Our People > Aidar Borangaziyev

Contributor

Aidar Borangaziev is a Kazakhstani expert specializing in regional security and transport-logistics connectivity between Central and South Asia. His research focuses on Afghanistan, the trans-regional connectivity of Central Asia, the development of transport corridors, and the impact of regional political and economic processes on the security architecture. He has experience in diplomatic service in Afghanistan and Iran. He is the founder and president of the private think tank Open World Policy Lab in Astana.

Articles

С5+1

C5+1 Statement Omits Afghanistan, Prioritizes Trans-Caspian Trade

The United States and the five Central Asian republics have issued a joint statement on economic and security cooperation that makes no mention of Afghanistan, once a central concern of U.S. regional policy. The document followed the October 19 C5+1 ministerial meeting in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Afghanistan's absence from the statement does not mean it has disappeared from negotiations or Washington's strategic interests. Nevertheless, a comparison with earlier C5+1 documents reveals a shift in the published agenda. Where Washington once placed considerable importance on connecting Central Asia with South Asia through Afghanistan, the latest statement focuses on trade across the Caspian Sea and investment in the region's minerals. Afghanistan's Changing Place in C5+1 Talks In July 2021, just weeks before the Taliban retook Kabul, C5+1 participants at a conference in Tashkent explicitly supported closer trade and transport links between Central and South Asia through Afghanistan, as well as efforts to secure peace in the country. That month, the U.S., Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan also announced plans for a quadrilateral platform to support trade and transportation projects linking the two regions. In July 2023, Afghanistan was the subject of a separate C5+1 special session in Astana. Officials called for an inclusive Afghan government that respected women's rights and backed further development of transport and energy links through the country. A joint statement issued by C5+1 leaders that September described Afghanistan as an important factor in Central Asian security. In the 2026 Samarkand statement, Afghanistan goes unmentioned even in the section on border security and terrorism. However, the October 2023 C5+1 connectivity statement had already highlighted the Trans-Caspian Trade Route, which connects Central Asia to Western markets, and also omitted Afghanistan. For Central Asian countries, the Afghan route remains important in practical terms. Uzbekistan is pursuing plans for a railway through Afghanistan to Pakistan, which would give it access to Indian Ocean ports. Kazakhstan is already a major supplier of food to Afghanistan, exporting around $216 million worth of flour and $122 million of wheat in the first seven months of 2026. In September, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also agreed with the United Arab Emirates to study a railway corridor through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan all share borders with Afghanistan. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also face the prospect of reduced water supplies from the Amu Darya as Afghanistan builds its Qosh Tepa Canal. Afghanistan's omission from a joint statement should therefore not be taken as a complete account of the policies of all five Central Asian states. What Constrains Washington One possible explanation lies in the U.S. approach to Afghanistan's current authorities. Washington allows practical contacts with representatives of the Taliban but does not recognize the government it has formed. The movement remains designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, although it is not included in the U.S. Department of State's separate list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The designation restricts dealings with the Taliban, although U.S. sanctions rules permit many commercial transactions involving Afghanistan's governing institutions, including civilian infrastructure and transportation projects....

