Turkmenistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Victory Day

No Tanks on Red Square as Moscow’s Victory Day Pull Fades in Central Asia

Russia’s Victory Day parade on May 9 is set to be more restrained this year, with tanks, armored vehicles, and missile systems absent from Red Square for the first time in nearly two decades. The Russian Defense Ministry cited the “current operational situation,” while the Kremlin blamed what it called Ukrainian “terrorist activity.” Russia also reported drone attacks aimed at Moscow in the days before the ceremony, and security around President Vladimir Putin has been tightened. The reduced scale of the parade carries a resonance beyond Russia. Victory Day remains one of the most emotionally charged dates in the post-Soviet calendar, including in Central Asia, where families still remember relatives who fought, died, or labored during World War II. But across the region, the holiday has increasingly been placed inside national calendars rather than left as part of Russia’s political script. The contrast with last year is sharp. In 2025, Moscow marked the 80th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat with its largest Victory Day parade since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Chinese troops marched on Red Square, Xi Jinping sat beside Putin, and foreign leaders attended from across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet space. Tanks, rocket launchers, missile systems, drones, and other military hardware rolled through the square. This year’s guest list is more limited. The Kremlin’s initial list of foreign delegations included leaders and senior figures from Belarus, Laos, Malaysia, Slovakia, the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and representatives from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska. Attendance has also been hard to read. Earlier reports said Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov were expected in Moscow, while the Kremlin’s initial published list of foreign guests did not include any Central Asian presidents. On May 8, however, Kazakh and Uzbek media reported that Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s Shavkat Mirziyoyev were traveling to Moscow for Victory Day events. The late confirmations complicate the picture, but they do not restore the full regional show of unity seen in the last two years, when all five Central Asian presidents were present at the Moscow parade. It does suggest, however, that Moscow’s political ownership of the date is less automatic than it once was. Victory Day, which commemorates the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in what Russia calls the Great Patriotic War, has long been one of the main rituals of modern Russian power. It draws large television audiences, fills public space with military symbolism, and presents the Kremlin as the guardian of a sacred national memory. The holiday speaks of sacrifice and family loss, but also of nationalism and state control over history. Putin has used that language repeatedly. On May 9, 2024, after appearing on Red Square in snowfall, he said Russia was going through a “difficult, milestone period,” and warned: “We will not allow anyone to threaten us. Our strategic forces are always in combat readiness.” In 2025, he used the 80th anniversary parade to link Soviet wartime memory to Russia’s current war, saying...

Afghanistan

Opinion: Hormuz Crisis Pushes Afghanistan Aid Routes Toward Central Asia

The crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is usually viewed through the lens of energy security or military escalation. But it also has another, less visible, humanitarian dimension. A recent article in The Guardian, “Calls for humanitarian corridor through Strait of Hormuz as Iran war hits vital aid,” points to a critical shift: because of the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, along with instability around Hormuz, traditional humanitarian supply routes are beginning to break down. For Afghanistan, this is no longer a theoretical concern but an operational reality. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), cited by The Guardian, the cost of delivering food to Afghanistan has tripled. Cargo that previously moved by sea through Hormuz and onward to Pakistani ports must now travel overland across multiple countries, adding weeks to delivery times. The consequences are felt most acutely by vulnerable populations, particularly children. Predictability is one of the core requirements of any humanitarian system, and that predictability is now disappearing. Some shipments are stranded in regional hubs. Routes are constantly changing. Fuel costs continue to rise. Even modest increases in oil prices significantly raise operational expenses for humanitarian agencies. For Afghanistan, the implications are severe. The country has been in a prolonged food crisis for several years, with millions dependent on external aid. Delays of even one or two weeks can directly affect malnutrition and mortality rates. According to United Nations estimates, around 3.7 million Afghan children are currently suffering from wasting, nearly one million of them from severe wasting, a condition associated with sharply elevated mortality risks. UNICEF estimates that in 2026 alone, 1.304 million children aged 6-59 months will require treatment for acute malnutrition, including severe cases and other high-risk groups. Another 1.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are also suffering from acute malnutrition. Under these conditions, even temporary disruptions in aid deliveries become a direct threat to human life. The situation is being compounded by several overlapping factors. First, instability around the Strait of Hormuz has made maritime routes both more expensive and riskier. Second, the Pakistani corridor, previously the main overland route, has become unreliable, as repeated border closures and restrictions have tied humanitarian deliveries to the fluctuating political and security relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Third, Iran has imposed restrictions on food exports and has itself become part of the conflict zone, undermining its role as both a supplier and transit route for Afghanistan. Together, these developments are creating what can be described as a “triple crisis” for humanitarian logistics into Afghanistan. The previous aid delivery system is effectively ceasing to function. In response, the WFP is restructuring its logistics network. One solution has been increased use of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor: Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea-Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. Although this route is longer and more expensive, it offers predictability and an alternative to disrupted maritime pathways. The key issue is no longer which route is cheapest, but which is reliable. This shift places Central Asia increasingly at the center of...

