• KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.44%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.44%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.44%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.44%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.44%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.44%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.44%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.44%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
22 December 2024

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 75

Uzbekistan Welcomes 6.5 Million Tourists in 10 Months of 2024, With China Leading Growth Outside CIS

Uzbekistan’s tourism industry is thriving, with 6.5 million foreign visitors from January to October 2024, fueled by a 17.2% year-on-year increase, or 951,300 more visitors compared to the same period last year. Among these tourists, 57,700 were from China, marking a 63.1% rise and making China the leading source of visitors outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). China's interest in landlocked Uzbekistan comes as no surprise. Rich in natural resources and brimming with untapped potential, Uzbekistan stands as a promising opportunity for growth and prosperity when strategic investments are managed effectively. For instance, China continues to dominate Uzbekistan’s trade scene, accounting for 18.8% of the country's total foreign trade turnover as of October 2024. Bilateral trade between the two nations reached $10.2bn, with Uzbekistan exporting $1.7bn worth of goods to China and importing $8.5bn in return. While this was a slight dip from the $10.8bn in 2023, China has maintained its position as Uzbekistan’s largest trade partner since 2020, thanks in part to strategic agreements like the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation (DTA). Additionally, China’s investment footprint in Uzbekistan is hard to miss. By the end of 2022, China had invested a total of $4.5bn, with over 2,000 Chinese enterprises operating in the country as of January 1, 2024. These businesses span a wide range of sectors, from oil and gas exploration to infrastructure development, automotive assembly, agriculture, and textiles. Projects include the Pengsheng Industrial Park, which focuses on construction materials and modern agriculture with a $129mn investment, and the Anjiyan Textile Park, which specializes in textile production, backed by more than $64mn. The Luoyang-Bukhara Agricultural Cooperation Zone takes this partnership to the next level, blending agricultural cultivation with industrial activities for a dynamic collaboration. Agriculture has blossomed as a key area of collaboration between Uzbekistan and China in recent years. Uzbek exports, such as cherries, apricots, and dried fruits are hitting the sweet spot in China, while Chinese investments in agri-tech are giving Uzbekistan’s productivity and export game a major boost. When it comes to green energy, Uzbekistan’s renewable ambitions are getting a powerful push from Chinese know-how. A standout project, a 1 GW solar power plant under the Belt and Road Initiative, is a shining example of both nations’ dedication to a greener, more sustainable future. In addition, on December 5, Uzbekistan's Uzatom and China National Nuclear Corporation Overseas (CNOS) signed a cooperation agreement, setting the stage for small nuclear power plants and improved uranium processing in Uzbekistan. This follows earlier talks about tapping into China's expertise to enhance the country’s nuclear energy capabilities. The digital transformation of Uzbekistan is another exciting frontier of opportunity. With plans to expand its digital infrastructure, Chinese companies are stepping in with cutting-edge technologies like 5G networks and e-commerce platforms. These innovations are set to supercharge Uzbekistan’s digital economy, making it more efficient and connected than ever before. It’s a win-win that promises to drive growth and elevate the country’s technological landscape. Two major...

British Think Tank: Kazakhstan is a Key Strategic Partner for the UK

On December 10, the British think tank the Henry Jackson Society presented its research report, “Understanding Kazakhstan’s Strategic Importance: A Middle Power Partner for the UK in Central Asia,” in the UK Parliament. The event was attended by members of both houses of the British Parliament and featured speeches by prominent figures, including Nusrat Ghani MP, Principal Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons; Magzhan Ilyassov, Ambassador of Kazakhstan to the United Kingdom; Darren Spinck, the report’s author and associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society; Ekaterina Miroshnik, Director for Eurasia Infrastructure at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); and Enzo Satkuru-Granzella, business analyst at the UK Critical Minerals Association. Exploring Kazakhstan’s Strategic Role Darren Spinck emphasized that the report examines Kazakhstan’s evolving role as a middle power on the international stage, highlighting its advancements in political reforms and sustainable economic development. It also explores opportunities for enhancing trade and investment between the UK and Kazakhstan, particularly in critical minerals and transit-transport routes. The report includes recommendations for the British Government and Parliament to strengthen this partnership. Nusrat Ghani MP shared her personal efforts to deepen UK-Kazakh relations during her time as Business and Trade Minister (2022–2024) and Minister of State at the Foreign Office (2024). She expressed confidence that the report would provide members of Parliament with valuable insights into Kazakhstan’s importance as a global actor and as a key partner for the UK in Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s Global Diplomacy and Strategic Partnerships Ambassador Magzhan Ilyassov highlighted Kazakhstan’s balanced, multi-vector foreign policy, which aims to safeguard national interests while promoting global security and dialogue. He provided updates on Kazakhstan’s international initiatives, including efforts on nuclear non-proliferation, the proposal to establish an International Agency for Biological Safety (IABS), and the creation of a UN Regional Hub for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Ekaterina Miroshnik from the EBRD underscored Kazakhstan’s role in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor. This trade route connects China with Europe and strengthens economic ties between Europe, Central Asia, and China. She highlighted the EBRD’s involvement in Middle Corridor projects, which are key to improving regional trade infrastructure. Enzo Satkuru-Granzella of the UK Critical Minerals Association noted Kazakhstan’s vast potential to contribute to the global supply chain of critical minerals. With its rich resource base, well-developed infrastructure, and skilled workforce, Kazakhstan is poised for long-term collaboration. He pointed to the Roadmap on critical minerals, signed between Kazakhstan and the UK in March 2024, as a solid foundation for mutual cooperation. Strengthening Bilateral Relations Participants at the event acknowledged Kazakhstan’s increasing geostrategic importance as a middle power and explored new avenues for strengthening ties between the two nations. A significant milestone in the bilateral relationship was the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed by Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu and the UK’s David Cameron in Astana on April 24, 2024. Great Britain remains one of Kazakhstan’s top foreign investors. Since 2005, the UK has invested...