1 week ago

C5+1 Diplomacy

C5+1 and the Forgotten Geography of Central Asia

In modern diplomacy, Central Asia usually means five post-Soviet states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. But how fixed are the region’s boundaries, and who gets to define them? Should Central Asia be understood as the five states that have emerged as a distinct political space? A broader historical and cultural region that includes Afghanistan, parts of Iran, western China, and Mongolia? Or an even more fluid system of economic, transportation, and strategic ties? New details about the origins of the C5+1 format involving the United States bring us back to precisely this question. Frederick Starr, one of the most consistent proponents of the Greater Central Asia concept, recently wrote that including Afghanistan was considered during early discussions of the American regional mechanism. In that case, the formula could have been C6+1. What makes this episode interesting is not that Afghanistan supposedly almost became the “sixth country of Central Asia.” More importantly, even before C5+1 was launched in 2015, there were different ways of understanding the region: political, historical and civilizational, and strategic. Those differences persist today, while closer relations with Afghanistan and Azerbaijan have once again raised questions about Central Asia’s boundaries. Political Central Asia and the C5 Politically, the definition is relatively clear. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan gradually developed from a geographical grouping into a distinct political category. C5+1 reflects precisely this logic. The joint declaration adopted in Samarkand on November 1, 2015, established regular cooperation between the United States and the five Central Asian states. Afghanistan was part of the regional agenda but was not included in the format itself. The “five plus an external partner” model has since proliferated. Germany uses the Z5+1 formula, from the German Zentralasien. Similar regional mechanisms operate with Japan, South Korea, the European Union, China, India, Russia, Italy, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and other partners. The proliferation of these formats reflects the extent to which external partners increasingly treat the C5 as a regional actor in its own right, while the five countries themselves are also increasingly acting in that capacity. But political Central Asia is not the only way to view the region. As part of UNESCO’s multivolume History of Civilizations of Central Asia project, the region was understood much more broadly. This historical and cultural space included not only the five former Soviet republics but also Afghanistan, northeastern Iran, Pakistan, northern India, western China, and Mongolia. UNESCO specifically noted that these were not rigid political boundaries but an area shaped by long-standing cultural and historical ties. This does not offer a “correct” alternative map. Rather, it shows that the region’s political, historical, and civilizational boundaries do not necessarily coincide. It was against this background that Starr proposed the concept of Greater Central Asia in 2005. This represented a third, strategic way of viewing the region. His idea was less about redrawing the geographical map than about changing American policy. In Starr’s view, the five post-Soviet republics and Afghanistan should be...

3 weeks ago

Bilateral Trade

West2West: Kazakhstan Adds a Regional Dimension to Trade with Afghanistan

In late September, a Kazakhstani official and business delegation led by Yerkin Tukumov, the Special Representative of the President of Kazakhstan for Afghanistan, visited Herat. The delegation included trade officials, representatives of the Mangystau and West Kazakhstan regions, and businesses. Officials called the new approach West2West, meaning cooperation between Kazakhstan's western regions and western Afghanistan. Kazakhstan and Afghanistan have held several business forums and exhibitions in recent years. However, the choice of Herat and the attempt to shift some cooperation from the intergovernmental to the interregional level make this initiative different. Since 2021, Kazakhstan’s economic dialogue with Afghanistan has developed mainly from the top down. The two governments set ambitious trade targets and sought to turn political engagement into commercial deals. The results looked impressive on paper. In October 2024, the two countries adopted a road map to raise mutual trade to $3 billion. In April 2025, documents worth $140 million were signed in Kabul, followed by 15 documents worth $303 million in Shymkent that October. Actual trade, however, grew much more slowly. In 2024, it totaled $545.2 million, while in 2025 it slipped slightly to $541.6 million. The $3 billion target remains more of a strategic benchmark than a near-term goal. According to official data from Kazakhstan, trade reached $581.1 million in January-July 2026, exceeding the total for the entire previous year. Kazakhstan’s exports accounted for $572.9 million, while imports from Afghanistan were just $8.2 million. Trade is therefore growing rapidly, but remains overwhelmingly one-sided. West2West is partly an attempt to broaden that relationship. Herat's Strategic Location Herat is one of Afghanistan’s main industrial and commercial centers, situated near several important transport routes. To the north is Torghundi, a rail border crossing with Turkmenistan. To the west runs the Khaf-Herat railway, which connects Afghanistan to Iran’s railway system. Herat could eventually become part of longer routes toward Kandahar and Pakistan, although much of the necessary infrastructure remains at the planning stage. During the September visit, officials opened a 43-kilometer section of the Khaf-Herat railway. Afghan sources estimate its cost at approximately $58 million. The section was built with the involvement of Kazakhstani company Integra Construction KZ. In August 2026, freight transported along the Khaf-Herat line totaled approximately 137,700 metric tons. Discussions have also focused on increasing its monthly capacity to 150,000 metric tons. Together with Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan has begun working on the Central Asia–South Asia railway project, which envisages a trans-Afghan connection to Pakistan’s ports. So far, the parties have agreed to conduct technical and economic studies, and no final route has been approved. The route through Turkmenistan is developing separately. Ashgabat views Torghundi-Herat as a joint project with Afghanistan linked to the expansion of the Serhetabat-Torghundi crossing and other infrastructure in western Afghanistan. Kazakhstan’s interest in Herat predates West2West. In 2023, Astana announced plans to establish a Kazakhstan Trade House in Afghanistan, with its main office in Herat. It opened in May 2024. Arman Yessentayev, its head, described Herat in 2023 as a...