Geopolitics

European Summit in Yerevan Sends a Signal to Central Asia

The 8th European Political Community summit in Yerevan highlighted deepening geopolitical fault lines while signaling that some post-Soviet countries, notably Azerbaijan and Armenia, are gradually shifting their geopolitical orientation away from Moscow. It is a realignment that Central Asian states are watching with increasing interest. On May 4, attention across post-Soviet space, from Russia and Belarus to Central Asia and the South Caucasus, turned toward Yerevan. Armenia, still a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Eurasian Economic Union and formally tied to the Collective Security Treaty Organization despite freezing its participation, hosted Europe’s political leadership. Among those attending were French President Emmanuel Macron, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President António Costa, and prime ministers including Donald Tusk, Keir Starmer, and Petteri Orpo. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev participated via video link. No Central Asian leaders attended the summit. Even so, the gathering carried a message for the region. Armenia hosted Europe’s political leadership while remaining tied to Moscow-led structures, including the CIS and the Eurasian Economic Union. For Central Asian governments pursuing their own multi-vector policies, the summit showed how a post-Soviet state can widen its diplomatic options without a clean break from Russia. The parallel is not exact, but it is visible. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan remain in the Eurasian Economic Union, while Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan remain in the CSTO. All five Central Asian states maintain working ties with Moscow, while expanding contacts with the EU, Turkey, China, and the Gulf, part of a wider effort to diversify foreign policy options through closer engagement with Europe and other outside powers. Turkey was represented by Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz, the highest-level Turkish official to visit Armenia since then-President Abdullah Gül in 2008. Turkey and Azerbaijan largely positioned themselves as counterweights to the dominant European framing, marking one of the summit’s key geopolitical divides. Aliyev adopted a confrontational tone, announcing a suspension of relations with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. “Instead of addressing fundamental problems of some member states, such as xenophobia, Islamophobia, antisemitism, migration, competitiveness, and homelessness, the European Parliament targets Azerbaijan, spreading slander and lies,” Aliyev said. “And the reason is that Azerbaijan restored its territorial integrity and sovereignty, put an end to separatism, and brought war criminals to justice.” In response, António Costa sought to soften tensions, emphasizing the summit’s historical significance as the first of its kind held in the South Caucasus and highlighting Aliyev’s participation as a symbol of peace efforts in the region. Cevdet Yilmaz focused on bilateral diplomacy, meeting Romanian President Nicușor Dan to discuss trade, regional issues, and global challenges. He also held talks with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, the summit’s host. The two sides signed a memorandum of understanding on the joint restoration of the historic Ani Bridge, located on the border between the two countries and dating back to the 11th century. Yilmaz suggested that Armenia would benefit from closer alignment with Turkey...

