Tajikistan Local Politics - The Times Of Central Asia

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Internet Restrictions

Internet Restrictions in Central Asia: How the Five Countries Differ

There is no single Central Asian internet. Crossing a border can turn a freely accessible website into one that is blocked or reachable only through a virtual private network (VPN). The contrast is starkest in Turkmenistan, where years of censorship have created a black market for access to the open internet. Freedom House’s 2025 Freedom on the Net assessment covers three of the five Central Asian countries. Kyrgyzstan scored 47 out of 100 and retained its Partly Free status. Kazakhstan scored 37, while Uzbekistan scored 29; both were classified as Not Free. Turkmenistan has the most restrictive system in the region. The largest measurement study of its internet censorship to date tested 15.5 million domains and found that more than 122,000 were blocked. Researchers also identified filtering rules that inadvertently made more than 5.4 million additional domains inaccessible. Bypassing these restrictions has developed into a market of its own. In July 2025, VPN keys were being sold for around $50 a month, while access through a connection exempt from government filters cost up to $2,000. Turkmen officials were also alleged to have been involved in selling such access. Such claims are difficult to verify independently inside one of the world’s most closed countries. Even so, the market illustrates the effect of years of blocking: for some residents, a working VPN can provide access to large parts of the internet that would otherwise remain unavailable. The situation in Kazakhstan is different. The internet is far more accessible than in Turkmenistan, although the authorities also use technical controls. A study published by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) found evidence that at least 17 news websites and 73 sites for circumvention tools were blocked between June 1, 2023, and June 1, 2024. The affected sites included independent media and major VPN services. Researchers also found evidence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) man-in-the-middle attacks, in which a third party intercepts an encrypted connection between a user and a website. This can allow the third party to read or alter the data passing through the connection. Similar technology prompted an international dispute in 2019, when internet service providers in Kazakhstan instructed users to install a government-issued security certificate capable of intercepting encrypted web traffic. Major browser developers responded by blocking the certificate or preventing their software from trusting it. Kazakhstan does not, however, operate a closed network. OONI found that some circumvention tools remained accessible, unlike in Turkmenistan, where stable access to the open internet can itself be difficult. Kyrgyzstan’s online environment has traditionally been more open than those of its Central Asian neighbors, though restrictions have increased in recent years. Freedom House kept the country in the Partly Free category in 2025, lowering its score from 48 to 47. It cited the detention of journalists and activists, as well as pressure on online media. Government control has also extended to internet infrastructure. In July 2025, President Sadyr Japarov signed a decree giving state-owned operator ElCat a temporary monopoly on international internet traffic. The decree set the one-year trial...

Former Presidents

What Do Former Presidents Do? From Akayev to Nazarbayev, the Fates of Central Asia’s Ex-Leaders

Central Asia has produced remarkably few former presidents who simply retired from public life. In Kyrgyzstan, former leaders have been driven from office, prosecuted, imprisoned, or forced into exile. Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev has followed a different path, largely withdrawing from public view after losing much of his political influence. Elsewhere, some of the region’s founding presidents died in office, leaving no post-presidential career to examine. The Times of Central Asia has previously examined how political succession has developed across the region. The fate of leaders after they leave office reveals another side of that political tradition. The architect of Kyrgyzstan’s early post-Soviet political model was its first president, Askar Akayev, who remained in office until 2005. Akayev introduced democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan, but gradually tightened the pressure on his opponents as his presidency progressed. His rule was badly shaken by the Aksy shootings in 2002, which followed the prosecution of opposition lawmaker Azimbek Beknazarov and a territorial dispute with China. Akayev’s government had agreed to transfer disputed border territory to China, a decision fiercely criticized by the opposition. In March 2002, demonstrators in southern Kyrgyzstan demanded Akayev’s impeachment. Security forces opened fire during the unrest, killing several people. The shootings became one of the defining political crises of his presidency. In a 2003 referendum, Akayev significantly strengthened presidential powers at parliament’s expense. Economic hardship, unemployment, widespread corruption, and allegations of fraud in the 2005 parliamentary elections eventually helped trigger the Tulip Revolution in March of that year. Akayev had to flee, with rumors at the time claiming that he was smuggled out in the trunk of an official car, wrapped in a carpet. Criminal cases involving corruption were opened against him and members of his family in Kyrgyzstan. The authorities repeatedly sought his extradition from Russia, but were unsuccessful. After leaving Kyrgyzstan, Akayev lived in Moscow and taught at Moscow State University. In 2006, he became a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In August 2021, Akayev reappeared in Bishkek. He unexpectedly flew into the country and was immediately questioned as part of the criminal investigation into corruption surrounding the Kumtor gold mine. Afterward, he said he had come to Bishkek for a week and was prepared to assist investigators. “I came to speak honestly and sincerely about how we built Kumtor, why we built it, and what mistakes may have been made. The investigation will continue,” he said. In 2023, Kyrgyzstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office announced that the criminal prosecution of Akayev had been terminated because the statute of limitations had expired. Tajikistan’s former president Rahmon Nabiyev was also forced from power. The former Soviet politician lost power amid the country’s civil war in 1992. He died at his home in Khujand the following year, at the age of 62, reportedly from a heart attack. According to his wife, Nabiyev spent his final months in Khujand in conditions resembling house arrest and received a pension of just five rubles. While Tajikistan did not repeat the experiment of violently...