4 weeks ago

Islamic State

ISKP and Central Asia: How the Threat Extends Beyond Afghanistan’s Borders

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) is developing transnational networks, complicating assessments of the threat to Central Asia. The group also retains territorial ambitions. One conventional way to assess the threat is to look at a map: the situation in Afghanistan’s northern provinces, their proximity to the borders of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the number of militants, and the possibility of infiltration into neighboring states. An August report by the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, based on information received through June 9, said the ability of terrorist groups to operate in Afghanistan remained an enduring threat to neighboring countries and Central Asia. The report also said ISKP had reportedly moved toward northern Afghanistan. During the period under review, the group suffered serious setbacks amid Taliban and Pakistani operations and was in the process of rebuilding. But looking only at Afghanistan’s borders is no longer enough. The Central Asian dimension of ISKP encompasses the group’s activities in Afghanistan, risks to the five Central Asian states themselves, and the involvement of some individuals from the region in transnational networks operating outside it. Old Networks and New Structures ISKP’s Central Asian dimension did not emerge from nowhere. Even before the group appeared in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, armed organizations formed by people from Central Asia were active there. Among them was the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). At different times, the IMU maintained ties with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In 2014, the Islamic State declared a “caliphate.” A year later, a faction of the IMU pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Lucas Webber, a researcher of extremist networks, and Bruce Pannier, a longtime analyst of Central Asian politics and security, have highlighted the role of an Uzbek-language propaganda infrastructure associated with the IMU in ISKP’s outreach to Central Asian audiences. Their analysis was published by the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET). The region’s older militant organizations have not simply been absorbed into ISKP. A July 2025 UN report separately mentions IMU members and fighters from other groups being used by Afghanistan’s Taliban authorities in law-enforcement and army units. A single “Central Asian network,” however, would misrepresent this fragmented environment of different connections and organizational affiliations. The same report described the recruitment of people from Central Asia, their significant presence among ISKP’s rank and file, and the group’s attempts to operate outside Afghanistan. In a 2024 article for CTC Sentinel, researchers Noah Tucker and Edward Lemon examined the involvement of Tajik citizens in a number of ISKP-linked attacks and networks. They argued that the recent surge in attacks and arrests was partly the “long tail” of the earlier Islamic State mobilization, including networks that had persisted after it. A February 2026 report by the UN Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team said ISKP continued to develop a network of cells capable of projecting a threat across the region and internationally. Propaganda Does Not Equal Mass Support Central Asian audiences occupy a noticeable place in ISKP propaganda....