Diplomacy

Turkmenistan Highlights International Outreach at Cabinet Meeting

A recent Cabinet meeting in Turkmenistan highlighted contacts with many countries and international organizations, reinforcing a perception that the tightly managed nation is taking more steps, however limited, to engage the world. Appearing via video link, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov presided over the May 1 meeting of ministers who covered economic growth, oil and natural gas production, scientific research, and other national priorities in a review of the year so far. But international outreach was a big part of the high-level discussion in an energy-rich Central Asian country often defined as opaque and restrictive. An account of the meeting by the Turkmenistan State News Agency (TDH) ticked off statistics: 220 delegations visited Turkmenistan this year, 400 delegations from Turkmenistan visited other countries, 711 negotiations and other meetings occurred in the country with foreign states and international agencies, and 57 more international documents were added to Turkmenistan’s legal code. “The development of diplomatic relations through foreign embassies is one of the important directions of the foreign policy work of neutral Turkmenistan,” said the report, referring to the country’s policy of non-alignment and not getting involved in the internal affairs of other countries. “Work on promoting relations with the countries of the Middle East is also ongoing,” it said. Iraq opened its embassy in Ashgabat in March, 17 years after Turkmenistan and Iraq established diplomatic relations in 2009. On May 4, Rashid Meredov, Turkmenistan’s foreign minister, spoke by telephone with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi about regional security, Caspian issues, and other matters, according to the Turkmen Foreign Ministry. The ministry’s statement did not mention the Iran conflict or uncertainty surrounding the ceasefire with the United States. Turkmenistan’s international campaign is consistent with a pattern seen across Central Asia, where governments have sought to diversify their trade and diplomatic ties while maintaining close relations with the region’s major powers, Russia and China. Turkmenistan, however, still exports most of its natural gas to China, its largest trading partner. At the same time, Turkmenistan is intensifying efforts to integrate into the global trading system, with officials reaffirming plans to move towards membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is the last post-Soviet republic to start WTO accession talks. Turkmenistan’s leaders are also working on their international profiles. Berdimuhamedov attended an ecological summit of regional leaders in Kazakhstan last month. His father and predecessor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, traveled to the U.S. in February, China in March, and Austria in April. This month, he is due to travel to the Russian city of Kazan. Although government transparency is limited in Turkmenistan, father and son appear to run the country through a power-sharing arrangement. Outsiders are getting more glimpses of Turkmenistan. The capital, Ashgabat, hosted an international tourism conference in April. This month, the Reuters news agency reported on a trip there after being given what it said was “rare access” to travel in the country. It remains unclear, however, whether any efforts to engage with the outside world will materially change daily life in Turkmenistan, where people...

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Belousov’s Bishkek Warning: Russia Uses SCO Meeting to Target Outside Influence in Central Asia

The April 28 meeting of defense ministers from the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), held in Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Bishkek, received relatively modest coverage in Central Asia and China. Russia’s Ministry of Defense, however, used the routine gathering to send a sharper message: Moscow remains opposed to any non-regional military presence in Central Asia. According to the SCO Secretariat, the meeting was attended by defense ministers from member states, the organization’s Secretary-General, and the director of the Executive Committee of the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. “During the meeting, the parties held a substantive exchange of views on pressing regional and international security issues, noting persistent challenges and threats, including international terrorism, extremism, transnational crime, as well as emerging risks in information and cybersecurity,” the SCO said in a general statement. The statement also emphasized the need to strengthen trust between the armed forces of member states, expand practical cooperation, conduct joint exercises, exchange experience, and develop mechanisms for military cooperation within the SCO. China’s Defense Minister Dong Jun used similar institutional language. According to Xinhua, Dong said the SCO should uphold the international order, improve security governance, and “eliminate the sources of turmoil and conflict through shared development.” He also called for deeper defense and security cooperation among member states. Kazakhstan’s Defense Minister Dauren Kosanov presented a report on the country’s approach to strengthening regional security, developing cooperation within the SCO, and improving joint responses to contemporary challenges, according to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense. The ministry said participants also discussed the expansion of practical cooperation between defense agencies and approved a cooperation plan for SCO defense ministries for 2027. Defense ministers from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan also held bilateral talks on the sidelines of the meeting, discussing military-technical cooperation, joint training, experience-sharing among officers, and initiatives aimed at strengthening regional security. Uzbek media described the talks as being held in a constructive and friendly atmosphere. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov adopted a markedly different tone. His remarks were not limited to general SCO language about counterterrorism or cyber threats. They directly targeted the possible presence of outside powers in Central Asia. “We are closely monitoring attempts by non-regional states to establish a military presence and address logistical tasks in Central Asia. We consider this unacceptable,” Belousov said, according to RIA Novosti. Belousov also expressed concern about Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, warning that militants from crisis zones could infiltrate neighboring countries, including the SCO space. Belousov further argued that U.S. activity in the Asia-Pacific region was having a destabilizing effect. “Their efforts to reshape the regional security system into a U.S.-centric model by strengthening military-political structures under Washington’s control provoke tensions, undermine regional stability, and increase the risks of armed conflict,” he said. The contrast was striking. The SCO Secretariat spoke in broad terms about common threats and institutional cooperation. China emphasized development, governance, and multilateral stability. Russia used the same setting to issue a direct warning over Central Asia. Iran added another layer to...

