International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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United Nations

Kyrgyzstan Wins First-Ever Seat on UN Security Council

Kyrgyzstan has been elected to the United Nations Security Council for the 2027–2028 term, securing a non-permanent seat after a closely watched contest for the Asia-Pacific Group’s vacancy. The election marks the first time Kyrgyzstan will serve on the Security Council, the UN’s most powerful body for matters of international peace and security. It also returns Central Asian representation to the Council for the first time in nearly a decade, following Kazakhstan’s 2017–2018 term. Kyrgyzstan defeated the Philippines for the Asia-Pacific seat in the General Assembly vote, joining the incoming class of non-permanent members that will serve two-year terms from January 1, 2027, through December 31, 2028. The 2026 election filled five seats: one for Africa, one for Asia-Pacific, one for Latin America and the Caribbean, and two for the Western European and Others Group. The contest went to four rounds of voting before Kyrgyzstan secured the required two-thirds majority, defeating the Philippines by 142 votes to 49. Austria, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe were also elected to the Council. Kyrgyzstan will replace Pakistan when the new term begins. The Asia-Pacific race was the only contest involving Central Asia, but the wider election produced a surprise in the Western European and Others Group, where Germany failed to win one of the two available seats. Austria and Portugal were elected instead. For Bishkek, the result represents a major diplomatic breakthrough. Kyrgyz officials had framed the campaign as an opportunity to give greater voice to states that have never served on the Council, particularly landlocked and mountainous countries facing security, development, climate, and connectivity challenges. As of 2027, 59 UN member states will still have never served on the Security Council. President Sadyr Japarov had urged world leaders to support Kyrgyzstan’s bid, framing it as a chance to give small, developing, and landlocked states a stronger voice on the UN Security Council. Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev also framed the campaign in broader multilateral terms, arguing that smaller states need a greater role in responding to global security challenges. “No single state can address modern-day threats alone; that is why multilateral diplomacy is critical,” he said, speaking before the vote. The victory also carries broader regional significance. Central Asia sits at the intersection of several issues regularly discussed at the Security Council, including Afghanistan, counterterrorism, water security, transnational crime, and regional stability. Kyrgyzstan’s term is expected to give the region a more direct platform in Council deliberations. The seat will not give Kyrgyzstan veto power, which is held only by the five permanent members. But non-permanent members vote on resolutions, sanctions, peacekeeping mandates, and statements, and each member holds the rotating presidency of the Council for one month during its term. For Central Asia, the timing is significant. Afghanistan remains a recurring security concern, while terrorism, border security, narcotics trafficking, and climate-related instability all carry direct regional implications. Kyrgyzstan’s presence will give Bishkek a formal role in debates that often affect the region but are usually shaped by larger powers. The Security...

U.S.-Central Asia Engagement

Washington Links TRIPP and Jackson-Vanik Repeal in Push Toward Central Asia

A notable strategic shift is taking place in U.S. foreign policy, one that could have a long-term impact on the economic architecture of Eurasia. After decades in which Central Asia and the South Caucasus were viewed largely through the lens of security, counterterrorism, and competition with Russia and China, Washington is increasingly emphasizing trade, investment, transport routes, and access to critical minerals. One of the clearest signs of this shift came during a recent hearing before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where Senator Steve Daines and Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed the implementation of the U.S.-backed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) framework, as well as the need to remove the outdated Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions. At first glance, these may appear to be separate issues: the peace process in the South Caucasus and Cold War-era trade legislation. In reality, however, they are closely connected. Together, they point to a broader U.S. effort to link Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Western markets through trade, transport, and investment. In recent years, Republican Senator Steve Daines of Montana has emerged as one of the most active advocates of expanding America’s presence in Central Asia. As co-chair of the Senate Central Asia Caucus and one of the leading proponents of legislative efforts to repeal Jackson-Vanik restrictions, Daines has consistently argued for stronger trade and investment ties between the United States and the countries of the region. During the hearing, Daines placed particular emphasis on the importance of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, describing it as one of the most underappreciated diplomatic efforts of recent years. According to the senator, resolving the conflict could open the door to a large-scale economic transformation of the wider region. Particularly noteworthy was his reference to a geopolitical concept associated with former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. In Daines’ formulation, Central Asia represents the “bottle,” while Azerbaijan serves as its “cork.” Opening transport routes through the South Caucasus, he argued, would allow flows of oil, gas, critical minerals, and other resources to move toward Western markets rather than toward Russia, China, or Iran. Daines said this approach helped address some of the most difficult issues in the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement process and laid the foundation for what he called a “landmark agreement” after nearly four decades of conflict. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described TRIPP as an initiative capable of fundamentally transforming Armenia’s economic role in the region. According to Rubio, the framework not only addresses the issue of transport access, which had long been a source of disagreement between Baku and Yerevan, but also creates an opportunity for Armenia to become a major trade and logistics hub connecting Europe and Asia. Rubio described TRIPP as central to the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement framework, emphasizing that the project could generate substantial investment flows and attract U.S. companies to infrastructure and transport projects across the region. Washington’s argument is that trade, transit, investment, and infrastructure can give the political settlement a stronger economic base. Unlike many previous peace...