1 month ago

Middle Corridor

Middle Corridor Debate Shifts From Geopolitics to Commercial Viability

For several years, interest in the Middle Corridor has risen sharply amid the war in Ukraine, tensions around Iran, sanctions, instability on maritime routes, and governments’ efforts to diversify supply chains. The route runs through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus. The way the issue is framed is now changing. The debate over whether this route is needed is moving into the background. A more important question is whether the Middle Corridor can develop from a politically attractive alternative into a sustainable transport and economic system that businesses will use not because of geopolitical circumstances, but because it is competitive. In this context, the 7th Caspian Business Forum, held in New York on September 22 and organized by the Caspian Policy Center (CPC), provided a useful snapshot of this shift. Representatives of the United States, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and major businesses took part. The discussions focused on the Middle Corridor, the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), energy, critical minerals, and attracting private capital. Freight volumes on the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route rose from 0.8 million tons to 4.5 million tons in the seven years to 2025, according to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Transport. The route carried about 77,000 twenty-foot equivalent units of containerized cargo in 2025, and Kazakhstan aims to raise that total to 300,000 by 2029. These volumes are substantial, but they show the limits of the Middle Corridor’s current capacity. It has not yet become a replacement for all traditional overland routes between China and Europe. The World Bank has noted that the Middle Corridor is more than a transit bridge between China and the European Union (EU). Growth in trade among the countries along the route, as well as their trade with Europe, could be equally important. With the necessary investment and organizational reforms, it estimates, trade flows could triple and transport times could roughly halve by 2030. The route passes through several countries, crosses the Caspian Sea, requires transfers between different modes of transport, and depends on coordination among railway operators, ports, customs services, and tariff policies. A study of transport connectivity between Europe and Central Asia by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, at the request of the European Commission, identified 33 priority investment needs in physical infrastructure and seven soft-connectivity measures, ranging from the digitalization of transport documents to the harmonization of tariffs, customs, and border procedures. The CPC forum addressed these issues as well. CPC President Efgan Nifti put it this way: “For the Corridor to reach its full potential, it must increasingly function as one integrated system – with harmonized border procedures, coordinated ports and railways, and digitalized documentation.” Kazakhstan’s position reflects this approach. The country’s presidential representative for negotiations with the United States, Erzhan Kazykhan, called the Middle Corridor a “strategic investment in the future” connecting Kazakhstan with the South Caucasus, Turkey, and Europe. He said Astana views TRIPP as a logical extension of the system that could shorten the route to European markets...

1 month ago

Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s Regional Ties Grow as Global Reintegration Stalls

For Central Asia, Afghanistan is both a source of risk and a potential route south. Governments across the region increasingly see a more stable Afghanistan as a way to open new markets and expand economic links with South Asia. Afghanistan is a direct neighbor of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The geography is different for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but their political and economic interests are no less significant. Many long-term plans for expanding Central Asia’s connections to the south depend in part on Afghanistan’s future and the role it can play in the regional economy. At the UN Security Council’s September 16, 2026, meeting on Afghanistan, Kazakhstan set out a position that may reflect a wider Central Asian view. Astana argued that engagement with Afghanistan’s current authorities should not be equated with recognition and that isolation could not offer a sustainable solution. Astana proposes moving past the current focus on humanitarian aid. In Kazakhstan’s view, the next phase of international engagement should gradually move Afghanistan from dependence on humanitarian aid toward economic self-reliance through job creation, private-sector development, the restoration of financial channels, and expanded trade and investment. The statement also calls for Afghanistan’s integration into the regional economy. Kazakhstan’s representative specifically discussed connections between Central and South Asia, Kazakh-Afghan business ties, trade houses in Herat and Kabul, and the new UN Regional Centre for the Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty. Astana also expressed concern about restrictions affecting Afghan women and girls. Georgette Gagnon, the UN secretary-general’s deputy special representative for Afghanistan, delivered the main briefing. Five years after the Taliban’s return to power, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) assesses that the de facto authorities face no significant armed or political threat to their control, although risks to long-term stability are accumulating and largely stem from their own policies. UNAMA therefore distinguishes between the Taliban’s control of the country and its prospects for long-term stability. UNAMA views the Doha process as the main multilateral framework for Afghanistan’s gradual reintegration into the international community. It links progress to women’s rights and inclusive governance, along with the fulfillment of counterterrorism commitments. The mission also notes that Kabul prefers bilateral relations to multilateral engagement. Russia and China focused on pragmatic engagement and economic recovery, stressing the need to avoid isolation. China also urged Kabul to step up its efforts against terrorist groups and lift restrictions preventing Afghan women employed by the UN from doing their jobs. Russia called for dialogue without pressure and for steps toward Afghanistan’s international reintegration without preconditions. Afghanistan’s economic ties with some regional partners are expanding while its political normalization at the global level remains unresolved. Kazakhstan’s position illustrates this divide. It allows for engagement without accepting the existing order as permanent or waiting for isolation to change it. Future international discussions on Afghanistan will have to address this tension.

