• KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
29 August 2026

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 1869

August 14 Blackout: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Continue to Dispute Its Cause

The blame game over Central Asia’s August 14 blackout continues. Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov says the large-scale blackout began with the shutdown of two generating units at the Toktogul Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) in Kyrgyzstan. Bishkek does not dispute that the failure occurred but rejects the claim that it was the direct cause of the subsequent outages across several countries. Akkenzhenov identified the events in Kyrgyzstan as the starting point of the emergency. According to him, the initial disturbance occurred on August 14 at 2:37 p.m. Kazakhstan time, or 3:37 p.m. in Kyrgyzstan, when generating units No. 1 and No. 2 at the Toktogul HPP went offline. The loss of generation altered operating conditions in Central Asia’s interconnected power system and led to a redistribution of power flows in southern Kazakhstan. A government commission in Kazakhstan is expected to make the final determination. Kazakhstan’s grid operator KEGOC had earlier provided a more detailed chronology. At 2:37 p.m., three 500 kV transmission lines tripped, separating southern Kazakhstan and the Central Asian grid from the rest of Kazakhstan’s power system. About 2,810 MW of consumer load was temporarily cut off. KEGOC later said that immediately beforehand, two generating units at the Toktogul HPP, with a combined capacity of about 600 MW, had gone offline. The resulting changes in power flows overloaded Kazakhstan’s North–East–South transmission corridor, triggering emergency protection systems. Akkenzhenov said the protection systems had worked effectively and praised KEGOC’s response. Kazakhstan’s power system was restored in approximately 2.5 hours. Kyrgyzstan acknowledges that the two units went offline. The country’s Energy Ministry described the incident as the “initial disturbance” in the interconnected power system, but stressed that the first event in an emergency sequence cannot automatically be considered the cause of all subsequent outages. According to its account, by 3:55 p.m. Kyrgyzstan time — 2:55 p.m. in Kazakhstan — the frequency in the interconnected power system had returned to the normal 50 Hz. At that point, Kyrgyzstan was also supplying neighboring power systems with about 250 MW. Bishkek maintains that the outage affecting the Almaty power hub occurred after normal frequency had already been restored. Kyrgyz energy officials therefore consider it premature to directly attribute all subsequent events to the failure at the Toktogul HPP. The disagreement, therefore, is less about what happened first than about the causal link between the initial failure and the chain of outages that followed. Why the Regional Grid Is Vulnerable The vulnerability is rooted in the architecture of the region’s power system itself. During the Soviet period, its power plants and high-voltage transmission lines were designed to operate as a single interconnected system rather than around today’s national borders. Energy ties weakened after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but in recent years the countries have again expanded parallel operation of their power systems. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan are connected through the Integrated Power System of Central Asia. Cross-border power flows are coordinated by the Energia Coordinating Dispatch Center in Tashkent. Hydropower in Kyrgyzstan and...

