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Journalist

Andrei Matveev is a journalist from Kazakhstan.

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Kazakhstan's Parliament

Amanat Adilet Merger as Kazakhstan Prepares for New Parliament

Kazakhstan’s long-dominant Amanat party has voted to merge into the newly formed pro-presidential Adilet party, transferring the machinery of the country’s ruling political force into a new vehicle more closely associated with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. The move gives Adilet the campaign infrastructure and nationwide network of officials and activists that it lacked as a newly registered party. For Amanat, it offers a way to move beyond a political brand still closely associated with former President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Amanat held a congress in Astana on June 12 that is likely to be remembered as the final meeting of a political organization whose history spans a quarter of a century. For most of that period, the party was known as Nur Otan, the ruling party built around Nazarbayev and chaired by him for much of its existence. The rebrand followed the chaos of January 2022, officially referred to in Kazakhstan as the January Events, when protests triggered by fuel price rises grew into the most serious political crisis in the country’s post-Soviet history. The violence weakened Nazarbayev’s remaining influence and accelerated Tokayev’s effort to distance the political system from the Nazarbayev era. It also made Nur Otan’s association with the former president a political liability. Tokayev took over Nur Otan from Nazarbayev in January 2022. Two months later, the party was renamed Amanat. Tokayev stepped down from the party leadership in April, after Kazakhstan amended its legislation to prohibit the president from being a member of any political party. Since then, Amanat has been led by Yerlan Koshanov, an experienced official and Tokayev ally. At the congress, Koshanov acknowledged that the 2022 name change had failed to remove the party’s association with the previous political era. “Let us be frank,” he said. “Certain associations and assessments related to the party’s past still remain in public consciousness.” Amanat remains politically useful: it has the organization needed to contest elections. But its connection to Nazarbayev’s era sits uneasily with Tokayev’s attempts to present his presidency as a break with the old system. Koshanov told delegates that the country needed “new points of unity” rather than new divisions, and said Amanat should combine its resources with Adilet as part of a single pro-presidential force. Delegates unanimously approved the decision to join Adilet. New Kid On The Block Adilet, meaning “justice,” is a very new party. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, it held its founding congress on May 7 and was officially registered by Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Justice on June 1. Its chairman is Aibek Dadebay, a former head of Tokayev’s presidential administration. The party presents itself as a pro-presidential force built around the language of responsibility and reform. On June 14, Adilet held its second congress. Party leader Aibek Dadebay, addressing participants, proposed voting in favor of Amanat joining Adilet, describing it as a decision based on national responsibility and broader state interests rather than narrow party calculations. Delegates approved the merger, confirming that Adilet is less the creation of an...

1 week ago

political parties

Kazakhstan’s Party Landscape Enters a Decisive Week

Kazakhstan’s party system may be approaching one of its most consequential turning points in years. With Amanat scheduled to hold a party congress on June 12 and the newly registered Adilet party planning its own gathering on June 14, speculation is growing that the country’s dominant political organization could be reshaped, merged, or rebranded ahead of elections to the new unicameral Kurultai. The immediate question is whether Amanat, the successor to the party originally created around Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, will remain the major pro-presidential force or whether its extensive organizational resources will be drawn into Adilet, a new party aligned with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s political agenda and reform program. For now, no merger has been officially announced, but the timing of the two congresses has made the possibility central to Kazakhstan’s political debate. Adilet held its founding congress on May 7, and was officially registered by the Ministry of Justice on June 1. It is led by Aibek Dadebay, the former head of Tokayev’s administration, and presents itself as a pro-presidential force built around the language of justice, responsibility, and reform. Its emergence adds an eighth officially registered party to Kazakhstan’s system, but its political importance lies less in the number of parties than in the possibility that it could become the new vehicle for the president’s loyalist coalition. That makes Adilet’s appearance significant in a regional context. For many years, Kyrgyzstan was often regarded as Central Asia’s most advanced state in terms of party development and political pluralism. Today, however, Kazakhstan has become a more influential reference point for party-building, one that is attracting attention in Tashkent and Dushanbe, while Kyrgyzstan has largely moved away from party-centered politics. Kazakhstan has developed a multi-party model in which several major political organizations are represented in parliament. The system seeks to balance the interests of the state with those of various social groups and constituencies. Individual elements of this model can be adjusted or transformed as political demands evolve. For example, as public nostalgia for communism began to fade, the Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan quietly dropped the word “Communist” from its public identity. Ironically, when the party was originally established, the word “People’s” had been added to distinguish it from the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, from which many of its founders had emerged. Through such splits, mergers, and rebrandings, Kazakhstan has gradually constructed a party system that encompasses organizations representing a broad spectrum of society, from state officials and business interests to rural communities. In both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, five political parties are officially registered. Their political spectrum broadly mirrors that of Kazakhstan: a dominant ruling party, a socialist or communist party, and organizations positioning themselves as democratic, people’s, agrarian, or environmental movements. Kyrgyzstan, by contrast, has taken a markedly different path. In 2025, the country completed its transition from a party-centered political system to one in which parties play a secondary role. Elections to the Jogorku Kenesh are now conducted primarily through a majoritarian model that emphasizes individual...

