Regional Cooperation - The Times Of Central Asia

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Kazakhstan Has a Deal for Tajik Electricity, Now the Wait Begins

In the latest sign of Central Asian regional cooperation, Kazakhstan has signed a long-term deal to import electricity from Tajikistan. However, that electricity might not reach Kazakhstan anytime soon, as there are some important details that need to be worked out by Tajikistan before supplies can begin. Kazakhstan’s energy problems Kazakhstan has been experiencing severe energy deficits for several years now, particularly during winter months. Kazakh Senator Suyindik Aldashev said in late February this year that Kazakhstan would be short some 5.7 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity in 2025, which would be a 46% increase in the country’s electricity deficit compared to 2024. Kazakhstan was forced to import electricity from Russia during the winter of 2024 to help alleviate energy shortages. These shortages contributed to Kazakhstan's decision to hold a referendum to approve the construction of the country’s first nuclear power plant (NPP). To date, however, there has been no announcement of which company will build the NPP, so additional electricity from that source could be a decade or more away. This has led Kazakhstan to explore importing energy resources from its Central Asian neighbors. The head of Turkmenistan’s Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov just visited Kazakhstan and met with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev with Turkmen gas exports to its northern neighbor high on the agenda. Kazakhstan has been in discussions with Tajikistan about electricity shipments for months, and the agreement was finalized toward the end of April. Rogun The source of the electricity Tajikistan intends to export to Kazakhstan is the Rogun Hydropower Plant (HPP) on the Vakhsh River, some 110 kilometers east of the Tajik capital Dushanbe. The Rogun HPP has a history of controversy. It was conceived in the 1960s when Tajikistan was a Soviet Republic. Construction on the project started in 1976, but not much had been done by the time the USSR collapsed in late 1991, and work ground to halt shortly thereafter. Russian company RUSAL signed an agreement in 2004 to invest more than $1 billion and finish building Rogun, but disputes over the project led the Tajik government to cancel the contract in 2007. One of the main differences between the two parties was RUSAL’s insistence the dam wall at Rogun be no higher than 285 meters, whereas the Tajik authorities wanted the original height of 335 meters. At 285 meters, the HPP’s output would have been 2400 megawatts (MW), while at 335 meters, the output would be 3600 MW. Russia’s Inter RAO EES was in talks with Tajikistan about the Rogun project in 2008, but in the end, nothing came from those negotiations. With no hope of foreign backing, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon started portraying Rogun as a project of national salvation, the key to energy independence. Rahmon’s government called on citizens to help finance construction of the HPP and when public support in the poorest country in Central Asia proved insufficient, citizens were pressured into buying shares in the project. The government in neighboring Uzbekistan objected to Rogun’s construction,...

Turkey Azerbaijan Regional Cooperation Ukraine War

What Does Turkey’s “Return” to Europe Mean for Central Asia?