Afghanistan

A View from Afghanistan: Silk Seven Plus a New Framework for Regional Integration

In recent years, regional integration has increasingly become a key instrument in countries’ economic and foreign policy strategies. This is particularly relevant for Central Asia, a landlocked region facing structural constraints in accessing global markets. In this context, the Silk Seven Plus (S7+) initiative, recently introduced by the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, has drawn attention. The concept is currently being promoted in Washington. According to its authors, the initiative has received “overwhelming bipartisan support from leading members of the House of Representatives and the Senate.” S7+ is positioned as a multi-stage framework for regional coordination centered on the countries of Central Asia, with plans for gradual expansion, first to Afghanistan and Azerbaijan, and potentially later to Pakistan. The initiative appears to propose a new model of cooperation focused on developing transport connectivity, facilitating trade, and coordinating economic policy among countries in Central and South Asia, as well as neighboring regions. Unlike traditional integration formats, S7+ is designed as a flexible, network-based framework rather than a rigid institutional structure. It functions more as a platform for practical cooperation, including the development of transit routes, the digitization of customs procedures, the reduction of logistics costs, and the expansion of trade and investment flows. This approach allows countries to participate voluntarily and at varying levels of engagement. Within this model, Central Asia is viewed as a key region for the formation of new economic linkages. Strengthening transport connectivity, diversifying trade routes, and reducing dependence on a limited number of corridors could enhance the resilience of regional economies and support deeper integration into global supply chains. Afghanistan holds particular significance within the S7+ framework. Geographically, it lies at the crossroads of Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, positioning it as a potential transit bridge. The development of routes through Afghanistan could shorten transport distances and improve regional logistics efficiency. In practice, however, this potential faces significant constraints. Key challenges include underdeveloped infrastructure, institutional limitations, and a lack of international recognition. These factors restrict Afghanistan’s ability to fully participate in multilateral initiatives and limit its access to investment and financial resources. At the same time, the flexibility of the S7+ format may create opportunities for Afghanistan’s gradual involvement. Unlike formal organizations, the initiative allows participation on a project-by-project basis without requiring full institutional integration. This aligns with the country’s current model of external engagement, where practical cooperation continues despite the absence of formal recognition. A comparison between S7+ and traditional regional formats highlights key differences. Existing frameworks, such as regional cooperation programs, typically rely on formal agreements and institutional mechanisms. In contrast, S7+ emphasizes flexibility, pragmatism, and the implementation of specific projects, potentially reducing political sensitivities and prioritizing economic interests. In a broader geopolitical context, interpretations of the initiative vary. For some external actors, it may signal the emergence of alternative transport routes and reduced dependence on established corridors. For others, it represents a complementary element within existing economic strategies. In any case, S7+ reflects intensifying competition over the development...