• KZT/USD = 0.00216
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
28 August 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 13491

From Lenin to Kenesary: What Kazakhstan’s Renamed Streets Say About Power

In July 2026, a new constitutional law on Kazakhstan’s administrative-territorial structure came into force. It retained a layered process for changing place names: local authorities must consider residents’ views, while onomastic commissions review proposals before final decisions are made. The previous legal framework dated to 1993. Replacing it with a constitutional law did not dismantle the machinery of onomastic policy but consolidated the roles of public consultation, local government and official commissions. The law formalized a system built over three decades, during which thousands of streets were renamed but the country’s urban map changed at markedly different speeds. Kazakhstan’s experience is often described as a simple substitution of Lenin with Abai and communist terminology with the symbols of independence. The geography of renaming suggests something more precise: a centralized nation-building project whose reach depends on local demography and the political cost of opposition. Research documenting 6,832 cases across 37 cities between 1991 and 2019 shows the disparity. Five cities accounted for 72% of all recorded renamings: Shymkent had 1,767, Almaty 1,064, Astana 860, Aktobe 783, and Kyzylorda 470. Pavlodar recorded 34, Petropavl 28, Oskemen 23, and Rudny only two. Raw totals partly reflect city size and urban expansion, but the study’s statistical analysis identified both city status and ethnic composition as significant factors. Renaming occurred less frequently where the share of Slavic residents was higher, a pattern the author interpreted as evidence of greater state caution in ethnically mixed cities. The procedure helps explain why a national symbolic agenda produced such local variation. Proposals move through public consultation, local representative and executive bodies, and onomastic commissions. These stages do not guarantee that public preferences will determine the outcome, but they create points at which opposition can slow or redirect a proposal. Astana, extensively rebuilt after becoming the capital in 1997, could remake its urban identity quickly. Established industrial cities in the north and east moved more carefully. The contrast between what disappeared and what survived is equally revealing. Explicitly ideological names associated with Lenin, Marx, Engels, and the October Revolution became far less common, while Almaty retained streets named after Soviet scientists, writers, and figures connected to Kazakhstan’s development. The authorities did not treat every Soviet reference alike. They separated communist ideology from cultural and intellectual contribution, producing selective de-Sovietization rather than wholesale symbolic purification. Municipal practice further complicates a purely nationalist reading. Official data from Kyzylorda for 2025 lists 874 city streets: 497 named after individuals, 270 after localities and water features, and 107 carrying conventional names. This snapshot does not identify which streets were renamed, but it shows that the present naming system encompasses historical figures, local geography, and ordinary municipal conventions. In the expanding Arai-Shugyla neighborhood, seven previously unnamed streets received names drawn from localities and water features. Onomastic policy was therefore organizing new urban space as well as redistributing historical visibility. Naming new streets and replacing old ones use the same administrative machinery, although their political consequences are not always comparable. The politics became clearer when...

At Least One Kazakh Tourist Unaccounted For in Nepal Floods

Kazakh officials are working to locate at least one Kazakh tourist who is unaccounted for following flash floods and mudslides in Nepal that killed hundreds of people and caused widespread destruction. A Kazakh woman was part of a tourist group in the area affected by the disaster near the border between Nepal and China’s Tibet region, the Kazakhstani state news agency Qazinform reported on Thursday. The agency and several other media outlets in Kazakhstan quoted Zhanbolat Usenov, spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as saying the tourist had crossed into China with the group and her whereabouts were unknown. Kazakhstan´s diplomats were working with local officials in a search for the Kazakh tourist, according to the media reports. Some later reports said a second Kazakh woman was unaccounted for in the area of the floods. On Wednesday, the Kazakhstani government had said no Kazakh citizens were reported among the dead and missing. The governments of other Central Asian countries are also monitoring the disaster aftermath. Citing Nepali police, The Kathmandu Post reported on Thursday afternoon that the death toll from the floods had risen to 359. That number is expected to rise. More than 800 people, many of them foreign tourists, are unaccounted for, according to authorities.

