Regional Security - The Times Of Central Asia

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Syria

Syria After Assad: What the New Regional Order Means for Central Asia

The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 fundamentally reshaped Syria’s regional position. The collapse of the old power structure weakened Iran’s entrenched military and economic networks and left Russia’s previously secured foothold uncertain. As Damascus enters a new political phase, external actors are recalibrating their strategies in a landscape that looks markedly different from that of the past decade. For Central Asian governments, the shift is not merely regional. Syria is becoming a testing ground for how mid-sized states navigate post-conflict environments shaped by larger powers, and a potential arena for economic and diplomatic outreach. As influence is redistributed and new investment and trade corridors are reconsidered, decisions taken in Damascus will increasingly intersect with Central Asia’s own foreign policy and economic calculations. In this emerging landscape, a power vacuum is being filled by states seeking to advance their interests. From the earliest days of Syria’s post-Assad transition, Turkey has been particularly active. As part of its declared comprehensive support for the new Syrian authorities, Ankara has taken steps to consolidate its position in the Syrian Arab Republic. Turkey is actively participating in infrastructure reconstruction, investing in economic projects, and expanding military-technical cooperation with Damascus. In August 2025, Syria and Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement covering areas including counterterrorism training, cybersecurity, demining, military engineering, logistics, and enhanced coordination between their armed forces. That same month, the two sides agreed to establish an intergovernmental business council under the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board to promote trade and investment cooperation between public and private companies. Turkish exports to Syria reached $3 billion in 2025, reflecting the rapid expansion of Ankara’s economic presence. For Central Asia, Ankara’s activism carries particular weight. Turkey has simultaneously deepened its political, economic, and security cooperation across the Turkic world, meaning its posture in Syria intersects with its broader regional strategy. A central element of Turkey’s Syria policy remains the issue of refugee returns. However, the prospect of large-scale repatriation is complicated by several factors, notably the long-term presence of around 2.5 million Syrian displaced persons in Turkish society and the absence of stable socio-economic conditions in Syria to support reintegration. Over more than a decade of conflict, a generation of Syrians has grown up in Turkey, many of whom are deeply embedded in the country’s social and economic life. Turkey’s obligations under the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, including the principle of non-refoulement, further constrain policy options. Taken together, these factors make large-scale return unlikely until Syria achieves sustained political stabilization and adequate living conditions. In the longer term, Turkey’s objective of neutralizing what it describes as the Kurdish threat emanating from Syrian territory will continue to shape its strategy. Israel has also intensified its military and political engagement since the change of power in Damascus. It has taken steps to establish control over areas adjacent to the Golan Heights and to create a buffer zone, arguing that such measures are necessary to safeguard national security against potential terrorist threats. Israeli officials...

Iran protests

Iran Protests and Regional Stability: An Afghan Perspective

The protests that spread across Iran in late 2025 and early 2026 reflected more than short-term public discontent, instead exposing the cumulative effects of a prolonged socio-economic crisis. Persistently high inflation, declining real incomes, and falling living standards have placed sustained pressure on households and weakened the social contract between the state and society. Against this backdrop, the unrest increasingly acquired a foreign policy dimension. Strong statements from U.S. officials warning of consequences in response to Iran’s handling of the protests, combined with Tehran’s rejection of what it described as external interference, heightened the risk of the crisis becoming internationalized. Thus, the protests in Iran ceased to be an exclusively domestic issue and became a factor of regional instability. A key feature of the current situation is that the Iranian crisis is developing simultaneously on three fronts: socio-economic, where protests are fueled by deteriorating living conditions; political, linked to a crisis of confidence and governability; and geopolitical, where internal processes are used by external actors as a tool of pressure. Consequences for Afghanistan For Afghanistan, developments in Iran carry direct and practical significance. Since late 2024, Iran has become a source of large-scale returns of Afghan migrants, both voluntary and forced. By 2025, this process had become systematic, placing a heavy burden on Afghanistan’s western provinces, particularly Herat. In the event of prolonged instability and a deepening economic crisis in Iran, the likelihood of additional waves of migrant returns would increase. This would place further strain on Afghanistan’s labor market, healthcare system, social infrastructure, and already limited economic resources. In a fragile economy, the return of large numbers of migrants intensifies competition for jobs and raises the risk of local social tensions. The trade and logistics dimension is equally significant. Iran remains Afghanistan’s key economic partner and a vital transit corridor, including through the Islam Qala border crossing. Any deterioration in Iran’s socio-economic conditions has a direct impact on trade flows, supply chains, and broader regional economic stability. Significance for Central Asia The ongoing protest movements and the deterioration of the situation in Iran, driven by a systemic economic crisis and growing political and social discontent, could have a significant impact on political and economic dynamics, as well as security, across Central Asia. On the one hand, governments in the region are responding with cautious concern, mindful of the potential spillover effects of instability and rising internal discontent. A prolonged crisis in Iran increases the risks of migration pressure, border instability, and cross-border threats, all of which directly affect regional security. On the other hand, a further deterioration of Iran’s internal situation could disrupt trade, transit, and energy ties with Central Asia, weakening Tehran’s regional influence and reshaping the balance of power. Under such conditions, the role of other regional and external actors, including Russia, China, Turkey, and Western countries, is likely to grow as they gain opportunities to strengthen their positions in the region. As a result, the crisis in Iran is evolving beyond a domestic challenge and is...

