Geopolitics - The Times Of Central Asia

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Recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Between Law, Diplomacy, and Pragmatism

After the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, the question of recognizing the new Afghan regime became one of the key issues in regional and global politics. Although no country has granted de jure recognition to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), international engagement with the de facto authorities is becoming increasingly institutionalized. This article attempts to systematize and provisionally classify countries based on their stance toward the IEA. This is not a formal legal typology but rather an analytical tool meant to identify "stable patterns of behavior" in the context of interactions with the de facto authorities in Kabul. This approach does not aim for exhaustive academic precision but provides a basis for further discussion and analysis. To begin, we must clarify some basic principles, first and foremost, the institution of recognition. In international legal doctrine, the recognition of a new state or government is a unilateral act by a state and does not require the approval of international organizations. The UN, including the Security Council, does not formally conduct acts of recognition, but its approval is required for admitting authorities to the UN General Assembly, which constitutes formal recognition of international legitimacy and a willingness by the global community to work with them. The key mechanism here is the UN Credentials Committee. This is a special committee of the UN General Assembly consisting of nine member states, which change on a rotating basis. It annually reviews the lists of delegations accredited to participate in UN General Assembly sessions. Between 2021 and 2024, the committee decided to reject the recognition of seats for the Taliban government. In effect, this constitutes a denial of international recognition at the UN level. While the decision of the Credentials Committee has no formal legal significance as an act of recognition or non-recognition, politically it sends a strong signal to other states: the UN still does not regard the IEA as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. In other words, the Credentials Committee acts as a kind of beacon: until it is "lit," a wave of de jure recognition from other states is highly unlikely. Many countries, especially those following a policy of collective decision-making, will take their cue from the UN. For now, the signal remains unchanged: the international community maintains a cautious distance from legitimizing the Taliban regime. As is well known, there are two types of recognition: de jure recognition, which is complete and official and involves the establishment of diplomatic relations, and de facto recognition, which is limited and does not imply full legitimization of the regime. Removing the Taliban from national terrorist lists (as Kazakhstan and Russia have done) does not constitute legal recognition, even though some may portray it as such. The UN itself uses the term "de facto authorities" to describe the Taliban. At the same time, the UN Security Council sanctions regime on Afghanistan (under Resolution 2255) provides for the application of sanctions on an individual basis, without qualifying the regime as a terrorist regime. The...

Multi-vector Foreign Policy Geopolitics International Diplomacy Central Asian politics

Breaking Old Ties: Central Asia’s Delicate Dance Between Russia and the West

Central Asian countries are increasingly asserting their independence in foreign policy, distancing themselves from traditional centers of global influence. Recent developments highlight a nuanced balancing act as states in the region navigate growing tensions between Russia and the West. Kyrgyzstan Pushes Back In Kyrgyzstan, the recent arrest of Natalya Sekerina, an employee of the Russian House in Osh, marked a notable assertion of sovereignty. Sekerina was detained under Part 1 of Article 416 of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, which pertains to the recruitment, financing, and training of mercenaries for armed conflict or attempts to overthrow state authority. Earlier, Sergei Lapushkin, an employee of Osh city hall, and two others were also detained in connection with the case. All suspects were later placed under house arrest. Nevertheless, the arrests are seen by observers as a clear signal that Kyrgyzstan is not simply aligning with Russian policy, despite its economic dependence on Moscow, particularly due to labor migration. The move was reportedly a response to the April 17 detention of over 50 Kyrgyz nationals in a Moscow bathhouse, where Russian security forces allegedly used excessive force. The Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal note of protest. Russia later stated that the detainees were in the country illegally and some were suspected of links to radical groups. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan is scrutinizing Western influence as well. In February, U.S. President Donald Trump announced funding cuts and a wind-down of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The announcement triggered debate in Kyrgyzstan, where some voices argued that while USAID had supported civil society, it also fostered instability and economic dependency. Critics claim the agency promoted Western values and helped establish a network of NGOs that played outsized roles in the country’s politics. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Seek Equilibrium In Kazakhstan, USAID also came under fire. Parliamentary Deputy Magherram Magherramov criticized the agency for promoting what he described as values alien to Kazakh society, referencing controversial events such as women’s rights marches and LGBTQ+ parades in Almaty. He called for a formal review of foreign-funded NGOs. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan witnessed a diplomatic rift during an April visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to the “Grieving Mother” memorial in Samarkand. Lavrov commented on the absence of a Russian-language inscription, provoking widespread backlash on Uzbek social media. Sherzodkhon Kudratkhodzha, rector of the University of Journalism and Mass Communications, responded sharply: “We are not their colony.” He also cited ongoing discrimination against Uzbek migrants in Russia, which, he argued, has been met with silence from Russian officials. A More Independent Foreign Policy Central Asian nations are increasingly holding intra-regional and international meetings, often excluding Russia. On April 25, intelligence chiefs from the region gathered in Tashkent to coordinate on regional security threats. The following day, a meeting of foreign ministers from Central Asia and China took place in Almaty. It was attended by Kazakh Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and counterparts from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and a...

