogen production of as much as 75,000 metric tons. Under the latest version, the estimated cost is about $2 billion, with renewable capacity of around 1 GW. Hydrogen production is now projected at up to 55,000 metric tons a year, while planned ammonia production remains unchanged at up to 310,000 metric tons. Kazakhstan has some obvious attractions for such a project: ample space for large renewable-energy developments and an established industrial base. East Kazakhstan is one of the country’s main metallurgical and power-producing regions. It also contains a significant share of Kazakhstan’s water resources, an important consideration because producing green hydrogen by electrolysis requires both electricity and water. The harder question is whether Kazakhstan can turn those advantages into ammonia that is competitive on international markets. Green ammonia remains substantially more expensive to produce than conventional ammonia. The International Energy Agency estimated in 2025 that ammonia made using electrolysis cost about three times as much on average before policy support and carbon pricing were taken into account. Competition for Asian buyers is also growing. Samsung C&T, which was named in 2025 as a potential buyer for the project in Kazakhstan, signed a binding 15-year agreement with India’s Reliance Industries in March 2026 for green ammonia produced in India. The deal is worth more than $3 billion, with supplies due to begin in the second half of fiscal year 2029. Kazakhstan also faces a geographical disadvantage. The country is landlocked, and ammonia produced in East Kazakhstan for South Korea or other overseas markets...

Jewelry Industry

Kazakhstan’s Jewelry Market Faces New Rules on Gold and Hallmarking

Kazakhstan produces and exports billions of dollars’ worth of gold, yet officially recorded domestic jewelry production amounted to just $7.2 million in 2025. The government now plans to tackle the gray areas of the market, from the origin of gold used by workshops to scrap from pawnshops and mandatory hallmarking of jewelry. According to the Ministry of Industry and Construction, the domestic jewelry market was worth about $168 million last year, up 3.4% from 2024. But market participants say that a significant share of trade in precious metals and jewelry remains outside the formal economy. The contrast is particularly striking given Kazakhstan’s position as a major gold producer and exporter. According to international trade statistics for 2025, Switzerland imported more than $1.1 billion worth of unwrought and semi-manufactured gold from Kazakhstan, the United Kingdom about $561 million, and Azerbaijan about $262 million. Together, those three destinations alone accounted for nearly $2 billion. Kazakhstan’s own reported export figures under the same trade category were considerably lower, highlighting a substantial discrepancy between the two sets of customs data. The path gold takes from extraction to a local jewelry workshop remains one of the industry’s weak points. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin said jewelers need a legal and affordable source of raw material. “We have major jewelry centers, and it is important to preserve this heritage and bring as much of the industry as possible into the legal economy,” Zhumangarin said, citing the importance of giving jewelers access to legally sourced gold. Pawnshops are another part of the gray market. In 2025, they sent about 3.2 metric tons of precious-metal scrap and waste to Tau-Ken Altyn for processing, down from 3.8 tons a year earlier. Tau-Ken Altyn operates a major precious-metals refinery in Astana. Refining involves purifying mined or recycled metal to a high degree of purity. The government is now considering requiring jewelry scrap and waste to be transferred to refiners. The authorities also want to revise the rules governing its acceptance and subsequent sale. The exact size of the shadow market is unknown. In 2024, Kaysar Zhumagaliyev, head of Kazakhstan’s League of Jewelers, said as much as 99% of the market was operating in the shadows. The association estimated the gray market at approximately $850 million to $960 million a year, using the average exchange rate for 2024. Zhumagaliyev linked it to underground workshops, smuggling, and gold purchases outside official channels. The government’s latest figures offer a more cautious picture, but they clearly illustrate the gap between registered businesses and the control system. In 2024, only 45 market participants submitted jewelry for mandatory hallmarking. In 2025, that number rose to 959. Tax authorities count 3,520 taxpayers working with jewelry, meaning that about 27% of them submitted products for mandatory hallmarking last year. A hallmark certifies the fineness of the precious metal and indicates that a piece has passed through the legal control system. The procedure therefore provides the authorities with one of the few measurable indicators...

Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s Regional Ties Grow as Global Reintegration Stalls