2 weeks ago

parliamentary elections

Kazakhstan’s August Elections: Who Will Enter the New Parliament?

On July 1, Kazakhstan’s new Constitution will come into force, triggering the dissolution of the current bicameral parliament. According to political observers, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is expected to sign a decree in early July calling elections to a new unicameral legislature, to be known as the Kurultai. No date has yet been formally announced, but analysts expect the vote to take place in the second half of August, most likely on either August 16 or August 23. On June 1, Kazakhstan officially registered a new political party, Adilet, meaning “Justice,” led by Aybek Dadebay, the former head of Tokayev’s presidential administration. As a result, eight political parties are now officially registered ahead of the election campaign, six of which are currently represented in the lower house of parliament. So far, however, none of the parties has shown significant signs of gearing up for the campaign. “Kazakhstan’s political parties know perfectly well that parliamentary elections will take place in the second half of August, that they will be conducted under a proportional representation system, and that skipping the election is not advisable because it could affect party financing,” political analyst Gaziz Abishev wrote on his Telegram channel. “They could already be actively working to revive their party brands and promote the public figures who will become the faces of the campaign. Yet the passivity is obvious.” In his view, internal party, inter-party, and broader elite-level processes are currently underway, suggesting that some form of political transformation is taking place behind the scenes. The emergence of Adilet appears to have influenced the calculations of Kazakhstan’s political class. The arrival of a second openly pro-presidential party introduces a significant element of uncertainty into a system long dominated by Amanat. Amanat traces its roots to former President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s political machine. Originally known as Otan, or “Fatherland,” it became Nur Otan in 2006 before being rebranded as Amanat following the January 2022 unrest. Former presidential candidate Amirzhan Kosanov believes the creation of Adilet reflects Tokayev’s desire to create political competition within the ruling elite while presenting it internationally as evidence of political pluralism. “Given the executive branch’s influence over election commissions and the largely artificial nature of the party system, the campaign beginning in July will most likely resemble a controlled competition between two principal actors: the ruling Amanat party and the new Adilet party,” Kosanov argued. For critics of the system, the upcoming elections increasingly resemble a contest between two pro-presidential forces. Organizationally, Amanat remains a formidable political machine. It inherited from the Nur Otan era an extensive nationwide network of regional branches and primary organizations embedded in large workplaces and institutions. Adilet, meanwhile, has already secured backing from a wide range of business associations, professional groups, technology organizations, creative-industry bodies, and civic initiatives. Its political council also includes senior executives from some of Kazakhstan’s largest companies, including Qarmet, Kazakhtelecom, and Allur Auto. Despite this, few analysts believe Kazakhstan is moving toward an American-style two-party system. Amanat and Adilet share broadly similar political...