2 months ago

Central Asia - Afganistan

Afghanistan Critical Minerals: Can Central Asia Help Unlock Them?

Central Asia is increasingly being drawn into the global competition for critical minerals. To the south lies Afghanistan, where much of the country’s substantial mineral wealth remains undeveloped. Kabul is now trying to turn those resources into an economic and diplomatic asset. Amir Khan Muttaqi, foreign minister in the Taliban government, told the Financial Times that Afghanistan would “definitely” welcome U.S. investment in mining, infrastructure, agriculture, and trade. Relations between the two countries, he said, should be viewed through the opportunities for future cooperation rather than the lens of 20 years of war. At the same time, Muttaqi invited the United States to reopen its embassy in Kabul while ruling out a return of U.S. control over Bagram Air Base. This was not an isolated overture. In mid-August, Muttaqi told The New York Times that the United States could reopen its embassy and invest in Afghanistan’s mineral resources, dams, and roads. On August 30, he told Kyodo News that Kabul was seeking to normalize relations with the United States on the basis of mutual respect and shared interests, while formal recognition remained “a matter for the next stage.” Taken together, these statements amount to a consistent diplomatic approach. Mineral resources are becoming one of the enticements the Taliban is using to offer Washington a new basis for bilateral relations: economic interests could open the way to broader engagement. Kabul Offers Resources, Washington Rejects the Pitch The timing of the offer is no coincidence. The Trump administration has significantly increased its focus on critical minerals and the resilience of supply chains. On July 30, the White House described U.S. dependence on foreign sources of critical materials as a growing risk to national security and authorized the use of Defense Production Act powers to restrict exports of certain recoverable critical minerals and materials. Ten days earlier, Trump signed an executive order aimed at strengthening defense supply chains and increasing reliance on critical materials and components sourced domestically or from allied countries. Kabul is trying to make itself relevant to this debate by presenting Afghanistan as a potential source of minerals and a destination for U.S. investment. The U.S. response, however, immediately demonstrated the limits of that strategy. On September 2, the State Department said in a written response to Voice of America that it had no plans to engage with the Taliban on developing critical mineral resources. The department pointed to the Taliban’s sanctions status and said U.S. investment could increase the financial resources available to Afghanistan’s current authorities. For Washington, the attractiveness of Afghanistan’s mineral resources cannot, for now, be separated from the political status and policies of those who control them. "$1 Trillion in Mineral Wealth" In 2007, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), working with the Afghanistan Geological Survey, conducted a major assessment of the country’s mineral resources. Researchers compiled data on known deposits and assessed the potential for undiscovered resources, covering commodities including copper, iron, gold, lithium, and rare earth elements. In 2010, a Pentagon task force put the gross value of Afghanistan’s mineral...

