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Putin Briefs Tokayev on U.S.-Russia Talks About Possible Ukraine Deal

Russian President Vladimir Putin has updated Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on U.S.-Russian talks, which have focused in recent weeks on trying to reach a settlement in the war in Ukraine. Putin and Tokayev spoke by telephone on Thursday, according to the offices of the two leaders. In the conversation, Putin “shared his assessments of the progress achieved in the dialogue between Russia and the United States,” the Kremlin said without providing details. It said the two men also discussed preparations for the May 9 commemoration in Moscow of victory over Nazi Germany in World War II, adding that Tokayev is expected to attend. Kazakhstan’s presidency said that Putin and Tokayev talked about topics including joint energy projects and “exchanged views on current international issues,” a possible reference to talks on the Ukraine war. U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff discussed Ukraine with Putin in St. Petersburg last week. American and Russian officials also negotiated in Saudi Arabia in February, in the first face-to-face meeting between the two countries since Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years earlier. Ukraine and its European allies fear the United States favors Russian negotiating positions, while Russia has ramped up accusations that some European countries are undermining any progress toward a settlement. The two sides remain far apart on key issues and U.S. President Donald Trump has expressed frustration over a conflict that he had said he would quickly resolve. Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries have tried to maintain a publicly neutral stance in the conflict. Tokayev, in particular, has emphasized the need for dialogue and welcomed a lengthy call last month between Putin and Trump. Another international priority for Kazakhstan is how to navigate Trump administration tariffs, and the government plans to send a delegation to Washington to negotiate.

Russia's War Energy Ukraine

Ukrainian Drone Strike Disrupts Kazakhstan’s Oil Exports

On February 17, Ukrainian drones struck the Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station, a key component of the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) in Russia’s Krasnodar region. The CPC, a 1,500-kilometer pipeline, transports crude from Kazakhstan’s Tengiz field to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, a crucial hub for global exports. The attack, confirmed by CPC operators, resulted in the temporary shutdown of the Kropotkinskaya station, the largest such facility on Russian soil. No casualties or oil spills were reported. Ukrainian sources, including the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and Special Operations Forces (SOF), claimed responsibility, citing the pipeline’s role in supporting Russia’s military-industrial complex. The strike reportedly involved seven drones armed with high-explosive warheads, significantly damaging energy infrastructure, including a gas turbine unit and a substation. Russian authorities estimated a 30–40 percent reduction in CPC throughput for the next six to eight weeks, affecting global supply chains. While CPC pipeline operators have not disclosed a precise timeline for repairs, the anticipated disruptions will inevitably place additional pressure on global energy markets. The degree of damage inflicted raises questions about the vulnerability of Russian energy infrastructure and the efficacy of existing defense systems in preventing such attacks. The CPC pipeline handles a substantial share of Kazakhstan’s oil exports. In 2023, it transported 63.5 million tons, or approximately 1.27 million barrels per day (bpd), with 90 percent of that volume originating in Kazakhstan. This pipeline disruption translates into a projected drop in Kazakh oil flows from 1.143 million bpd to an estimated range of 0.69 to 0.80 million bpd. Consequently, Kazakhstan’s total crude exports—including volumes transported via alternative routes such as the Trans-Caspian corridor and rail—are expected to decline by up to 28.6 percent. The revenue impact could be severe given oil’s centrality to Kazakhstan’s economy. Even a short-term disruption will reverberate across multiple sectors, affecting fiscal revenues and potentially leading to a recalibration of investment strategies within the country’s energy sector. Although Kazakhstan has sought to diversify its oil export routes since 2022, alternatives remain limited. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), connecting Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea and then onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, carried just 1.8 million tons in 2023. This is but a fraction of CPC’s capacity. Other options, such as the Druzhba pipeline to Europe and rail transport, are constrained by infrastructure bottlenecks and geopolitical risks. Given these constraints, Astana has increasingly prioritized the expansion of maritime oil exports, including investments in new tankers and port facilities. However, logistical challenges, cost considerations, and geopolitical uncertainties continue to complicate Kazakhstan’s ability to execute a seamless transition away from Russian transit routes. The attack underscores the vulnerability of Russia’s energy infrastructure amid the ongoing war. Unlike previous Ukrainian strikes targeting refineries and storage depots, this is a direct hit on a critical transit corridor with transnational implications. The disruption may accelerate Astana’s long-term push for diversification, including investment in new tankers and expanded partnerships with U.S. and European firms. In light of these developments, Kazakhstan...