Acwa and KOWEPO Explore Renewable Energy Projects in Uzbekistan

South Korea’s KOWEPO, which is wholly owned by state-controlled Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), is moving into Uzbekistan’s rapidly expanding green energy market alongside Saudi Arabia’s Acwa, one of the market’s largest players. No specific projects have been announced yet, but the companies will explore opportunities in renewable generation and energy storage while considering the possibility of attracting South Korean financing. The memorandum was signed in Tashkent on August 25. For KOWEPO, the agreement offers an opportunity to bring to Central Asia the experience it has gained through projects in the Middle East totaling 3.5 GW of renewable capacity and 877 MW of gas-fired generation. For Acwa, Uzbekistan has already become its second-largest market after Saudi Arabia. The company has operated there since 2019 and is developing 19 projects with a combined capacity of more than 10 GW and potential investment estimated at $15 billion. Abid Malik, Acwa’s president for Central Asia, said the companies would also seek to “facilitate engagement with Korean financial institutions” as they assess potential projects. Acwa’s portfolio in Uzbekistan includes solar and wind power, conventional generation, green hydrogen, and energy storage. Storage is becoming increasingly important as the share of solar and wind grows because utility-scale batteries can store surplus electricity and return it to the grid when renewable generation falls. Uzbekistan aims to expand renewable energy capacity to around 25 GW by 2030, with renewables targeted to account for 54% of electricity generation. The rapid construction of solar and wind farms comes as electricity demand rises and Uzbekistan seeks to modernize a power system that has historically relied heavily on gas-fired generation. Acwa has already secured contractual priority to develop up to 2 GWh of new battery energy storage capacity in the country. KOWEPO could therefore provide additional expertise and capital. Uzbekistan’s energy transition has already attracted major investors from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, China, and elsewhere. For now, the agreement with KOWEPO remains a framework arrangement, with the capacity, cost, locations, and timelines of any joint projects yet to be announced. Its practical significance will become clearer if the companies move from exploring opportunities to concrete investment decisions.

Tokayev Criticizes Delays in Kazakhstan’s School AI Rollout

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has criticized delays in Kazakhstan’s drive to introduce artificial intelligence into schools, saying the government had failed to implement his May decree properly ahead of the new academic year. Speaking at Kazakhstan’s annual August conference for educators, Tokayev said: “Its implementation ahead of the new academic year has not been properly ensured. This is a major shortcoming.” He called for urgent measures to regulate and systematize the use of AI by children and teachers. The May decree set a tight schedule. A comprehensive implementation plan was due by July 1. Pilot schools and their internet connections were to be ready by August 1, along with synchronized regional plans. National standards governing AI use are due by September 1. Tokayev did not specify which targets had been missed. The standards are intended to cover AI-generated educational content, assessment, and academic integrity. The decree also requires stronger protection of students’ personal data and a professional development plan for teachers. It says AI should be used as an additional classroom tool without replacing teachers’ work. Astana sees the program as preparation for employment rather than simply another digital classroom initiative. “Artificial intelligence and its tools are not amusing toys, but a means of earning a living,” Tokayev said. AI material is due to be added to existing digital literacy and computer science courses during the 2026-27 academic year. A separate rural-school pilot is scheduled to begin on September 1 in ten small schools in the Pavlodar and Kyzylorda regions. Officials plan to expand it to 50 schools in November and another 300 in January 2027. The pilot will test personalized learning in fourth-grade mathematics, digital literacy, native-language classes, and AI. The government sees the technology as one way to narrow the longstanding gap in educational opportunities between urban and rural schools. International guidance points to questions the national standards may need to settle. UNESCO recommends a minimum age of 13 for independent use of generative AI, protection of students’ personal data, and teacher training. Kazakhstan’s decree addresses data protection and training but does not specify an age threshold. The government has until September 1 to approve the national standards and its plan for teachers’ professional development.