Middle Powers

Kazakhstan’s Middle Power Moment: From Balancer to Regional Organizer

In “What Is the Status of Middle Powers?”, Michel Duclos of the Institut Montaigne presents Kazakhstan as a test case for whether middle powers can still influence outcomes in an era of intensifying great power rivalry. Writing after the Regional Ecological Summit in Astana, which brought together nine heads of state around President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Duclos notes that Kazakhstan “plays a leadership role” among states navigating pressures between China and Russia. He also argues that Tokayev, drawing on his experience as a former senior UN official, is seeking to elevate Kazakhstan into an intermediate power on multilateral issues. That is a useful lens for understanding Tokayev’s foreign policy. Rather than treating Kazakhstan’s position between larger powers as a liability, he has sought to turn geography, energy resources, logistics, diplomatic reliability, and convening power into regional agency. The result is an emerging model of middle power leadership rooted not in confrontation, but in coordination, credibility, and practical cooperation. That assessment places Tokayev’s foreign policy in a broader category than traditional balancing. Kazakhstan’s importance does not rest only on its raw assets — uranium, oil, minerals, logistics, or its position along Central Asian land routes. It also rests on how Astana uses those assets: as a convening state, a reliable partner, and a practical organizer of regional cooperation. Under Tokayev, multi-vector diplomacy has become less a defensive posture than an operating strategy, aimed at keeping Kazakhstan open to multiple partners while building platforms others have reason to use. In that sense, Kazakhstan is being presented not simply as a state located between great powers, but as one increasingly able to give structure to the space between them. Moving from “balancer” to “regional organizer” is only possible if Kazakhstan turns geography, resources, and diplomacy into practical systems others have reason to use. The clearest operational evidence of this shift is transport. Kazakhstan’s geography has often been described as a constraint. It is landlocked, vast, and positioned between larger powers. But the growth of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor, allows Astana to recast that geography as a strategic advantage. In the first quarter of 2026, 125 container trains transited Kazakhstan via the Middle Corridor, a 34.4% increase from the same period in 2025. The Times of Central Asia also reported that freight volumes along the route through Kazakhstan have grown more than fivefold over seven years, from 0.8 million tons to 4.5 million tons annually. These figures show that Kazakhstan is not simply selling potential; it is building operational value into the corridor. This is where the idea of Kazakhstan as a regional organizer becomes concrete. A balancing state tries to avoid overdependence on any single power. An organizing state builds systems that others have a reason to use. If Kazakhstan can make the Middle Corridor faster, more predictable, more digitalized, and more commercially reliable, it is not merely balancing Russia, China, Europe, Türkiye, and the South Caucasus. It is creating connective tissue between them. World Bank analysis suggests that infrastructure...

Counter-Terrorism

Turkmenistan Seeks Bigger Counter-Terrorism Role in Central Asia

Turkmenistan wants to host a United Nations counter-terrorism facility that would contribute to cooperation among Central Asian countries, whose security concerns have included online radicalization, instability in Afghanistan, and the repatriation of citizens from Syria and Iraq. Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov discussed the initiative with Alexandre Zouev, a Russian diplomat who is acting under-secretary-general of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), during a visit by Turkmenistan’s top diplomat to the United States last week. In the May 28 meeting, the Turkmen delegation provided details about the plan to establish a program office of UNOCT in Ashgabat, according to the ministry. It said the office “will become a key analytical and expert platform in the region.” Such offices in host countries have a minimum of three staff members, for example, the office head, a project manager, and an administrator, and often rely on funding from the host nation, according to UNOCT, which is based at U.N. headquarters in New York. The offices focus on “capacity-building projects and activities” with a focus on the country or region, the office said. In 2022, U.N. counter-terrorism officials helped to set up what they described as an early warning network with representatives from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The mechanism promotes regional information-sharing. Besides governments, it involves civil society organizations and academics. Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan share borders with Afghanistan, where continuing security problems have slowed Central Asian efforts to develop trade routes in deals with the ruling Taliban movement. Chinese interests in Tajikistan have been targeted by cross-border attacks in the past year. Tajikistan’s security forces have stepped up patrols on the border, which is challenging to monitor because of the remote, mountainous terrain. Several Central Asian countries have also organized the repatriation of their citizens from conflict zones in Iraq and Syria. Former male fighters who joined Islamic militant groups can face close monitoring and jail time, while women and children tend to be viewed as victims in need of humanitarian support. U.N. officials have also collaborated on counter-terrorism concerns in Central Asia with the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a regional group that includes Russia and has focused heavily on the threat of extremist infiltration from Afghanistan.

EAEU

As Armenia Looks West, Could Uzbekistan Move Closer to the EAEU?