Oil Market Geopolitics OPEC Oil

Kazakhstan Weighs OPEC+ Exit, Raising Fears of Global Oil Price War

Kazakhstan is reportedly considering a reassessment of its participation in the OPEC+ alliance, raising concerns among major global oil market players, according to Reuters. Reuters columnist Ron Bousso Thomson noted that recent statements from Kazakhstan’s new Minister of Energy, Yerlan Akkenzhenov, emphasized prioritizing national interests over adhering to the cartel's production quotas. In an interview with Reuters, Akkenzhenov said, "Kazakhstan will proceed from its own interests in determining production volumes". Such rhetoric may signal Kazakhstan's de facto refusal to comply with OPEC+ quotas and could mark the first step toward a formal withdrawal from the alliance, which is led by Saudi Arabia. Since 2022, OPEC+ members had agreed to cut output by 5.85 million barrels per day to stabilize prices within a $70-90 per barrel range. Production Growth Despite Restrictions Kazakhstan has consistently exceeded its production limits. In March 2025, the country produced 1.85 million barrels of oil per day, 26% above its established quota of 1.468 million barrels. This surge is attributed to the expanded development of the Tengiz field. Such non-compliance has reportedly irritated Saudi Arabia, which, according to IMF estimates, needs oil prices above $90 per barrel to balance its national budget. In early April, Riyadh responded by slashing oil prices for the Asian market and accelerating production increases, signaling its displeasure toward undisciplined alliance members. Analysts warn that if tensions escalate further, Saudi Arabia could resort to drastic measures, potentially triggering a global price war. The Danger of a Price War The specter of a repeat of 2014, when Saudi Arabia flooded the market to push out U.S. shale producers, looms large. Should OPEC+ collapse, a supply glut could cause oil prices to plummet. Countries with higher production costs, such as Kazakhstan, would be particularly vulnerable to such a scenario. Risks for Kazakhstan's Budget and the Tenge According to analysts, Kazakhstan faces significant fiscal risks. Economist Arman Beisembayev explained that citizens would not immediately feel the impact of a sharp decline in oil prices due to existing contracts, which typically take three to six months to fulfill. However, he cautioned that economic repercussions could begin to surface by the fall. Financial analyst Andrei Chebotarev predicted that falling oil revenues would necessitate a budget revision. The current state budget is based on an oil price of $75 per barrel and an exchange rate of 470 tenge per U.S. dollar. In reality, oil prices are trending toward $65, and the tenge has depreciated to 518 per dollar. “Most likely, the government will increase withdrawals from the National Fund and revise budget expenditures. Devaluation may also become inevitable to balance the budget under new realities,” Beisembayev added. Global Turbulence and Geopolitical Factors Experts highlight that the policies of U.S. President Donald Trump's administration, particularly the escalation of trade conflicts, have played a significant role in destabilizing global markets. Newly imposed U.S. tariffs have already dampened global oil demand. “For developed countries, cheap oil is a boon. But for Kazakhstan, it poses risks and a threat of recession,” Beisembayev added....