Uzbekistan’s Reported Chinese Jet Deal in a Changing Arms Market

China’s J-10CE could become Uzbekistan’s first new combat fighter in decades that was designed neither in Russia nor the Soviet Union. This summer, defense publications and analysts reported that Tashkent had allegedly already received the first aircraft and could eventually acquire 24 jets. Neither Uzbekistan nor China has confirmed the deal. If the reports prove accurate, the purchase would mark a notable shift for a region whose armed forces still rely heavily on Soviet- and Russian-made equipment. For decades, Russia was the natural source of new weapons, spare parts and maintenance. Its position is no longer unchallenged. China can offer combat aircraft and air-defense systems, Turkey has established itself in the drone market, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are developing their own defense industries. Whether or not the reports prove accurate, they point to two broader trends: Central Asian countries are increasingly looking beyond Russia for newer military technology, while some are also trying to produce more equipment at home. Shadow Purchase In July, reports emerged of the alleged delivery of four J-10CEs to Uzbekistan. The aircraft is the export version of the Chinese J-10C multirole fighter manufactured by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. Its export variant has already been purchased by Pakistan. Subsequent reports spoke of a possible contract for 24 aircraft and of Uzbek pilots undergoing training in China. Uzbek news outlet Kun.uz attempted to verify the claims and contacted the country’s Ministry of Defense. The ministry responded that it had no information it could provide on the matter. Chinese authorities and manufacturers have also made no public announcement of a sale. Nevertheless, throughout the summer, reports of Uzbekistan purchasing J-10CEs have refused to die down. Russian Weapons Remain the Backbone of Existing Arsenals Uzbekistan inherited a combat aircraft fleet from the Soviet Union built primarily around MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters. These aircraft were developed in the Soviet era, and after the collapse of the USSR, Russia remained the main source of compatible spare parts, weapons, repairs, and upgrades. The reports about the J-10CE challenge this established model. A new fighter comes with a different weapons, maintenance and training ecosystem. Over time, this creates dependence on a new supplier. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, Russian exports of major arms in 2021–2025 were 64% lower than during the previous five-year period. Russia’s share of global arms exports fell from 21% to 6.8%, leaving it the world’s third-largest supplier after the United States and France. Those figures do not mean that China has replaced Russia as Central Asia’s dominant arms supplier. Russia retains a strong position, above all because of the equipment Central Asian militaries already operate. Kazakhstan is perhaps the clearest example. According to SIPRI data for 2021–2025, Russia accounted for 83% of Kazakhstan’s imports of major arms. Spain accounted for 7.9% and France for 3.6%. Kazakhstan operates Russian Su-30SM fighters, as well as helicopters, armored vehicles and air-defense systems. Any abrupt change in procurement policy would raise questions over the compatibility of ammunition, communications systems, maintenance, and the training of crews...

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan Coordinate on Nuclear Plant Safety

Uzbekistan is building its first nuclear power plant and preparing a second, while Kazakhstan intends to build at least three. Central Asia’s two largest economies are entering nuclear power at almost the same time. Even before their first reactors come online, the two countries are beginning to coordinate on safety and environmental monitoring, including potential transboundary impacts. On August 21, representatives of the two countries met in Tashkent and agreed on the main areas of further cooperation, including a road map and follow-up steps. The meeting came four days after a new announcement by Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. On August 17, he said preparations were under way for a second nuclear power plant, although the country’s first nuclear complex in the Jizzakh region is only at the initial stage of construction. The location, capacity, timetable, and technology partner for the new plant have yet to be announced. Uzbekistan’s nuclear project has expanded considerably over the past two years. In 2024, Tashkent and Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom agreed to build a small nuclear power plant with six 55 MW RITM-200N reactors. The configuration was later revised to an integrated plant in the Forish district of the Jizzakh region, comprising two large VVER-1000 units and two small RITM-200N reactors. The complex will have a total capacity of about 2.1 GW. Construction formally began on June 4, 2026, when concrete was poured for the first reactor unit. A technical launch of the first small reactor is planned for late 2029, while the first large unit is expected to begin operating in 2033. The entire complex is expected to be operational by 2035. Official projections of annual generation range from about 15.4 billion to 17.2 billion kWh. Rapidly growing electricity demand is driving discussion of a second plant. Uzbekistan needs more generating capacity as industry and new urban projects grow and the population approaches 40 million. Natural gas remains the backbone of power generation, but the government is also expanding solar and wind energy. Nuclear power is intended to provide baseload electricity around the clock, regardless of weather conditions. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer and has the world’s second-largest uranium reserves, but it currently has no operating commercial nuclear power reactors. In a nationwide referendum in October 2024, voters approved the construction of a nuclear power plant. The country’s first plant is planned near the village of Ulken on the shore of Lake Balkhash, with Rosatom selected to lead the international consortium for the project.   A nuclear industry development strategy approved in April 2026 calls for Kazakhstan to have at least three nuclear power plants by 2050. It also covers nuclear science and workforce training, along with the management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. China National Nuclear Corporation has been selected to build Kazakhstan’s second plant; in July 2025, Roman Sklyar, then the country’s first deputy prime minister, said China would also build the third. The April 2026 strategy is less specific, however, and lists small modular...

