• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00190 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09201 0.33%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.42%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00190 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09201 0.33%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.42%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00190 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09201 0.33%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.42%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00190 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09201 0.33%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.42%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00190 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09201 0.33%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.42%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00190 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09201 0.33%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.42%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00190 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09201 0.33%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.42%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00190 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09201 0.33%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.42%
21 January 2025

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 18

Navigating Afghan-Pakistani Conflict: Central Asia’s Mediating Role in Regional Stability

Recently, there has been a significant increase in tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with both sides regularly exchanging accusations. In addition to this, border conflicts have become more frequent, with border crossings periodically closed. According to Modern Diplomacy, both countries are in a state of quite severe political conflict, and distrust and hostility from the Afghan population towards Pakistan is growing even though the "victory of the Taliban and the reincarnation of the Islamic Emirate... should have been a victory for Pakistan and strengthened its position in the region.” The confrontation between the two neighbors in South Asia is a source of concern for other countries in the region, especially for the Central Asian republics, which are increasingly acquiring the status of independent players in their dealings with Afghanistan. Due to their proximity, these republics to varying degrees link their development with a stable Afghanistan designed to become a bridge to South Asia. Negative dynamics in Afghan-Pakistani relations are a cause of much wringing of hands. Pakistan was among the first states to recognize the independence of the former Soviet Central Asian republics and has dynamic ties with them. Pakistan's trade turnover with the region is roughly $500 million annually, most of which comes from imports to Pakistan. The nations are linked by the Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement (QTTA), the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project, the CASA-1000 energy project, and the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan Railway Project. The majority of these projects use Afghanistan as a bridge between Central Asia and Pakistan. In this regard, the countries of Central Asia are interested in a political situation which excludes confrontational approaches; none of them are interested in further destabilization in Afghanistan. In the Central Asian republics, there is a well-established understanding of Pakistan's exceptional and particularly important role in Afghanistan’s stability. Pakistan has a defining influence on security in Afghanistan and has historically been the most integrated in Afghan issues at the level of political and multi-ethnic conflicts. Pakistan is linked to its neighbor by historical and socio-cultural ties. In reality, however, a different story is emerging. At both a global and regional level, active measures out of Islamabad set to discredit the de facto Taliban-led government of Afghanistan have been observed. Islamabad has undertaken a robust information campaign, which has put forward an entrenched narrative about Afghanistan being one of the world’s major sources of terrorism. In this information war, Islamabad, being a fully-fledged member of the international community, has clear advantages and has used all available tools, including access to global platforms. Islamabad also has access to specialized committees and departments of the UN, which regularly prepare reports on the situation in Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, it has used these to include ideas favorable its' position on the world stage. Acting as a source of information, Islamabad has presented its point of view, which the international community has largely accepted as objective information. However, it does not provide specific data, such as the size of terrorist groups or the location of their training camps....

Inside Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Power Play

Kazakhstan recently held a referendum in which approximately 71% of voters supported the initiative to construct the country's first nuclear power plant (NPP). This project is part of Kazakhstan's broader strategy to diversify its energy mix, reduce dependence on coal, and address chronic energy shortages that have affected the country for years. As the world's largest uranium producer, Kazakhstan has abundant natural resources that make nuclear power a viable and strategic option. The government views nuclear power as crucial for enhancing energy independence and security, while also contributing to environmental sustainability by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The goal is for nuclear energy to contribute about 5% of the national generation mix by 2035, marking a significant shift towards cleaner energy sources.   A strategic opportunity for Kazakhstan The NPP project is expected to be undertaken by an international consortium, the members of which are yet to be selected. Kazakhstan's balanced multi-vector foreign policy encourages the involvement of various potential partners, such as Russia's Rosatom, China's National Nuclear Corporation, South Korea's Hydro & Nuclear Power, and France's EDF. Kazakhstan's strategy for involving an international consortium aims to reduce potential geopolitical risks, particularly concerning Russia's Rosatom. Rosatom is a key player in the nuclear energy sector, but Western sanctions against Russian companies raise concerns about its involvement in Kazakhstan's project. By involving multiple international partners, Kazakhstan aims to prevent overreliance on any single country, such as Russia, and maintain a diversified approach to foreign relations. This approach allows Kazakhstan to leverage advanced technologies from multiple sources, foster innovation, improve efficiency, and reduce risks associated with the NPP's construction and operation. It also ensures that the best practices from leading global enterprises can be integrated into the project, enhancing overall safety and performance. Moreover, the involvement of international partners is likely to facilitate knowledge transfer, enabling Kazakhstan to build domestic expertise in nuclear energy. The estimated cost for the NPP is between $10 and $12 billion, with the expectation that contractors will secure financing. An international consortium could attract investment from multiple sources, including their own countries, thereby reducing Kazakhstan's financial burden for the project, inculcating resilience against uncertainties such as currency fluctuations, and distributing the risks among several stakeholders. As sanctions against Rosatom and broader economic concerns make sole reliance on Russian intolerably risky, attracting investment from multiple international stakeholders will also enable Kazakhstan to spread financial risks, thus enhancing the project's viability. A key strategic opportunity for Kazakhstan is to develop self-sufficiency in uranium enrichment. As the world's largest producer of uranium, Kazakhstan has the potential to enrich its own yellowcake, i.e., impure uranium obtained by processing uranium ore. Developing this capability would reduce Kazakhstan's dependence on Russia for enriched uranium imports and significantly enhance its energy independence. Japan serves as a relevant model for this, as it enriches uranium domestically under international safeguards for civilian nuclear use. Kazakhstan could pursue a similar approach under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision, ensuring compliance with its non-proliferation commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation...

