Regional Security - The Times Of Central Asia

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Regional Security

Threats to Regional Security: Why Escalation Around Iran Matters for Central Asia

For Central Asia, the central question is not simply whether a wider conflict involving Iran would destabilize the Middle East, but how that instability could spill north into a region that has repeatedly absorbed the consequences of crises to its south. Central Asian states have seen before how militant infiltration, narcotics trafficking, and extremist mobilization can intensify when neighboring wars weaken state control and create more permissive transit corridors. History gives Central Asia specific reasons to take that risk seriously. During the Tajik civil war and its aftermath, the Tajik-Afghan border became a frontline against crossings by Afghan militants and narcotics traffickers. In 1999 and 2000, fighters from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, or IMU, carried out the Batken incursions into southern Kyrgyzstan, took hostages, and demonstrated how quickly insecurity from the Afghan theater could penetrate Central Asia. At the same time, Afghan opiates moved north through the Northern Route, tying militancy, organized crime, and border insecurity into a single regional problem. Afghanistan remains the most important precedent, but the comparison with Iran must be made carefully. After the fall of Najibullah in 1992, Afghanistan fragmented into competing militias and warlord zones. The Taliban later emerged from that disorder, and the Afghan state collapsed again when the Taliban captured Kabul and returned to power in 2021. Iran is structurally different. It has a centralized state, a denser security apparatus, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, which is deeply embedded in regime security and domestic politics. For that reason, the most plausible risk is not an immediate Afghanistan-style collapse, but a slower weakening of control in peripheral regions that could open space for armed groups, trafficking networks, and extremist recruiters. Those peripheral regions matter because Iran’s borderlands already contain armed actors with their own agendas. In the northwest, PJAK remains part of the Kurdish militant landscape. In the southeast, Jaysh al-Adl operates in Sistan-Baluchistan and adjoining border areas. Their capabilities should not be exaggerated, and they do not represent entire Kurdish or Baloch populations. But in a period of prolonged instability, such groups could exploit weaker local control, greater arms circulation, and more permissive smuggling corridors. For Central Asia, however, the greatest concern is the interaction between any Iranian crisis and the threat environment centered on Afghanistan. United Nations reporting in 2025 assessed ISIL-K as the predominant extra-regional terrorist threat, and the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center says ISIS-K has carried out attacks in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia while using media to recruit new members and advance a vision of “Khorasan” that explicitly includes parts of Central Asia and Iran. In other words, Central Asia already faces a live extremist ecosystem to its south; wider instability involving Iran could amplify that pressure rather than replace it. This is why Central Asia should not be seen as a passive observer. The region sits at the junction of security corridors linking Afghanistan, Iran, the Caspian basin, and Russia. A wider conflict involving Iran could intensify trafficking through existing routes, strain border...

Organization of Turkic States (OTS)

Informal OTS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Tests Limits of Turkic Coordination