For Central Asia, Afghanistan is both a source of risk and a potential route south. Governments across the region increasingly see a more stable Afghanistan as a way to open new markets and expand economic links with South Asia. Afghanistan is a direct neighbor of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The geography is different for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but their political and economic interests are no less significant. Many long-term plans for expanding Central Asia’s connections to the south depend in part on Afghanistan’s future and the role it can play in the regional economy. At the UN Security Council’s September 16, 2026, meeting on Afghanistan, Kazakhstan set out a position that may reflect a wider Central Asian view. Astana argued that engagement with Afghanistan’s current authorities should not be equated with recognition and that isolation could not offer a sustainable solution. Astana proposes moving past the current focus on humanitarian aid. In Kazakhstan’s view, the next phase of international engagement should gradually move Afghanistan from dependence on humanitarian aid toward economic self-reliance through job creation, private-sector development, the restoration of financial channels, and expanded trade and investment. The statement also calls for Afghanistan’s integration into the regional economy. Kazakhstan’s representative specifically discussed connections between Central and South Asia, Kazakh-Afghan business ties, trade houses in Herat and Kabul, and the new UN Regional Centre for the Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty. Astana also expressed concern about restrictions affecting Afghan women and girls. Georgette Gagnon, the UN secretary-general’s deputy special representative for Afghanistan, delivered the main briefing. Five years after the Taliban’s return to power, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) assesses that the de facto authorities face no significant armed or political threat to their control, although risks to long-term stability are accumulating and largely stem from their own policies. UNAMA therefore distinguishes between the Taliban’s control of the country and its prospects for long-term stability. UNAMA views the Doha process as the main multilateral framework for Afghanistan’s gradual reintegration into the international community. It links progress to women’s rights and inclusive governance, along with the fulfillment of counterterrorism commitments. The mission also notes that Kabul prefers bilateral relations to multilateral engagement. Russia and China focused on pragmatic engagement and economic recovery, stressing the need to avoid isolation. China also urged Kabul to step up its efforts against terrorist groups and lift restrictions preventing Afghan women employed by the UN from doing their jobs. Russia called for dialogue without pressure and for steps toward Afghanistan’s international reintegration without preconditions. Afghanistan’s economic ties with some regional partners are expanding while its political normalization at the global level remains unresolved. Kazakhstan’s position illustrates this divide. It allows for engagement without accepting the existing order as permanent or waiting for isolation to change it. Future international discussions on Afghanistan will have to address this tension.

Almaty Museum of Arts

Almaty Museum of Arts Begins Centre Pompidou Partnership With The Clock

A year after opening, Almaty Museum of Arts (ALMA) has brought one of contemporary art’s best-known works to Kazakhstan: Christian Marclay’s The Clock, a 24-hour artwork assembled from thousands of film and television clips. The installation, jointly owned by Centre Pompidou, Tate, and the Israel Museum, marks the beginning of a long-term partnership between the Almaty museum and its Paris counterpart. The Clock opened to the public on September 12 and will run through October 12. The work is being shown in Central Asia for the first time. Marclay created it in 2010 from thousands of fragments of films and television programs showing clocks or referring to time. Together, they form exactly 24 hours of screen time synchronized with the real world. If a visitor watches The Clock in Almaty at 3:42 p.m., it is also 3:42 p.m. on screen. In 2011, the work won the Golden Lion at the Venice Biennale. A year later, it was jointly acquired by Centre Pompidou, Tate in London, and the Israel Museum in Jerusalem. The Clock has since been shown at major museums around the world. Four 24-hour screenings are scheduled in Almaty, on September 19 and 26, and October 3 and 10. “Cooperation with Centre Pompidou is not a one-off event, but the beginning of a long story,” museum founder Nurlan Smagulov said in the museum’s announcement of the exhibition. ALMA opened on September 12, 2025. At its core is Smagulov’s collection of more than 700 works of modern Kazakh art, assembled over the past three decades. It includes works by Salikhitdin Aitbayev, Sergey Kalmykov, Yerbossyn Meldibekov, and other leading Kazakh and Kazakhstan-based artists. According to the museum, more than 460,000 people visited ALMA during its first year. The museum staged four major exhibition projects, including a solo exhibition by video art pioneer Bill Viola. For its first anniversary, it opened Müsinder, an exhibition spanning seven decades of Kazakh sculpture. More than 110 other events included lectures, discussions, concerts, and film screenings. The museum also published three books. The arrival of The Clock marks a new stage in the young museum’s international ambitions. Centre Pompidou has been expanding its presence beyond Paris for more than a decade. Its Paris building is closed for renovation until 2030, giving added scope to its international exhibition program. Málaga opened in 2015, and a project in Shanghai followed in 2019. Centre Pompidou Hanwha opened in Seoul in June 2026, while KANAL–Centre Pompidou is due to open in Brussels in November. Another site is planned for Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil, in 2028. The model varies between locations, with Centre Pompidou providing works from its collection, expertise, and jointly developed programs rather than simply reproducing its Paris museum abroad. Almaty is pursuing a different model again. There will be no Pompidou branch here: ALMA remains an independent private museum. For now, the partnership can be seen quite literally – in a darkened gallery where Marclay’s screen keeps Almaty time. The museum says its international network will expand again...