Ambassador of Taliban-led Afghanistan Starts Work in Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has reported that on October 9, Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov received Abdul Ghafar Terawi, the new head of Afghanistan’s diplomatic mission to Uzbekistan, in Tashkent. During talks, both parties emphasized the need to enhance relations between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, realize the untapped potential of cooperation, and develop new projects to serve the interests of their people. The ambassador expressed gratitude on behalf of Afghanistan for the ongoing assistance provided by Uzbekistan. Speaking at the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly late in September, Uzbek Foreign Minister Saidov stated that Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia and addressing the Afghan problem is  key to ensuring stability and sustainable development in the region. “Uzbekistan is pursuing a pragmatic policy towards Afghanistan. We will continue to contribute to Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction and the development of its transport and energy infrastructure,” announced the Uzbek foreign minister. He also commended Uzbekistan's implementation of the ambitious construction of the Trans-Afghan railway,  which by providing  access to global ports, will have a positive impact on the economic development of the vast region. The minister emphasized that the International Trade Center, recently established in the Uzbek city of Termez on the Afghan border, was designed to foster a favorable business environment and enhance logistics, and added that Uzbekistan is ready to expand the Educational Center for Afghan citizens in Termez into a global training center. Afghanistan’s TOLOnews earlier reported that China and the United Arab Emirates had also officially accepted ambassadors from the Taliban-led Afghan government. Early in September, Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced a decision to remove the Taliban from the list of prohibited organizations within the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic. The Ministry emphasized that the removal of the Taliban, the unrecognized group that effectively controls Afghanistan, from the list of banned terrorist organizations aims to enhance regional stability and support ongoing dialogue. Early in June, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced that his country had removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations, stressing that the move was made to develop trade and economic ties with Taliban-led Afghanistan, and in late August, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry accredited a chargé d’affaires of Taliban-led Afghanistan to expand trade, economic, and humanitarian cooperation between the two countries.

The Ferghana Valley: Navigating Complex Challenges in Central Asia’s Most Volatile Region

The Ferghana Valley is one of Central Asia’s most fertile and densely populated areas, but it is also among the most volatile. Spanning Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, this landlocked region has long been a hotbed of ethnic tension, water disputes, and political instability. These challenges are deeply rooted in the geography, history, and sociopolitical landscape, making the valley a key focal point for understanding broader regional dynamics in Central Asia.   Geographical Importance and Ethnic Diversity Nestled between the towering Tien Shan and Pamir Mountain ranges, the Ferghana Valley covers over 22,000 square kilometers. It is fertile land nourished by the Syr Darya River, making it a critical area for cultivating cotton, fruits, and vegetables. These natural resources have historically drawn diverse populations, creating a vibrant ethnic mosaic. The valley is home to Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks, as well as smaller ethnic groups. While ethnic Uzbeks form the majority, significant Kyrgyz and Tajik minorities inhabit border regions. The ethnic diversity of the Ferghana Valley is both a strength and a source of tension. Soviet-era border policies exacerbated these divisions by creating artificial boundaries that crisscrossed the valley, leaving behind ethnic enclaves — pockets of one nationality surrounded by the territory of another. These enclaves have complicated governance and territorial integrity, making border management a persistent challenge.   The Soviet Legacy and Border Disputes During Soviet rule, the Central Asian republics were organized under Stalin’s divide-and-rule strategy, which deliberately created complex borders to weaken local identities and prevent regional unity. The Ferghana Valley, divided among three Soviet republics, is a prime example of this approach. After the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, the administrative boundaries became international borders overnight between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The lack of clearly defined borders has sparked numerous conflicts over territory, water, and land. A notable clash between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2021 resulted in over 40 deaths and the destruction of homes and infrastructure. Many disputes revolve around access to scarce resources like water and arable land. These issues have escalated into violent confrontations, leading to casualties and the displacement of local populations.   Water: A Scarce and Contested Resource Water is the lifeblood of the Ferghana Valley, but disputes over its allocation are a major source of tension. The valley depends heavily on irrigation for its agricultural productivity, and the Syr Darya River, along with its tributaries, plays a crucial role in supplying water to the region. However, the division of the valley among the three countries complicates water management. Uzbekistan, the most populous of the three, relies on the valley’s water resources for its cotton industry, a cornerstone of its economy. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which control the headwaters of the Syr Darya, often use their upstream position to leverage water access. This dynamic has led to frequent disagreements over water usage. For instance, Kyrgyzstan has at times threatened to withhold water unless it receives compensation, either through payments or electricity.   Ethnic Tensions and Political Instability Ethnic tensions further complicate the Ferghana Valley’s already volatile...