Escalating tensions linked to the widening conflict in the Middle East have tested the political cohesion of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), according to Kazakh political commentator Dzhanibek Suleyev. Recent incidents affecting both Azerbaijan and Turkey — including drone strikes in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and a missile intercepted by Turkish air defenses — have raised security concerns across the wider region. Suleyev argues that developments of this scale might normally prompt an urgent summit of heads of state. Instead, Turkey convened an informal meeting of foreign ministers and senior diplomatic representatives from OTS member states. The gathering took place on March 7, when officials convened at the invitation of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. According to Turkish media, ministers later met with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during their visit. Speaking to The Times of Central Asia, Suleyev drew attention to how the meeting was covered in the media of Central Asian member states. “In the Uzbek press, coverage was limited, and even on the website of their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is not a single word about the informal summit of OTS foreign ministers. Kazakhstan, moreover, was represented not by Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev but by his deputy Alibek Bakayev. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry issued four notes about the trip of its minister Jeenbek Kulubaev to Istanbul, three of which were devoted to the summit, but without any particular details,” Suleyev said. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry published a short summary of the meeting, noting in broad terms that representatives discussed cooperation among Turkic states and regional developments. According to Suleyev, the joint statement adopted after the meeting was difficult to find outside of Azerbaijani media. One of the few outlets to publish the text in full was Azerbaijan’s APA news agency. Much of the statement focused on the incidents affecting Azerbaijan and Turkey, stressing that “any threat to the security of OTS member states causes concern for the entire Organization… The ministers strongly condemned the attacks carried out from the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of the Republic of Azerbaijan, including strikes against civilian facilities and the territory of the Republic of Turkey,” the statement continued. “The rest of the statement boils down to destabilization in the Middle East could lead to a global economic crisis, the Palestinian conflict must be resolved taking into account UN resolutions, and so on,” Suleyev told TCA. One notable event during the meeting was the foreign ministers’ reception by President Erdoğan. Official summaries released by participating governments described the discussion in diplomatic terms. “Kazakh sources wrote that ‘prospects for the development of cooperation within the framework of Turkic cooperation were discussed,’” Suleyev said. Kyrgyz statements used similar language, stating that the “President of Turkey… noted the importance of regular dialogue on current regional and international issues and expressed interest in further developing multilateral cooperation within the framework of the Organization.” “In short, these are streamlined diplomatic formulations without specific details,” Suleyev said. According to a press...

Afghanistan

Three Main Principles of Kazakhstan’s Afghan Policy

August 15, 2026 will mark five years since the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan. This substantial period can be assessed in different ways, particularly given the widespread skepticism at the outset regarding the Taliban’s ability to govern effectively and build relations with other countries. The situation in Afghanistan remains complex and multifaceted, with diverging trends. On the one hand, the current Afghan leadership faces a wide range of internal challenges, primarily socio-economic. After the Taliban’s return to power, humanitarian assistance declined sharply. For many years, two-thirds of Afghanistan’s budget had been financed through foreign aid, and its reduction has significantly affected the social conditions of ordinary Afghans. According to the United Nations, only one-third of the $2.4 billion humanitarian response plan required for 2025 has been funded. Over 21 million Afghans require humanitarian assistance. The economic situation has been further complicated by the deteriorating humanitarian environment, largely due to the deportation of millions of Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan this year. In total, around 4.5 million Afghans have returned since 2023, primarily through deportations from Iran and Pakistan, resulting in a 10% population increase. Other pressing social issues remain. Several countries continue to focus on security and terrorist threats, as well as government inclusiveness and the rights of women and girls, particularly their access to employment and education. At the same time, nearly five years into Taliban rule, the anticipated “economic and political collapse” has not materialized. The national budget is gradually increasing, and small and medium-sized enterprises are emerging. Industrial parks aimed at developing domestic production have appeared in major cities such as Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Herat. Since 2023, relative macroeconomic stabilization has been observed, although growth rates remain insufficient to offset demographic pressures and reduce poverty. The World Bank forecasts Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth at 4.3% in 2025, with inflation projected to remain low at approximately 2%. According to the United Nations, the area under opium poppy cultivation has declined by 95% during the years of Taliban rule. At the same time, synthetic drug production has reportedly increased, reflecting trends observed in many other countries. Politically, the Taliban maintains consolidated control over most of the country. In other words, a more stable, albeit fragile, reality has emerged, one that Central Asian countries must engage with on a daily basis. Kazakhstan has adopted a pragmatic approach. Its policy toward Afghanistan is based on a model of “pragmatic engagement without recognition,” while developing an independent system of transport, energy, and humanitarian ties with the country. Kazakhstan’s decision to remove the Taliban from its list of banned organizations does not signify a departure from international law nor does it constitute automatic recognition of the current Afghan authorities. On the issue of formal recognition, Kazakhstan relies on decisions of the UN Security Council. From a foreign policy perspective, this step forms part of a broader strategy: Kazakhstan is adapting its instruments to a changed reality while remaining within international norms and avoiding symbolic gestures that could be interpreted as...

