• KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
03 August 2026

Our People > Andrei Matveev

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Journalist

Andrei Matveev is a journalist from Kazakhstan.

Articles

Central Asia and Azerbaijan: What the Region’s Leaders Agreed at Issyk-Kul

The Kyrgyz resort town of Cholpon-Ata, on the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul, briefly became Central Asia’s political capital as it hosted a series of high-level meetings, including bilateral talks between the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the state visit of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and the informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Only a few years ago, such a format would have seemed unlikely. Today, however, regional leaders are discussing joint railway projects, energy security, transport corridors, investment, and foreign-policy coordination rather than managing old disputes. The agreements reached in Cholpon-Ata suggest that the consultative format is gradually evolving from a platform for political dialogue into a mechanism for practical regional cooperation. From Conflict to Alliance                                                 Ahead of the informal multilateral meeting, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held bilateral talks that set the tone for the broader regional meeting. Relations between the two countries now stand in sharp contrast to the situation sixteen years ago. Following the ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, relations between Bishkek and Tashkent entered one of their most difficult periods since independence. The agenda between the two neighbors has since changed dramatically. Speaking in Cholpon-Ata, Mirziyoyev said relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan had reached “a historic peak.” Bilateral trade has increased almost tenfold in recent years, reaching $1.2 billion last year. The two countries now have around 450 joint ventures, operate a joint Development Fund to support cooperative projects, and have established 15 air routes and five bus services linking their cities. Mirziyoyev described the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway as one of the most important joint initiatives between the two countries, arguing that the project would reshape transport links across Eurasia. “This railway will fundamentally change the geopolitical landscape. Those who understand what it took to make this happen know what a major achievement it is,” Mirziyoyev said. The talks concluded with the signing of a Treaty on Allied Relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The two sides also exchanged several bilateral documents, including agreements covering sections of their common border and the joint use of the Chashma spring. A Broader Regional Agenda While the Japarov-Mirziyoyev talks focused primarily on bilateral relations, the informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan broadened the discussion to regional integration, transport connectivity, energy security, and foreign-policy coordination. Opening the meeting, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov said one of the clearest results of closer regional cooperation had been the Central Asian countries’ growing support for one another on the international stage. As an example, he cited the region’s joint support for Kyrgyzstan’s successful bid for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for the 2027-2028 term. Japarov also revived the idea of introducing a single tourist visa for foreign visitors traveling across Central Asia, proposing that the region’s foreign ministries intensify consultations on the initiative. Azerbaijan’s participation as a full member gave the meeting additional significance. Baku joined the consultative format as a...

3 days ago

Wildberries Kazakhstan Sellers Count Losses After Ukraine Strikes

Over the past month, Ukrainian forces have carried out a series of strikes on the facilities of Russia's largest online marketplace, Wildberries. As with previous attacks on Russia's energy infrastructure, including that of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the consequences are again being felt by citizens and businesses in neighboring countries, highlighting the extent to which the war's economic effects now extend far beyond the battlefield. Since July 18, Ukrainian strikes have hit Wildberries logistics facilities in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Crimea, as well as in Tver and Tambov Oblasts. According to the Russian business daily Kommersant, the attacks damaged logistics facilities representing more than 10% of Wildberries’ total warehouse floor space, with a combined area exceeding 550,000 square meters. Alongside Wildberries, another major Russian marketplace, Ozon, also operates in Kazakhstan. Its logistics network has so far not been affected by similar attacks. Together, the two companies account for more than 85% of Kazakhstan’s cross-border online marketplace segment, according to data presented in June by Mazhilis deputy Aituar Koshmambetov during parliamentary discussions on the development of e-commerce. E-commerce has become one of Kazakhstan’s fastest-growing sectors, expanding roughly fivefold since 2020. The market was valued at $6.7 billion in 2025, and the government aims to increase that figure to $19.5 billion by 2029. Against that backdrop, Kazakh sellers were always likely to be affected sooner or later. On Tuesday, Kazakhstan’s National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, Atameken, said it had begun collecting information on Kazakh businesses affected by the attacks on Wildberries facilities in Russia. According to preliminary estimates by the Ecommerce-KZ Association, more than 100 member companies suffered losses as a result of fires at the marketplace’s logistics centers. Their combined losses exceed $2.1 million. Following an request from Atameken to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade and Integration, the ministry has approached Russian authorities and the Wildberries for further information. For neighboring Kyrgyzstan, the situation surrounding Wildberries has proved even more painful. Compensation for lost goods is now being discussed at the level of the country’s economy minister, who is negotiating with the marketplace’s management. Much of Kyrgyzstan’s garment industry and trading sector now depend on Wildberries. According to the country’s association of garment manufacturers, individual producers have suffered losses ranging from 1 million to 100 million Kyrgyz soms, or approximately $11,400 to $1.14 million. While businesses in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are counting their losses, Wildberries itself appears to be reconsidering its logistics strategy. According to a report in Kommersant, the company has begun searching for vacant warehouse space in Kazakhstan and is prepared to lease virtually all of the country’s available modern warehouse capacity. According to NF Group, only 5.8% of Kazakhstan's modern warehouse space was vacant at the end of 2025. Stanislav Akhmedzyanov, managing partner at IBC Global, said the Kazakh market has no single warehouse facility of 100,000 square meters, which is reportedly the amount of space Wildberries requires. As of the end of June 2026, only 130,000 square meters of warehouse space remained available across the country, scattered...