Turkey’s ties with Europe are undergoing a reinvigoration. This phenomenon is foregrounded by recent high-level diplomatic engagements and burgeoning military and economic linkages, which may at first glance appear as a realignment within the Euro-Atlantic system. It holds deeper implications, however, and most consequentially for Central Asia. Turkey is re-entering the European strategic imagination, this time not as a supplicant but as a self-assured middle power. Europe's altered international environment, by changing its external posture, will provide the Central Asian states with additional geopolitical resources in a world marked by shifting alignments and competing centers of power. To grasp the systems-level implications of this shift, one must first dispense with the linear narrative of bilateralism that has long framed Turkey-Europe or Turkey-Central Asia relations in isolation. Instead, Turkey’s position as a hub of multi-vectorial networks — anchored in NATO, increasingly interlocked with EU markets, yet culturally and politically entwined with Turkic Central Asia — makes it a proactive agent whose movement in one sphere triggers systemic perturbations across others. Thus, when Turkey edges closer to Europe, it also subtly reconfigures the vector of Central Asia’s international relations. The second Trump administration is continuing the transition in Europe’s security architecture that was inaugurated during the first. With longstanding assumptions about American commitment to the Atlantic alliance shaken, Europe finds itself unmoored. In this new context, Turkey’s military interventions — its incursions in northern and now central Syria, its containment of Russian advances in Ukraine, and its supply of military drones to Azerbaijan — demonstrate a degree of strategic autonomy that is rare among NATO members. Europe has noticed. The readjustment of its view of Turkey is evident through invitations to summits with key EU players, overtures from German and Polish leaders, and discussions around deepening the customs union. Turkey is no longer peripheral country knocking at the EU’s door; shifts in the international system have made it an increasingly indispensable node in the continent’s security and energy architectures. This European courtship of Turkey has ramifications well beyond Brussels or Berlin, or even Ankara. For the Central Asian states, afflicted by asymmetric dependencies on Russia, Turkey’s geopolitical normalization with Europe presents a "demonstration effect". That is, it puts the spotlight on a regional actor that is using soft power affinities and hard power capabilities to parlay its peripheral status into centrality. Turkey’s return to Europe showcases a successful strategy of multidirectional engagement. Such "strategic hedging" obviates obedience to any single bloc, instead leveraging the overall system's recursive entanglements for national-interest advantage. The Turkish-Azerbaijani partnership is illustrative. Turkey’s provision of military assistance used during the Second Karabakh War in 2020, notably the Bayraktar TB2 drones, enabled Azerbaijan to shift the regional balance. Russia is no longer the hegemonic power in the South Caucasus and must compete in a condition where it is diplomatically and militarily weakened by its war against Ukraine. Baku stands to benefit from its multisectoral economic cooperation with Ankara, which goes far beyond military assistance. Specifically, Azerbaijan's partnership with Turkey...

Khujand Summit Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Regional Cooperation Border

Historic Khujand Summit Paves Way for Peace in the Ferghana Valley

The presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan gathered in the northern Tajik city of Khujand on March 31 for meeting that is decades overdue. Among the agreements the three signed were one fixing the border where their three countries meet. Prior to Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s arrival, Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov and Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon exchanged ratified documents of the border agreement between the two countries. Rahmon and Japarov, via video link, also launched the Datka-Sughd power transmission line, a major step in the CASA-1000 project that aims for both their countries to supply electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan. These agreements might not seem monumental, but they represent a major departure from the troubled past the three governments have had in their border areas. Trouble in Paradise The three countries share the Ferghana Valley, an area roughly the size of Costa Rica that is home to more than 20% of Central Asia’s population. Since the Central Asian states became independent in late 1991, the Ferghana Valley has also been the region’s hotbed of tension. The Ferghana Valley is the cradle of ancient Central Asian civilization. Some living there today say it was the location of the Garden of Eden, and it is not difficult to see why. The Valley is abundant in fruits and vegetables and has extensive arable and grazing land. It is surrounded by mountains to the north, east, and south, and the rivers that flow from these mountains supply ample water. Since independence, the Ferghana Valley has been the most dangerous place in all of Central Asia. The arbitrary borders Soviet mapmakers drew to divide Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan left many problems for the three after they became independent states. Agreement on where Kyrgyz-Uzbek border is came only in late 2022, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan just signed the agreement on delimitation of their border on March 12. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan The roots of Islam lie deep in the Ferghana Valley. There were already calls for Shari’a law in Uzbekistan’s section of the valley just months after Uzbekistan declared its independence. The most serious security threat to Central Asia to date originated in the Ferghana Valley in 1999 and 2000. In early August 1999, a group of some 20 armed militants from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) appeared in southern Kyrgyzstan, captured a village, and took the villagers and subsequent government negotiators hostage. The IMU leaders were from the eastern Uzbek city of Namangan. They were connected to the protests in Uzbekistan in late 1991 and later joined the Islamic opposition in neighboring Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war. The peace accord that ended the civil war called for opposition fighters to either join the Tajik armed forces or disarm. There was no longer any need for the opposition’s foreign fighters, and the final phase of disarmament was underway by the summer of 1999. In mid-August, the Kyrgyz government paid a ransom for the hostages’ release and the departure of the IMU militants, but this provided...