A Final Deal Along Central Asia’s Deadliest Border

It took some 33 years, but on December 4, Kyrgyz and Tajik officials reached a final agreement on delimitation of the last sections of their 972-kilometer border. It is a relief for the entire Central Asian region. In those 33 years the five Central Asian countries (including Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have been independent, the only open conflicts between the armed forces of two Central Asian countries happened between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In the southern Kyrgyz city of Batken on December 4, Kyrgyz security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev and Tajik counterpart Saimumin Yatimov announced an agreement that Tajik state news agency Khovar said “fully completed the delimitation of the remaining sections of the Tajik-Kyrgyz state border.” Most of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border runs through the Pamir Mountains. The eastern part, approximately two-thirds of the common frontier, passes through remote and sparsely inhabited areas. Agreement on where the dividing line between the two countries was easy to reach in this section. The remaining one-third of the border in the west proved far more difficult to find compromises. [caption id="attachment_26293" align="aligncenter" width="2256"] Road near the Kyrgyz village of Ak-Sai. On one side of the road is Tajikistan, the other side, Kyrgyzstan; image: Bruce Pannier[/caption] Kyrgyz and Tajiks are two of the oldest peoples in Central Asia. Their ancestors lived in what is now the border area many hundreds of years before there were any borders. The Soviet Union changed that when it created the Kyrgyz and Tajik Soviet Socialist Republics, not only drawing lines on a map, which were redrawn more than once, but also including enclaves on either side of the border. Roads in the area zigzagged back and forth, one minute through Kyrgyzstan, and few minutes later through Tajikistan, over and over again. As border tensions began to appear toward the end of the 2000-2010 period, both countries started building roads to avoid crossing into the neighboring state, but the terrain is rugged, limiting possibilities for alternate routes. Also, new road construction is expensive and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are both poor countries. [caption id="attachment_26294" align="aligncenter" width="2256"] The entrance to Tajikistan's Vorukh enclave; image: Bruce Pannier[/caption] The lone road leading from Batken to the Kyrgyz village of Ak-Sai and the Tajik enclave of Vorukh weaves through both countries several times and in some places, the road is the border. Visible from any village in this area are the snow-capped mountains, but down in the valleys, water has always been a problem. Like the roads, small rivers and canals meander across both sides of the border, and unsurprisingly, water use is a major source of tensions and has been a significant obstacle in deciding where the border should be. The first hints of trouble came after 2000 and involved petty vandalism, usually children throwing rocks at passing vehicles with license plates from the neighboring country. This escalated and after 2010, when incidents of physical altercations between members of border communities started, followed by vandalism targeting homes and businesses in border villages. Since much of...

Uzbekistan and China Introduce Visa-Free Regime for 30 Days

The heads of the foreign ministries of Uzbekistan and China have signed an agreement which will allow citizens of both countries to travel without visas for up to 30 days. This was announced by Uzbek Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov. The document was signed December 1 in Chengdu during a business forum. Saidov emphasized that the agreement will be an important step towards strengthening bilateral ties, and developing trade and cultural exchange between the countries. The initiative to simplify the visa regime was discussed last spring during Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's state visit to China. Until now, Uzbeks had to obtain a visa to travel to China, while Chinese citizens from March 2021 could visit Uzbekistan without visas for up to 10 days. The date when the visa-free regime will come into effect will be announced later.