Caspian Pipeline Drone Attack incident Russia's War Caspian Region Oil and Gas Ukraine

Ukraine’s Drone Strike on Russian Oil Hub Sparks Concerns Over Kazakhstan’s Energy Security

On February 17, seven Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) attacked an oil transportation facility of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), targeting the Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station in Russia. Following the attack, reports emerged that the volume of oil pumped from Kazakhstan through the CPC could decrease by 30% for a period of one and a half to two months. Conflicting Reports on the Impact On February 18, Ukraine officially confirmed the strike. "Yesterday, the Ukrainian defense forces carried out a pinpoint strike on strategic facilities of the military and fuel and energy infrastructure of the Russian Federation... The Kropotkinskaya and Andriapol oil pumping stations, which played a key role in transporting fuel for the occupiers, were hit. After the strike, they were put out of action, significantly complicating the logistics of fuel supplies to the aggressor," the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated. Shortly after, Transneft, the Russian shareholder in the CPC, warned that oil pumping volumes from Kazakhstan could drop by approximately 30% due to the damage. Meanwhile, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak provided an even bleaker assessment. During a meeting with President Vladimir Putin, he stated: "We see a decrease in pumping volumes by about 30 - 40% compared to levels before the drone attack." Novak estimated that restoring the CPC infrastructure would take "several months, at least," citing the need to replace damaged Western-made equipment, including Siemens gas turbines. However, later that day, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy issued a statement disputing these claims. "Currently, there are no restrictions on Kazakh oil shipments via the CPC, and acceptance is proceeding as scheduled," the ministry said. Despite this, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov framed the attack as a direct assault on Kazakhstan’s energy infrastructure. Expert Perspectives: Overreaction or Serious Threat? While officials issued conflicting statements, financial analyst Rasul Rysmambetov urged against panic. Writing on his Telegram channel ArtFinanze, he dismissed talk of a 30% reduction in pumping volumes as an "overreaction." However, he acknowledged that the attack exposed the risks of Kazakhstan’s reliance on foreign transit routes. "Geopolitical and other risks when exporting through third countries can easily double. It’s too early to panic; there are few catastrophic scenarios at this stage. But if attacks on infrastructure continue, it will become increasingly difficult to protect the underwater pipeline system, especially considering the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s recent losses. Kazakhstan’s oil facilities have been largely spared so far, but there’s no guarantee this will continue. Contrary to popular belief, the fact that companies like Chevron are involved won’t deter anyone; on the contrary, such infrastructure can be used to exert pressure on entire countries," he warned. Kazakhstan’s Dilemma: Dependence on Russian Routes While experts downplay immediate consequences, Kazakhstan’s vulnerability is undeniable. Calls to boost domestic petrochemical production to reduce dependence on foreign pipelines remain largely aspirational. Meanwhile, efforts to diversify oil export routes have yielded little progress. Currently, 93% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports pass through Russian territory, leaving the country with limited alternatives: Caspian Pipeline Consortium...

Politics Ukraine War negotiations Russia's War Trump Administration

Trump-Putin Deal Talks: Central Asia at the Nexus of Global Power Shifts

The reported discussions this week between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin have become a central focus for global media and analysts. However, for Central Asia, the most pressing question is not when the war in Ukraine will end—an outcome that could occur as unexpectedly as the contact between U.S. and Russian leaders—but what Russia’s next move will be. The future actions of Moscow remain a primary concern for the five Central Asian countries. On February 12, Donald Trump announced via his social network, Truth Social, that he had a lengthy phone conversation with Vladimir Putin. His main message was that both leaders had agreed on the need to end the war and would take immediate action. The day before, Trump told reporters at the White House that members of his negotiating team and Putin’s representatives would meet in Munich. Despite skepticism from many analysts who anticipated a longer negotiation process, talks are already scheduled to begin on Valentine’s Day. In the same post, Trump revealed the composition of his negotiating team: “I have asked Secretary of State Marco Rubio, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, National Security Advisor Michael Waltz, and Ambassador and Special Representative Steve Witkoff to lead the negotiations.” Although the details of Trump’s proposed peace plan remain under discussion, a rough outline has emerged from various sources which involve: A freeze in fighting along the current front line. The establishment of a demilitarized zone spanning the entire 1,300-kilometer front. Deployment of a European military contingent, including UK troops, to patrol the demilitarized zone (U.S. troops will not be involved, but may provide training and logistical support). A 20-year postponement of Ukraine’s NATO membership bid in exchange for continued Western arms supplies. Recognition of Russian sovereignty over occupied territories. Security guarantees for Ukraine from European countries. A possible EU membership pathway for Ukraine by 2030. A 10-year reconstruction plan for Ukraine, funded by European countries and Russian contributions. A gradual lifting of sanctions on Russia’s energy sector over several years. Reimbursement of U.S. military aid to Ukraine through Ukrainian natural resource revenues. Presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2025, especially if a settlement is reached between Kyiv and Moscow. If Russia accepts these terms, they are likely to be included in the final draft of the agreement. Notably, Trump’s plan takes Moscow’s interests into account, though some points were reportedly rejected during the February 12 call. The depth of the proposal suggests that Trump’s team and Putin’s representatives have been in contact for some time, well before Trump’s formal inauguration as U.S. president. Trump first hinted at such talks in March 2023, when he claimed he could resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict within 24 hours of taking office. At the time, many dismissed this as election rhetoric. However, recent events suggest that he is following through on his promises. A striking example is the release of Mark Vogel, an American sentenced in Russia to 14 years in prison for marijuana possession. His return to the U.S. was part of a...

war migration Russia's War Migrants

Russian Exodus and Return: Kazakhstan Feels the Impact as War Migrants Come and Go

