Turkmenistan Business & Economy - The Times Of Central Asia

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Air Routes

Turkmenistan’s Air Connectivity Shows Little Change Despite Expansion Plans

Turkmenistan’s airport schedules remain largely unchanged, with no new destinations added and previously announced flights yet to begin operating. Plans to expand international air links from Turkmenistan have been discussed for years, but little has changed in practice. At the end of last year, Russia’s S7 Airlines announced the launch of the Ashgabat-Novosibirsk route starting March 31. Tickets went on sale at the time, with flights planned once a week. However, as of early April, the flights are absent both from the airline’s schedule and from airport data. Only connecting options remain in booking systems. No official explanation has been provided, despite considerable interest in the route. Flights from Turkmenistan to Russia remain in high demand, significantly exceeding supply. Tickets sell out almost immediately despite high prices, which passengers often associate with monopoly conditions and possible corruption schemes. At present, the choice is limited to two routes: S7 Airlines operates Ashgabat-Moscow flights, while national carrier Turkmenistan Airlines serves only the Ashgabat-Kazan route. The limited number of direct routes forces passengers to seek alternatives. One of the most common is transit through Uzbekistan. The neighboring country can be reached by land, and from there dozens of flights to Russian cities are available. At the same time, there is separate demand for travel to Uzbekistan itself, including for business, education, and tourism. Nevertheless, Turkmenistan has no direct air links with any neighboring country. The restoration of flights with Uzbekistan was discussed in 2025 by presidents Serdar Berdimuhamedov and Shavkat Mirziyoyev, but no specific timelines or routes have been announced since. Some travel takes place via Azerbaijan. In the first two months of this year, more than 4,000 citizens of Turkmenistan entered the country. A significant share of these trips is related not to tourism but to obtaining European visas, as doing so from within Turkmenistan is more difficult. Meanwhile, discussions on transport cooperation between Ashgabat and Baku have focused mainly on cargo transportation. The only notable change has been an increase in the number of flights between Ashgabat and Istanbul, driven by the foreign carrier Turkish Airlines.

Transport Corridor

Kyrgyzstan Tests Alternative Transport Route to Russia That Bypasses Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan and Russia are advancing plans for an alternative transport route that would bypass Kazakhstan. The proposed Southern Transport Corridor would connect the Russian port of Astrakhan across the Caspian Sea to the Turkmenbashi port in Turkmenistan and then continue overland through Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan. The first test cargo shipments along this corridor have already been completed, according to Russian media reports citing Kyrgyzstan’s First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Amangeldiyev. Amangeldiyev said Kyrgyzstan views the development of this southern route via the Caspian Sea as a promising alternative for trade between the two countries. “We’re working in this direction. We have a strategic partnership in this area and a shared vision. We are currently in negotiations,” he told Russia’s TASS news agency on April 3 on the sidelines of the CIS International Economic Forum in Moscow. Discussions on establishing the new transport corridor date back to October 2024, during the visit of then–prime minister of Kyrgyzstan Akylbek Japarov to Moscow. For Kyrgyzstan, the Southern Transport Corridor offers a way to reduce dependence on transit through Kazakhstan. At present, most cargo traffic between Russia and Kyrgyzstan passes through the territory of Kazakhstan. Trucks from Kyrgyzstan often face delays of several days at the border, creating significant obstacles for cargo transport, particularly for perishable agricultural goods. The new corridor is expected to help alleviate these bottlenecks and provide an alternative route linking Kyrgyzstan with the European part of Russia. Kazakhstan would continue to serve as the primary transit route for trade with Russia’s Siberian, Ural, and Far Eastern regions.

Trade

Afghanistan Aims to Increase Trade with Central Asia to $10 Billion

Afghanistan aims to increase trade with Central Asian countries to $10 billion over the next three to four years, Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi said at a meeting in Kabul. According to Muttaqi, Afghanistan’s trade turnover with countries in the region reached approximately $2.7 billion in 2025, marking a significant increase compared to previous years. The statement was made during a consultative dialogue involving representatives from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, focused on regional cooperation, trade, and the development of transit routes. Muttaqi said Afghanistan intends to leverage its geoeconomic position to connect Central Asia with markets in South and West Asia. Among key projects, he highlighted the TAPI gas pipeline, which is currently under construction. Afghan authorities are seeking to expand economic ties despite ongoing international sanctions affecting the banking sector, which continue to constrain investment inflows. At the same time, Russia remains the only country to have officially recognized the Taliban government that came to power in 2021. Several countries, including China, India, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, maintain a diplomatic presence in Kabul. Landlocked Central Asian countries view southern routes through Afghanistan as an alternative to northern corridors via Russia, which have been complicated by sanctions. Afghanistan shares a border of more than 2,300 km with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, and continues to face security challenges, including threats from extremist groups, drug trafficking, and irregular migration. However, Muttaqi said the situation along the borders remains generally stable. Earlier reports indicated that Kazakhstan is exploring the possibility of investing in rare earth metal mining in Afghanistan. The national company Tau-Ken Samruk is conducting laboratory analysis of samples collected in Afghanistan and Rwanda.