Succession

The Tradition of Power – Why Political Succession in Central Asia Follows Its Own Rules

In January 2027, Kyrgyzstan will hold a presidential election, an event that is anything but routine for the Central Asian republic. Over the past three decades, political crises, often surrounding disputed elections, have repeatedly ended in the removal of presidents. Kyrgyzstan remains an outlier in the region, although it, too, has gradually been moving towards a political model that has long become the norm across the rest of Central Asia. This year marks 35 years since the Soviet republics embarked on independent political lives following the collapse of the USSR. Yet many of the mechanisms governing the transfer of supreme power, shaped during the Soviet era, continue to define politics across the independent states. In Central Asia, three decades of independence have produced a distinctive model of political succession. The final years of the Soviet Union became known as the era of the so-called "gun-carriage race." As one ageing General Secretary after another passed away, an unwritten rule appeared to emerge: the official who chaired the state funeral commission for the deceased leader often became his successor. A remarkably similar pattern later emerged in Central Asia – first in Turkmenistan, then in Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan's first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, died in December 2006. The state funeral commission was chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Health Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, who simultaneously became acting president. It was during those funeral ceremonies that the wider public was introduced for the first time to the family of Turkmenbashi. Under the constitution, parliamentary speaker Ovezgeldy Atayev should have assumed the presidency. Instead, he was stripped of immunity and arrested, clearing the way for Berdimuhamedov to take the acting presidency. After assuming the presidency in 2007, Berdimuhamedov gradually abandoned the more eccentric elements of his predecessor's personality cult while building a political system centered on his own leadership. If Niyazov styled himself Turkmenbashi – Leader of All Turkmens – his successor adopted the title Arkadag, or Protector of the Nation. In February 2022, Berdimuhamedov unexpectedly announced that he would step down following an early presidential election scheduled for March 12. He explained the decision by saying it was time to "give the younger generation an opportunity to govern the country." Few doubted that he was referring to his son Serdar Berdimuhamedov, who by then had already occupied most of the key positions within the state hierarchy. That is precisely what happened. Serdar Berdimuhamedov became president, while his father moved to the chairmanship of the Halk Maslahaty, retaining the title of National Leader of the Turkmen People. Uzbekistan followed a similar pattern, although under different circumstances. Islam Karimov built a highly centralized presidential system that left virtually no room for political competition. This applied not only to political opponents, but also to those closest to the president. His eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, was placed under house arrest while her father was still alive. Following his death, she was convicted and remains imprisoned in Uzbekistan. When Karimov died in September 2016, reports of his death circulated for several days...

Women’s Empowerment

Tajikistan Develops Gender Equality Strategy and Expands Support for Women

Tajikistan is developing a new strategy to address gender-related social norms for 2027–2036 while expanding programs aimed at increasing women’s economic participation and cooperation with international organizations. The draft strategy was presented at a meeting organized jointly by the Committee for Women and Family Affairs under the Government of Tajikistan and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Representatives of 46 international organizations, development partners, and civil society groups took part in the discussions, the committee said in its review of activities for the first half of 2026. According to the committee, the strategy is intended to serve as the country’s main policy framework on gender equality over the next decade. It aims to address social norms that limit opportunities for women, promote greater participation in economic, political, and public life, and increase support for families. UNICEF is providing technical assistance in developing the document. The initiative builds on Tajikistan’s National Strategy for Enhancing the Role of Women through 2030, adopted in 2021. Under its 2026–2030 implementation plan, the government plans to further increase women’s participation in public administration, business, education, and civic life. It will also continue presidential quota and grant programs that support women’s education and entrepreneurship. One of the government's flagship initiatives is a presidential grant program for women entrepreneurs. This year, authorities received 945 project applications, which are currently under review. The program provides financial support for businesses in manufacturing, agriculture, handicrafts, and services, with the stated goals of creating jobs, increasing household incomes, and expanding opportunities for women-led enterprises. In 2026, Tajikistan was elected to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women for the 2027–2031 term, a development that authorities say reflects growing international recognition of the country’s work on gender equality. Despite these initiatives, violence against women remains a significant challenge. According to the U.N., more than 2,500 criminal cases involving violence against women have been opened in Tajikistan over the past five years. A national survey also found that 23% of women reported experiencing physical violence at least once, with most incidents occurring within the family.