Syria

Syria After Assad: What the New Regional Order Means for Central Asia

The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 fundamentally reshaped Syria’s regional position. The collapse of the old power structure weakened Iran’s entrenched military and economic networks and left Russia’s previously secured foothold uncertain. As Damascus enters a new political phase, external actors are recalibrating their strategies in a landscape that looks markedly different from that of the past decade. For Central Asian governments, the shift is not merely regional. Syria is becoming a testing ground for how mid-sized states navigate post-conflict environments shaped by larger powers, and a potential arena for economic and diplomatic outreach. As influence is redistributed and new investment and trade corridors are reconsidered, decisions taken in Damascus will increasingly intersect with Central Asia’s own foreign policy and economic calculations. In this emerging landscape, a power vacuum is being filled by states seeking to advance their interests. From the earliest days of Syria’s post-Assad transition, Turkey has been particularly active. As part of its declared comprehensive support for the new Syrian authorities, Ankara has taken steps to consolidate its position in the Syrian Arab Republic. Turkey is actively participating in infrastructure reconstruction, investing in economic projects, and expanding military-technical cooperation with Damascus. In August 2025, Syria and Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement covering areas including counterterrorism training, cybersecurity, demining, military engineering, logistics, and enhanced coordination between their armed forces. That same month, the two sides agreed to establish an intergovernmental business council under the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board to promote trade and investment cooperation between public and private companies. Turkish exports to Syria reached $3 billion in 2025, reflecting the rapid expansion of Ankara’s economic presence. For Central Asia, Ankara’s activism carries particular weight. Turkey has simultaneously deepened its political, economic, and security cooperation across the Turkic world, meaning its posture in Syria intersects with its broader regional strategy. A central element of Turkey’s Syria policy remains the issue of refugee returns. However, the prospect of large-scale repatriation is complicated by several factors, notably the long-term presence of around 2.5 million Syrian displaced persons in Turkish society and the absence of stable socio-economic conditions in Syria to support reintegration. Over more than a decade of conflict, a generation of Syrians has grown up in Turkey, many of whom are deeply embedded in the country’s social and economic life. Turkey’s obligations under the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, including the principle of non-refoulement, further constrain policy options. Taken together, these factors make large-scale return unlikely until Syria achieves sustained political stabilization and adequate living conditions. In the longer term, Turkey’s objective of neutralizing what it describes as the Kurdish threat emanating from Syrian territory will continue to shape its strategy. Israel has also intensified its military and political engagement since the change of power in Damascus. It has taken steps to establish control over areas adjacent to the Golan Heights and to create a buffer zone, arguing that such measures are necessary to safeguard national security against potential terrorist threats. Israeli officials...