5 days ago

U.S. Imposes 12.5% Tariff on Kazakhstan Over Third-Country Import Controls

Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian economy included in a new U.S. tariff action covering 60 trading partners. An additional tariff of 12.5% has been imposed on a range of Kazakh goods, excluding products listed in the annexes to the final decision. The rate applies to goods entered for consumption in the United States from July 24, 2026. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade and Integration said about 95% of the country’s exports to the United States would remain outside the measure because of the exemptions. It also said the new tariff replaces an expired temporary 10% surcharge and will not be added to it. Kazakhstan already prohibits forced labor in domestic employment under Article 7 of its Labor Code. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) did not allege that Kazakh exporters use forced labor. Its finding concerned a separate gap: Kazakhstan lacks a customs prohibition capable of excluding foreign goods produced wholly or partly with forced labor. The investigation was launched in March under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, a mechanism that allows Washington to respond to foreign practices it considers discriminatory or restrictive to U.S. commerce. In June, USTR concluded that the policies of all 60 economies under review warranted action. The final decision followed more than 1,600 written comments and testimony from over 100 witnesses. Most of the economies were divided into two rate groups, while the European Union, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Switzerland received special treatment linked to existing most-favored-nation tariffs. This was not a Kazakhstan-specific finding. USTR identified the same deficiency in 53 other economies, including Australia, Japan, Norway, Singapore, and South Korea. Together, the 60 economies under investigation accounted for 99.4% of U.S. imports. A 10% tariff was imposed on countries that had introduced at least a partial ban on imports associated with forced labor or made corresponding commitments to Washington. Kazakhstan was placed in the 12.5% category alongside Australia, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, and several other U.S. trading partners, as well as China and Russia. The immediate cost to Kazakhstan will depend largely on the scope of the exemptions. Washington exempted raw materials where tariffs could leave the U.S. market without sufficient domestic supply, products whose higher cost could cause wider economic disruption, and goods that the United States cannot produce in sufficient quantities or obtain elsewhere. The 12.5% rate therefore does not mean that all Kazakh exports will become more expensive in the American market. The structure of bilateral trade further limits the likely damage. Kazakhstan’s exports to the United States are concentrated in commodities, particularly oil, uranium, metals, and semi-processed materials. Many serve U.S. energy and industrial needs. The Kazakh government’s estimate that about 95% of exports remain exempt indicates that the largest trade flows should avoid the additional tariff, although the U.S. notice does not provide a Kazakhstan-specific calculation. According to U.S. figures, goods trade between the two countries reached $5 billion in 2025. U.S. imports from Kazakhstan rose by 73%...

