In the early hours of Tuesday, December 17, an explosion occurred at the entrance of an apartment building in a modest Moscow district, killing two people: Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant. Kirillov was the head of the Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense (RCBD) troops of the Russian Armed Forces. A briefing by him had reportedly been scheduled for later that day.
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced the arrest of a suspect: a 1995-born citizen of Uzbekistan. According to the FSB, the suspect was identified and detained through joint operations with Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Investigative Committee.
According to investigators, the explosive device had been attached to an electric scooter parked near the building’s entrance. Surveillance was allegedly conducted via a video camera placed inside a carshare vehicle parked nearby for several days.
While the Ukrainian side has not officially claimed responsibility for the attack, some sources linked to Ukraine’s Security Service have reportedly done so. Russian officials quickly blamed Ukraine. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated, “The Kiev regime does not shy away from such methods,” without providing evidence.
Soon after, Investigative Committee spokesperson Svetlana Petrenko claimed that the suspect had confessed to being recruited by Ukrainian special services, who allegedly promised him an EU passport and $100,000. However, a video of the confession released by the FSB raises doubts. The suspect, who appears to struggle with Russian, delivers statements that suggest he may not fully understand what he is saying.
While the confession’s credibility is unclear, the nationality of the suspect – another migrant from Central Asia – is what resonates most in the short term.
The incident follows a previous terrorist attack at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, after which migrants from Central Asia faced intensified scrutiny. Over the past six months, many Central Asian workers living in Russia have felt treated not as second-class but as third-class citizens. Document checks, lengthy detentions, and increasingly restrictive rules for entry and residency in Russia have become commonplace.
In August, Russia’s Interior Ministry reported that almost 92,800 foreign citizens were expelled in the first half of 2024 – a 53.2% increase compared to the same period in 2023.
In response to the attack, nationalist groups and patriotic public figures are once again urging the Russian government to introduce a visa regime for Central Asian countries, particularly Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Similar measures have been observed in Turkey after the Crocus incident involving Tajik citizens, and in the UAE following a high-profile crime involving Uzbek nationals.
It is highly likely that anti-migrant sentiment in Russia will intensify in the coming months. Coupled with increased security operations, this trend could escalate into new forms of repression targeting migrants. Such measures are likely to strain Russia’s relations with Central Asian republics, where the treatment of migrant workers remains a sensitive issue.