3 weeks ago

Why the Caspian Is Becoming Eurasia’s New Energy Crossroads

Russia’s war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East are accelerating the emergence of a new Eurasian energy architecture, with the Caspian region increasingly at its center. In international politics, moments when several global crises simultaneously create opportunities for new centers of influence are rare. Today, a vast area stretching from Central Asia to the South Caucasus is experiencing just such a moment. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped Europe’s approach to energy security. Tensions in the Middle East have also raised questions about the reliability of traditional energy supply routes. Meanwhile, the global energy transition is driving demand for both clean-energy sources and alternative transport corridors. Against this backdrop, the Caspian region is no longer viewed as a peripheral economic space. It is increasingly emerging as a critical hub in Eurasia’s evolving energy system. Baku Energy Week 2026 shows how far this shift has come, highlighting Azerbaijan’s transformation from a traditional oil and gas producer into a strategic connector linking Central Asia, Türkiye, Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. One of the forum’s most significant political signals came in the form of a message from U.S. President Donald Trump to participants. His remarks went beyond a routine diplomatic greeting and reflected a broader shift toward a more pragmatic view of global energy policy. Trump described the United States as a strong supporter of Azerbaijan’s oil and gas industry and said the U.S.-Azerbaijan energy partnership would become more important in the years ahead. For much of the past decade, Western energy strategies appeared increasingly focused on rapid decarbonization and climate objectives. However, rising energy prices, Europe’s energy crisis, and growing global electricity demand have prompted policymakers to reassess those priorities. Trump openly reaffirmed support for the oil and gas sector and emphasized that the United States remains a long-standing energy partner of Azerbaijan. More importantly, Washington appears to recognize Baku’s strategic role in global energy security. The Trump administration increasingly views energy security as an element of geopolitical competition and is prepared to support projects that diversify supplies of hydrocarbons and critical raw materials. Speaking at the opening of Baku Energy Week, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said Trump’s policies had helped return energy policy to “normality.” Aliyev also noted that the oil and gas industry had faced sustained pressure from advocates of a rapid energy transition. It was therefore no coincidence that Azerbaijan signed a series of agreements during the forum with major American companies, including Chevron, JPMorgan, Oracle, and Comstock Resources. Particularly noteworthy was a cooperation agreement covering critical minerals and rare earth elements. For Washington, access to these resources is increasingly a matter not only of energy policy but also of technological and national security amid intensifying competition with China. In effect, Washington is beginning to view Azerbaijan as an important platform in a changing Eurasian energy map. While Washington is signaling renewed political backing, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remains one of the principal architects of the region’s practical integration. Over the past...

3 weeks ago

EAEU

As Armenia Looks West, Could Uzbekistan Move Closer to the EAEU?

Armenia’s increasingly uncertain future within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) appears to have entered a new phase. On May 29, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan issued a joint statement calling on Yerevan to clarify whether it intends to pursue deeper integration with the European Union or remain committed to the Eurasian bloc. The four leaders announced that members of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council would present a report at the next meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in December 2026 outlining the possible consequences of suspending Armenia’s participation in the EAEU treaty framework. “We share the view that the Republic of Armenia should, within the shortest possible timeframe, hold a nationwide referendum on joining the European Union or continuing its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union,” the statement said. Speaking to journalists after the summit in Astana, Russian President Vladimir Putin drew parallels between Armenia’s current trajectory and the developments that preceded the crisis in Ukraine. “I have mentioned this before: the crisis in Ukraine began with attempts to join the EU,” Putin said. He added that significant differences between European and EAEU standards, particularly in agriculture and industry, make simultaneous participation in both integration projects difficult. “Combining the two is practically impossible,” Putin said. “Therefore, we would be forced to curtail much of our economic integration work with Armenia.” The following day, Russia recalled its ambassador to Armenia for consultations amid Yerevan’s growing engagement with the European Union. According to Russian political analyst Arkady Dubnov, the move was a clear diplomatic signal of Moscow’s dissatisfaction with the pro-European course pursued by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government and indicated a downgrading of bilateral relations. Dubnov also argued that Armenia’s representative at the Astana summit, Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan, avoided harsher criticism from Putin partly because of the position taken by Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. “Kazakhstan itself signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union in 2020,” Dubnov noted, suggesting that arguments about Armenia’s European integration harming the EAEU are largely political rather than economic in nature. One recent poll appears to reinforce confidence within Armenia’s ruling camp. A survey conducted ahead of parliamentary elections indicates that Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party could secure nearly 65% of decided voters, positioning it for a convincing victory and a substantial parliamentary majority. Against that backdrop, Moscow’s pressure on Yerevan may be less about influencing the outcome of Armenia’s elections than about preparing for a longer-term strategic realignment. Supporters of Pashinyan increasingly associate his political project with closer ties to Europe, a perception reinforced not only by European leaders but also by U.S. President Donald Trump, who recently expressed support for Pashinyan’s re-election campaign. For his part, Pashinyan appears focused on a broader regional recalibration. Speaking via Facebook Live on May 31, he emphasized the importance of normalizing relations with neighboring states. “I am convinced that we will achieve the goal of normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye,” he said. “This means that a balanced and balancing...