6 days ago

Kazakhstan’s $5 Billion Kashagan Fine Moves Into New Legal Phase

Kazakhstan has escalated its dispute with the foreign investors behind the Kashagan oil field, warning the consortium’s managing director that he could face administrative and criminal liability over its failure to pay an environmental fine of nearly $5 billion. The warning to Giancarlo Ruiu, managing director of North Caspian Operating Company, was reported by Reuters, which cited two sources and a document it had reviewed. NCOC’s shareholders include Eni, ExxonMobil, Shell, and TotalEnergies, each with a 16.81% stake; Kazakhstan’s state-owned KazMunayGas, with 16.88%; CNPC, with 8.33%; and Inpex, with 7.56%. The dispute began after the Department of Ecology for the Atyrau Region inspected the consortium’s production facilities in 2022 and identified about ten alleged violations. Inspectors said that by November 1, 2022, more than 1.7 million metric tons of sulfur had accumulated at a storage site within the Bolashak oil and gas processing complex. NCOC’s permit allowed it to store no more than 730,000 tons. According to the environmental authorities, the operator had exceeded the permitted limit by more than twofold. In early 2023, the regional environmental department issued a notification seeking 2.356 trillion tenge in penalties, equivalent to about $5.4 billion at the exchange rate at the time. NCOC rejected the allegations and maintained that its sulfur-handling operations complied with Kazakh law and the permits issued for the project. The proceedings continued for more than three years. In August 2025, a court set aside the original notification because of procedural deficiencies in the way it had been issued. The ruling did not dismiss the environmental allegations themselves. The authorities subsequently issued a new notification, allowing the case to proceed. After further domestic proceedings, the Atyrau Regional Court upheld the penalty on June 19, allowing the ruling to enter into force. It later emerged that members of the consortium had been aware of the risk posed by the growing sulfur stockpiles for years. In 2017, Eni warned that the project was heading towards exceeding the permitted storage capacity. By late 2020, NCOC had also cautioned that Kazakhstan’s new Environmental Code, adopted the following year, would increase the risk of substantial penalties. According to internal documents reported by Bloomberg, Eni executives proposed processing more of the sulfur for sale on international markets. ExxonMobil, TotalEnergies, CNPC, and Inpex were not planning comparable measures at the time, while KazMunayGas had yet to settle on a position. On July 14, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Justice said the domestic court ruling had entered into force and gave NCOC until July 20 to pay voluntarily. The ministry said compulsory enforcement proceedings could begin if the consortium failed to meet the deadline. NCOC did not pay by July 20. The Justice Ministry subsequently warned Ruiu of possible liability for non-compliance, marking a further escalation in a dispute that had already moved beyond the original question of sulfur storage. The consortium continued to deny wrongdoing and maintained that the penalty could not be enforced while international arbitration proceedings were under way. Its foreign shareholders are separately challenging the fine...

1 week ago

Aliyev Sees Azerbaijan and Central Asia’s Interests Converging

The Shusha Global Media Forum, an annual gathering held in Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region and conceived as a platform for journalists and media representatives from dozens of countries across Europe and beyond, including the United States, acquired broader regional significance last year because of its consequences for several Russian participants. Last year’s forum attracted widespread attention in Russia after two prominent Russian participants faced repercussions at home. Mikhail Gusman, then first deputy director general of the state news agency TASS, was dismissed shortly after attending the event and praising Azerbaijan, although no official reason was given. The following month, pro-Kremlin political analyst Sergei Markov was designated a “foreign agent” after facing criticism for his favorable comments about Azerbaijan. It was therefore unsurprising that this year’s forum attracted close attention from media outlets around the world. Beyond the forum’s Russia-related significance, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev’s remarks pointed to a broader regional shift. Azerbaijan increasingly sees its political and economic interests converging with those of Central Asia, particularly through the Middle Corridor, cross-Caspian energy links, and infrastructure cooperation. According to official figures, approximately 160 journalists, experts, and public officials from 53 countries attended the event. The forum brought together representatives of around 30 international news agencies, more than 60 leading media organizations, and roughly 10 international organizations and companies. Former TASS executive Mikhail Gusman attended the fourth Shusha Global Media Forum and highlighted its growing international profile. “There are very few, if any, media platforms in the world that bring together representatives of media organizations from every region to exchange views and engage in dialogue. That is precisely why the importance of this forum cannot be overstated,” he said. As in previous years, President Aliyev opened the forum and spent nearly three hours answering questions from journalists representing a wide range of countries. Given the latest deterioration in relations between Baku and Moscow, many observers were watching to see whether questions would prompt unusually sharp comments about Russia. The organizers did not shy away from potentially sensitive questions. Ukrainian journalist Dmytro Gordon, who has been designated an extremist in Russia, was once again invited to the forum and made full use of the opportunity. Gordon noted Ukrainian drone and missile strikes deep inside Russia before asking Aliyev what counsel he would offer Ukraine and President Vladimir Putin. “What advice would you give Putin today, when, in my view, he no longer has any good options left?” Gordon asked. Aliyev avoided an overtly confrontational response, stating that Ukraine should “never agree to occupation” and that the war “must be stopped—and stopped immediately.” Aliyev’s exchange with journalists and analysts from Europe and the United States painted a clear picture of Azerbaijan’s worldview and the role it sees for itself internationally. That perspective remains heavily shaped by the three-decade conflict between Baku and Yerevan over Karabakh. According to Aliyev, the United States, France, and Russia all sought to preserve the status quo during that period. He described those decades as a “time of war,” arguing that...