2 months ago

Central Asia - Afghanistan Relations

Five Years Without Recognition: How Central Asia Is Building Relations with Afghanistan

Five years of Taliban rule have shown that international relations with an unrecognized government can go much further than many imagined after the fall of Kabul in August 2021. Russia remains the only country to have formally recognized Afghanistan’s current authorities, yet the complete isolation some expected has not materialized. Afghanistan receives foreign diplomats and participates in regional talks, while neighboring states pursue trade and infrastructure projects with Kabul. Over the past five years, the Taliban have signed mining agreements worth billions of dollars, including projects involving Chinese and Iranian capital. This diplomatic arrangement has become possible because international approaches toward Afghanistan have diverged. Restrictions on the rights of women and girls continue to block broader international legitimization of the Taliban. In August, the UN described the situation facing Afghan women as the world’s most severe women’s rights crisis. At the same time, neighboring states have practical issues to address involving trade, security, water, energy, and transportation. Central Asia has gone particularly far in developing practical engagement. Afghanistan is gradually being integrated into regional economic ties without any formal change in its international status. Engagement Without Recognition On April 5, 2026, Kabul hosted the first dedicated Central Asia-Afghanistan Consultative Dialogue, attended by representatives of all five Central Asian states. The participants discussed economic ties and regional connectivity. The format itself was presented as a multilateral political mechanism for regular engagement between Afghanistan and Central Asia. This is already more than a collection of separate contacts with Kabul. The region is gradually developing its own model for dealing with the Taliban, driven by issues that cannot simply be left unresolved. Trade and transportation continue regardless of diplomatic status. In the first quarter of 2026 alone, rail freight between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan reached 1 million tons, up 77% year over year. Tajikistan, which long maintained the toughest stance toward the Taliban among Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors, has also expanded working contacts with Kabul, although border security remains a serious concern. Tajik officials say five Chinese citizens were killed in two attacks launched from Afghan territory in late 2025, while Dushanbe has long warned about militant groups operating in Afghanistan, including Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). So far, this model has allowed political recognition to remain separate from practical cooperation. But the region is gradually moving beyond trade and diplomatic contacts toward proposed infrastructure projects with multibillion-dollar price tags. From Trade to Long-Term Bets Afghanistan’s economy is growing, but it remains too weak to finance major infrastructure projects on its own. The World Bank estimated real GDP growth at 4.8% in 2025, but the return of around 3.7 million Afghans and rapid population growth contributed to a 5.6% decline in GDP per capita. Investment remains weak, while businesses have limited access to financing. The financial system also maintains connections with the outside world through narrow channels. The World Bank has noted limited correspondent banking relationships, a lack of direct access to accounts in the United States, and the significant role of the informal hawala...

2 months ago

ISKP Islamic State – Khorasan

Islamic State Khorasan Province Expands Reach Beyond Afghanistan

More than a decade has passed since the formal emergence of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). For Central Asia, the history of this group is especially significant: the region features prominently in its propaganda and recruitment, and people from Central Asian countries have become part of transnational networks linked to ISKP. Today, ISKP must be assessed as more than an armed group operating in Afghanistan. Over the past decade, it has repeatedly lost leaders, been driven from most of its original territorial strongholds, and endured several major campaigns against it. Yet it has not disappeared. The current iteration of ISKP differs markedly from the organization that tried to establish itself in eastern Afghanistan in 2015-16. The main change is that it has learned to survive and spread its influence without controlling substantial territory. This transformation makes it especially important for Central Asia. Distance from the Afghan border and the number of districts under the group’s control are becoming less important measures of the threat. Its ability to maintain transnational ties, address audiences in local languages, and use migrant and digital networks is becoming more important. A large body of recent research, including a recently published monograph by the Usanas Foundation, makes it possible to trace this transformation. The group’s decade-long history is important for what it reveals about changes in the modern terrorist threat: loss of territory and a decline in membership do not necessarily mean an organization will disappear. ISKP did not emerge in a vacuum. Its original core was formed largely by members of existing jihadist organizations. They included former commanders of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Taliban members, and representatives of other groups who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State’s leadership after the organization emerged in Iraq and Syria. On January 26, 2015, Islamic State officially announced the creation of its “Khorasan Province.” Eastern Afghanistan became its main territorial base. This choice was no accident. Significant Salafi communities and religious networks had long existed in the region. Their development can be traced at least to the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s, and by 1990, Kunar Province already had its own Salafi political-religious movement, which briefly established the Islamic Emirate of Kunar. These networks should not automatically be equated with jihadism, but the presence of an established religious milieu and long-standing tensions between some Salafis and the Taliban gave ISKP more favorable conditions for its initial recruitment and entrenchment. The initial strategy largely replicated the Islamic State model in Iraq and Syria. ISKP sought to do more than carry out terrorist attacks. It tried to establish itself on the ground, build bases and its own control structures, collect local revenue, and demonstrate an ability to impose an alternative order. It was an effort to implement a specific territorial project. That effort to establish a territorial foothold soon became the group’s main source of vulnerability. From the middle of the decade, ISKP came under pressure from several adversaries at once. The armed forces of the former Afghan government and the...