The Illusion of Influence: The CSTO’s Journey From Symbolic Maneuvers To Real Challenges

Accompanied by a picture of military hardware - though in reverse gear as if symbolically - today, the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) website announced that “From 26 to 30 September, formations participating in the command-staff exercise 'Unbreakable Brotherhood-2024' with the CSTO Peacekeeping Forces are regrouping in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Contingents of CSTO troops are being sent from the Republic of Belarus, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Tajikistan to the exercise area in accordance with the plan.” In reality, the history of the CSTO is one of refusals, inaction, and sometimes unexpected successes. On August 31, Armenia announced it had frozen its participation in the CSTO. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said he would not name the day when Armenia would leave the CSTO and called the decision to freeze the republic's participation in all structures of the organization correct “at this stage.” In many ways, this half-hearted decision reflects a certain amorphousness that originally characterized the CSTO.   History The history of the structure's emergence reflects this lack of crystalline form. The Collective Security Treaty (CST) was signed in Tashkent between Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on May 15, 1992. Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia later joined in 1993. The treaty came into effect in 1994 and was set to last five years. During the 1990s and the disintegration of Soviet-era institutions, organizations such as the CSTO or the previously created Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), whose founding protocol was signed in Almaty, were created to facilitate a smooth “divorce” between the newly independent states. The CSTO was also seen as a force capable of curbing the regional conflicts which were boiling over, such as the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan. Tashkent's bet on Russian weapons in case of conflicts with the Taliban did not work out, however. From the turn of the 1990s into the 2000s, two serious fissures across the borders of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan took place; the republics fought back with their own military and weapons, in addition to Kazakhstan coming to the rescue. The Collective Security Treaty expired in 1999, with Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia withdrawing, whilst Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan soldiered on under a new pact. The remaining states later transformed the CST into the Collective Security Treaty Organization in 2002. Uzbekistan joined as a full member of the CSTO in 2006 but then flip-flopped and suspended its membership in 2012.   A powerless organization While the CSTO was still developing, with President Vladimir Putin coming to power in Russia, the Kremlin's foreign policy changed substantively from that of the Yeltsin era, when Moscow remained indifferent to Nursultan Nazarbayev's integration initiatives. The new direction of Russian foreign policy was expressed in the concepts of “Russia rising from its knees” and the "gathering of lands.” Over time, this evolved into joint war games and military operations with the West in the Middle East and Africa, and for a period the Kremlin seemed to lose interest in Central Asia....

Russia’s FM: U.S. Interest in Central Asia’s Economy Could Harm Russia’s Development

Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, during a question-and-answer session with students at Moscow’s MGIMO University in early September, noted that “a growing number of extra-regional actors,” including the United States, have taken an interest in fostering trade via the so-called Middle Corridor -- a route connecting Asia to Europe via Central Asia, bypassing Russia. Lavrov’s speech suggests that the U.S. interest in the economic future of Central Asia will negatively impact Russia's development. Lavrov noted that Russia maintains “warm and allied” relations with Central Asian nations, which are bound to Russia economically and strategically via several agreements, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. He added that Russia “cannot prevent anyone from establishing deeper ties with other partners.” Lavrov couldn’t resist lashing out at the United States, saying the motives of American officials in Central Asia aren’t magnanimous. “When our partners and allies in Central Asia expand their relations with the West, I do not have the slightest doubt that they understand perfectly well that apart from pursuing its noble and transparent objectives, the West also seeks to undermine the Russian Federation’s influence there,” he said. The U.S. engages with Central Asia through the B5+1 process, which promotes Western investment by encouraging reforms to reduce trade barriers and streamline customs. Recently, Central Asian countries have signed agreements to improve trade regulation, and the U.S. has helped some countries upgrade their infrastructure. U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan Daniel Rosenblum has said in a statement: “In August ... the United States provided Kazakhstan’s Customs Service with advanced Dell Technologies Inc. servers to help make border procedures more efficient. “Adopting innovative technologies will streamline processes, enhance accuracy, improve transparency, and foster a business-friendly environment, attracting more investors and boosting economic growth,” Russia's war in Ukraine has weakened the Kremlin’s ability to pressure Central Asian states to follow its wishes. Russia depends on covert trade through Central Asia to bypass sanctions and get goods for its war. Meanwhile, China is supplying dual-use technologies to Russia and has overtaken Russia as the leading trade partner for Central Asian countries. In his remarks, Lavrov called China “a reliable partner” but didn’t mention it in the context of Central Asia’s growing trade dynamics.