3 weeks ago

EAEU

EAEU Leaders Meet in Astana Amid Growing Internal Trade Disputes

Astana is hosting Eurasian Economic Union events on May 28-29, with leaders arriving on Thursday and the main meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council scheduled for Friday, May 29. The first part of Thursday was dominated by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and his delegation during Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan. At the Palace of Independence, Tokayev and Putin introduced their official delegations to each other during the Russian president’s state visit, while Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov said the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meeting would begin on Friday morning in narrow and expanded formats. The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council is the highest body of the Eurasian Economic Union, which came into force on January 1, 2015. Now more than a decade old, the bloc is facing deepening internal contradictions driven largely by external economic pressure on Russia, the Union’s core member. Some of those tensions are linked to the bloc’s expansion beyond its original Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan core. To understand the current state of Eurasian integration, it is necessary to revisit its origins, particularly the role played by Kazakhstan and its first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had sought to preserve a looser union among the Soviet republics as the USSR collapsed. As prime minister and later president of the Kazakh SSR, Nazarbayev understood the economic consequences that would follow the collapse of the integrated Soviet economic system, and how deeply Kazakhstan remained tied to Soviet-era supply chains, infrastructure, and decision-making structures centered in Moscow. Nazarbayev first publicly proposed the idea of Eurasian integration in 1994 during a lecture at Moscow State University. At the time, however, the administration of Russian President Boris Yeltsin showed little interest in the concept. That changed after Vladimir Putin came to power. In 2001, the Eurasian Economic Community, known as EurAsEC, was established, bringing together Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. The founding agreement had been signed in Astana in October 2000. Uzbekistan joined EurAsEC in 2006, but suspended its membership only two years later. Meanwhile, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan launched work in 2007 on creating a Customs Union, which officially came into existence in 2010. In the autumn of 2011, Putin announced plans to establish a Eurasian Economic Union based on a future Single Economic Space. Two years later, Nazarbayev proposed dissolving EurAsEC in connection with the planned creation of the EAEU by Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia were invited to join the Customs Union. However, by 2014, when the treaty establishing the EAEU and dissolving EurAsEC was signed, neither Armenia nor Kyrgyzstan had initially been central to the Eurasian project. At that stage, much of the discussion revolved around the possible accession of Ukraine. Russian political commentator and current State Duma deputy Anatoly Wasserman devoted several books to the idea of integrating Ukraine into the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan project, including Ukraine and the Rest of Russia. Wasserman argued that Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine needed to move away from a raw-materials-based economic model by creating a unified market...

4 weeks ago

EAEU Summit in Astana: Is Moscow Pushing Armenia Toward the Exit?

Russian President Vladimir Putin is due to arrive in Astana on May 27 for a state visit, while the Eurasian Economic Forum and a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council will take place in Kazakhstan’s capital on May 28-29. Against the backdrop of increasingly strained relations between Moscow and Yerevan, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan will not attend the summit. Armenia will instead be represented by Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan. Kazakhstan’s presidential administration has already outlined the agenda for the visit. Putin is expected to receive full state honors. After the official welcoming ceremony, Putin and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev will hold bilateral talks. On May 28-29, Tokayev, Putin, and other EAEU leaders are expected to take part in the Eurasian Economic Forum and the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meetings. Strategic Partnership and Growing Pressure Political analyst Andrey Chebotarev said the agenda of the Tokayev-Putin talks is likely to focus on implementing the declaration signed during Tokayev’s state visit to Russia in November 2025, which raised Kazakhstan-Russia relations to the level of a “comprehensive strategic partnership and alliance.” The declaration envisioned expanded cooperation in politics, security, economics, integration, high technology, and humanitarian affairs. According to Chebotarev, the two presidents now need to define concrete mechanisms for implementing those agreements. Among the most sensitive issues is the planned construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant with the participation of Russia’s Rosatom. Astana, Chebotarev argued, is particularly interested in ensuring the continuity of the project as Western sanctions against Moscow tighten. Another key issue is the uninterrupted transit of Kazakh oil exports to Europe through Russian territory. “This issue is especially relevant given, first, the suspension of oil deliveries through the Druzhba pipeline, which the Russian side explains as being due to technical reasons, and second, the continuing Ukrainian drone attacks on the Russian ports of Novorossiysk and Ust-Luga on the Black and Baltic seas,” Chebotarev said. Other likely topics include logistics linked to the North-South transport corridor and the worsening decline in the Caspian Sea’s water level, particularly ahead of the planned seventh summit of Caspian littoral states later this year. Information Wars and the Golden Horde Debate The Putin-Tokayev meeting is taking place against an increasingly difficult information backdrop shaped by several Russian media outlets and commentators. Russian public discourse has continued to react strongly to the recent international symposium in Astana dedicated to the legacy of the Golden Horde, as well as to Tokayev’s remarks during the event. Kazakh political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev, commenting ahead of Putin’s visit, argued that Kazakhstan-Russia relations were being subjected to “attacks and information provocations.” He described this as part of a campaign to turn Kazakhstan into “a platform for confrontation with Russia” amid the broader Russia-West conflict. He added that similar efforts were visible in attempts to inflame tensions between Kazakhstan and China. At the same time, Ashimbayev avoided publicly criticizing Russian opinion leaders, many of whom have become increasingly vocal in questioning the alliance between Moscow and Astana. Armenia’s Growing...

