• KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
21 September 2026

Viewing results 13 - 18 of 1897

Space Days Kazakhstan Highlights Push Beyond Baikonur

Kazakhstan is home to Baikonur, the cosmodrome from which the Space Age began, but the country has spent three decades trying to turn that Soviet inheritance into a space sector of its own. At Space Days Kazakhstan, held on September 7–9 in Astana and Baikonur, Kazakhstan presented new satellite projects and plans for international cooperation. A day later, talks with China were announced on a separate five-satellite network for Central Asia. By 2030, Astana plans to assemble an international constellation of nine Earth-observation satellites, six of them Kazakh. The country is also upgrading its national satellite communications system, developing new Earth-observation spacecraft at home, and expanding cooperation with China and other partners. Kazakhstan still relies heavily on Russia at Baikonur, and many of its newer projects depend on foreign technology and cooperation. Nevertheless, Astana is seeking greater control over the infrastructure and spacecraft on its own territory while widening the number of countries it works with. Taking More Control at Baikonur One of the clearest examples of Kazakhstan’s attempt to gain more control over its space sector is Baiterek, a joint project with Russia that dates back to 2004. The original agreement called for a new launch complex at Baikonur. But the project spent much of the next two decades being redesigned as Russia changed the rocket it planned to use. Baiterek was first intended for the Angara rocket, then Zenit, and finally Soyuz-5, known in Kazakhstan as Sunkar. Each change brought further delays. After launch targets in 2023, 2024, and 2025 slipped, Soyuz-5 finally lifted off from Baikonur on April 30, 2026. The rocket carried a dummy payload on the first flight in the test program. The launch mattered less for what it carried than for what it represented. Kazakhstan now operates the launch pad and ground infrastructure used by Baiterek, giving it a larger role at a cosmodrome long dominated by Russia. But Russia still builds the rocket. That reflects the wider relationship at Baikonur. The cosmodrome remained on Kazakh territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but Russia leases it through 2050 for $115 million a year and continues to use it for its human spaceflight program. In July 2026, Baikonur was again used for an international mission to the ISS. Kazakhstan is therefore not replacing Russia at Baikonur. It is trying to take a larger role in a space complex where Russia remains deeply embedded. But launch infrastructure is only one part of Kazakhstan’s attempt to develop capabilities of its own. Increasingly, the focus is on satellites. Building Satellites at Home KazSat is the country’s national satellite communications and broadcasting system. KazSat-3 currently provides data transmission, television, and other communications services. Its planned operating life ends in late 2029. KazSat-3R is being developed as its replacement. The national operator, the Republican Center for Space Communication, invited more than 40 spacecraft manufacturers to participate in the selection process. Fourteen companies responded: two from Kazakhstan and twelve from abroad. The operator plans to cover more than half...

Kazakhstan Prepares for China Investment Forum While Pursuing U.S. AI Ties

Kazakhstan will host a major investment forum with China in Almaty on September 25, with artificial intelligence expected to feature prominently among potential new agreements. The meeting comes as Astana deepens technology cooperation with Beijing while remaining part of the U.S.-backed Pax Silica initiative. Tokayev confirmed his participation in the forum in an interview with China’s Xinhua News Agency. “This forum is intended to serve as a platform for launching new concrete economic and investment cooperation projects,” the president said. In the same interview, Tokayev outlined potential cooperation with China in AI and digital technologies, ranging from industry, mining, and energy to transport, healthcare, satellite technology, and data centers. Some projects in these areas are already being discussed with Chinese businesses. During Tokayev’s July visit to Shanghai, Kazakhstan and Chinese companies signed more than 70 commercial agreements with a stated value exceeding $15 billion. They included projects involving Huawei, robotics development, AI in the automotive industry, and the Data Center Valley in Ekibastuz, where a complex with capacity of up to 1 GW is planned. Two International Initiatives in Three Weeks On June 25, Kazakhstan became the first country in Central Asia to join Pax Silica, a U.S.-backed initiative aimed at developing trusted supply chains for the AI economy. It covers areas including semiconductors, critical minerals, computing infrastructure, energy, and advanced manufacturing. Kazakhstan also signed a joint statement with the United States on an AI Opportunity Partnership. On July 16, Kazakhstan joined 28 other countries in Shanghai in signing an agreement to establish the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO). The organization, headquartered in Shanghai, says its goals include expanding international cooperation and developing approaches to global AI governance. Its other founding participants include Brazil, China, Indonesia, Russia, and the four other Central Asian states: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Beijing is promoting wider access to AI technologies and open models, workforce development, and greater participation by developing countries in setting international rules. China is also seeking to reduce its technology sector’s dependence on U.S. components. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, has remained part of Pax Silica. Washington Raises the Question of Choosing Sides On August 14, Reuters reported that the U.S. State Department had drafted a letter for countries partnering with Washington on AI. Countries participating in both Pax Silica and the China-backed initiative could be asked to choose between the two frameworks. A U.S. official told Reuters that Washington wanted a clearer separation between the American and Chinese technology ecosystems. The report specifically identified Kazakhstan as a participant in both initiatives and said its dual participation had raised concerns in Washington. At the time, the document remained a draft. There is no public evidence that Kazakhstan has received such a demand or that Washington has formally required Astana to choose between the two initiatives. Several weeks later, Tokayev argued in his Xinhua interview against dividing technology along geopolitical lines. “AI should not become the privilege of a narrow circle of the most technologically advanced states, much less turn into a new...