Border Security

Two Tajik Border Guards Killed in Attack Along Afghan Border

Tajikistan’s border troops have reported an armed incident along the country’s southern border with Afghanistan. While the attackers were neutralized during the confrontation, Tajikistan suffered casualties among its personnel. According to the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) of the Republic of Tajikistan, the incident occurred late on December 23, 2025. Three armed individuals described as “members of a terrorist organization” attempted to launch an attack on border post No. 5 “Bo” of the 0341 “Sarchashma” detachment in the Shamsiddin Shohin district. The intruders illegally crossed the state border at approximately 11:30 p.m. and entered Tajik territory. The following morning, at 11:15 a.m., Tajik border guards located the suspects. According to the official statement published by the Khovar news agency, the attackers refused to surrender and opened fire. All three assailants were killed in the ensuing operation. Tajik security forces seized a significant cache of weaponry at the scene, including three M-16 rifles, a Kalashnikov assault rifle, three foreign-made pistols equipped with silencers, ten hand grenades, one pair of night vision goggles, explosives, and other combat gear. Two members of the Border Troops of the SCNS, Zirekhbon Navruzbekov and Ismatullo Kurbonov, were killed in the clash. Authorities extended their condolences to the families of the fallen officers. The SCNS noted that this was the third such incident in the past month involving armed incursions from Afghan territory. In a strongly worded statement, the border service criticized the Taliban authorities for failing to uphold their international obligations and repeated commitments to secure the border and prevent terrorist activity. “These facts confirm that the Taliban government is demonstrating a serious and repeated inability and irresponsibility, in fulfilling its international obligations and consistent promises to ensure security and stability on the state border with the Republic of Tajikistan,” the statement read. Tajikistan called on Afghan authorities to issue a formal apology and implement additional effective measures to secure the shared border. According to Tajik officials, the border area is now stable, and an investigation into the latest incident is ongoing. Two earlier attacks were reported on November 26 and 30, 2025, also originating from Afghan territory. In those incidents, five Chinese citizens were killed and three injured. The attacks targeted a mining company in the Shohin district and a construction company in the Darvaz district. Tajikistan condemned the attacks and demanded that the Taliban arrest those responsible. The Afghan Foreign Ministry responded by stating that the attacks were intended to “create instability and mistrust between countries in the region.” President Emomali Rahmon publicly condemned the incidents and ordered Tajik security forces to take decisive measures to restore stability and prevent further cross-border attacks.

Organization of Turkic States

Gabala 2025: What the Turkic World Will Discuss Amid Global Turbulence

On October 7, leaders of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) will gather in Gabala, Azerbaijan, for the 12th summit under the theme “Regional Peace and Security.” At first glance, it may look like another routine engagement. Yet against the backdrop of overlapping global crises, the forum is increasingly a test of the OTS’s maturity and relevance. The summit unfolds amid a turbulent international landscape. Afghanistan continues to cast a shadow over Central Asia: economic volatility, migration risks, and the activity of extremist groups remain sources of concern for OTS members. The ongoing war in Ukraine, meanwhile, is reshaping Eurasian transit routes, placing the bloc’s states in delicate positions between East and West. At the same time, violence in the Middle East is adding to the pressures on Turkey’s already complex foreign policy environment. The Middle Corridor at the Center A key theme in Gabala will be the advancement of the Middle Corridor, formally known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. This east–west route connects China with Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Investments are moving forward across the chain: Kazakhstan is expanding port and rail capacity, Azerbaijan is modernizing the Port of Baku in Alat, Georgia is upgrading its railway hubs, and Turkey is reinforcing the Baku–Kars line. Once a logistical project, the corridor is evolving into a strategic framework that ties together economic, environmental, and security considerations. Customs harmonization, digital tracking systems, and sustainability standards are now discussed as much as cargo volumes. Security, Coordination, and Soft Power Security will also be on the table, though framed in practical rather than military terms. Issues such as counter-terrorism cooperation, cyber resilience, disaster response, and the safety of emerging transit corridors are likely to feature. In this sense, security is increasingly seen as the foundation for trade and investment rather than a standalone agenda. Beyond infrastructure, OTS continues to develop soft power tools. Educational exchanges, cultural cooperation, green energy initiatives, and water management projects are part of efforts to build intra-regional trust. The recently inaugurated UN Regional Center for the SDGs in Almaty provides another anchor, aligning the Turkic bloc with global sustainability frameworks. A Turning Point for the Turkic Council? Founded in 2009 primarily as a cultural and humanitarian forum, the OTS is now edging toward a broader role. By coordinating infrastructure projects, harmonizing regulations, and cautiously addressing security concerns, it is positioning itself as a relevant player in Eurasian affairs. Much will depend on whether Gabala produces more than communiqués. Concrete steps on the Middle Corridor, digital customs corridors, joint water initiatives, or disaster coordination could demonstrate that the OTS is maturing into a platform for practical solutions. While major breakthroughs are unlikely, even incremental progress would signal that the Turkic Council is becoming a pillar of regional stability and integration.