4 weeks ago

National Identity

Kazakhstan Looks to the Golden Horde for a Deeper National Narrative

A major international symposium dedicated to the Golden Horde opened this week in Kazakhstan’s capital, underscoring the country’s growing effort to redefine its historical narrative and national identity through the legacy of the Great Steppe. The symposium, held under the patronage of UNESCO and titled “The Golden Horde as a Model of Steppe Civilization: History, Archaeology, Culture and Identity,” brought together more than 300 scholars, including 120 foreign researchers from over 20 countries. The event reflects Kazakhstan’s effort to align its national narrative with a growing body of scholarship that treats nomadic societies not as a “backward” alternative to sedentary civilizations, but as a distinct and highly sophisticated model of statehood shaped by the economic realities of the Eurasian steppe. Opening the symposium, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev declared that “no historian today questions the power of the Golden Horde, the empire that ruled the Great Steppe and occupied vast expanses of Eurasia. The empire that connected East and West and exerted a profound influence on the development of civilizations and the formation of states was unquestionably one of the largest political structures in history,” Tokayev said. [caption id="attachment_49194" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: Akorda[/caption] The Legacy of the Great Steppe The Golden Horde, also known as the Ulus of Jochi, emerged from the empire created by Genghis Khan across the Eurasian steppe. The wider Eurasian steppe stretched from Eastern Europe toward Mongolia, while the Golden Horde controlled a vast western portion of that world. The region long served as home to Indo-European, Turkic and Mongol nomadic peoples. Its open geography, largely free of impassable mountain barriers, enabled the large-scale movement of herds of horses, sheep and cattle in search of pastures and water sources. It was in this region, on the territory of present-day northern Kazakhstan, that horses were first domesticated about 5,500 years ago near the settlement of Botai. The archaeological Botai culture dates back to roughly 3700-3100 BCE. The Golden Horde itself traces directly to Jochi, the eldest son of Genghis Khan, whose descendants ruled the Ulus of Jochi across a vast territory from the Irtysh to the Danube. Over time, the Ulus of Jochi was divided between Jochi’s sons into western and eastern wings known respectively as the White Horde (Ak-Orda) and the Blue Horde (Kok-Orda). By the middle of the 15th century, the Ulus of Jochi had fragmented into successor polities, including the Siberian, Uzbek, Kazan, Crimean, and Kazakh khanates, as well as the Nogai Horde. Moscow’s rise also unfolded in the shadow of this post-Horde order before it later became the core of the Russian Empire. [caption id="attachment_49193" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Image: Akorda[/caption] Between Myth and Statehood Because written sources on the Golden Horde remain fragmented, much of its legacy survived through oral traditions, epics, myths, and legends. In Kazakh tradition, for example, khans continued to be chosen from among the Chinggisids, direct descendants of Genghis Khan, and elevated on a white felt carpet during coronation ceremonies. The period also produced oral epics preserved through the tradition of the...