Afghan Refugees

Tajikistan Officially Confirms Deportation of Afghan Refugees

Tajikistan’s State Committee for National Security (GKNB) has publicly commented for the first time on the deportation of Afghan citizens from the country, citing alleged violations of national law and crimes that the authorities said had sparked public outrage. The statement followed an appeal by Afghan citizen Muhammad Hakim Tursun, who criticized the deportation of his compatriots. In its response, published through the state news agency Khovar, the security service claimed that some Afghan citizens living in Tajikistan had “grossly violated the requirements of the law” despite being provided with conditions for residence, work, and education. To justify the deportations, the agency cited crime statistics that it said involved Afghan citizens and foreign nationals, without clearly explaining the time period covered or how many cases were linked specifically to Afghan refugees in Tajikistan’s Sughd region. According to the GKNB, the authorities recorded 670 cases of illegal drug trafficking, 32 cases involving membership in terrorist organizations, 15 cases of sexual violence against minors, and 594 instances of forged documents being used to obtain refugee status. The security service also reported 45 cases involving the organization of gambling and entertainment establishments and 25 cases related to ties with what it described as “destructive organizations” and attempts to destabilize the situation in the country. Particular attention in the statement was devoted to a high-profile murder case in Khujand. According to the agency, on the evening of April 30, Afghan citizen Rahmoni Muhammadumar allegedly killed local resident Aziza Vokhidova, who, according to authorities, “attempted to defend her honor and dignity.” Earlier, Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry reported the detention of the suspect. In a video released by authorities, the suspect allegedly confessed to the crime, saying he acted because of “strong sexual attraction” and stabbed the woman multiple times. Following the killing, residents of the Dehmoy jamoat in Jabbor Rasulov district told journalists that their Afghan neighbors had suddenly disappeared. According to witnesses, unidentified individuals transported approximately 200 to 250 refugees away in vehicles on May 4, many of whom had reportedly lived there for years. Until the publication of the GKNB statement, the authorities had not officially confirmed the mass deportation of Afghans. Officials had instead limited themselves to reminding foreigners of the need to comply with migration laws. Tajikistan has previously faced criticism over the forced return of Afghan refugees. In December 2024, UNHCR urged the authorities to halt deportations after at least 41 Afghan citizens, including 37 refugees, were returned without due process. The agency warned that forced returns to Afghanistan could violate international law and place returnees at risk. The security service stressed that more than 10,000 Afghan families who obey Tajik laws continue to reside in the country. The statement also said Tajikistan has served as a “second homeland” for several generations of Afghan citizens over the past 35 years and claimed that the state treats them “impartially.” Nevertheless, the agency emphasized that security concerns remain its top priority.

Emergency Response

Tajikistan to Gain Access to Emergency Financing Under New World Bank Project

The World Bank Group has approved a Contingent Emergency Response Project (CERP) for Tajikistan, providing the country with a financial instrument designed to enable the rapid reallocation of resources in the event of crises and emergencies. According to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Finance, the mechanism allows up to 10% of undisbursed funds from the World Bank’s current investment portfolio to be redirected annually to emergency needs. This gives the government additional flexibility in managing already allocated resources. The mechanism can be activated following an official declaration of a state of emergency. However, preparations for its use are carried out in advance. Experts note that CERP eliminates the need to seek new funding sources by enabling the rapid redeployment of existing funds. These resources can be used to procure food, water, and medical supplies, provide emergency services with necessary protective equipment, and support the agricultural sector. Assistance to households affected by crises is also provided. The mechanism forms part of the broader Rapid Response Option (RRO) framework, which allows governments to swiftly reallocate funds from ongoing projects to respond to emergencies. Tajikistan has already formally adopted this instrument. The Ministry of Finance also noted that CERP will operate in conjunction with the existing Tajikistan Preparedness and Resilience to Disasters Project. According to officials, the combined use of these instruments is expected to strengthen the country’s capacity to respond to potential risks.