Turkmenistan to Chair Group of Landlocked Developing Countries

Turkmenistan’s mission to the United Nations says the country has been elected the next chair of the Group of Landlocked Developing Countries, which consists of 32 countries facing particular trade and transit challenges because of their geography and reliance on neighboring nations. Turkmenistan will begin its two-year term as chair on January 1, 2027, after receiving unanimous support from all members of the group in a meeting at U.N. headquarters in New York on September 3, the Turkmen diplomatic mission said. Azerbaijan will become vice-chair of the group of landlocked developing countries. The current chair and vice-chair are Bolivia and Kyrgyzstan, respectively. The new leadership will be endorsed at a ministerial-level meeting at the U.N. on September 24, according to the Turkmen mission. It said that Turkmenistan will take the lead in coordinating the group’s activities on pressing issues such as “energy and transport connectivity.” A key priority for the group is implementation of the Awaza Programme of Action for 2024–2034, a U.N.-backed plan that promotes infrastructure investment, deeper integration into global trade networks and other measures to help the countries overcome their geographical disadvantages. The United Nations says that the group of countries often face difficulties such as reduced foreign investment, limited export options, and slower economic growth. “Without direct access to coastal ports, landlocked developing countries must rely on transit countries to connect them with international markets. This can lead to increased transportation trade costs, delays in the movement of goods, and susceptibility to political and economic instability in transit countries,” the U.N. says. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are also in the group. While Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have coastlines on the Caspian Sea, they are still classified as landlocked countries by the United Nations because the Caspian, an enclosed body of water, doesn’t have direct access to the world's oceans.

Central Asian States Call for New Arms Controls as Nuclear Framework Weakens

Foreign ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have called for new, verifiable arms control mechanisms to prevent a nuclear arms race, warning that international disarmament efforts are losing ground. In a joint statement issued on September 8 to mark 20 years since the signing of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, the five governments expressed concern over stalled disarmament, the end of key agreements, and the modernization of nuclear arsenals. They urged nuclear powers to resume negotiations. The statement comes seven months after New START, the last U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms treaty, expired on February 5. UN Secretary-General António Guterres said its expiration left the two countries without binding limits on their strategic nuclear arsenals for the first time in more than half a century. President Donald Trump has criticized New START as a “badly negotiated deal” and called instead for a new, modernized arms control treaty that would include China. The ministers also cited the failure of the Eleventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which ended without a consensus outcome on May 22. Kazakhstan had already advanced a similar position. As TCA reported, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev used the August 29 anniversary of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site’s closure to call for negotiations among nuclear powers, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and renewed multilateral action to reduce nuclear risks. Kazakhstan’s connection to the issue extends beyond diplomacy. The Soviet Union conducted 456 nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk between 1949 and 1989. Kazakhstan closed the site in 1991 and subsequently relinquished the nuclear arsenal it had inherited after the Soviet collapse. The regional treaty was signed in Semipalatinsk on September 8, 2006, and entered into force in 2009. It established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone located entirely in the Northern Hemisphere, directly bordering two nuclear-weapon states, Russia and China. That history gives Kazakhstan a distinctive place in regional nuclear diplomacy. Uzbekistan originated the proposal for the zone, presenting it at the UN General Assembly in September 1993. The September 8 statement explicitly acknowledges Uzbekistan’s initiative while crediting all five countries with establishing the zone. The statement also recognizes Kyrgyzstan for initiating the International Day for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Awareness, observed annually on March 5, and Turkmenistan for chairing the December 2024 anniversary meeting in Ashgabat. Kazakhstan has also helped coordinate cooperation beyond Central Asia. In August 2024, it hosted a conference in Astana with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs to strengthen cooperation among nuclear-weapon-free zones, following an earlier meeting in 2019. The five states also renewed their appeal for the United States to ratify a protocol providing security assurances to the region. In May 2014, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States signed the protocol on negative security assurances, committing not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the five Central Asian treaty members. The other four signatories have ratified it. Washington has not. The request is longstanding. The five governments made the same appeal...

