Turkmenistan Business & Economy - The Times Of Central Asia

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Opinion

Turkmenistan and the New Geopolitics of Silicon

Central Asia is not foreign to the emerging geopolitics of silicon and artificial intelligence (AI). Kazakhstan especially has made itself noticed, joining the US-led Pax Silica initiative in June and the Chinese-led World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) in July. Kazakhstan is the only country participating in both initiatives, which is characteristic of Astana’s multi-vector diplomacy. Whilst other Central Asian states have joined WAICO, Turkmenistan, consistent with its permanent neutrality stance, has joined neither. Neutrality, however, does not prevent economic participation, and a case has to be made for Turkmenistan. Two Frameworks for International Cooperation Although both initiatives respond to the same underlying reality - the growing strategic importance of artificial intelligence - they differ in scope and emphasis. Pax Silica is built around the material and economic foundations of AI, focusing on securing and coordinating the physical supply chains that make computation possible and aiming implicitly to reduce reliance on China. WAICO, by contrast, is centered on the political and normative dimension of AI, prioritizing governance, safety standards, and international coordination, where Beijing could push its rhetoric in favour of open-source artificial intelligence as a model for AI development. Taken together, they reflect two complementary but distinct ways of structuring the emerging AI order: one rooted in industrial capacity and supply-chain control, the other in multilateral rules. On that matter, Turkmenistan's possible relevance does not lie in software, semiconductor fabrication or AI regulation, but much further upstream: silicon metallurgy. From Gas to Silicon Silicon is abundant in nature, but transforming it into industrial materials is an energy-intensive process. Quartz or quartzite is used to produce both silicon ferroalloys and silicon metal. Ferrosilicon is principally consumed by the iron and steel industries, where it serves as a deoxidizing and alloying agent. Silicon metal, meanwhile, is used in aluminum alloys and chemical production, while a small share is further purified into the extremely high-purity silicon required by the semiconductor industry. Ferrosilicon should not be presented as a material that goes directly into AI chips. But establishing competitive ferrosilicon production can constitute a first industrial step into the broader family of silicon metallurgy. And Turkmenistan has already begun considering precisely that. In 2020, the Turkmen authorities reported that the Ministry of Industry was studying the production of metallurgical-grade silicon using local resources. Practical tests had already been conducted using quartz sand, metal mixtures and petroleum coke, while the government presented the development of domestic mineral resources as part of a broader strategy of industrialization and export diversification. The ambition became more concrete in January 2024. Turkmenistan's Ministry of Industry and Construction Production launched an international tender for a feasibility study for a ferroalloy plant intended to manufacture ferrosilicon, silicon carbide, and technical silicon. A 2024 feasibility study for such a project envisions a plant in Balkan Velayat capable of producing 15,000 tons of FeSi75 ferrosilicon annually. The proposed complex would operate two 12,500 kVA furnaces. Rather than depending exclusively on domestic raw materials, the study envisages sourcing quartzite from nearby Iran and...

Fuel Prices

Turkmenistan Tightens Diesel Limits as Fuel Shortages Persist

Turkmenistan has halved the amount of diesel that vehicles may carry in their tanks when leaving the country, cutting the limit from 300 to 150 liters from August 10. The charge for every liter above the limit has also risen from 20 manat (about $1) to 30 manat (about $1.50). The move is the second tightening of the rules in several months. According to Chronicles of Turkmenistan, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov signed the relevant decree on August 5. At the beginning of April, vehicles leaving Turkmenistan were limited to 300 liters of diesel in their tanks, with a charge of 20 manat, or about $1 at the market exchange rate, for every additional liter. Enforcement was assigned to the border and customs services, as well as the state-owned concern Turkmenneft, The Times of Central Asia reported. The large price difference between Turkmenistan and neighboring markets creates an incentive to take fuel across the border. In April, The Times of Central Asia reported that diesel in Turkmenistan cost around $0.05 per liter, compared with approximately $1 in Uzbekistan, $0.60 in Kazakhstan, and $0.90 in Russia. Low regulated prices extend beyond diesel. In July, petrol in Turkmenistan cost around $0.43 per liter, placing the country among the world's cheapest markets. By comparison, AI-95 petrol cost about $0.68 in Kazakhstan, approximately $1.02 in Kyrgyzstan, and around $1.34 in Uzbekistan, according to Chronicles of Turkmenistan. Independent media have also reported persistent shortages of petrol and diesel inside Turkmenistan, particularly outside Ashgabat. In July, Turkmen.news reported large queues at filling stations and shortages of both petrol and diesel in the regions. The outlet also published documents indicating problems with aviation kerosene supplies at Ashgabat International Airport. One document from June 2024 said the airport had 2,500 tons of kerosene available, enough for only two to three days at prevailing consumption levels. By December 2024, another document showed reserves had fallen to 728 tons, less than one day's supply. Turkmen.news reported that problems with kerosene allocations continued into 2026. The situation is notable because Turkmenistan produces and refines its own oil. The country has two major refining centers, the Turkmenbashi oil refinery complex on the Caspian Sea and the Seydi refinery in the east. Petroleum products are supplied to the domestic market and also exported. Fuel shortages have occurred repeatedly. In 2024, eastern regions of Turkmenistan experienced serious petrol shortages. Drivers in the Lebap and Mary regions waited for hours at filling stations, while some stations imposed purchase limits. The shortage also disrupted public transport and contributed to higher food prices, The Times of Central Asia reported. The latest border restrictions add another element to this picture. Independent outlets have linked the limits to the wide gap between heavily regulated domestic fuel prices and prices abroad, which creates opportunities for cross-border resale. Halving the diesel allowance to 150 liters further restricts the amount that can leave Turkmenistan in vehicle tanks as reports of domestic shortages continue.