2 months ago

humanitarian aid

Kazakhstan Afghanistan Ties Expand With Aid, Medicine and Trade Talks

A Kazakhstani delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin visited Kabul on June 19-21, combining humanitarian aid, medical cooperation, education and trade talks with Afghanistan’s Taliban-led authorities. Kazakhstan has long treated Afghanistan as a central regional issue, arguing that stability and economic integration there are in the interests of Central Asia as a whole. Kazakh officials have framed engagement with Kabul as part of a broader effort to support Afghanistan’s reconstruction while keeping the country linked to regional trade, transport and humanitarian initiatives. Kazakhstan has also taken steps to formalize working contacts with Kabul. It removed the Taliban from its list of banned organizations in 2023, has kept its embassy in Kabul open, and has allowed Afghanistan’s diplomatic mission in Astana and consulate in Almaty to continue operating. Kazakhstan has not, however, formally recognized the Taliban government. One of the central elements of the visit was the delivery of another shipment of humanitarian aid. The decision followed a request from Afghanistan’s National Disaster Management Agency after torrential rains affected 31 of the country’s 34 provinces in March, bringing with them floods and landslides. UN figures from early April said the floods affected more than 73,000 people across 31 provinces, killing 93 people, injuring 181, destroying 7,672 homes and damaging farmland and roads. In June 2026, Kazakhstan delivered humanitarian aid that included food and medical supplies. This assistance came as part of Kazakhstan’s broader policy of sustained humanitarian support for Afghanistan. According to the UN, about 21.9 million people, roughly 45% of Afghanistan’s population, are expected to need humanitarian assistance in 2026. The mass return of Afghan citizens from Pakistan and Iran has created additional pressure. In 2025 alone, according to available estimates, about 2.5 million people returned to Afghanistan. Against this backdrop, any practical assistance is particularly important. Healthcare was another focus of the visit. Kazakhstan already has a record of work in Afghanistan in this area. In 2025, a medical mission involving 13 Kazakhstani doctors was organized in Kabul. The doctors performed emergency surgeries, provided consultations, and held training courses for local medical personnel. This year’s delegation included nine specialists from Kazakhstan’s leading medical institutions. As part of the Days of Kazakh Medicine in Afghanistan, they are expected to spend a week providing consultations, practical assistance and training for Afghan healthcare workers. [caption id="attachment_50713" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: Aidar Borangaziyev[/caption] Kazakhstan also used the visit to promote medical technology exports. At the business forum, the Kazakh side presented the HES-7 system, a mobile diagnostic platform that uses artificial intelligence for ECG and functional diagnostics, rapid laboratory tests and screening for several diseases. Kazakh officials said the sides were expected to sign an agreement for the delivery of 4,500 units of the equipment to Afghanistan, worth $45 million. Kazakhstan also handed over a VibroLUNG medical system to the Afghan side. The Kazakhstani device is designed to help restore respiratory function, improve bronchial drainage, expand lung capacity, prevent respiratory complications, and accelerate patient rehabilitation. The medical...

5 months ago

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