Geopolitics EU-Central Asia Relations

Central Asia: An Arena of Geopolitical Attraction

Though 2025 is not yet at its halfway point, Central Asia has already emerged as one of the primary stages of global diplomatic engagement. Rich in natural resources and strategically positioned between global powers, the region has attracted increasing interest from the European Union, China, Russia, and others. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and their neighbors are asserting greater agency, pursuing multi-vector foreign policies, and striving to capitalize on evolving geopolitical dynamics. EU-Central Asia: A New Chapter Amid regular annual meetings, a landmark event this year was the inaugural EU-Central Asia Summit, held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on April 3-4. Leaders of all five Central Asian states met with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Discussions centered on infrastructure development, including the Trans-Caspian route, digitalization, energy security, and water resource management. The summit concluded with a pledge to sign an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. This meeting was facilitated by a reconfiguration of global alliances. U.S. President Donald Trump's new tariff policies and the evolving relationship between Washington and Moscow have led European leaders, unwilling to restore ties with Russia, to seek new partnerships. Central Asia, with its strategic position and investment potential, is increasingly appealing. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the region’s economic leaders, are particularly eager to attract foreign capital. The EU represents a possible source, though Russian analysts remain skeptical about Europe’s ability to dislodge Russian and Chinese influence. For instance, Mikhail Neizhmakov of the Russian Agency for Political and Economic Communications noted that while von der Leyen spoke of a €12 billion Global Gateway investment package, China is the largest exporter of investment in the Eurasian region, with accumulated direct investment of $58.6 billion at the end of the first half of 2024, according to the Eurasian Development Bank. Security Discourse and Russian Narratives In addition to the EU summit, the region hosted other key diplomatic events, such as the Digital Forum in Almaty earlier this year, which was attended by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. Another major gathering was the CIS Council of Foreign Ministers, held on April 11, also in Almaty. Ministers approved a 2025 consultation plan and adopted joint statements on regional security, humanitarian cooperation, and opposition to unilateral sanctions. Kazakhstan: A Regional Diplomatic Hub Kazakhstan has so far distinguished itself as Central Asia’s foremost diplomatic player in 2025, hosting high-level visits and spearheading regional engagement. In January, Prime Minister Mishustin visited Astana and Almaty. February saw King Abdullah II of Jordan meet with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to discuss investment and humanitarian cooperation. In March, President Tokayev welcomed his Slovenian counterpart, Nataša Pirc Musar, who expressed interest in expanding bilateral trade. French President Emmanuel Macron is also preparing to visit Kazakhstan later this year, reinforcing France’s strategic interest in the region. In June, meanwhile, Chinese President Xi Jinping is scheduled to attend the second Central Asia-China Summit in Astana, where trade and investment will top the agenda. Navigating a New Geopolitical Order Today, Central Asia represents a vital intersection of East and West....

Organization of Turkic States Geopolitics EU-Central Asia Relations EU-Central Asia Summit Northern Cyprus

