• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10567 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10567 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10567 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10567 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10567 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10567 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10567 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10567 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
23 February 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 124

2025: The Year Central Asia Stepped Onto the Global Stage

For much of the post-Soviet era, Central Asia occupied a peripheral place in global affairs. It mattered to its immediate neighbors, but rarely shaped wider debates. In 2025, that changed in visible ways. The region became harder to ignore, largely not because of ideology or alignments, but because of assets that the world increasingly needs: energy, minerals, transit routes, and political access across Eurasia. One of the clearest signs came in April, when the European Union and the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in Samarkand for their first summit at the head-of-state level. The meeting concluded with a joint declaration upgrading relations to a strategic partnership, with a focus on transport connectivity, energy security, and critical raw materials. The document marked a shift in how Brussels views Central Asia, moving beyond development assistance toward geopolitical cooperation, as outlined in the official EU–Central Asia summit joint declaration. European interest is rooted in necessity. Russia’s war in Ukraine has forced EU governments to rethink energy imports, supply chains, and overland trade routes. Central Asia sits astride the most viable alternatives that bypass Russian territory. It also holds resources essential to Europe’s green transition, including uranium and a range of industrial metals. The region’s leaders spent much of the year framing their diplomacy around these tangible advantages, rather than abstract political alignments. The United States followed a similar track. Through the C5+1 format, Washington deepened engagement with all five Central Asian states, with particular emphasis on economic cooperation and supply-chain resilience. A key element has been the Critical Minerals Dialogue, launched to connect Central Asian producers with Western markets. This initiative formed part of a broader U.S. effort to diversify access to strategic materials and reduce dependence on Russia and China. Russia remained a central but changing presence in Central Asia throughout 2025. Economic ties, labor migration, and shared infrastructure ensured that Moscow continued to matter across the region. At the same time, however, Russia’s war in Ukraine constrained its ability to act as the dominant external power it once was. Central Asian governments maintained pragmatic relations with Moscow, but they increasingly treated Russia as one partner among several rather than the default reference point. Trade continued, security cooperation persisted, and political dialogue remained active, yet the balance shifted toward hedging rather than dependence. Uranium sits at the center of this shift, with the United States having banned imports of certain Russian uranium products under federal law, with waivers set to expire no earlier than January 1, 2028. As Washington restructures its nuclear fuel supply chain, Central Asia’s role has grown sharply. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2024 Uranium Marketing Annual Report, Kazakhstan supplied 24% of uranium delivered to U.S. reactor operators, while Uzbekistan accounted for about 9%. Canada and Australia remain major suppliers, but the Central Asian share is now strategic rather than marginal. That economic weight translated into political visibility. In December, U.S. President Donald Trump said he would invite Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to attend...

Can the New Multimodal Route Become a Sustainable Corridor for Central Asia?