Afghanistan

Opinion: The Contact Group on Afghanistan – Central Asia Formulates a Regional Position

On August 26, special representatives on Afghanistan from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met for the first time in Tashkent. The meeting resulted in the creation of a permanent regional platform: the Contact Group on Afghanistan. This gathering was not only a continuation of commitments outlined in the joint statement from the most recent Consultative Summit of Central Asian heads of state, but also a step toward preparing for the next high-level format, scheduled for November in Tashkent. Formally, Turkmenistan was absent. Available information suggests the reasons were purely technical. Ashgabat was ready to join and expressed support for the results through its foreign ministry channels. The key outcome is that Central Asian states have, for the first time, shown their readiness to speak with one voice on an issue long shaped by competing external interests. This is not the start of forming a common position; that had already developed de facto in recent years. All Central Asian countries have supported trade and transit with Afghanistan, continued supplying electricity and food, and maintained working contacts with the Taliban, while avoiding extremes. The Tashkent meeting institutionalized this approach: parallel tracks have now shifted, cautiously, toward coordination. Informal unity has been formalized into a tool. Unlike external players, who often cloak interests in grand rhetoric, Central Asia acts openly and pragmatically. The logic is simple: whatever is done for Afghanistan is, in fact, done for oneself. That is the distinctive feature of the regional approach - no ideological cover, no attempts to reshape Afghanistan. Examples are straightforward. Electricity continues to flow even when payments are delayed - not as charity, but as an investment in security. A blackout in Afghanistan could trigger refugee flows and threats heading north. Exports of flour and fuel sustain Afghan markets but also expand outlets for Central Asian producers. Participation in trans-Afghan corridors is not a gift to Kabul but an opportunity for Central Asia to anchor itself in southern logistics routes. Ultimately, every step “for Afghanistan” is primarily for the region itself. If Kabul ignores basic rules, cooperation will simply stop. In politics, there are no eternal friends, only eternal interests. The new format does not yet imply collective pressure on the Taliban. Rather, it creates conditions for each country to conduct more substantive bilateral dialogue, but grounded in a shared position. Until now, Central Asia has mainly spoken to the Taliban about trade, transit, and infrastructure. The Contact Group now makes it possible to add another dimension: clarifying boundaries of what is acceptable on issues like extremism, border escalation, or water pressure. For now, “red lines” are unlikely, since the Taliban have not crossed them. The situation remains manageable, leaving room for constructive dialogue. Equally important, the Contact Group is not a threat or ultimatum. Coordination is meant to expand opportunities for dialogue, not limit them. In the long run, this could evolve into a sustainable C5+A format. Afghanistan would then be integrated into regional frameworks not as a problem to be managed, but as...

Security

Syrian Forces Intensify Arrests of Uzbek and Foreign Militants in Idlib

Syrian forces under the administration of Ahmed al-Sharaa have escalated their long-running security campaign against foreign fighters in northwestern Syria, targeting individuals affiliated with the Islamic State (ISIS) and other jihadist factions. According to Syrian sources cited by the El Manshar news outlet, the crackdown has gained momentum in recent months, with a focus on detaining commanders and field operatives of various nationalities, particularly in the Idlib region. Among those detained are several Uzbek nationals. In June 2025, security forces in Idlib arrested Ayoub “Abu Dujana” al-Uzbeki, a military trainer, and transferred him to an undisclosed location. In late August, another Uzbek figure, known as Islam al-Uzbeki, was detained during a raid in the Qasour neighborhood of Idlib. On September 3, Syria’s Internal Security Directorate announced the dismantling of an ISIS cell in the Harem area of western Idlib, with all members taken into custody, including fighters from Iraq and Uzbekistan. This is not the first time Uzbek militants have been the focus of security operations. Reports from late 2022 documented more than 20 raids on ISIS-affiliated cells across Idlib province, resulting in the arrests of several Uzbek fighters. Since 2020, forces loyal to Sharaa have also targeted the al-Qaeda-linked “Tawhid and Jihad” battalion, detaining senior figures such as its founder, Abu Saleh al-Uzbeki. Those arrests sparked violent clashes with rival jihadist groups. Analysts suggest the campaign aims to consolidate Sharaa’s authority by bolstering security services, pre-empting the rise of autonomous armed factions, and eliminating groups that resist integration into his command structure. It also appears intended to signal compliance with previous understandings with the United States concerning the handling of foreign fighters in Syria. Despite these efforts, El Manshar notes that extremist groups continue to maintain a limited but persistent presence in eastern Idlib and along the Turkish border. The campaign, therefore, represents a protracted struggle for dominance rather than a definitive resolution of the foreign fighter issue.