The Illusion of Influence: The CSTO’s Journey From Symbolic Maneuvers To Real Challenges

Accompanied by a picture of military hardware - though in reverse gear as if symbolically - today, the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) website announced that “From 26 to 30 September, formations participating in the command-staff exercise 'Unbreakable Brotherhood-2024' with the CSTO Peacekeeping Forces are regrouping in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Contingents of CSTO troops are being sent from the Republic of Belarus, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Tajikistan to the exercise area in accordance with the plan.” In reality, the history of the CSTO is one of refusals, inaction, and sometimes unexpected successes. On August 31, Armenia announced it had frozen its participation in the CSTO. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said he would not name the day when Armenia would leave the CSTO and called the decision to freeze the republic's participation in all structures of the organization correct “at this stage.” In many ways, this half-hearted decision reflects a certain amorphousness that originally characterized the CSTO.   History The history of the structure's emergence reflects this lack of crystalline form. The Collective Security Treaty (CST) was signed in Tashkent between Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on May 15, 1992. Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia later joined in 1993. The treaty came into effect in 1994 and was set to last five years. During the 1990s and the disintegration of Soviet-era institutions, organizations such as the CSTO or the previously created Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), whose founding protocol was signed in Almaty, were created to facilitate a smooth “divorce” between the newly independent states. The CSTO was also seen as a force capable of curbing the regional conflicts which were boiling over, such as the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan. Tashkent's bet on Russian weapons in case of conflicts with the Taliban did not work out, however. From the turn of the 1990s into the 2000s, two serious fissures across the borders of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan took place; the republics fought back with their own military and weapons, in addition to Kazakhstan coming to the rescue. The Collective Security Treaty expired in 1999, with Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia withdrawing, whilst Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan soldiered on under a new pact. The remaining states later transformed the CST into the Collective Security Treaty Organization in 2002. Uzbekistan joined as a full member of the CSTO in 2006 but then flip-flopped and suspended its membership in 2012.   A powerless organization While the CSTO was still developing, with President Vladimir Putin coming to power in Russia, the Kremlin's foreign policy changed substantively from that of the Yeltsin era, when Moscow remained indifferent to Nursultan Nazarbayev's integration initiatives. The new direction of Russian foreign policy was expressed in the concepts of “Russia rising from its knees” and the "gathering of lands.” Over time, this evolved into joint war games and military operations with the West in the Middle East and Africa, and for a period the Kremlin seemed to lose interest in Central Asia....

Russia’s FM: U.S. Interest in Central Asia’s Economy Could Harm Russia’s Development

Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, during a question-and-answer session with students at Moscow’s MGIMO University in early September, noted that “a growing number of extra-regional actors,” including the United States, have taken an interest in fostering trade via the so-called Middle Corridor -- a route connecting Asia to Europe via Central Asia, bypassing Russia. Lavrov’s speech suggests that the U.S. interest in the economic future of Central Asia will negatively impact Russia's development. Lavrov noted that Russia maintains “warm and allied” relations with Central Asian nations, which are bound to Russia economically and strategically via several agreements, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. He added that Russia “cannot prevent anyone from establishing deeper ties with other partners.” Lavrov couldn’t resist lashing out at the United States, saying the motives of American officials in Central Asia aren’t magnanimous. “When our partners and allies in Central Asia expand their relations with the West, I do not have the slightest doubt that they understand perfectly well that apart from pursuing its noble and transparent objectives, the West also seeks to undermine the Russian Federation’s influence there,” he said. The U.S. engages with Central Asia through the B5+1 process, which promotes Western investment by encouraging reforms to reduce trade barriers and streamline customs. Recently, Central Asian countries have signed agreements to improve trade regulation, and the U.S. has helped some countries upgrade their infrastructure. U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan Daniel Rosenblum has said in a statement: “In August ... the United States provided Kazakhstan’s Customs Service with advanced Dell Technologies Inc. servers to help make border procedures more efficient. “Adopting innovative technologies will streamline processes, enhance accuracy, improve transparency, and foster a business-friendly environment, attracting more investors and boosting economic growth,” Russia's war in Ukraine has weakened the Kremlin’s ability to pressure Central Asian states to follow its wishes. Russia depends on covert trade through Central Asia to bypass sanctions and get goods for its war. Meanwhile, China is supplying dual-use technologies to Russia and has overtaken Russia as the leading trade partner for Central Asian countries. In his remarks, Lavrov called China “a reliable partner” but didn’t mention it in the context of Central Asia’s growing trade dynamics.