Possible 2,200-Year-Old Greek Military Camp Found in Uzbekistan

Archaeologists in southern Uzbekistan may have identified an exceptionally rare Hellenistic military camp at a site previously thought to be a small rural settlement. Dating back around 2,200 years, Iskandar Tepa may have functioned as a temporary base for Greco-Bactrian troops and could be the first such camp identified in Central Asia. Alexander the Great conquered Bactria and Sogdiana in the late fourth century B.C., bringing Greek armies deep into Central Asia. After his empire fragmented, Greek-ruled states continued to control parts of the region for centuries. Iskandar Tepa is located in the Sherabad District of Surkhandarya Region, within the ancient borderlands between Bactria and Sogdiana. A Czech-Uzbek archaeological expedition identified the site in 2017. At first, it was interpreted as a Greco-Bactrian settlement, with later research suggesting it may have been a watch post. The mound had no known local name when archaeologists discovered it, so they gave it the working name Iskandar Tepa. Iskandar is the local form of Alexander, making the name equivalent to “Alexander’s Hill.” The latest research suggests the site had a different function altogether. Geophysical surveys and excavations indicate that Iskandar Tepa was probably occupied only briefly, perhaps as a temporary military camp. The findings were published in June 2026 in the Journal of Archaeological Science: Reports. The authors place the site in the Hellenistic period, while Archaeology Magazine dates the proposed military camp to the second century B.C. Iskandar Tepa’s layout supports the military interpretation. The site occupies a naturally protected hilltop. A perimeter ditch about 400 meters long enclosed an area of roughly 1.2 hectares and measured between 4 and 7 meters wide. However, researchers found little evidence of permanent buildings inside the enclosure. That combination is more consistent with a temporary fortified camp than with a permanent settlement. Coins associated with Hellenistic rulers help date the site. Considered alongside the site’s layout and other finds, the coins also support the interpretation that a military unit may once have occupied it. Supplying water to the people stationed there would have been a separate challenge. Archaeologists found large ceramic storage vessels, known as khums, buried in the ground. They also identified what appears to have been a canal, up to 1.1 meters wide, that carried water from several kilometers away. Researchers suggest that the vessels may have been used to store water for a temporary garrison. Geophysical surveys also revealed around 90 elongated pits. Many are interpreted as graves in a burial ground that developed after the main period of occupation at Iskandar Tepa or partly overlapped with it. Temporary military camps from the Hellenistic period are extremely difficult to identify archaeologically because, unlike cities and fortresses, they left relatively few permanent structures. Iskandar Tepa could therefore reveal another side of the Hellenistic presence in Central Asia by showing how relatively small military units stationed far from major urban centers secured water and monitored the surrounding territory. Southern Uzbekistan has also yielded evidence from a much earlier period. In 2025, researchers reported that...

Opinion: Why Central Asia Cannot Afford to Abandon the Iranian Route

Kazakhstan had barely secured a foothold in Iran’s largest commercial port when renewed military escalation made the southern route risky again. The problem for Central Asia is that Iran is more than a trading partner. For a region without direct access to the open sea, it provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. On June 28, Kazakhstan and Iran signed a 27-year build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreement for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. The agreement allocates two years for construction and the following 25 for operation. Astana expects the terminal to provide more direct access to markets in the Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. The project almost immediately found itself in a different reality. In July, U.S. strikes hit Iranian railway and coastal infrastructure. The Aq Taqeh Khan bridge on a rail route connecting Iran with Turkmenistan and, further north, with Kazakhstan, was damaged. There was no confirmed halt to Central Asian freight traffic, but military risk was no longer an abstract concern for carriers. That risk has now been compounded by a new U.S. sanctions campaign. On August 24, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent launched what Washington calls Operation Economic Outcast, combining direct sanctions with pressure on Iran’s foreign economic partners. The United States said it would set timelines for other countries to shut down economic activity with Iran, while the scope of secondary sanctions was expanded to cover five areas: digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping. Nearly 60 Iran-linked individuals, entities, and vessels were also sanctioned. The United States has not publicly identified which countries could face penalties first. War and sanctions can make the Iranian route more expensive, slower, and more dangerous. They cannot change geography. Iran gives Central Asia overland access to ports on the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. From Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, cargo can move onward toward India, the Gulf states, and East Africa. Iran also provides a western overland route toward Turkey. This is one of the fundamental differences between the Iranian route and the Middle Corridor, which crosses the Caspian Sea before continuing through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The Middle Corridor requires cargo to move between rail and maritime transport. Iran offers the possibility of a continuous overland chain while also providing access to ports connected to the Indian Ocean. For Kazakhstan, the southern route is already more than a plan. Trade with Iran increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor reached 3.5 million tons, while rail traffic between Kazakhstan and Iran increased by 69%. It is this expanding transport network that is now exposed to greater military and sanctions risks. There is another factor. A free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, entered into force on May 15, 2025. It significantly reduced tariff barriers to trade in goods between the two sides. Uzbekistan offers...