Trade and Migrant Workers Fuel Serbia’s Growing Ties with Uzbekistan

BELGRADE – While seeking to join the European Union – a process that has been going on for nearly two decades – Serbia is also moving to build closer relations with Central Asia. After expanding cooperation with Kazakhstan earlier this year, the Southeast European nation is now looking to replicate that momentum in its relations with Uzbekistan. At first glance, the two countries seem to have little in common. Serbia is a relatively small economy with strong ties to European markets, while Uzbekistan is Central Asia’s most populous nation and one of the region’s fastest-growing economies. Yet the two states are actively expanding their cooperation. On September 8, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and his Uzbek counterpart, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, signed a joint statement establishing a strategic partnership between Belgrade and Tashkent. Uzbekistan’s leader’s visit to Serbia comes less than a year after Vucic made his first official trip to the Central Asian state. In the meantime, the Serbian government announced its plans to open an embassy in Tashkent – a move that will undoubtedly further strengthen diplomatic and economic ties between the two countries. While the economy was at the top of the agenda during Vucic and Mirziyoyev’s talks in Belgrade, the meeting also carried significant political importance for the Serbian leader. Mirziyoyev arrived in Serbia on September 7, when thousands of people gathered to attend the funeral of former Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladic. His death and the public tribute to him have reopened divisions over Serbia’s wartime legacy and further complicated its relationship with the European Union. Vucic had a long-standing reason not to attend the ceremony: he was due to meet Mirziyoyev at the airport. However, multiple opposition figures accused the Serbian leader of using Mirziyoyev’s visit as a justification for staying away, with one alleging that the visit had actually been rescheduled to give him an excuse. The following day, the two leaders, as well as Serbian and Uzbek delegations, signed 20 agreements in various fields, from digitalization and renewable energy to trade, transport, agriculture, tourism, healthcare, and culture. Vucic even hinted that Serbia aims to expand military ties with Uzbekistan. As he stressed, Belgrade plans to develop long-range ballistic missiles over the next year and has invited Uzbekistan to cooperate in this area. Meanwhile, the Southeast European nation is expected to establish direct flights between Belgrade and Tashkent within the next seven to eight months. More importantly, Serbia, which has free trade agreements with the European Union, China, Turkey, the UK, and the Eurasian Economic Union, as well as regional Balkan nations, hopes to strike such a deal with Uzbekistan. According to Jagoda Lazarevic, the country’s Minister of Internal and Foreign Trade, if the process succeeds, Serbia would become the first European country to enter into free trade talks with Uzbekistan. However, bilateral trade between the two nations remains relatively small, reaching $41.8 million in 2025. By comparison, according to data from Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade and Integration, trade between the largest Central Asian country...

Afghanistan Critical Minerals: Can Central Asia Help Unlock Them?

Central Asia is increasingly being drawn into the global competition for critical minerals. To the south lies Afghanistan, where much of the country’s substantial mineral wealth remains undeveloped. Kabul is now trying to turn those resources into an economic and diplomatic asset. Amir Khan Muttaqi, foreign minister in the Taliban government, told the Financial Times that Afghanistan would “definitely” welcome U.S. investment in mining, infrastructure, agriculture, and trade. Relations between the two countries, he said, should be viewed through the opportunities for future cooperation rather than the lens of 20 years of war. At the same time, Muttaqi invited the United States to reopen its embassy in Kabul while ruling out a return of U.S. control over Bagram Air Base. This was not an isolated overture. In mid-August, Muttaqi told The New York Times that the United States could reopen its embassy and invest in Afghanistan’s mineral resources, dams, and roads. On August 30, he told Kyodo News that Kabul was seeking to normalize relations with the United States on the basis of mutual respect and shared interests, while formal recognition remained “a matter for the next stage.” Taken together, these statements amount to a consistent diplomatic approach. Mineral resources are becoming one of the enticements the Taliban is using to offer Washington a new basis for bilateral relations: economic interests could open the way to broader engagement. Kabul Offers Resources, Washington Rejects the Pitch The timing of the offer is no coincidence. The Trump administration has significantly increased its focus on critical minerals and the resilience of supply chains. On July 30, the White House described U.S. dependence on foreign sources of critical materials as a growing risk to national security and authorized the use of Defense Production Act powers to restrict exports of certain recoverable critical minerals and materials. Ten days earlier, Trump signed an executive order aimed at strengthening defense supply chains and increasing reliance on critical materials and components sourced domestically or from allied countries. Kabul is trying to make itself relevant to this debate by presenting Afghanistan as a potential source of minerals and a destination for U.S. investment. The U.S. response, however, immediately demonstrated the limits of that strategy. On September 2, the State Department said in a written response to Voice of America that it had no plans to engage with the Taliban on developing critical mineral resources. The department pointed to the Taliban’s sanctions status and said U.S. investment could increase the financial resources available to Afghanistan’s current authorities. For Washington, the attractiveness of Afghanistan’s mineral resources cannot, for now, be separated from the political status and policies of those who control them. "$1 Trillion in Mineral Wealth" In 2007, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), working with the Afghanistan Geological Survey, conducted a major assessment of the country’s mineral resources. Researchers compiled data on known deposits and assessed the potential for undiscovered resources, covering commodities including copper, iron, gold, lithium, and rare earth elements. In 2010, a Pentagon task force put the gross value of Afghanistan’s mineral...