3 weeks ago

As Azerbaijan Pushes Back Against Moscow, Central Asia Watches

The recent diplomatic escalation between Azerbaijan and Russia appeared to have run its course in April, after Moscow agreed to pay compensation over the Azerbaijan Airlines crash in Kazakhstan. Instead, the dispute has entered a new phase, and its implications now reach beyond the South Caucasus. On July 6, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Mikhail Yevdokimov and handed him a formal note of protest over what Baku described as a Russian drone strike on a fuel station owned by Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region on the evening of July 5. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said the attack on SOCAR facilities in Ukraine was not an isolated incident. It cited previous strikes on the company’s gas distribution compressor station and oil depot in Odesa, which caused material damage and injured employees. Baku also pointed to earlier damage to the Azerbaijani embassy building in Kyiv and the honorary consulate in Kharkiv, calling on Moscow to investigate and comply with its obligations to protect civilian infrastructure and diplomatic missions. At the same time, Shusha — known to Armenians as Shushi, retaken by Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war, and still regarded by many Armenians as occupied — hosted an international conference devoted to what participants described as Russia’s “colonial policy,” the “Circassian genocide,” and the situation of non-Russian peoples within the Russian Federation. The conference declaration called on Moscow to “recognize its historical crimes, abandon its chauvinistic policies, and end the forced recruitment of ethnic minorities into the war against Ukraine.” Experts from Azerbaijan, the United States, France, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Türkiye, and Georgia attended the conference. None of the Central Asian republics was represented. That absence was telling. Central Asian governments may be distancing themselves from Moscow in certain areas, but they remain reluctant to participate in openly anti-Russian political initiatives. For Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat, the question is not whether Russia’s position has weakened, but how far they can move without provoking pressure from Moscow. For Central Asia, the dispute is not a distant quarrel in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is now a central link in the westward routes that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan are trying to strengthen as alternatives to Russian territory. The Middle Corridor runs from China through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and onward through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye to Europe. Any deterioration in Azerbaijan-Russia relations therefore has practical implications for Central Asian transit, energy, and diplomatic room for maneuver. The first major rupture in relations between Baku and Moscow came after Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243, traveling from Baku to Grozny, was damaged by Russian air-defense fire over Russian territory on December 25, 2024. The aircraft later crashed while attempting an emergency landing near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people. Azerbaijan blamed Russia and demanded an apology, accountability, and compensation. Relations deteriorated further in June 2025 following the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg and reports of torture. The most prominent victims were the...

4 weeks ago

Kazakhstan Court Ruling Clears Legal Path for Tokayev to Seek Another Term

Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Court has ruled that President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev may seek another term under the country’s 2026 Constitution, effectively resetting the count created under the previous Basic Law while leaving the single seven-year presidential term formally in place. The ruling, issued on July 7 after Tokayev’s request, addressed whether people who held senior offices under the 1995 Constitution could be elected or appointed to those posts under the new Basic Law, adopted in a March 15 referendum and in force since July 1. The offices covered include the president, the chair and judges of the Constitutional Court, the chair of the Supreme Court, and the prosecutor general. The court said restrictions in the 2026 Constitution are linked only to elections and appointments made under the new constitutional order and laws adopted on its basis. It said the new Constitution contains no provision requiring terms, elections, or appointments under the 1995 Basic Law to be counted when the new limits are applied. The court’s official interpretation says people who held those offices under the 1995 Constitution “may be elected or appointed to the corresponding positions after the 2026 Constitution enters into force.” In practical terms, the ruling removes the main legal barrier that had been assumed to prevent Tokayev from appearing on the presidential ballot again. Tokayev was elected in November 2022 to what was presented as a single, non-renewable seven-year term ending in 2029. He has not announced another run, and the ruling does not set a timetable for a presidential election. Speculation has also continued over whether Tokayev could seek a future international role, including as UN secretary-general. According to political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev, the Constitutional Court’s clarification resolves a strategic issue over the president’s term of office. He recalled that Tokayev’s 2022 election followed an earlier constitutional reform that introduced the single seven-year presidential term. A later dilemma emerged because the previous constitutional rules would have required elections to be held in December 2028, almost a year before the end of the seven-year mandate. “In the new Constitution, these formulations were changed, but a new question emerged: does the new Constitution require a review of terms in connection with the reset of political institutions? The text itself contained no relevant provisions. At a press briefing on voting day, Tokayev said the next elections would be held in 2029,” Ashimbayev said, adding that Tokayev’s appeal showed that the issue would be handled through constitutional procedure rather than political assumption. The court, he said, indicated that adoption of the new Constitution does not mean the automatic extension of norms contained in the old Constitution or decisions adopted on its basis. “Thus, the single seven-year term is confirmed, but it will be counted from the moment elections are held. The Constitution, however, prohibits holding presidential and parliamentary elections at the same time, which moves the presidential issue to the autumn,” Ashimbayev said. “It is clear that this is about the right, not the obligation, of the incumbent head of state to...