Oil Production

Karachaganak Maintenance to Cut Kazakhstan’s Oil Output by Up to 450,000 Tons

Karachaganak, one of Kazakhstan’s three largest oil and gas fields, entered planned maintenance on September 7, a shutdown expected to reduce the country’s oil and gas condensate output by 400,000–450,000 metric tons before work ends on October 1. The interruption comes in a year when the government has already lowered its national production forecast following repeated disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the main export route for Kazakhstan’s oil. In August, Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said Kazakhstan had lowered its 2026 oil production target from 98 million to 96 million metric tons. He put production losses from attacks on CPC infrastructure in January, June, and July at about 3.5 million metric tons. CPC loadings rebounded by 22% in August after July’s disruptions, reaching around 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd). CPC exports are expected to fall to about 1.5 million bpd in September, partly because of the Karachaganak maintenance. More than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports move through CPC. The July shutdown at the Black Sea terminal showed how quickly an export disruption can force production cuts at fields far inland. On July 22, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate output fell by about 21%, while output at Tengiz dropped 56%, from roughly 925,000 to 406,000 bpd. Karachaganak also depends on Russian processing infrastructure. Raw gas from the field is sent to Russia’s Orenburg gas processing plant. In June, Karachaganak reduced production after an incident at the plant sharply curtailed its intake of gas from the field. Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. (KPO), the field’s operator, is expanding its gas reinjection capacity. The process returns some of the produced gas to the reservoir, helping to maintain pressure and sustain oil and gas condensate output. A fifth gas reinjection compressor began operating in 2024. In June 2026, KPO announced that the KEP-1B project, which includes a sixth compressor, had begun reinjecting gas ahead of schedule. The Energy Ministry has said the two compressors would help maintain Karachaganak’s liquid hydrocarbon production at around 11–12 million metric tons a year. Following the expansion of Tengiz, Kazakhstan had expected national oil production to approach 100 million metric tons a year. Its production capacity has increased, but the events of 2026 have exposed the limits of the infrastructure used to move that oil to market. In May, Akkenzhenov said there was no full-scale alternative to CPC. Some oil can be rerouted across the Caspian into the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline or east to China, but these routes cannot absorb CPC-scale volumes. CPC can carry up to 72.5 million metric tons a year from Kazakhstan. Whether or not the maintenance reduction was already incorporated into the revised forecast, Kazakhstan has little room for further disruption to the export and processing infrastructure on which its production depends.

Central Asia-South Korea Summit 2026

From Critical Minerals to Connectivity: South Korea’s Stakes in Central Asia

On September 16, Seoul hosted the first Korea–Central Asia Summit, bringing President Lee Jae Myung together with the heads of all five Central Asian states. The meeting elevated a dialogue that has run at a ministerial level since 2007 to the level of heads of state. The leaders adopted a Seoul Declaration setting the terms for future engagement and agreed to hold summits every two years. On September 14, trade and industry ministers from South Korea and the five Central Asian states met in Seoul for the first C5+Korea Industry Ministers’ Meeting. They signed a joint statement launching a standing platform for industrial cooperation. Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investment, Industry and Trade used the occasion to push for a shift away from raw-material trade toward joint production and localization. Behind the diplomatic choreography sits a practical problem: the minerals both sides keep discussing cannot move without a route to carry them. A Minerals Agenda with Separate Tracks South Korea relies heavily on imported minerals for its manufacturing industries. Seoul has been developing separate plans with each country. With Tajikistan, discussions have focused on gold and silver, alongside antimony. With Kyrgyzstan, Seoul has been discussing antimony and tungsten. Cooperation with Uzbekistan covers minerals and digital manufacturing. With Kazakhstan, a central issue is moving beyond raw exports toward processing inside the country, as The Times of Central Asia reported ahead of the summit. South Korean firms are pursuing supply diversification independently. POSCO International and LX International have been expanding overseas mineral investments, including graphite and nickel projects, amid Chinese export restrictions. The Transport Connection Consider the Bolashak chrome mine in Kazakhstan, which Eurasian Resources Group launched in late 2024. The company plans to ramp it up to a design capacity of 7.5 million metric tons of chrome ore a year. Production on that scale makes reliable transport an essential part of the commercial equation. An Atlantic Council analysis identifies limited processing capacity and underdeveloped westward routes as obstacles to U.S. mineral partnerships with Central Asia. It presents the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor as a route to Western markets that avoids Russian and Iranian territory. That argument needs a distinction when applied to Korea. The corridor runs westward toward Europe; it is not a prerequisite for minerals to reach South Korea. Its relevance is the wider choice of buyers it could offer Central Asian producers, including potential Korean-backed processing ventures serving those markets. That corridor is being built out. The Aktau container hub has a planned capacity of 240,000 twenty-foot equivalent units. The World Bank-backed Mointy–Kyzylzhar railway is meant to remove a 149-kilometer detour and accommodate 30 train pairs a day, against roughly ten on the existing constrained route. Traffic is already rising: 125 container trains crossed Kazakhstan on the Trans-Caspian route in the first quarter of 2026, up 34.4% year-on-year. Japan has also become involved, pledging in August 2025 to help modernize customs operations at the port of Aktau. The Seoul Declaration also backs Korean participation in transport infrastructure, including modernization and digitalization. In...