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U.S. Sanctions on Gazprombank Put Uzbekistan’s $4.8 Billion Copper Ambitions at Risk

Uzbekistan faces a significant economic challenge as U.S. sanctions on Russia’s Gazprombank disrupt the $4.8 billion Yoshlik mine expansion project. The project, managed by state-owned Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Combine (MMC), is critical to Uzbekistan’s plan to nearly double its copper production by 2026, according to The Diplomat. However, with Gazprombank now excluded from the international payments system, the project’s financing is at risk. The Russian Government directly owns 36.44% of Gazprombank's capital. Financing Challenges The Yoshlik mine expansion aims to increase copper output by 78% and gold production by 50%, making it a cornerstone of Uzbekistan’s economic development strategy. However, Almalyk MMC’s reliance on Gazprombank leaves it vulnerable to delays and potential secondary sanctions. This situation exacerbated earlier difficulties after U.S. and EU sanctions in 2022 suspended an $800 million tranche from Russian development bank VEB.RF, another key financial backer. Almalyk MMC must now urgently secure alternative financing to keep the project on track. Russia’s Role in Uzbekistan’s Economy Russia remains Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner, and remittances from Uzbek workers in Russia account for 18% of Uzbekistan’s GDP. Russia’s involvement in the Yoshlik project began in 2021 when Gazprombank and VEB.RF pledged $2 billion to finance mining equipment purchases. Impact on European and British Partners The Yoshlik project also involves significant participation from European and British firms: Germany: Engineering firms such as Thyssenkrupp have supplied critical equipment. Germany’s KfW IPEX-Bank recently arranged $2.55 billion in financing for the project. However, U.S. sanctions on Gazprombank could create legal and logistical hurdles, putting pressure on Germany’s government to reassess its support for exports to Uzbekistan. United Kingdom: The UK has taken a complex position. While it sanctioned Gazprombank in 2014, British firms, including Weir Group, remain involved in the project. In 2024, the U.K.’s export credit agency guaranteed a refinancing deal through Spain’s Santander Bank, reflecting the mine’s importance to British exporters. As reported by TCA, earlier this week, the UK Export Finance (UKEF) guaranteed a €12.6 million ($13.25 million) loan to the Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex to refinance the purchase of fully automated vehicles. Urgency for Alternative Financing For Uzbekistan, securing alternative sources of funding is critical. Almalyk MMC must navigate a challenging sanctions landscape while keeping the Yoshlik project on schedule. Failure to do so could not only isolate the company but also hinder Uzbekistan’s broader economic goals, particularly its ambitions to expand its mining sector and boost foreign investment.

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West Monitors Syria for Plans of Jihadis, Some From Central Asia

Some counterterrorism experts in the West are assessing whether the ouster of Bashar Assad´s regime in Syria will lead to a recalibration of the Islamic militant groups that opposed him, some of which include especially hardline recruits from Central Asia. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian group that led an offensive into Aleppo and Damascus and forced Assad to flee in a span of two weeks, is trying to turn to governance with a relatively moderate image even though it was associated with Al-Qaeda earlier in the Syrian civil war and is labeled a terrorist organization on some Western lists. It’s too early to say whether HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Golani will stick to a message of tolerance or can make it work in a fractured country with gutted institutions, but there are signs that some jihadis object to his message of inclusiveness. “Many of them are Central Asians and they may look to go somewhere else. I think we’re inevitably going to see a certain amount of splintering from what happens in Syria,” said Colin Clarke, a terrorism researcher and author of After the Caliphate. At an Atlantic Council event in Washington on Wednesday, Clarke said there is an “interplay” between religious extremism in Afghanistan and Syria, and that a number of groups with Central Asian members have those connections. Clarke said he will be watching to see whether the connections grow following Assad’s abrupt exit after more than two decades in power. Some estimates put the number of Islamic militants who have traveled from Central Asia to Syria and Iraq over the years at around several thousand, though the figures vary and are difficult to confirm. Many joined the Islamic State group, which was defeated in Iraq and is much diminished in Syria although the U.S. recently carried out air strikes to prevent any resurgence by the group amid Syria’s current upheaval. One jihadist group with Central Asia links that collaborated with HTS in the successful campaign against Assad is Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad, designated a terror group by the U.S. State Department in 2022. The group carried out a Saint Petersburg, Russia metro attack in 2017 that killed 14 passengers and injured 50 others, as well as a suicide car bombing of the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in 2016 that injured three people, according to the U.S. Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad is comprised mainly of Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz combatants, according to Daniele Garofalo Monitoring, which traces jihadist propaganda and military activity. There are an estimated 400-500 fighters in the group. Another HTS ally is Katibat Mujaheddin Ghuroba Division, which has between 200 and 400 fighters, according to the Garofalo site. Many are Uzbeks, Tajiks and Uyghurs, though the group also has Arab militants. There is also Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, which dates to the early stages of the Syrian civil war that began in 2011. The jihadist group is believed to have 400-500 fighters, mostly Chechens, Tajiks, Dagestanis, Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs and Ukrainians, as well as...