The launch of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Caspian multimodal corridor has generated significant interest as another attempt to expand Eurasian transport connectivity. A pilot shipment in the fall of 2025 demonstrated the technical feasibility of the new route: cargo transported from Kashgar, China, passed through Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, reached Turkmenistan, and was then delivered to Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea, continuing along the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway toward Europe. Despite its evident geopolitical appeal, questions remain over the route’s long-term sustainability and commercial viability. The central question is whether this demonstration project can evolve into a regularly functioning transport corridor. A Third Alternative Between the Northern and Middle Corridors This multimodal route can be seen as a potential alternative to the two existing pathways: the northern route, China-Kazakhstan-Russia-Europe; and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), or Middle Corridor, which passes through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkey. The growing geopolitical risks along the northern route since 2022, combined with capacity limitations on the Caspian segment of the TITR, have spurred interest in a third option, a so-called “southern belt” traversing Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Each country along this route has its own strategic calculus. Uzbekistan is seeking to overcome its “double continental isolation” and elevate its role as Central Asia’s transit hub. Kyrgyzstan is aiming to monetize its geographic position between China and the Ferghana Valley. Turkmenistan is developing the port of Turkmenbashi as an alternative to the increasingly congested hubs of Aktau and Alat. China, meanwhile, continues to diversify its westward overland trade routes. The Uzbek Factor: Geoeconomics vs. Logistics From Tashkent's perspective, this corridor aligns with its long-term transport strategy. Analysts frequently cite Uzbekistan’s ambition to transition from a landlocked to a “land-linked” state with direct access to China, the Caspian Sea, and southern routes to the Indian Ocean. The new route offers Uzbekistan three strategic advantages: alternative access to China via Kyrgyzstan, enhanced status as a regional transit hub, and deeper transport cooperation with Turkmenistan, including potential joint development of the Turkmenbashi port. However, when shifting from geopolitical ambition to logistical execution, serious limitations emerge, many outside Uzbekistan’s control. Kyrgyzstan: A Bottleneck in the Chain Documents from the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program highlight the continued challenges facing multimodal transport in the region, namely slow transit, poor modal integration, border delays, and outdated logistics technologies. Within this corridor, Kyrgyzstan remains the primary bottleneck. Approximately 82% of its foreign trade by weight is transported by road, making the route through this mountainous country highly seasonal, expensive, and unpredictable. According to the International Road Transport Union, Kyrgyzstan’s transport system faces severe constraints from alpine terrain, avalanches, and impassable mountain passes that render winter transport nearly impossible in many areas. It is therefore unsurprising that, following the pilot shipment, no major logistics operators committed to shifting regular cargo to this route. The Caspian Sea: Structural Constraints The Caspian Sea leg, anchored by Turkmenbashi port, presents another critical challenge. The limitations here are systemic rather than national. Key issues include insufficient...

Trump Signals G20 Invitation in Outreach to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

Recent telephone conversations between the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and United States President Donald Trump have generated significant international attention. Beyond routine diplomatic communication, the exchanges carry broader geopolitical implications for Central Asia. Trump has publicly stated his intention to invite the leaders of both countries to the G20 summit, which the United States will host in Miami in 2026. The announcement drew widespread international media coverage, highlighting growing global interest in the region. Official statements from Kazakhstan’s presidential office said that President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev held a lengthy conversation with Trump that covered a range of issues, including the conflict in Ukraine. Tokayev described the situation as complex, noting that territorial concerns remain central and require realistic compromises. He reiterated Kazakhstan’s readiness to offer a platform for negotiations, while clarifying that the country does not seek to act as a mediator. Notably, Kazakhstan’s official summary did not mention a potential G20 invitation, nor did the U.S. readout refer to peace talks. Uzbekistan’s statement likewise focused on strengthened political engagement, the launch of joint projects worth billions of dollars, the establishment of an American-Uzbek Business and Investment Council, and expanded regional cooperation, including within the C5+1 format, without explicitly mentioning the G20 summit Despite these omissions, Trump confirmed on his social network Truth Social that the U.S. plans to host the G20 next year and intends to invite the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as guests. At this stage, the announcement appears to be an expression of intent rather than a formal invitation. Nevertheless, the signal marks a notable shift in U.S. foreign policy priorities toward Central Asia. Even guest invitations for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan would amount to recognition of their growing roles as “middle powers” in global affairs, giving them a rare platform to engage directly with the world’s leading economies. Regional Context and Broader Dynamics The timing of the calls is significant. They followed an informal meeting of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) leaders in St. Petersburg, an event observers characterized as largely ceremonial. The summit was marked by the conspicuous absence of Azerbaijan’s president, who cited scheduling conflicts for his nonattendance. Preparations for the 2026 G20 summit are already underway. In mid-December, the first meeting of G20 Sherpas was held in Washington, bringing together representatives from the world’s leading economies and international organizations. Poland was invited as the only full guest of the U.S. presidency for this meeting. The State Department outlined key priorities for the upcoming summit: stimulating economic growth, ensuring access to reliable and affordable energy, and advancing innovative technologies. While the G20 is a forum rather than a formal international organization, and its decisions are advisory and shaped by differing member interests, participation would still provide Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with an influential platform. Direct engagement at this level would allow both countries to present their priorities on economic development and sustainable growth to a global audience.