1 month ago

OTS Summit in Turkistan Reveals Strains Beneath Turkic Unity

Last Friday, the Kazakh city of Turkistan, officially promoted as the “spiritual capital” of the Turkic world, hosted an informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). The official theme was artificial intelligence and digital development, but the meeting also highlighted older questions about the OTS’s political identity, its relationship with Russia, and Ankara’s influence within the Turkic world. Because the gathering was informal, much of what took place remained behind closed doors. Yet public statements, official readouts, and subsequent commentary offered clues about the tensions and competing agendas within the organization. The summit brought together the presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, as well as Tufan Erhurman, president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is recognized only by Turkey. The meeting followed Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s state visit to Kazakhstan, during which the two countries signed 15 agreements, including a Declaration on Eternal Friendship and an Enhanced Strategic Partnership between Kazakhstan and Turkey. In Turkistan, summit participants visited the mausoleum of Khoja Ahmed Yasawi, where Erdoğan donated a handwritten Quran manuscript to the historic site. Leaders also launched the construction of a Center for Turkic Civilization. The presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan separately visited a newly built mosque donated to Turkistan by Tashkent. Despite the atmosphere of symbolism and fraternity, however, the summit also exposed clear differences between Ankara’s wide-ranging vision for the OTS and Astana’s insistence that the organization should remain a practical cooperation platform. Those differences became especially visible in President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s speech at the summit. “Recently, opinions have been voiced portraying our organization as a military alliance. It is obvious that those spreading such speculation pursue malicious goals and seek to sow discord. Kazakhstan considers it necessary to reject such positions,” Tokayev said. “The Organization of Turkic States is neither a geopolitical project nor a military organization. It is a unique platform aimed at strengthening trade, economic, technological, digital, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation among brotherly nations.” Kazakh political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev argued that Tokayev’s remarks reflected a growing internal debate within the OTS. “On the one hand, some media interpreted his words as a response to foreign experts warning about the emergence of a ‘Turanic NATO.’ On the other hand, it should be noted that some fellow presidents within the OTS persistently promote the development of military cooperation. Kazakhstan is equally persistent in defining which forms of interaction it considers acceptable within the organization,” Ashimbayev wrote. Another analyst, Andrei Chebotarev, also argued that the core message of Tokayev’s speech was to frame the OTS primarily as a platform for economic, technological, digital, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. “In this context, he rejected the idea of transforming the organization into a military-political bloc. This sent a signal both to pan-Turkic political forces interested in such a transformation and to political elites in countries that view the organization’s activities with caution,” Chebotarev said. Chebotarev also noted that Tokayev referenced the “OTS+” format launched at the organization’s previous summit in Azerbaijan and voiced support...

1 month ago

State Visit

Erdoğan Visit Highlights Kazakhstan’s Middle Corridor Strategy

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Kazakhstan highlighted the growing importance of the Middle Corridor in Ankara-Astana relations, while also showing how Kazakhstan is trying to deepen ties with Turkey without abandoning its multi-vector foreign policy. According to experts, the central issue discussed during negotiations was the development of the Middle Corridor, officially known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). The importance of the route was underscored directly by Erdoğan during a joint media briefing following the talks. The Turkish president highlighted the strategic significance of the East-West-Mediterranean transit corridor crossing the Caspian Sea, describing it as a “modern version of the Silk Road,” the relevance of which is becoming increasingly apparent. The Kazakh side sought to frame the visit within a broader political and cultural context. The declaration signed by the two presidents, along with other documents exchanged by the official delegations, pointed less to a breakthrough than to the continued expansion of existing political, economic, transport, and cultural cooperation. Kazakhstan and Turkey agreed to deepen cultural, humanitarian, and economic cooperation, while continuing joint investment projects, including the further infrastructure development of Almaty International Airport, which is managed by Turkey’s TAV Holding. Political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev noted that the tone of the visit was largely shaped by an unusually emotional and ceremonial welcome. “Tokayev called Erdoğan a ‘dear brother’ and described his visit as a ‘historic event.’ Erdoğan, in turn, thanked the Kazakh leader for the invitation to visit the ‘land of ancestors.’ Tokayev twice emphasized that there are ‘no disagreements or contradictions’ between Kazakhstan and Turkey. He described Erdoğan’s policies as ‘balanced and far-sighted,’ while noting Turkey’s steadily growing influence on the global stage,” Ashimbayev wrote. According to Ashimbayev, Tokayev also praised Turkey as a “golden bridge” connecting Europe and Asia, as well as the broader Turkic world. At the same time, the analyst pointed out that Erdoğan, in an article written for the Kazinform agency, also sharply condemned what he described as Israel’s “crimes” against shared human values, despite Kazakhstan maintaining strong and mutually beneficial ties with Israel. “Contrary to some interpretations, Erdoğan’s visit did not resemble an inspection by a ‘senior brother.’ The Turkish leader was welcomed with maximum ceremony and genuine warmth, but the format of cooperation itself clearly points to equal relations in the economic and humanitarian spheres,” Ashimbayev argued. “Kazakhstan has its own clearly defined position on a broad range of international and domestic issues, and those positions are neither subject to outside discussion nor imply following anyone else’s political line,” he added. Alena Dmitriyeva, head of analysis and communications at the Youth Research Center, said the negotiations reflected the emergence of a new architecture of cooperation across Eurasia. “Ankara gains access to Central Asia, while Astana gains access to alternative transport routes,” Dmitriyeva said, pointing to intensified cooperation on the Trans-Caspian corridor, development of the Aktau and Kuryk ports, and increased oil shipments through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Cooperation with Turkey has already helped reduce cargo transit times along the Middle...

1 month ago

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