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Tinker, Tailor, Kazakh Ties: UK Spy Trial Reveals Moscow’s Long Shadow in Kazakh Politics

London's Central Criminal Court, known as the Old Bailey, is currently hearing the trial of several Bulgarian nationals accused by the British authorities of spying for Russia’s intelligence services. The case is likely being scrutinized not only in Moscow but also in Astana, as at least two of the six alleged operations relate to Kazakhstan. A Favor for Nazarbayev The defendants, five Bulgarian citizens, are accused of planning six espionage operations, one of which centers around Bergey Ryskaliyev, a former senior Kazakh official during the presidency of Nursultan Nazarbayev.The accused filmed Ryskaliyev in his London home and plotted to alternately dress up as DHL or Deliveroo drivers, or use a fake ambulance as a cover to access his premises. Ryskaliyev served as akim of the oil-rich Atyrau region from 2006 to 2012, before leaving Kazakhstan amid serious corruption allegations. Both he and his brother Amanzhan - an ex-deputy of the Mazhilis - have been wanted in their homeland for over a decade, facing charges of large-scale corruption, organized crime, false entrepreneurship, and money laundering. Public opinion in Kazakhstan attributes the Ryskaliyev brothers’ prosecution to their alleged involvement in the December 2011 Zhanaozen uprising. According to reports, the uprising was intended to culminate in Nazarbayev’s resignation through a symbolic “march to Astana.” By the summer of 2012, Nazarbayev seemed wary of Ryskaliyev, publicly thanking him for his service during a visit to Atyrau. Shortly after, Ryskaliyev resigned for "health reasons,” while Amanzhan stepped down as a Mazhilis deputy. The brothers remained in hiding for years, with their lawyers claiming in a 2019 trial that their whereabouts were unknown. However, reports later surfaced that Ryskaliyev had filmed and leaked a video of Nazarbayev in London’s Hyde Park, allegedly using it to blackmail the former president. Ryskaliyev denied this, characterizing his actions as a “small rally” outside Nazarbayev’s residence. Despite these allegations, Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court ruled in 2020 to return some of Ryskaliyev’s confiscated assets, including land, money, and shares in various companies, and to reverse property seizures which had affected their spouses. Prosecutors in the London trial allege that Ryskaliyev’s case was part of an operation to foster stronger ties between Moscow and Astana, with Russia suggesting that Kazakhstan might benefit from pursuing him. If accurate, this initiative likely predated January 2022, when Nazarbayev retained significant influence despite stepping down as president. Targeting Tokayev? The second alleged operation appears to have been directed at Kazakhstan’s current president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Prosecutors claim the defendants planned a staged protest outside Kazakhstan’s embassy in London in September 2022, intending to pass information about the “organizers” to the Kazakh authorities. This, they argue, was another effort to bolster Russian-Kazakh relations. However, details reported by Germany’s Der Spiegel suggest a more specific objective. According to the report, the FSB instructed the operatives to stage a protest and send a letter to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, ostensibly from a fabricated group critical of Tokayev. Plans also included splashing fake blood or pig’s blood on the...