Transit Corridors

Afghan Traders in Ashgabat Discuss Proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan Transit Corridor

A delegation from the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Investment was in Turkmenistan in recent days as the two countries explore ways to boost trade and develop transit corridors, according to Afghan state media. Mawlawi Fazal Mohammad Saber, Afghanistan’s chargé d'affaires in the Turkmen capital of Ashgabat, met the group of Afghan traders during their visit, the National Radio and Television of Afghanistan, also known as RTA, reported on Thursday. The Afghan delegates and their counterparts in Turkmenistan discussed a proposal to create a new transit corridor from the Turkmen city of Turkmenabat to the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif, according to TOLOnews, a news organization based in Kabul. It said the Afghan side had invited Turkmenistan to send a delegation of 100 traders and investors to Afghanistan. Turkmenabat is an economic hub in eastern Turkmenistan that is close to the border with Uzbekistan. Mazar-e-Sharif is the biggest city in northern Afghanistan and is a significant transit point for trade in Central Asia. Mazar-e-Sharif is closely linked to Uzbek trade and transport networks, though Turkmenistan has also been working to expand its economic presence in the city. The latest outreach between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan reflects a wider policy among Central Asian countries to expand economic ties with Taliban authorities in Kabul and increase access to South Asian and other markets, adding to the landlocked region’s options for trade at a time of geopolitical uncertainty. The leadership of those countries retains concerns about the security situation in Afghanistan, but hopes that engagement will help to stabilize their southern neighbor. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are key drivers of Central Asia’s growing relationship with Afghanistan. One of the high-profile projects featuring Ashgabat’s involvement is the planned 1,800-kilometer Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, which has faced years of delays and challenges, including heightened Afghan-Pakistani tensions.

GDP

Turkmenistan Reports 6.3% GDP Growth for the First Half of 2026

Turkmenistan's economy grew by 6.3% in the first six months of 2026 compared with the same period last year, according to Turkmen state media. Among Central Asian countries that had published first-half figures, Turkmenistan's reported growth rate was higher than Kazakhstan's but lower than those of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. By the end of the first half of 2026, Kazakhstan's economy had grown by 4.1%. Kyrgyzstan's economy expanded by 11.9%, reaching 960 billion som ($11 billion), with construction posting the fastest growth at 69.6%. Tajikistan reported growth of 8.2%, while Uzbekistan reported GDP growth of 8.5%. Turkmenistan's official figures should be treated with caution. The International Monetary Fund projects growth of about 2.4% for 2026 and says it uses its own GDP estimates because the official narrative is difficult to reconcile with other available data. Official data shows growth of 10.4% in transport and communications, 8.5% in trade, 8.4% in services, 6.7% in construction, 2.7% in industry, and 2% in agriculture. Retail trade turnover increased by 10.1%, while foreign trade turnover rose by 7.5%. The fuel and energy sector continues to play a central role in Turkmenistan's economy. The country possesses some of the world's largest natural gas reserves, and hydrocarbon production and exports remain its principal source of foreign currency earnings and a defining feature of the national economy. Construction is another major pillar, driven largely by state spending. Capital investment totaled 18.6 billion manats ($5.3 billion) in the first half of 2026, up 4.3% year on year and equivalent to 16.5% of GDP. Of this, 45.1% went to production facilities and 54.9% to social and cultural buildings. The government is also seeking to produce more construction materials and other goods domestically, reducing the need for imports. For the remainder of the year, the government says it will focus on completing ongoing construction projects, increasing capacity utilization at industrial plants, maintaining the stability of the manat, developing the tax system, preparing next year's state budget, and improving the use of budget funds. Earlier, The Times of Central Asia reported that Turkmenistan sees the proposed Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor as a key route for diversifying its natural gas exports to Europe, as Ashgabat seeks to reduce its dependence on a limited number of export markets.