4 weeks ago

Kyrgyzstan’s Water Compensation Push Tests Central Asian Unity

Central Asia’s water diplomacy is entering a contentious phase. Kyrgyzstan, where much of the region’s runoff is formed, is reviving calls for economic compensation from downstream users. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have rejected the idea, saying current agreements do not provide for payments for transboundary river water. The dispute comes as the region tries to maintain annual water-allocation deals while adapting agriculture to worsening scarcity and climate pressure. Water has long tied together the region’s upstream and downstream states. The 2021 and 2022 clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border showed how disputes over land, border infrastructure, roads, security posts, and water access can escalate when local tensions are not contained. Yet political will alone does not guarantee agreements between countries. The Central Asian republics cooperate on water issues through two interstate bodies. One is the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, established in 1993 by all five Central Asian republics. Kyrgyzstan suspended its participation in IFAS in 2016, and now attends the fund’s meetings as an observer. The second body is the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination, whose meetings are held once a quarter. At its 93rd meeting in Bukhara in early April, the commission confirmed limits for water withdrawal from transboundary rivers, following decisions approved at the 92nd meeting in Dushanbe. For the Amu Darya, the 2026 water allocations set the total withdrawal limit for the water-management year from October 2025 to October 2026 at about 55.4 billion cubic meters. Of this, 15.9 billion cubic meters is allocated for the cold period, from October to April. Tajikistan has been allocated 9.8 billion cubic meters per year, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan each receive 22 billion. A significant part of the flow, 44 billion cubic meters, must pass through the adjusted section of the Kerki hydrological post, helping secure the lower reaches of the river. For the Syr Darya, the total water withdrawal limit for the non-growing season is 4.219 billion cubic meters. Kazakhstan will receive 460 million cubic meters through the Dustlik Canal, Kyrgyzstan 47 million, and Tajikistan 365 million, while the largest share will go to Uzbekistan, 3.347 billion cubic meters. The inherited framework is also facing pressure from outside the five-state system. Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal, which is being advanced outside the Soviet-era allocation structure, has added uncertainty on the Amu Darya. The Central Asian republics also cooperate in bilateral and trilateral formats. In January, Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan joint working groups met in Turkestan. The sides reaffirmed water cooperation, agreed to continue repairs on the Dostyk canal, and planned automated hydrological posts on the Syr Darya. In May, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan agreed on the operating regime of the Bahri-Tojik Reservoir for the summer of 2026. From June to August, the reservoir is to operate in a coordinated mode to supply irrigation water to farmers in the Maktaaral and Zhetysai districts of southern Kazakhstan. These agreements show that regional mechanisms still work, but experts continue to warn that climate pressure, data gaps, and uneven national interests could overwhelm existing formats. “Forecasting the...

1 month ago

Kazakhstan’s Parliament Gives Way to New Kurultai Under Tokayev’s Constitutional Reset