Russia’s Strategic Posturing and Putin’s November Visit to Kazakhstan

On November 27, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan underscored the complex geopolitical and security challenges facing the region. Hosted by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana, the visit took place amidst heightened tensions following Russia’s deployment of its Oreshnik hypersonic missile in Ukraine on November 21. This escalation has reshaped the regional security environment, compelling Kazakhstan to confront potential spillover effects of the Ukraine conflict. Energy remained a central focus during the visit. Kazakhstan remains heavily reliant on oil exports through the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which passes through southern Russia. This cooperation benefits Kazakhstan economically but, by tying Kazakhstan further into Russian energy networks, it further complicates Astana's efforts to balance relations with Moscow and Western powers. Following periodic closures of the CPC route on various pretexts, Kazakhstan has resolved to diversify its energy export strategy. It has increased shipments by barge across the Caspian Sea to enter the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which terminates on Turkey's coast in the eastern Mediterranean. One should not be surprised if ideas about the old Trans-Caspian Oil Pipeline (TCOP) project are taken out of deep storage for reanimation. The TCOP is an undersea link first discussed in the late 2000s between then-Presidents Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Nicolas Sarkozy of France. It was shelved at the time because it did not seem geoeconomically necessary. Since then, relations between Russia and Kazakhstan have been complicated by the periodic CPC closures that, although they are given technical justification, appear politically motivated by Moscow to squeeze Astana. Kazakhstan's short-term solution, to increase oil shipments by barge across the Caspian Sea to Baku for insertion into the BTC pipeline, simply cannot attain the volumes necessary to provide a strategic alternative to the CPC. The BTC, at present, would be able to accommodate whatever volumes Kazakhstan would be able to transit to Azerbaijan including via a prospective TCOP, for export to world markets from Ceyhan. One would suppose that bilateral discussions also covered the possible participation of Rosatom in the construction and operation of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant (NPP). However, no mention of this topic was made in public statements. Kazakhstan would prefer to escape the vise-like pressure between Russia and China on this matter. That is why Tokayev has discussed participation by the French firms Orano and EDF with France's President Emmanuel Macron. It has recently been suggested that it would be technically feasible for Kazakhstan to find a group of Western companies capable of executing the project. A Western consortium would have no reason to hesitate to include Kazatomprom in an appropriate role, not excluding capacity-building. The Russia-only and China-only options for the NPP's construction would be less welcoming to such a possibility. Kazakhstan's leadership has become properly sensitive to how energy partnerships are not just economic decisions, but strategic calculations in Central Asia's volatile geopolitical landscape. Indeed, Russia’s use of the Oreshnik missile against Ukraine has created an entirely new security situation. It has raised concerns that...

Putin in Kazakhstan: Language Diplomacy, Treaty Fine Print and a Hack

Geopolitical tensions, finding common ground on oil and gas transportation and deliveries and Russia’s hopes of beating out rivals to build Kazakhstan´s first nuclear power plant. These were some of the big ticket themes framing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s trip to the Central Asian nation last week. The Times of Central Asia looks at a few other things that happened on the sidelines:   A Tale of Two Languages “Kazakhstan is practically a Russian-speaking country, which you have probably had a chance to see for yourself.” Putin was extolling close ties between Russia and Kazakhstan when he made that remark to journalists in Astana last week. But the comment also drew attention to how Kazakhstan uses the Kazakh language to express national identity and independence from a past controlled by Moscow. In November 2023, during an earlier visit by Putin to Astana, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev spoke in Kazakh rather than Russian, causing senior Russian officials to reach somewhat hurriedly for their earpieces to get the translation. While Russia and Kazakhstan share a long land border and are bound by deep economic and security ties, Tokayev’s semantic switch seemed to be a reminder that Kazakhstan, a former Soviet republic and Russian imperial territory, would follow its own path. Last week, both leaders went out of their way to emphasize linguistic harmony, even if tensions sometimes emerge over Kazakhstan’s increasing promotion of the Kazakh language. There is a significant ethnic Russian minority living in Kazakhstan. “One third of schoolchildren in our country are educated in Russian. We attach special importance to this issue. It is for this reason that I proposed the creation of the International Russian Language Organization,” Tokayev said. Putin thanked Tokayev for backing the use of the Russian language, “widely and freely,” in Kazakhstan. He said there are plans to open three Russian language schools in Kazakhstan, with Russian government support. Some social media posts claimed there was a diplomatic dustup between the two leaders, showing video of Putin´s “Russian-speaking country” remark followed by Tokayev speaking in Kazakh in an apparent pushback. However, the video appears to be spliced from different events. Putin is shown standing; Tokayev is seated. Furthermore, the Kremlin transcript shows that Putin made the remark at a solo news conference.   That’s What It Says, But… The treaty of a regional security group that includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belarus and Armenia says members must provide military and other help to any member subjected to “aggression by any state or group of states.” Does that mean members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, or CSTO, should get behind Russia in its war against Western-backed Ukraine? After all, Putin says Russia is a target of Ukrainian and Western aggression, even if some dispute the assertion because he launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Putin was asked the question on Thursday after a state visit to Kazakhstan and a meeting of the regional security group in Astana. Each security group member “stands ready to act in accordance with...