Ukraine - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 31

Russia Military CSTO Ukraine NATO Trump Administration

One Military Alliance (CSTO) Monitors Woes of Another (NATO)

A “zombie” alliance, one Western analysis said. A “paper tiger,” said another. The Collective Security Treaty Organization, a regional group of post-Soviet states that includes Russia and several countries in Central Asia, has come in for some harsh criticism over the years because of perceptions that it is ineffective. Now, the CSTO, described in some circles as a smaller, Russia-dominated counterweight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is closely monitoring a widening split in the NATO security alliance between the United States and Europe. It’s a stunning turnaround that raises questions on both sides about whether and to what extent countries would honor alliance obligations as U.S. President Donald Trump shakes up the global order. While he pushes Ukraine to make a peace deal with Russia, Europe is pledging more support for Ukraine, and deadly fighting continues after three years of war. Overnight, Russia attacked Ukrainian energy infrastructure with drones and missiles, officials in Ukraine said Friday. The Collective Security Treaty Organization has appeared to struggle for cohesion and purpose at times. Its members are Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. While Belarus is loyal to Russia, Armenia has frozen its participation in the group because it felt abandoned by Russia during recent military losses to Azerbaijan. None of Russia’s partners in the CSTO have deployed troops to support its war in Ukraine. But a rise in Russia’s military and diplomatic stature, buoyed by perceptions that Trump favors rapprochement with President Vladimir Putin, could inject some momentum into the regional alliance. At the same time, the Central Asian states, at least, are likely to keep a pragmatic course, balancing international relationships and trying to avoid the perception of taking sides. In an interview with the Russian newspaper Izvestia published on Thursday, CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov was asked about reports that some European countries could send troops to Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping force. Tasmagambetov, a former Kazakh prime minister, downplayed the possibility, saying it would create “a dangerous situation on a regional scale” and that the CSTO was following the situation. “In addition, it is unlikely that the population of European countries, tired of the growing negative phenomena in the economy and social sphere, will approve of such a decision by their governments. After all, this will be an additional burden on the shoulders of society, even if these contingents are not involved in offensive operations, but will, for example, perform police or surveillance functions,” he said. “If such risks arise, the CSTO will be ready to offer various options for assistance within the framework provided for in the organization’s statutory documents and, of course, approved by all member states,” Tasmagambetov said. Russia has been blunt on the issue, saying it opposes any arrangement in which European peacekeepers are deployed in Ukraine.

Energy Ukraine Russia's War

Ukrainian Drone Strike Disrupts Kazakhstan’s Oil Exports

On February 17, Ukrainian drones struck the Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station, a key component of the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) in Russia’s Krasnodar region. The CPC, a 1,500-kilometer pipeline, transports crude from Kazakhstan’s Tengiz field to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, a crucial hub for global exports. The attack, confirmed by CPC operators, resulted in the temporary shutdown of the Kropotkinskaya station, the largest such facility on Russian soil. No casualties or oil spills were reported. Ukrainian sources, including the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and Special Operations Forces (SOF), claimed responsibility, citing the pipeline’s role in supporting Russia’s military-industrial complex. The strike reportedly involved seven drones armed with high-explosive warheads, significantly damaging energy infrastructure, including a gas turbine unit and a substation. Russian authorities estimated a 30–40 percent reduction in CPC throughput for the next six to eight weeks, affecting global supply chains. While CPC pipeline operators have not disclosed a precise timeline for repairs, the anticipated disruptions will inevitably place additional pressure on global energy markets. The degree of damage inflicted raises questions about the vulnerability of Russian energy infrastructure and the efficacy of existing defense systems in preventing such attacks. The CPC pipeline handles a substantial share of Kazakhstan’s oil exports. In 2023, it transported 63.5 million tons, or approximately 1.27 million barrels per day (bpd), with 90 percent of that volume originating in Kazakhstan. This pipeline disruption translates into a projected drop in Kazakh oil flows from 1.143 million bpd to an estimated range of 0.69 to 0.80 million bpd. Consequently, Kazakhstan’s total crude exports—including volumes transported via alternative routes such as the Trans-Caspian corridor and rail—are expected to decline by up to 28.6 percent. The revenue impact could be severe given oil’s centrality to Kazakhstan’s economy. Even a short-term disruption will reverberate across multiple sectors, affecting fiscal revenues and potentially leading to a recalibration of investment strategies within the country’s energy sector. Although Kazakhstan has sought to diversify its oil export routes since 2022, alternatives remain limited. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), connecting Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea and then onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, carried just 1.8 million tons in 2023. This is but a fraction of CPC’s capacity. Other options, such as the Druzhba pipeline to Europe and rail transport, are constrained by infrastructure bottlenecks and geopolitical risks. Given these constraints, Astana has increasingly prioritized the expansion of maritime oil exports, including investments in new tankers and port facilities. However, logistical challenges, cost considerations, and geopolitical uncertainties continue to complicate Kazakhstan’s ability to execute a seamless transition away from Russian transit routes. The attack underscores the vulnerability of Russia’s energy infrastructure amid the ongoing war. Unlike previous Ukrainian strikes targeting refineries and storage depots, this is a direct hit on a critical transit corridor with transnational implications. The disruption may accelerate Astana’s long-term push for diversification, including investment in new tankers and expanded partnerships with U.S. and European firms. In light of these developments, Kazakhstan...