Badakhshan Fighting Raises Risks for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

In Nusay district, Badakhshan province (northeast Afghanistan), fighting began around August 11 between Taliban forces and followers of Juma Khan Fateh, a local Taliban commander of ethnic Tajik origin who had resisted efforts to disarm his network. The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project (ACLED) identifies the immediate trigger as an attempt to remove military equipment and vehicles from areas under Fateh’s control, amid longer-running tensions over disarmament, local authority, and control of gold mining. Similar disputes over gold mines have repeatedly produced clashes between local commanders and Taliban forces since 2021. Fateh surrendered on August 17 after nearly a week of fighting. By August 22, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said his case was being prepared for trial. Post-surrender reporting also indicated weapons seizures and disarmament activity around Fateh-linked sites and associates, although the scale of the reported seizures and disarmament remained incompletely verified. The Fateh episode came amid a broader increase in armed instability in Badakhshan during 2026. ACLED recorded 22 anti-Taliban armed-opposition events in the province from January through July, compared with four from June through December 2025. In July, one opposition group temporarily seized the Yaftal-e Sufla district headquarters, while the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) reportedly fought Taliban forces in Zebak. The Yaftal-e Sufla and Zebak operations were separate from the Fateh confrontation, and there is no credible evidence of coordination with Fateh’s network. Fateh’s surrender ended the immediate confrontation, while separate armed-opposition activity in Badakhshan continued. The fighting has already had a direct cross-border consequence for Tajikistan. Nusay lies opposite Tajikistan’s Darvoz district. On August 13, gunfire from the Afghan side crossed into Darvoz, killing a 21-year-old woman inside her home and damaging residential property. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry lodged a formal protest, saying the fighting had violated the country’s airspace and demanding respect for the state border and measures to prevent a recurrence. The Afghan Foreign Ministry acknowledged the death and expressed regret while blaming “disruptive and opportunistic elements.” The one confirmed limited incident does not show that the conflict has extended into Tajikistan on a sustained basis, but it makes the cross-border dimension more than hypothetical. Tajikistan shares a 1,374-kilometer frontier with Afghanistan, much of it facing Afghan Badakhshan. Dushanbe had already treated this border as a persistent security problem. In late November 2025, two attacks launched from Afghanistan’s territory killed five Chinese nationals and wounded five others in Tajikistan, which then instituted tighter border measures, while the Taliban pledged to cooperate on security and investigations. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is also implementing a program to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan frontier with weapons, equipment, and other border-protection means. Its 2026–27 implementation phase antedates the present fighting. A 2026 Security Council monitoring report said Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was active mainly in northern Afghanistan, particularly Badakhshan, and was developing cells capable of projecting a regional threat, with Central Asia remaining a key focus. It also reported concern in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the role of their nationals in the organization and the possible...

Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan Target $1 Billion in Trade as Investment and Transit Links Expand

Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have set a target of increasing bilateral trade to $1 billion by 2030, as economic ties expand from a relatively low base into vehicle manufacturing, oil and gas, investment, and transport across the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s state visit to Uzbekistan on August 23–24 added new projects to that list. The two presidents signed a Treaty on Eternal Friendship and a program aimed at increasing bilateral trade to $1 billion by 2030. Political relations, meanwhile, have been moving faster than economic ties. In 2023, the two countries established the Supreme Interstate Council, and a year later they signed a Treaty on Allied Relations. The latest trip was Aliyev’s third state visit to Uzbekistan in five years and his seventh visit overall. Aliyev said ahead of his trip to Tashkent that bilateral trade more than tripled in 2025 to reach $795 million. Uzbekistan’s Center for Economic Research and Reforms, however, reported a much lower total of $307.3 million for the same year. Neither side has explained the discrepancy, which may reflect different definitions of trade. Sustaining growth toward the $1 billion target will require broader trade and more joint production, including goods aimed at markets beyond the two countries. From Trade to Investment The Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan Investment Company is intended to help turn some of these plans into operating businesses. Established in 2023 with $500 million in capital, the company finances projects in both countries. Some areas of cooperation have already reached the production stage. Azerbaijan’s Azermash CP works with Uzbek manufacturers to produce Chevrolet and Isuzu vehicles in Azerbaijan. By July, more than 10,700 Chevrolet vehicles and 275 Isuzu buses had been produced. More than 130 commercial entities with Uzbek investment are registered in Azerbaijan. During the latest visit, the two sides opened a gypsum plant. They also laid foundations for five SOCAR filling stations and a silver-ore enrichment plant. For Baku, the interest in Uzbekistan is understandable. With a population of more than 38 million, Uzbekistan is Central Asia’s most populous country. The Uzbek economy is growing rapidly, while the authorities are opening more sectors to private and foreign capital. For Azerbaijani companies, this offers access to a market considerably larger than their own as well as a foothold in Central Asia. For Tashkent, Azerbaijan offers investment and expertise in the oil and gas sector. SOCAR, the Azerbaijani state oil company, has been operating in Uzbekistan for years. A joint venture between Uzbekistan’s O‘ZLITINEFTGAZ and the Azerbaijani company’s research institute has been operating since 2016. Cooperation is now gradually moving from engineering services toward much larger exploration and potential production projects. The main project is on the Ustyurt Plateau in western Uzbekistan. BP joined the project in May 2026 with a 40% stake, while SOCAR, which is the operator, and Uzbekneftegaz each hold 30%. Total investment could reach around $2 billion if commercially viable reserves are found and the project proceeds to development. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the project envisages extensive seismic...

Kazakhstan Peace Talks: Basel Al-Haj Jassem on Syria and the South Caucasus

Basel Al-Haj Jassem, a Syrian political adviser and analyst, has worked on the Middle East, the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia for many years, with a particular focus on peace processes. He is the author of the Arabic-language book Kazakhstan and the Syrian Astana, which examines Kazakhstan’s role in the Astana Process on Syria. While Al-Haj Jassem was in Kazakhstan as an observer of the first elections to the country’s new unicameral parliament, the Kurultai, The Times of Central Asia spoke with him about Kazakhstan’s international standing and the country’s possible role as a mediator in the South Caucasus and the Middle East. He described the elections as well organized and “a new stage in the development of Kazakhstan’s political system,” although he added that “in a year it will already be possible to give a more concrete assessment of the Kurultai’s work.” TCA: You have known Kazakhstan for many years and have observed the country from different professional perspectives. In your view, how have Kazakhstan’s role and international standing changed over the past two decades? Al-Haj Jassem: I think the changes that have taken place in Kazakhstan over the past two decades go far beyond economic growth or the expansion of foreign relations. The country has gradually moved from being an important Central Asian state to one whose political and diplomatic presence extends beyond its immediate geographical surroundings. Several factors have contributed to this: its geographical position, balanced relations with Russia, China, the West, and the Islamic world, as well as its ability to avoid becoming rigidly aligned with opposing political blocs. But what I consider most important is that Kazakhstan has built a reputation as a state capable of maintaining dialogue with different parties, including those that are sometimes opposed to one another. TCA: One of your books is devoted to Kazakhstan and the Astana Process on Syria. That experience demonstrated Kazakhstan’s potential as a venue for negotiations. What further role could the country play in the Middle East? Al-Haj Jassem: The experience of the Astana Process on Syria was important because it showed that a state that is not itself a direct party to a conflict can provide space for dialogue that cannot be achieved elsewhere. Kazakhstan, of course, was not a party determining decisions on the Syrian issue, but it created a political and diplomatic environment that helped maintain channels of communication between participants who found it difficult to sit at the same table. I think this experience can be developed further, but it is not necessarily a matter of literally reproducing the Astana Process model. Today, the Middle East needs different forms of mediation, including quiet diplomacy, humanitarian initiatives, and support for dialogue between religious and cultural communities. Kazakhstan’s advantage is that it carries no colonial legacy in the region and is not part of traditional intra-Arab rivalries. At the same time, the country maintains good relations with various Arab and Islamic states. This gives Kazakhstan a certain freedom of action, particularly in situations where a settlement requires, above...