The mass migration of Russians following the war in Ukraine has significantly impacted Kazakhstan’s economy and social fabric. However, many Russian citizens who initially sought refuge in the country are now returning home. Adapting to Post-Soviet Countries Proves Challenging According to independent Russian demographer Alexei Raksha, Russian migrants who left their homeland after February 2022 are more likely to return from Kazakhstan than from other countries. An estimated 800,000-900,000 people left Russia following the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the first wave coming after the military campaign was launched, and the second following the announcement of a partial mobilization in September 2022, when queues on the Russian side of the Verkhny Lars border with Georgia stretched for twenty miles. Reports of graft were rife, with the police blocking the roads and demanding bribes from those attempting to flee. Free seats in cars were being sold for $1,000, with border guards charging $200 for an exit stamp. [caption id="attachment_28574" align="aligncenter" width="780"] The Georgian side of the Verkhny Lars border with Russia; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] This wave of migration left Russia with a labor shortage of some 4.8 million people. The choice of destination was often influenced by visa-free entry, ease of legalization, and the presence of acquaintances. Prices in Tbilisi skyrocketed in 2022-23, leading to a surge in evictions, resentment, and understandable fears given previous invasions that Russia would use the new diaspora as a pretext for another incursion. A similar situation occurred in Yerevan. "With the influx of Russians, rents in Yerevan doubled and, in some cases, even tripled," Ani Khachataryan, an environmental activist told TCA. Migration continued in 2023, but the number of returnees also increased. Around 45% of those fleeing Russia initially went to Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Armenia, though by 2023, that share had dropped to 32%. As of July 2024, at least 650,000 people who left Russia after it invaded Ukraine were estimated to still be abroad. Migration routes were fluid: 64% of Russians stayed in their first destination, while 26% moved further, often to the European Union, the United Kingdom, or Switzerland. About 10% returned to Russia. Among those who relocated, nearly half changed countries more than once, with Serbia emerging as a new hub. Many continued working remotely for Russian companies or found employment with Western firms. Most returnees came from the former Soviet republics, with Kazakhstan leading the trend - one in five Russian emigrants in Kazakhstan eventually went back. By contrast, those who settled in the European Union, the United States, Canada, and Israel were far less likely to return. Raksha attributes this pattern to economic factors: Russians who moved to post-Soviet states, including Kazakhstan, tended to be middle-income earners. Meanwhile, wealthier Russians, who had jobs with Western firms or owned businesses were more likely to relocate to the U.S. or Europe. A Temporary Relocation In September 2022, following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decree on partial mobilization, Russian migrants surged into Kazakhstan. Long queues formed at border crossings, and some fleeing men abandoned their...

migrants rights Criminal Responsibility Russia Migration Russia's War Migrants Crime

Killing of Russian General Kirillov: Arrest of Uzbek Suspect Raises Fears Among Central Asians

In the early hours of Tuesday, December 17, an explosion occurred at the entrance of an apartment building in a modest Moscow district, killing two people: Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant. Kirillov was the head of the Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense (RCBD) troops of the Russian Armed Forces. A briefing by him had reportedly been scheduled for later that day. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced the arrest of a suspect: a 1995-born citizen of Uzbekistan. According to the FSB, the suspect was identified and detained through joint operations with Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Investigative Committee. According to investigators, the explosive device had been attached to an electric scooter parked near the building's entrance. Surveillance was allegedly conducted via a video camera placed inside a carshare vehicle parked nearby for several days. While the Ukrainian side has not officially claimed responsibility for the attack, some sources linked to Ukraine’s Security Service have reportedly done so. Russian officials quickly blamed Ukraine. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated, “The Kiev regime does not shy away from such methods,” without providing evidence. Soon after, Investigative Committee spokesperson Svetlana Petrenko claimed that the suspect had confessed to being recruited by Ukrainian special services, who allegedly promised him an EU passport and $100,000. However, a video of the confession released by the FSB raises doubts. The suspect, who appears to struggle with Russian, delivers statements that suggest he may not fully understand what he is saying. While the confession's credibility is unclear, the nationality of the suspect - another migrant from Central Asia - is what resonates most in the short term. The incident follows a previous terrorist attack at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, after which migrants from Central Asia faced intensified scrutiny. Over the past six months, many Central Asian workers living in Russia have felt treated not as second-class but as third-class citizens. Document checks, lengthy detentions, and increasingly restrictive rules for entry and residency in Russia have become commonplace. In August, Russia’s Interior Ministry reported that almost 92,800 foreign citizens were expelled in the first half of 2024 - a 53.2% increase compared to the same period in 2023. In response to the attack, nationalist groups and patriotic public figures are once again urging the Russian government to introduce a visa regime for Central Asian countries, particularly Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Similar measures have been observed in Turkey after the Crocus incident involving Tajik citizens, and in the UAE following a high-profile crime involving Uzbek nationals. It is highly likely that anti-migrant sentiment in Russia will intensify in the coming months. Coupled with increased security operations, this trend could escalate into new forms of repression targeting migrants. Such measures are likely to strain Russia's relations with Central Asian republics, where the treatment of migrant workers remains a sensitive issue.