Ukraine Oil and Gas Caspian Region Russia's War incident Drone Attack Caspian Pipeline

Ukraine’s Drone Strike on Russian Oil Hub Sparks Concerns Over Kazakhstan’s Energy Security

On February 17, seven Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) attacked an oil transportation facility of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), targeting the Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station in Russia. Following the attack, reports emerged that the volume of oil pumped from Kazakhstan through the CPC could decrease by 30% for a period of one and a half to two months. Conflicting Reports on the Impact On February 18, Ukraine officially confirmed the strike. "Yesterday, the Ukrainian defense forces carried out a pinpoint strike on strategic facilities of the military and fuel and energy infrastructure of the Russian Federation... The Kropotkinskaya and Andriapol oil pumping stations, which played a key role in transporting fuel for the occupiers, were hit. After the strike, they were put out of action, significantly complicating the logistics of fuel supplies to the aggressor," the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated. Shortly after, Transneft, the Russian shareholder in the CPC, warned that oil pumping volumes from Kazakhstan could drop by approximately 30% due to the damage. Meanwhile, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak provided an even bleaker assessment. During a meeting with President Vladimir Putin, he stated: "We see a decrease in pumping volumes by about 30 - 40% compared to levels before the drone attack." Novak estimated that restoring the CPC infrastructure would take "several months, at least," citing the need to replace damaged Western-made equipment, including Siemens gas turbines. However, later that day, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy issued a statement disputing these claims. "Currently, there are no restrictions on Kazakh oil shipments via the CPC, and acceptance is proceeding as scheduled," the ministry said. Despite this, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov framed the attack as a direct assault on Kazakhstan’s energy infrastructure. Expert Perspectives: Overreaction or Serious Threat? While officials issued conflicting statements, financial analyst Rasul Rysmambetov urged against panic. Writing on his Telegram channel ArtFinanze, he dismissed talk of a 30% reduction in pumping volumes as an "overreaction." However, he acknowledged that the attack exposed the risks of Kazakhstan’s reliance on foreign transit routes. "Geopolitical and other risks when exporting through third countries can easily double. It’s too early to panic; there are few catastrophic scenarios at this stage. But if attacks on infrastructure continue, it will become increasingly difficult to protect the underwater pipeline system, especially considering the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s recent losses. Kazakhstan’s oil facilities have been largely spared so far, but there’s no guarantee this will continue. Contrary to popular belief, the fact that companies like Chevron are involved won’t deter anyone; on the contrary, such infrastructure can be used to exert pressure on entire countries," he warned. Kazakhstan’s Dilemma: Dependence on Russian Routes While experts downplay immediate consequences, Kazakhstan’s vulnerability is undeniable. Calls to boost domestic petrochemical production to reduce dependence on foreign pipelines remain largely aspirational. Meanwhile, efforts to diversify oil export routes have yielded little progress. Currently, 93% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports pass through Russian territory, leaving the country with limited alternatives: Caspian Pipeline Consortium...

Russia Politics Ukraine

What Awaits Central Asia When the War in Ukraine Ends?