Kazakhstan’s bicameral parliament held its final joint session in Astana on June 30, closing a 30-year legislative era before the new Constitution takes effect on July 1. The change will replace the Senate and Mazhilis with a single-chamber Kurultai. Elections to the new body are expected in August, with 145 deputies to be elected through party lists. No current deputy will transfer automatically into the new chamber, giving the coming vote direct importance for Kazakhstan’s parties and for President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s wider state overhaul. Addressing the final joint session, Tokayev framed the change as more than an administrative reform. He said Kazakhstan was entering “a new chapter in the development of independent Kazakhstan,” and beginning what he called a new historical era. The president also used his speech to summarize the work of the parliament created under the 1995 Constitution. Over three decades, the legislature adopted around 3,500 laws, which Tokayev said had helped strengthen the country’s statehood. “Today, we are completing an important parliamentary political cycle and opening a new chapter in the development of independent Kazakhstan,” Tokayev said. According to Tokayev, more than 300 major laws, including constitutional legislation, have been adopted over the past three years. He described them as “a reliable platform for our future achievements.” The transition also carries a succession dimension. The new Constitution creates a vice presidency and rewrites parts of the state architecture ahead of the scheduled end of Tokayev’s single seven-year presidential term in 2029. Tokayev has presented the changes as a modernization of governance, while the August Kurultai election will show how much room the new party-list system gives to political competition. Tokayev told deputies that the new legislature would need to move faster than the outgoing parliament. He said the Kurultai would be expected to remove bureaucratic obstacles, improve the speed and quality of law-making, and bring qualified experts and consultants into legislative work. “The Kurultai will have to eliminate all obstacles in the form of bureaucratic procedures, increase the speed and quality of law-making, and organize the effective work of qualified experts and consultants,” Tokayev said. He linked those goals to global instability and digital competition, saying Kazakhstan had to adapt legislation to a rapidly changing environment. “The Kurultai will have to work at an accelerated pace to promptly adapt national legislation to rapidly changing realities within the digital matrix,” Tokayev said. “This is a critically important task, as it will determine Kazakhstan’s readiness to participate in global competition.” Tokayev praised the outgoing deputies for their work on digital legislation. He said there had been no ready-made templates for regulating artificial intelligence, and credited the parliament with helping build a flexible legal system. Tokayev said Kazakhstan had become one of the first countries to adopt both a Digital Code and a specialized law on artificial intelligence. He also pointed to the new Constitution’s guarantees on the protection of personal data in cyberspace. The next phase, he said, would include a full e-Parliament system. Tokayev first raised that idea...

1 month ago

Kurultai Election Campaign Takes Shape in Parliament’s Final Budget Debate

Kazakhstan's outgoing parliament spent one of its final sessions debating the government's management of the 2025 budget, in what often resembled a dress rehearsal for the country's first Kurultai election campaign. On July 1, Kazakhstan’s new constitution will enter into force, replacing the current Senate and Mazhilis with a single-chamber Kurultai. The new legislature will have 145 deputies elected through party lists, and elections are expected in August. No current deputy will transfer automatically into the new chamber. Those who want to remain in national politics will need a place on a party list and a fresh mandate. That gave the June 26 session an unusual political significance: would any outgoing deputies use the budget debate to make a final public break with the government? Some did put pointed questions to Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov and Finance Minister Madi Takiyev as parliament reviewed and approved the reports of the government and the Supreme Audit Chamber on the execution of the republican budget for 2025. Finance Minister Madi Takiyev presented the figures in optimistic terms. According to him, Kazakhstan’s economy grew by 6.5% in 2025, while GDP increased by $14.7 billion in dollar terms. Meanwhile, public debt remains low at around 22.8% of GDP, or approximately $74.5 billion.  Deputies asked Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov why, despite GDP growth of 6.5%, Kazakh citizens’ incomes had declined.  Bektenov referred to high inflation, which has been eating into household incomes. “Last year, inflation peaked in September at 12.9%. Now, as a result of measures taken by the government, the National Bank and other interested agencies, inflation over the first five months of this year has declined to 10.4%,” the prime minister said. He recalled that the government had adopted a separate plan to raise household incomes. According to the government, the average monthly wage reached 442,000 tenge, about $910. He said there were already sectors, such as agriculture and transport, where real incomes had increased. Mazhilis deputy Azat Peruashev, who recently stepped down after 15 years as chairman of the Ak Zhol party but still heads its parliamentary faction, focused on the National Fund. He said the government had failed to keep an earlier promise to reduce withdrawals. “When approving the draft budget for 2024-2026, the government announced a plan to reduce withdrawals from the National Fund starting in 2025. In fact, the volume of funds received from the National Fund in 2025 remained high, at approximately $10.8 billion,” he said. The National Fund is one of the most politically sensitive parts of Kazakhstan’s public finances. Built largely from oil and gas revenue and managed through the National Bank, it is meant to serve two functions: to help stabilize the budget when commodity revenue falls, and to preserve part of the country’s resource wealth for future generations. Heavy withdrawals therefore carry a political cost. They can help cover current spending, but they also reduce the savings Kazakhstan has accumulated from its oil wealth, making the size of annual transfers a perennial political argument. Peruashev...

1 month ago