Regional Cooperation Trilateral Relations Kyrgyz-Tajik Border

A New Chapter of Peace and Cooperation in Central Asia: The Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Agreement

On March 13, 2025, a historic milestone was achieved with the signing of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border agreement. This long-anticipated treaty, signed by Kyrgyzstan's President Sadyr Japarov and Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon, resolved a long-running dispute over the 984-kilometer boundary between the two nations. Clashes in 2021 and 2022 left scores dead, hundreds wounded, and thousands displaced. The resolution marked not only the end of an enduring source of regional tension but also the beginning of a prospective era of peace and collaboration. The significance of this agreement is substantial and far-reaching. For decades, the unresolved Kyrgyz-Tajik border remained a flashpoint for clashes, occasionally escalating into violence between communities living in border regions such as Batken. The new treaty now promises a peaceful future, with both leaders showing their commitment to long-term regional stability. A Diplomatic Achievement The path to this agreement was anything but straightforward, with Kyrgyz President Japarov characterizing the land exchanges involved in the treaty as a “tough but necessary decision.” During Nauryz celebrations in Osh, Japarov praised the expert teams who worked for four years to reach a settlement that balanced the interests of both sides. Japarov emphasized the benefits of the treaty for border-area communities, specifically in Batken, where tensions have been acute. The “lives of our citizens in border areas of the Batken region will be peaceful from now on,” he stated, promising new homes for residents displaced during past conflicts. The treaty aims to bring not only peace but also economic development, as secure frontiers pave the way for cross-border trade and infrastructure investment. For Tajikistan's President Rahmon, the agreement not only resolved a geopolitical challenge but reinforced the shared value of cooperation in the region. His message during Nauryz to President Japarov symbolized the optimism underpinning their new relationship. “I am confident that our countries, relying on the high universal values of this ancient holiday, will continue their joint efforts to enrich the content of their multifaceted relations,” Rahmon wrote. Messages of Support on a Symbol of Renewal The signing of the treaty aligned closely with Nauryz, the ancient festival that symbolizes renewal, prosperity, and unity across Central Asia. World leaders also viewed the timing as auspicious, with U.S. President Donald Trump extending his congratulations to President Rahmon in a message of goodwill on the occasion of Nauryz. “This is a major achievement that will bring great economic benefits and security to both countries," Trump wrote, highlighting the agreement's potential to stabilize the region. Trump also reaffirmed America's support for Tajikistan’s sovereignty, underscoring the importance of ongoing cooperation. His words echoed a broad international sentiment celebrating the Kyrgyz-Tajik agreement as a step toward enhanced regional partnerships. Regional Cooperation on the Rise The Kyrgyz-Tajik border agreement forms part of a broader trend of strengthening ties among Central Asian nations. Recently, Kyrgyzstan resolved a similar border issue with Uzbekistan, setting a precedent for peaceful dispute resolution. Now, Japarov has suggested taking the next step by creating a visa-free travel regime and even a unified regional...