U.S. President Donald Trump seems resolute in his goal to end, or at least freeze, the war in Ukraine. To achieve such an ambitious objective, he is using a strategy of gradually normalizing relations with Russia, with his recent talks with Russian leader Vladimir Putin playing an important part. But how will Trump’s Russia policy impact Central Asia – a region that has traditionally been in Moscow’s geopolitical orbit, but is now aiming to develop closer ties with the West? Ever since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, on February 24, 2022, Kazakhstan – the region’s largest country – has been offering its services as a mediator. Astana hoped to eventually host peace talks between Russian and Ukrainian representatives. Such a possibility, at least at this point, does not seem very realistic, given that Putin and Trump are reportedly scheduled to meet in Saudi Arabia, and Kyiv and Moscow still refuse to negotiate directly. In the month since Trump returned to the White House, he has not focused on Central Asia. That, however, does not mean that Kazakhstan, as well as the other Central Asian countries, will not play a significant role in the post-war period. Several Russian analysts claim that Washington’s ultimate goal is to “turn Russia against China” and use Moscow as an instrument against Beijing in a potential new Cold War between the United States and the People’s Republic. Given the strategic importance of Central Asia for both Russia and China, in the long term, the region could very well become a theater for various proxy conflicts. For the time being, however, such a scenario does not seem very probable, as there is no strong anti-Chinese sentiment in Russia, and Central Asian nations are determined to continue pursuing their “multi-vector” foreign policies, rather than picking a side in global conflicts. Thus, once the Ukraine war comes to an end, regional actors will undoubtedly seek to strengthen their political, economic, and military positions, aiming to avoid being involved in another Great Game. Although economic indicators in Central Asia are trending upwards in many respects, higher wages in areas such as construction and the broader services sector can still be earned outside the region. Although Russia has traditionally been the top destination for Central Asian migrants, that might soon change. Faced with the growing anti-migrant sentiment that came as a result of the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in 2024, and the fact that Russia is actively recruiting labor migrants to fight in Ukraine, many of them are expected to look for new destinations, where they can find safer conditions and better opportunities. A post-war Ukraine could be one of them. According to Vasily Voskoboynik, President of the All-Ukrainian Association of Companies for International Employment, in 2023 Ukraine needed 4.5 million migrant workers, while the International Organization for Migration and the International Labor Organization believe that it will need 8.2 million laborers. In Voskoboynik’s view, it is necessary to consider countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, and India, as...

Russia Migration Ukraine Migrants prisoners Migrant Rights

Russia May Impose Stricter Rules on Central Asian Migrants

New immigration regulations in Russia could affect millions of Central Asian migrants. A proposed bill from the Russian Ministry of Education would require migrant children to pass a Russian language test. Those who fail would be required to enroll in a three-month language program, funded by their parents. If a child does not attend the required language classes, regional authorities will investigate the family’s living conditions and report the case to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Parents who fail to ensure their child meets the language requirements could face administrative penalties. As of September 1, 2024, nearly four million Central Asian migrants were officially living in Russia. With tightening immigration policies in Russia, the challenges facing Central Asian migrant workers continue to grow. According to a recent survey by the FOCUS Alliance of Euro-Asian Sociologists, most Kyrgyz citizens believe that working conditions for migrants in Russia will worsen significantly in the near future.

Russia Ukraine Crime investigation

New Arrests Made in Moscow Over Russian General’s Killing

Batukhan Tochiyev and Ramazan Padiyev have been detained in connection with the assassination of Russian General Igor Kirillov, head of the Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense (RCBD) Forces. According to a report by RIA Novosti, the arrests were announced by Svetlana Petrenko, the official representative of the Investigative Committee. “Based on the collected evidence, Tochiyev and Padiyev have been charged with carrying out a terrorist act as part of an organized group under Article 205 of the Russian Criminal Code. The court has been petitioned to place them under detention,” Petrenko said. Previously, The Times of Central Asia reported that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSS) had arrested another suspect, Akhmadzhon Kurbonov, a 1995-born Uzbek citizen. According to the investigation, Tochiyev and Padiyev rented a hostel room in the Moscow region for Kurbonov, who is alleged to have carried out the attack. Kurbonov was apprehended while attempting to flee after the bombing. Petrenko added that the authorities are continuing their investigation in collaboration with the FSS and Ministry of Internal Affairs to identify the individuals responsible for planning and organizing the attack. The suspects are believed to have operated under the guidance of a still-unknown curator. The Basmanny Court of Moscow has ordered the detention of Tochiyev and Padiyev until February 17. General Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Major Ilya Polikarpov, were killed on December 17 at approximately 6:00 a.m. when a bomb concealed in a scooter exploded near the entrance of a residential building on Ryazansky Prospekt as they exited the building. Kurbonov was detained the following day. According to investigators, he claimed he'd been acting on the orders of Ukrainian special services and that he was promised $100,000 and relocation to a European Union country in exchange for carrying out the attack. Authorities are now focused on uncovering the broader network behind the plot, which they believe was orchestrated as part of a larger plan by external forces.