Central Asia Considers Single Gas Ring to Link Regional Energy Systems

A proposal to connect the five Central Asian capitals into a unified, synchronized gas network has generated widespread debate among regional energy experts following a major industry forum in Tashkent. The idea, referred to as the “Central Asia Gas Ring,” was introduced by Kazakh oil and gas analyst Askar Ismailov during the Central Asia Oil & Gas Forum in early November. An analysis of the proposal was later published by the Uzbek outlet Upl.uz, citing assessments from regional and international experts. The concept envisions physically linking the gas transportation systems of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan into an integrated regional ring, modeled on the existing Central Asian Unified Power System, which already enables cross-border electricity coordination. According to Ismailov, natural gas should be seen not only as a tradable resource but as a strategic instrument for regional integration and energy security, especially in the context of growing geopolitical volatility. Experts cited by Upl.uz argue that a gas ring could help countries better manage seasonal fluctuations in demand and reduce the risk of widespread energy shortages. Recent winter blackouts, particularly in Uzbekistan, have heightened concerns about supply resilience. The proposed system could also ensure more stable gas flows to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which lack significant domestic hydrocarbon resources and frequently experience shortages. The initiative has attracted interest beyond Central Asia. Valérie Ducrot, head of the Global Gas Center, described the plan as a new model of energy cooperation that could attract international investment if the five participating states align their energy policies. Research groups such as SPIK and SpecialEurasia, also cited in the analysis, view the project as a potential cornerstone of regional infrastructure, aligning national interests around shared goals for stability and integration. Economic incentives vary across the region. For Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, the ring could provide enhanced flexibility in export routes and pricing mechanisms. For gas-dependent Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the proposal promises greater energy security, seen as essential for long-term economic and social development. External stakeholders, including China and the European Union, are expected to show interest in financing the project, while Russia is likely to seek continued influence over pricing structures and logistics. Ismailov estimates the total cost at between $4 billion and $5 billion, with most of the funding needed for modernization of aging Soviet-era pipelines and construction of select new infrastructure segments. While Upl.uz notes that technical and political hurdles remain, the proposal highlights growing momentum toward collective energy solutions in Central Asia.

Central Asia’s Road to the Southern Seas: A Search for Stability

India has confirmed that it received a six-month sanctions waiver from the United States for its involvement in developing Iran’s Chabahar port. According to The Times of India, the decision followed intensive diplomacy by New Delhi, which convinced Washington that Chabahar provides India’s only practical overland access to Central Asia that avoids Pakistan. Through Chabahar, India is building a land-based counterpart to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, creating an alternative axis linking the Indian Ocean with Eurasia while bypassing Islamabad and Beijing. The exemption, valid until April 2026, gives India room to negotiate with Washington. For Central Asia, the episode reflects a broader challenge: choosing viable routes to the southern seas. Current debates about “Afghan transit” focus largely on the Trans-Afghan Railway and the so-called Kabul corridor connecting northern Afghanistan with Pakistan’s ports. Yet Afghanistan’s transport network is forming along multiple lines. Alongside the eastern route, a western corridor from Herat to Kandahar and Spin Boldak is also developing, offering access both to Pakistan and to Chabahar. The integration of western Afghanistan’s infrastructure with Iran’s transport network makes this corridor more reliable under today’s political and security conditions. It aligns with projects pursued by Iran, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan and positions Herat as a major hub. It is also close to the North–South Transport Corridor, the Lapis Lazuli and Middle Corridors, and the Caspian and Persian Gulf regions. The planned Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat line fits the logic of the Five Nations Railway Corridor, potentially giving Tajikistan and Uzbekistan access to Chabahar and, if stability improves, to Pakistan’s ports as well. By contrast, the eastern route will remain constrained by the unstable Afghan–Pakistani border and the volatile relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Afghanistan’s own priorities also differ from outside assumptions: the Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak line primarily serves as an internal transport spine linking the west and south. For Kabul, the route to Gwadar is more a political gesture than a practical goal. Some analysts note that developing the western corridor also helps rebalance the country’s economic geography toward its more diverse western regions. These dynamics strengthen the western route’s appeal. The Taliban leadership has even urged Afghan businesses to reduce reliance on Pakistani ports, signaling a structural shift in trade orientation. Both Chabahar and Gwadar face political risks. Pakistan’s transit routes pass through areas affected by insurgency, including Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as the broader narcotics routes of the Golden Crescent. The greatest uncertainty remains the fluctuating relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Gwadar, while technologically superior, is undermined by chronic instability. Chabahar’s capacity is more modest, but its integration with Iran’s road and rail network provides reliability. The United States adds another layer of complexity. The waiver suggests Washington is balancing its Iran sanctions regime with its strategic partnership with India. The United States is not directly involved in regional infrastructure but retains enough influence to shift the balance between the western and eastern routes. Under certain conditions, Gwadar may appear less problematic for Washington than Chabahar. At the same time, selective sanctions exemptions...