Regional Cooperation Free Trade Regime Economic Cooperation

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan Implement Free Trade Agreement

On February 25, 2025, the free trade agreement between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan officially came into effect, eliminating customs duties on most goods produced in both countries, with certain exceptions. This landmark move aims to strengthen trade and economic ties between the two neighbors. The announcement was made by Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investments, Industry, and Trade on March 7, following the completion of all legal procedures for the Protocol on Exceptions to the Free Trade Regime, signed on July 16, 2024. The protocol had been approved earlier by Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev through Resolution No. 29 on January 27, 2025. Key Provisions and Economic Sectors Under the new trade rules, Turkmenistan has removed customs duties on a range of key Uzbek exports, including the following items with their previous tariffs or taxes noted: Cement (100%) Textiles (50%) Furniture (50%) Glass containers (50%) Water heating boilers (15%) Plastic and polypropylene products (10%) Sausages and meat products ($2 per kg) Cottonseed oil ($1 per kg) Officials anticipate that the free trade system will boost economic activity between the two countries by facilitating business operations and encouraging investment. The Uzbek Ministry of Investments, Industry, and Trade, along with other government bodies, is working to help Uzbek businesses maximize the benefits of the new trade framework, whilst both governments expect the deal to accelerate industrial cooperation across sectors such as construction, agriculture, and manufacturing. Growing Trade Volume or a One-Way Street? The agreement reflects already expanding trade dynamics. According to TurkmenPortal, trade turnover between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan increased by 23% in the first quarter of 2024 compared to the same period in 2023, reaching $455 million. Turkmen exports to Uzbekistan surged by 36%, totaling $407 million. Turkmenistan's imports from Uzbekistan experienced a 30% decline, however, dropping from $69.2 million to $48 million during the January- May period compared to the same timeframe in 2023. Strengthened Bilateral Relations and Regional Impact Nevertheless, the agreement represents more than economic policy and could underscore a new era of trust and cooperation. Both countries have worked to improve their relationship through proactive diplomacy, with recent high-level meetings - including those between Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov - emphasizing the shared goal of collaborating across trade, cultural, and political spheres. The free trade regime sets a benchmark for greater economic collaboration within Central Asia, whilst the elimination of tariffs and smoother trade between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan could inspire similar agreements among neighboring countries. While challenges such as infrastructure harmonization and policy alignment remain, the benefits of this agreement showcase the potential for regional integration.

International trade China e-Commerce Regional Cooperation Trade

Kazakhstan and China Set to Expand Trade and E-Commerce

Trade between Kazakhstan and China continues to grow, reaching $43.8 billion in 2024, according to China’s General Administration of Customs. Kazakhstan’s exports to China amounted to $15.8 billion, marking a 9% increase from the previous year. These figures were announced by Han Chunlin, China’s newly appointed ambassador to Kazakhstan, during a meeting with Kazakh Minister of Trade and Integration Arman Shakkaliyev on February 8. “This trend confirms our steady progress toward the ambitious goal of doubling bilateral trade turnover in the near future,” the ambassador stated. Strengthening Trade and E-Commerce Cooperation The meeting focused on expanding Kazakh-Chinese trade and economic cooperation, with particular emphasis on e-commerce platforms. Shakkaliyev highlighted that bilateral trade reached a historic high in 2024 and reaffirmed Kazakhstan’s commitment to diversifying its exports while expanding the range of products supplied to China. He also announced plans for trade and economic missions in 2025, alongside Kazakhstan’s participation in major exhibitions in China. A key discussion point was the development of online trade through leading Chinese e-commerce platforms, including JD.com, Alibaba, and Douyin. Kazakhstan’s Growing Presence in Chinese E-Commerce Alibaba: Launched in 2022, Kazakhstan’s dedicated section on Alibaba now includes 290 domestic companies offering over 7,500 products. Total sales on the platform have already surpassed $260 million. JD.com: In 2023, JD.com opened a Kazakhstan section, featuring over 60 products. Revenue from Kazakhstani goods sold on the platform grew from RMB 1 million in 2023 to RMB 1.3 million in 2024. Kazakhstan’s e-commerce industry has seen rapid growth in recent years. According to the Ministry of Trade and Integration, online transactions from January to November 2024 totaled approximately 3.2 trillion KZT (over $6 billion), accounting for 14.5% of total retail trade. As Kazakhstan strengthens its trade ties with China, digital commerce is expected to play an increasingly important role in bilateral economic relations.