Iran protests

Iran Protests and Regional Stability: An Afghan Perspective

The protests that spread across Iran in late 2025 and early 2026 reflected more than short-term public discontent, instead exposing the cumulative effects of a prolonged socio-economic crisis. Persistently high inflation, declining real incomes, and falling living standards have placed sustained pressure on households and weakened the social contract between the state and society. Against this backdrop, the unrest increasingly acquired a foreign policy dimension. Strong statements from U.S. officials warning of consequences in response to Iran’s handling of the protests, combined with Tehran’s rejection of what it described as external interference, heightened the risk of the crisis becoming internationalized. Thus, the protests in Iran ceased to be an exclusively domestic issue and became a factor of regional instability. A key feature of the current situation is that the Iranian crisis is developing simultaneously on three fronts: socio-economic, where protests are fueled by deteriorating living conditions; political, linked to a crisis of confidence and governability; and geopolitical, where internal processes are used by external actors as a tool of pressure. Consequences for Afghanistan For Afghanistan, developments in Iran carry direct and practical significance. Since late 2024, Iran has become a source of large-scale returns of Afghan migrants, both voluntary and forced. By 2025, this process had become systematic, placing a heavy burden on Afghanistan’s western provinces, particularly Herat. In the event of prolonged instability and a deepening economic crisis in Iran, the likelihood of additional waves of migrant returns would increase. This would place further strain on Afghanistan’s labor market, healthcare system, social infrastructure, and already limited economic resources. In a fragile economy, the return of large numbers of migrants intensifies competition for jobs and raises the risk of local social tensions. The trade and logistics dimension is equally significant. Iran remains Afghanistan’s key economic partner and a vital transit corridor, including through the Islam Qala border crossing. Any deterioration in Iran’s socio-economic conditions has a direct impact on trade flows, supply chains, and broader regional economic stability. Significance for Central Asia The ongoing protest movements and the deterioration of the situation in Iran, driven by a systemic economic crisis and growing political and social discontent, could have a significant impact on political and economic dynamics, as well as security, across Central Asia. On the one hand, governments in the region are responding with cautious concern, mindful of the potential spillover effects of instability and rising internal discontent. A prolonged crisis in Iran increases the risks of migration pressure, border instability, and cross-border threats, all of which directly affect regional security. On the other hand, a further deterioration of Iran’s internal situation could disrupt trade, transit, and energy ties with Central Asia, weakening Tehran’s regional influence and reshaping the balance of power. Under such conditions, the role of other regional and external actors, including Russia, China, Turkey, and Western countries, is likely to grow as they gain opportunities to strengthen their positions in the region. As a result, the crisis in Iran is evolving beyond a domestic challenge and is...

Border Security

Two Tajik Border Guards Killed in Attack Along Afghan Border

Tajikistan’s border troops have reported an armed incident along the country’s southern border with Afghanistan. While the attackers were neutralized during the confrontation, Tajikistan suffered casualties among its personnel. According to the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) of the Republic of Tajikistan, the incident occurred late on December 23, 2025. Three armed individuals described as “members of a terrorist organization” attempted to launch an attack on border post No. 5 “Bo” of the 0341 “Sarchashma” detachment in the Shamsiddin Shohin district. The intruders illegally crossed the state border at approximately 11:30 p.m. and entered Tajik territory. The following morning, at 11:15 a.m., Tajik border guards located the suspects. According to the official statement published by the Khovar news agency, the attackers refused to surrender and opened fire. All three assailants were killed in the ensuing operation. Tajik security forces seized a significant cache of weaponry at the scene, including three M-16 rifles, a Kalashnikov assault rifle, three foreign-made pistols equipped with silencers, ten hand grenades, one pair of night vision goggles, explosives, and other combat gear. Two members of the Border Troops of the SCNS, Zirekhbon Navruzbekov and Ismatullo Kurbonov, were killed in the clash. Authorities extended their condolences to the families of the fallen officers. The SCNS noted that this was the third such incident in the past month involving armed incursions from Afghan territory. In a strongly worded statement, the border service criticized the Taliban authorities for failing to uphold their international obligations and repeated commitments to secure the border and prevent terrorist activity. “These facts confirm that the Taliban government is demonstrating a serious and repeated inability and irresponsibility, in fulfilling its international obligations and consistent promises to ensure security and stability on the state border with the Republic of Tajikistan,” the statement read. Tajikistan called on Afghan authorities to issue a formal apology and implement additional effective measures to secure the shared border. According to Tajik officials, the border area is now stable, and an investigation into the latest incident is ongoing. Two earlier attacks were reported on November 26 and 30, 2025, also originating from Afghan territory. In those incidents, five Chinese citizens were killed and three injured. The attacks targeted a mining company in the Shohin district and a construction company in the Darvaz district. Tajikistan condemned the attacks and demanded that the Taliban arrest those responsible. The Afghan Foreign Ministry responded by stating that the attacks were intended to “create instability and mistrust between countries in the region.” President Emomali Rahmon publicly condemned the incidents and ordered Tajik security forces to take decisive measures to restore stability and prevent further cross-border attacks.