Cross-Border Trade

Turkmenistan Renovates Customs Post on Border with Iran

Turkmenistan took steps to expand economic ties with Iran this week, completing the upgrade of a customs checkpoint on the border with its neighbor to the south and hosting an Iranian cabinet minister. The modernization of the Sarahs Autoyollary customs post at the Turkmen-Iranian border follows upgrades earlier this year at the Artyk post, also on the border with Iran, and the Garabogaz checkpoint, on the northern border with Kazakhstan, according to Turkmenistan’s State Customs Service. It said improvements to the Sarahs Autoyollary post, which is located at “the intersection of several international transport corridors,” include renovated buildings and a digital monitoring system that will help agents process vehicles and goods faster and more reliably. Meanwhile, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov discussed the expansion of Turkmen-Iranian trade in a meeting with Farzaneh Sadegh, Iran’s roads and urban development minister, in Ashgabat on Monday, Turkmenistan’s state media reported. The Iranian ministry said Sadegh and top Turkmen officials discussed joint projects in transportation, energy, electricity, and infrastructure development. Iran is a significant economic partner for Turkmenistan and other Central Asian countries that are trying to diversify and expand trade corridors to foreign markets, although Iran’s conflict with the United States has highlighted the vulnerability of transit through Iranian territory. Earlier this month, Iranian officials alleged that a U.S. strike hit a railway bridge on a northern Iranian line crossing into Turkmenistan, although there was no independent confirmation. Iran later said it had repaired the tracks and trains were running again. On Monday, Turkmenistan criticized an attack on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea that the Iranian government blamed on Ukraine, which has acknowledged strikes on vessels in the sea that were allegedly carrying military cargo linked to Iran and Russia. The Caspian Sea is critical to Turkmenistan's ambition to play a larger role in the Middle Corridor, a trade network linking Asia and Europe via Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Energy Security

Central Asia Rethinks Energy Security After the 2026 Fuel Crisis

The summer of 2026 marked a turning point for energy security in Central Asia. In July, drone strikes temporarily halted crude oil receipts and loadings at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) marine terminal in Novorossiysk. Although CPC resumed normal operations on July 27, the incident exposed the vulnerability of one of the region’s principal export routes to external security risks. Russia, which for decades has been Central Asia’s principal supplier of refined petroleum products, has also faced prolonged pressure in its domestic fuel market. Reduced utilization at some refineries and rising domestic demand have created longer-term challenges. Restrictions on gasoline and diesel exports have added to the pressure, affecting the Russian economy and neighboring states that have traditionally relied on Russian supplies. For three decades, Central Asia’s system for supplying refined fuels remained relatively stable. Russian refineries covered shortages in local markets, providing fuel that was both comparatively affordable and predictable in volume. The events of 2026, however, reaffirmed a basic principle of national security: during large-scale crises, governments tend to prioritize domestic stability over external trade commitments. For Central Asian states, this has prompted a fundamental reassessment of long-established approaches to energy security. Any strategy dependent on a single external supplier ultimately becomes vulnerable to disruptions beyond its control, regardless of their origin. The current crisis has also revealed significant differences in how well prepared the region’s governments are to protect their domestic fuel markets. Kyrgyzstan has proved the most vulnerable. The country consumes around 1.6 million metric tons of fuel annually, with 90-95% of supplies imported from Russia. Faced with a sharp reduction in available supplies during May and June 2026, the Kyrgyz authorities were forced to begin urgent negotiations with alternative suppliers, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. Uzbekistan has been in a somewhat stronger position. Until recently, Russian companies dominated the country’s imported gasoline market. During the first five months of 2026, Uzbekistan spent more than $1 billion on imports of crude oil and petroleum products, while spending on motor gasoline imports increased by 85.1% compared with the same period a year earlier. Tashkent has responded by prioritizing strategic fuel reserves. Ahead of the coming autumn and winter season, the government has begun building a 120,000-metric-ton reserve of motor gasoline. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, enjoys a considerably higher degree of energy self-sufficiency thanks to its developed refining sector, centered on the modernized refineries in Atyrau, Pavlodar, and Shymkent. It is therefore unsurprising that Bishkek turned first to Astana when seeking emergency fuel supplies. Kazakhstan’s potential to serve as a regional supplier nevertheless has clear limits. The country’s domestic fuel market periodically comes under structural pressure during the spring and autumn agricultural seasons and when planned maintenance is carried out at its refineries. As a result, Astana must balance support for its regional partners with maintaining stability at home. Although Kazakhstan annually agrees with Russia on duty-free import quotas of up to 1.12 million metric tons of Russian petroleum products under the indicative fuel balance mechanism, the current...