Central Asia Creates a Rift in the Turkic World Over Cyprus

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the five Central Asian republics have been performing a very complex balancing act. In some cases, this dynamic has forced them to make difficult decisions from a geopolitical point of view. This is the case with what has happened in recent weeks regarding diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, a member of the European Union since 2004. Between December 2024 and the end of March 2025, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have each appointed diplomatic representatives in the Republic of Cyprus. Kazakhstan has decided to open its own embassy in Cyprus directly, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have accredited their respective ambassadors in Italy as diplomatic representatives for the Eastern Mediterranean Island also. Looking at the calendar, it doesn't seem to be a coincidence that these decisions were taken in the weeks leading up to the first historic summit between the European Union and Central Asia at the level of heads of state and government. The fourth point of the official joint declaration issued at the end of the meeting clarifies the matter: the text clearly states the support of the parties involved - the European Union and Central Asia - for United Nations Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984). These two resolutions make it clear that the only recognized authority on the island is that of the Republic of Cyprus. In recent years, there has been no shortage of explicit references to the Cyprus issue in relations between the European Union and Central Asia. This was the case, for example, in September 2023: during a conference in Brussels, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan were warned against officially accepting the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TNRT) as an observer member of the Ankara-led Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Dietmar Krissler, head of the European External Action Service's Central Asia desk, spoke of the possible “negative effects” for the Central Asian members if they were to ratify TRNT's access to the Organization as an observer. Returning to the summit held in Samarkand at the beginning of April, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced during the discussions that €12 billion would be invested in Central Asia in various sectors. By also using the prospect of these investments, the European Union's diplomatic pressure on the Central Asian republics over Cyprus has been successful. As BBC Türkçe reports, this is not just a formal declaration of intent: in the official joint statement, future cooperation is in fact closely linked to compliance with the principles contained in the two UN resolutions, a very clear position. From Turkey's point of view, however, the picture is quite different. Turkey is the only country in the world to officially recognize the TRNC, which became a self-proclaimed independent entity in 1984 after Turkey invaded part of the island in 1974. Over the years, Ankara’s pressure has succeeded in preventing relations between the Central Asian republics and the Republic of Cyprus from going as...

History Geopolitics The Great Game

The Ruthless History of the Great Game in Central Asia

In the so-called New Great Game, Central Asia is no longer a mere backdrop; with its strategic location, massive oil and gas reserves, and newfound deposits of critical raw materials, it’s a key player. In stark contrast to events in the 19th century, this time, Central Asia finds itself courted by four great powers - China, the EU, the U.S., and Russia - instead of caught in the crosshairs of conquest. The region finds itself with agency. However, the original Great Game was anything but fair play. Comprising vast steppes, nomadic horsemen, descendants of Genghis Khan’s Great Horde, and a lone nation of Persians, during the 19th century, the once-thriving Silk Road states became entangled in a high-stakes battle of expansion and espionage between Britain and Russia. Afghanistan became the buffer zone, while the rest of the region fell under Russian control, vanishing behind what became known as the “Iron Curtain” for almost a century. The term “Great Game” was first coined by British intelligence officer Arthur Conolly in the 19th century, during his travels through the fiercely contested region between the Caucasus and the Khyber. He used it in a letter to describe the geopolitical chessboard unfolding before him. While Conolly introduced the idea, it was Rudyard Kipling who made it famous in his 1904 novel Kim, depicting the contest as the epic power clash between Tsarist Russia and the British Empire over India. Conolly’s reports impressed both Calcutta and London, highlighting Afghanistan’s strategic importance. Britain pledged to win over Afghan leaders — through diplomacy, if possible, and by force, if necessary. The Afghan rulers found themselves caught in a barrage of imperial ambition, as the British and Russian Empires played on their vulnerabilities to serve their own strategic goals. Former Ambassador Sergio Romano summed it up perfectly in I Luoghi della Storia: "The Afghans spent much of the 19th century locked in a diplomatic and military chess match with the great powers — the infamous 'Great Game,' where the key move was turning the Russians against the Brits and the Brits against the Russians." The Great Game can be said to have been initiated on January 12, 1830, when Lord Ellenborough, President of the Board of Control for India, instructed Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General, to create a new trade route to the Emirate of Bukhara. Britain aimed to dominate Afghanistan, turning it into a protectorate, while using the Ottoman Empire, Persian Empire, Khanate of Khiva, and Emirate of Bukhara as buffer states. This strategy was designed to safeguard India and key British sea trade routes, blocking Russia from accessing the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean. Russia countered by proposing Afghanistan as a neutral zone. The ensuing conflicts included the disastrous First Anglo-Afghan War (1838), the First Anglo-Sikh War (1845), the Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848), the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878), and Russia’s annexation of Kokand. At the start of the Central Asian power struggle, both Britain and Russia had scant knowledge of the region's people, terrain, or...