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U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan Daniel Rosenblum Resigns

U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan Daniel Rosenblum has announced his resignation, effective January 20, 2025. His departure coincides with similar resignations by U.S. Ambassadors Philip Goldberg in South Korea and Mark Libby in Azerbaijan, all stepping down from diplomatic service. The timing of these resignations has sparked speculation, as it aligns with the start of a new presidential term for Donald Trump. End of a Distinguished Career Rosenblum informed the Kazakh government of his decision on November 26, concluding a nearly 28-year career with the U.S. State Department. He has served as Chief of Mission in Kazakhstan since November 2022, representing the United States through five presidential administrations and eight secretaries of state. “It has been a tremendous honor to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan. I have developed a deep respect for the country’s culture, traditions, and people,” Rosenblum said. Under his tenure, bilateral relations flourished, with progress in trade, investment, cultural exchange, university partnerships, and security cooperation. Rosenblum also emphasized his admiration for Kazakhstan’s family-oriented values and expressed optimism about its future: “Kazakhstan’s future is bright, and its opportunities are virtually limitless because the country is built on strong family traditions,” he remarked. While Rosenblum plans to retire from the State Department, he expressed a desire to return to Central Asia, possibly as a tourist or in another capacity. Transition at the U.S. Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission Deborah Robinson will serve as Chargé d’Affaires until a new ambassador is appointed and confirmed. The U.S. Consul General in Almaty, Michelle Erkin, will also continue her work. Rosenblum’s predecessor, William Moser, ended his term in September 2021, preceding Rosenblum’s appointment in late 2022. Resignations in South Korea and Azerbaijan Rosenblum’s resignation coincides with similar announcements by Philip Goldberg, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, and Mark Libby, U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan. Goldberg, who has served in diplomatic roles for nearly 35 years, plans to step down in January 2025. His tenure in South Korea began in July 2022, during the administration of President Yoon Suk-Yeol, and was marked by efforts to strengthen the U.S.-Korea alliance and enhance trilateral cooperation with Japan. Mark Libby’s resignation reflects similar timing, with discussions focusing on the alignment of these departures with the return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency. A Broader Diplomatic Crisis? These resignations occur against the backdrop of challenges in the U.S. diplomatic service, highlighted in a report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The report detailed staffing issues during Trump’s first term, with several key State Department positions either unfilled or held by interim appointees. The conclusion of Rosenblum’s distinguished career marks the end of a productive chapter in U.S.-Kazakh relations, leaving his successor with the task of continuing to foster this important bilateral partnership.

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Uzbek Deputy Proposes Introducing Visa Regime With Russia

Russian politician Leonid Slutsky has proposed establishing a comprehensive set of mandatory rules for foreign workers in Russia, called the “Migrant Code.” Developed in coordination with diasporas and law enforcement agencies, the code outlines guidelines for migrants seeking legal employment in Russia. According to Slutsky, the Migrant Code will require foreign workers to learn Russian and ensure their families also acquire language skills if residing in Russia. Migrants, he says, must respect Russian culture and traditions, adhere to public behavior standards, obtain official employment, and pay taxes. Additional requirements include securing insurance against deportation or expulsion, undergoing fingerprinting, genomic registration, and mental health testing. In response, Alisher Qodirov, chairman of Uzbekistan’s Milli Tiklanish (National Revival) party, suggested introducing a visa regime with Russia to address potential instability and a rise in migration flows. Qodirov underscored the importance of Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries implementing stricter entry and exit controls to Russia, alongside enhanced requirements for job seekers. He emphasized the need for migrants to respect their host country’s language, culture, and laws while reaffirming the significance of national values. He further stated that educating Uzbek workers on their rights and responsibilities would help mitigate social, political, and economic challenges for Uzbekistan. It would also protect citizens from exploitation and discrimination abroad, reinforcing the nation’s commitment to safeguarding its people.

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Kazakhstan Opens Pavilion in Uzbek-Afghan Border Trade Center

Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade and Integration has announced the opening of a trade pavilion showcasing Kazakh products at the Termez International Trade Center, located in the town of Termez, Uzbekistan, near the Afghan border. The pavilion is expected to serve as a strategic platform for promoting Kazakh goods in the markets of Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. The Termez International Trade Center is a crucial hub at the crossroads of Central Asian trade routes, facilitating significant trade flows between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Opened on August 29, the center was inaugurated by Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov and acting Afghan Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar. The facility includes retail spaces, hotels, a medical center, and other amenities. Notably, it supports transactions in multiple currencies, such as U.S. dollars, euros, rubles, and yuan. Afghan citizens can visit and conduct trade at the Termez center for up to 15 days without requiring an Uzbek visa. Kyrgyzstan has also secured a presence at the Termez International Trade Center. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, on November 11, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Economy and Commerce acquired a trade pavilion, providing a strategic foothold to expand Kyrgyzstan’s influence in the markets of Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have both removed the Taliban from their lists of terrorist organizations, aligning with broader efforts by Central Asian nations to deepen trade and economic ties with Afghanistan.