Armenia’s increasingly uncertain future within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) appears to have entered a new phase. On May 29, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan issued a joint statement calling on Yerevan to clarify whether it intends to pursue deeper integration with the European Union or remain committed to the Eurasian bloc. The four leaders announced that members of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council would present a report at the next meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in December 2026 outlining the possible consequences of suspending Armenia’s participation in the EAEU treaty framework. “We share the view that the Republic of Armenia should, within the shortest possible timeframe, hold a nationwide referendum on joining the European Union or continuing its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union,” the statement said. Speaking to journalists after the summit in Astana, Russian President Vladimir Putin drew parallels between Armenia’s current trajectory and the developments that preceded the crisis in Ukraine. “I have mentioned this before: the crisis in Ukraine began with attempts to join the EU,” Putin said. He added that significant differences between European and EAEU standards, particularly in agriculture and industry, make simultaneous participation in both integration projects difficult. “Combining the two is practically impossible,” Putin said. “Therefore, we would be forced to curtail much of our economic integration work with Armenia.” The following day, Russia recalled its ambassador to Armenia for consultations amid Yerevan’s growing engagement with the European Union. According to Russian political analyst Arkady Dubnov, the move was a clear diplomatic signal of Moscow’s dissatisfaction with the pro-European course pursued by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government and indicated a downgrading of bilateral relations. Dubnov also argued that Armenia’s representative at the Astana summit, Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan, avoided harsher criticism from Putin partly because of the position taken by Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. “Kazakhstan itself signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union in 2020,” Dubnov noted, suggesting that arguments about Armenia’s European integration harming the EAEU are largely political rather than economic in nature. One recent poll appears to reinforce confidence within Armenia’s ruling camp. A survey conducted ahead of parliamentary elections indicates that Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party could secure nearly 65% of decided voters, positioning it for a convincing victory and a substantial parliamentary majority. Against that backdrop, Moscow’s pressure on Yerevan may be less about influencing the outcome of Armenia’s elections than about preparing for a longer-term strategic realignment. Supporters of Pashinyan increasingly associate his political project with closer ties to Europe, a perception reinforced not only by European leaders but also by U.S. President Donald Trump, who recently expressed support for Pashinyan’s re-election campaign. For his part, Pashinyan appears focused on a broader regional recalibration. Speaking via Facebook Live on May 31, he emphasized the importance of normalizing relations with neighboring states. “I am convinced that we will achieve the goal of normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye,” he said. “This means that a balanced and balancing...

Nuclear Diplomacy

Kazakhstan Offers the IAEA a Practical Option on Iran

On May 26, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev received IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi in Astana. The meeting pointed beyond bilateral nuclear cooperation toward Kazakhstan’s possible role in wider nuclear-security problems. Tokayev welcomed a roadmap for deepening Kazakhstan’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency through 2036, alongside documents on nuclear medicine and science. Grossi’s visit also followed Kazakhstan’s referendum on its first post-independence nuclear power plant, which has widened the civilian side of the country’s nuclear profile. Iran was not the subject around which the meeting was organized, but it is the issue that gives the meeting strategic weight. In particular, Kazakhstan’s established IAEA relationship could help give nuclear diplomacy a practical form if political agreement first creates a need for technical implementation. The potential is real, but it is narrow. Any political resolution of the Iran nuclear issue turns on decisions by Tehran, Washington, Israel, regional states, and the IAEA. The parties must first agree politically on an IAEA-led arrangement for Kazakhstan to enter the scene. Tokayev’s own formulation was appropriately limited: Kazakhstan’s assistance would be a gesture of good faith, and only if appropriate international agreements exist. Its involvement would come after the political bargain, not before it. Kazakhstan’s nuclear profile begins with the Soviet nuclear testing site at Semipalatinsk, which made nuclear policy a shared public memory before it became a diplomatic profile. Between 1949 and 1989, this site became one of the central locations of the Soviet nuclear-weapons program. The Nevada–Semipalatinsk movement, founded in 1989 by Olzhas Suleimenov, turned public opposition to testing into a political force before the site was closed in August 1991. Kazakhstan’s nuclear policy still expresses a public memory of Soviet testing and its public-health consequences. That memory does not make Kazakhstani society simply anti-nuclear, but it means that the country's nuclear policy carries a sensitive history. From the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan inherited on its territory one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals. That arsenal included strategic nuclear warheads associated with intercontinental missiles and long-range bombers. Kazakhstan did not merely surrender an arsenal; it made renunciation part of its international profile. The country chose non-nuclear status, transferred the weapons to Russia, and joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state. This renunciation gave political restraint an institutional form and gave Kazakhstan a special status in nuclear affairs. That standing has also appeared in earlier Iran-related diplomacy. Kazakhstan hosted two rounds of P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran in Almaty in 2013, and in 2015 Kazatomprom supplied Iran with 60 metric tons of natural uranium as part of the internationally coordinated implementation of the JCPOA. That standing now operates most clearly through Kazakhstan’s long cooperation with the IAEA. The Tokayev-Grossi meeting and the 2026–2036 cooperation roadmap make Kazakhstan’s nuclear development part of a continuing institutional relationship. Grossi’s visit also included agreements on nuclear science, healthcare delivery, and agricultural applications under IAEA programs. Tokayev and Grossi are not improvising a political solution to Iran; they are strengthening an institutional channel through...