Fuel Exports

Turkmenistan Introduces Fuel Limits for Vehicles Leaving the Country

Turkmenistan introduced new rules governing fuel exports at the beginning of April. Under the regulations, the amount of diesel in the tanks of vehicles leaving the country must not exceed 300 liters. If this limit is exceeded, a fee of approximately $1 per additional liter is charged. The new rules primarily affect heavy-duty trucks, which traditionally carry large volumes of fuel. Enforcement has been assigned to the State Border Service, the State Customs Service, and the state-owned company Turkmenneft. Specialists from the General Directorate of Türkmennebitönümleri, the entity responsible for the distribution of petroleum products, are tasked with measuring fuel volumes at border checkpoints. The fuel volume of each vehicle is checked and entered into an electronic system. If the limit is exceeded, the driver is issued two receipts: one remains with the driver, while the other is sent to a bank for payment. All measurements are also recorded in a dedicated logbook. According to the authorities, this system is intended to reduce the risk of fraud and informal payments. The reasons for tightening the regulations are clear. Diesel in Turkmenistan costs around $0.05 per liter. By comparison, in the summer of 2025, it cost about $1 in Uzbekistan, approximately $0.60 in Kazakhstan, and around $0.90 in Russia. This price disparity has long created conditions for black-market activity. Fuel is smuggled abroad and resold, while domestic shortages periodically occur. Drivers face restrictions at filling stations, and additional fuel is often sold at a surcharge that can reach 200% of the official price. As a result, the market has become distorted, with potential state revenue reportedly being diverted through corrupt practices. Another contributing factor is the recent rise in global fuel prices, driven in part by escalating tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, a critical route for global oil and gas shipments. Similar measures have been introduced elsewhere in the region. Kazakhstan tightened regulations on the export of petroleum products and, in autumn 2025, imposed a full ban that remains in effect until May this year. Russia also restricted fuel exports starting April 1, with the measures expected to remain in place until at least July 31.

Food Security

Iran Conflict Drives Food Price Pressures Across Central Asia

The war around Iran is beginning to push up food price risks in Central Asia as disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz raise fertilizer and fuel costs, while Tehran’s halt to some food exports adds pressure in regional markets. The impact is not manifesting as shortages, but as rising costs across the systems that produce, move, and sell food. The United Nations has warned that the crisis is disrupting one of the world’s most important trade corridors for energy and agricultural supplies. A large share of global fertilizer trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and reduced shipping traffic is tightening supply and pushing up prices. Higher fuel costs are adding a second layer of pressure on farmers and transport networks. Fertilizer and fuel are among agriculture’s highest costs. Even modest increases can compress margins quickly, forcing farmers to cut usage or pass costs on, with pressure moving through to retail prices. Central Asia is particularly exposed to this shift in costs. The region relies on imported fuel and fertilizers, and depends on long, multi-stage transport routes. When costs increase at any point in that chain, they accumulate before goods reach markets. The second layer of pressure comes from Iran itself. On March 3, Tehran imposed a ban on exports of food products as part of wartime economic measures. Reporting in Tajikistan indicates that the move could affect the availability and pricing of goods such as dairy, sugar, fruit, and spices, particularly in wholesale and lower-cost retail markets. Iran is not a dominant supplier, but plays a role in specific markets. Tajikistan is the clearest example. Tajikistan has also expanded its economic relationship with Iran in recent years, supported by cooperation in industry and transport. Iranian goods are widely present in retail supply chains, and trade between the two countries has grown steadily in recent years. That growth is part of a broader trend. Iran’s economic ties with Central Asia have expanded under new trade arrangements and bilateral initiatives. Kazakhstan and Iran have discussed increasing trade turnover to $3 billion, reflecting the rising use of Caspian routes and port infrastructure, which are now under threat. [caption id="attachment_46480" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Aralsk Bazaar. Rising transport and fertilizer costs are beginning to push up food prices across the region. Image: Michael J. Bland[/caption] Transport adds a third layer of pressure. As risks rise across the Middle East, airlines and freight operators are avoiding large swathes of Iranian airspace and surrounding routes, forcing rerouting and raising costs across supply chains. European aviation safety authorities have issued conflict-zone bulletins warning of heightened risks in the region, and carriers have adjusted accordingly. Rerouting increases fuel use, extends journey times, and raises insurance costs. Those increases affect cargo as well as passengers, and over time, higher logistics costs feed into the price of imported goods, including food. On land, the same pattern is visible. As southern routes become less predictable, more freight is shifting toward the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route - the Middle Corridor -...

Oil Imports

Georgia May Replace Russian Oil with Imports from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan

Georgia’s only oil refinery, owned by Black Sea Petroleum (BSP), plans to completely stop importing Russian oil and instead switch to crude supplies from Turkmenistan and, potentially, Kazakhstan. This was announced by the company’s CEO, David Potskhveria. According to Potskhveria, the shift would not only diversify supply sources but also open access to European markets. “We will completely replace Russian oil with Turkmen oil, and then with Kazakhstani oil. This will give us the opportunity to export products to the EU,” he said. The rationale is straightforward: imports of Russian petroleum products into the European Union are currently prohibited. Maintaining previous supply arrangements would effectively block access to European markets. However, switching suppliers presents logistical challenges. As Potskhveria noted, processing of Turkmen crude can begin only after transit issues through Azerbaijan are resolved. For now, logistics remain the main bottleneck. While the refinery is technically ready, implementation depends on securing reliable transport routes. The proposed move away from Russian oil follows earlier developments. In late February, the EU considered including the Kulevi port on a preliminary sanctions list due to its import and processing of Russian crude. The trigger was a shipment delivered in October 2025 by Russneft, involving approximately 105,000 tons of oil to the port of Kulevi. The shipment prompted criticism from the Georgian opposition, which accused the authorities of undermining the sanctions regime and appealed to European institutions. The Kulevi refinery is a relatively new entrant to the regional oil market. It began operations in December last year and has already outlined expansion plans. Its current processing capacity is around 1.2 million tons per year, with plans to increase this to 4.5 million tons. At present, the facility produces fuel oil, diesel, and other petroleum products. Future plans include expanding output to Euro-5 standard gasoline, jet fuel, and Eurodiesel. BSP’s international partners reportedly include Trafigura and Saudi Aramco.