Opinion: Multi-Vectorism 2.0 – Kazakhstan Seeks Balance in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

The world is reverting to the logic of bloc confrontation. Sanctions regimes, technological barriers, and deepening mistrust between major powers are compelling medium-sized states to chart independent courses. Kazakhstan stands at the center of this evolving geopolitical matrix. While Moscow remains a vital partner in defense and energy, Astana is simultaneously cultivating strong ties with other global power centers, including China, the U.S., Turkey, the European Union, and the Gulf states. Yet Kazakhstan refuses to align with any single bloc, adhering instead to a strategy of "flexible autonomy", cooperating broadly while preserving its sovereignty. Russia: Alliance with Strategic Boundaries On November 11-12, 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. The two leaders signed a declaration on a comprehensive strategic partnership and alliance, reaffirming cooperation on security, energy, and logistics projects. Key discussions included the gasification of border regions, the modernization of energy infrastructure, and the transit of Russian energy via Kazakhstan. Tokayev emphasized Kazakhstan’s interest in a stable and prosperous Russia, calling Putin a “statesman of global stature.” Still, this alignment does not supplant Kazakhstan’s multi-vector policy. The Moscow visit directly followed Tokayev’s talks in Washington, underscoring that Astana views relations with Russia as one of several strategic pillars. The U.S.: Investment and Critical Minerals Diplomacy During Tokayev’s visit to the U.S. in early November 2025, he and President Donald Trump oversaw the signing of 29 agreements totaling approximately $17 billion. The deals spanned industry, energy, digitalization, education, and innovation. Highlights in recent collaboration between Kazakhstan and the U.S. include a $2.5 billion John Deere production facility in Kostanay and Turkestan, a $1.1 billion development of tungsten deposits, and over $1 billion in digital infrastructure cooperation with companies such as Hewlett Packard Enterprise, Oracle, and Starlink. Leading global funds also pledged roughly $1 billion in new investments. These agreements reflect growing trust and a shared commitment to investment-driven, high-tech cooperation. China: Strategic Synergy and Technological Convergence China remains Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner and a cornerstone of its eastern vector. During Tokayev’s October 17, 2023 visit to Beijing, he and President Xi Jinping reaffirmed a “comprehensive strategic partnership” built on political trust and economic cooperation. In June 2025, Xi Jinping visited Astana for the second China-Central Asia Summit, where he and Kassym‑Jomart Tokayev reinforced their countries’ “comprehensive strategic partnership”, oversaw deals spanning energy, infrastructure, agriculture, and digital technology. Later that year, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin, the two leaders used the platform to deepen cooperation within a multilateral framework, promoting connectivity and regional trade under the Belt and Road Initiative. Turkey: Civilizational Ties and Strategic Growth Ties between Kazakhstan and Turkey are underpinned by shared cultural and historical foundations. At the fifth High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council meeting in Ankara on July 29, 2025, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan welcomed Tokayev, reaffirming Turkey’s role as a major investor and educational partner. More than 12,000 Kazakh students are enrolled in Turkish universities. Defense cooperation is expanding under the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), and tourism and...