• KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
28 August 2026

Viewing results 13 - 18 of 1139

Satellite Images Suggest Damage at Russian Space Center Linked to Kazakhstan’s Baikonur

Satellite imagery purportedly showing damage from a Ukrainian missile strike at a key Russian space center is circulating online, although there is no independent confirmation of whether Soyuz rocket facilities at the site were hit. Without providing details, Russia has acknowledged that industrial infrastructure was hit in an attack late last week in the Samara region, but has not publicly identified any impact on the Progress Rocket Space Center in Samara. Ukraine says it targeted the site because it supports Russia’s war effort. The Progress facility also makes Soyuz-2 rockets that are regularly launched from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan to deliver spacecraft to the International Space Station. ExileNova+, a Ukrainian channel that tracks damage assessments and other aspects of the war with Russia, posted what it said was a satellite image of damage to a building involved in Soyuz rocket production. “Two hits were recorded on building 106A, where onboard electronics, control systems, cable networks, and instrument compartments for the rockets are assembled. Building 106B, where the final assembly takes place, is located nearby,” ExileNova+ said on Telegram. There was no independent confirmation of the claims about damage at building 106A. Business Insider, a U.S. publication, published a satellite image that it said shows a hole in the roof of a Progress center building, as well as damage to the exterior. The publication said the image was obtained from U.S. firm Vantor. For now, it is difficult to assess how the missile strike in Samara could affect future Soyuz launches from the Baikonur Cosmodrome, which Russia leases from Kazakhstan. Roscosmos, the Russian space agency, said a launch pad at Baikonur was damaged during the liftoff of a crewed spacecraft in late November 2025 but was repaired in early 2026. Soyuz rockets then launched Russian spacecraft from Baikonur in March and April of this year. “The extent of the damage at Progress and its impact on future Soyuz launches will likely become clearer over time. Even a temporary disruption could complicate a production schedule already expected to rely on existing rocket stocks to meet growing demand,” Alison Sayer wrote in an analysis for ISR University, a team of former U.S. Department of Defense professionals, national security experts, and others. Roscosmos is a civilian entity, but Russia’s military relies on satellites and other space infrastructure provided or operated by the country’s space industry. Tracking platform Orbital Radar identifies the Russian Aerospace Forces, a branch of the Russian military, as the operator of multiple Soyuz-2 launches, including launches from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in northern Russia.

Kazakhstan South Korea Working Visa Route Opens Under EPS

South Korea is opening an official route into its labor market for citizens of Kazakhstan, thousands of whom already work in the country without legal status. Seoul has added Kazakhstan to its Employment Permit System (EPS), a government program that allows South Korean employers facing labor shortages to recruit workers from participating countries. Kazakh workers are expected to begin arriving through the system in 2028. Kazakhstan has become the 18th country designated as a sending country under the EPS, according to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Labor and Social Protection. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan already participate in the program. Kazakhstan had sought admission since 2023, but its large population of undocumented workers in South Korea became the main obstacle to an agreement. According to figures cited by Kazakh officials in 2025, about 15,000 Kazakhstanis were working in South Korea, roughly 11,000 of them without legal status. The EPS allows foreign workers to obtain E-9 visas for jobs in sectors facing labor shortages, including manufacturing, construction, agriculture, and fisheries. Workers are generally admitted for three years, with extensions allowing them to remain for up to four years and 10 months. Recruitment will not begin immediately. Kazakhstan and South Korea must first sign a memorandum of understanding and establish the arrangements for the Korean-language test required under the EPS (EPS-TOPIK), which Kazakh officials have said will be conducted at the National Testing Center in Almaty. Kazakh citizens can travel to South Korea visa-free for short stays, but this does not give them the right to work. Some visitors have overstayed and found jobs in construction, agriculture, and other sectors. The scale of undocumented employment complicated Kazakhstan’s attempt to join the EPS. In the fall of 2025, Kazakh officials acknowledged that Seoul wanted concrete measures to reduce illegal migration. Astana prepared a roadmap aimed at reducing the number of undocumented workers and preventing those recruited through a future legal scheme from overstaying. For prospective workers, the change is straightforward: instead of entering South Korea as a visitor and seeking work without authorization, applicants will be able to apply from Kazakhstan and enter the country with permission to work. The agreement forms part of a broader effort by Kazakhstan to create legal routes for its citizens working abroad. Astana has also reached labor-migration agreements or cooperation arrangements with countries including Qatar and the United Kingdom, while pursuing similar deals elsewhere.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Dispute Cause After Regional Power Failure Hits Almaty

A major power failure affected parts of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan on August 14. In Almaty, electricity went out at 2:38 p.m. local time in four districts, disrupting transport and traffic in Kazakhstan’s largest city. Traffic lights stopped working and some businesses closed. The metro suspended service, and passengers still underground were evacuated. At several busy intersections, motorists and delivery couriers began directing traffic themselves. In Kyrgyzstan, outages affected parts of Bishkek and Issyk-Kul Region. “An accident in the power system of a neighboring country affected the Central Asian power grid. As a result, power supply disruptions were observed in the Surkhandarya region and several other regions,” Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry said. In Tajikistan, electricity went out in Dushanbe at about 3 p.m. and in numerous other cities and districts. Later that day, the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources said it had formed a working group to determine the cause. The ministry also denied reports of an accident at the Nurek Hydropower Plant. The Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company (KEGOC) later issued a preliminary account attributing the blackout to an emergency at Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul Hydropower Plant. “Due to the emergency shutdown of two hydropower units with a combined capacity of 600 megawatts at the Toktogul HPP in the Kyrgyz Republic, there was a power surge on the North-South transit line, causing an overload and its disconnection by emergency protection systems. As a result, Kazakhstan’s southern zone was separated from the country’s unified power system,” KEGOC explained. Kyrgyz energy officials offered a different account. They said an external outage occurred at 3:34 p.m. Kyrgyzstan time on a high-voltage transmission line connecting northern and southern Kazakhstan. The disturbance split the Central Asian grid into isolated sections, leaving Kyrgyzstan temporarily operating autonomously while automatic protection safeguarded equipment. Both accounts illustrate the interdependence of the Central Asian Power System (CAPS). The Soviet-era network connected the region’s electricity systems across borders that were then internal. It was part of a regional water-and-energy arrangement in which hydropower releases from upstream republics supported irrigation downstream. Cross-border power exchanges declined after the Soviet Union collapsed. In 1999, the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed a parallel-operation agreement. Turkmenistan disconnected from CAPS in 2003, while Tajikistan was disconnected from Uzbekistan in December 2009. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed an electricity-trade agreement in March 2018. The southwestern section of Tajikistan’s grid reconnected to CAPS in June 2024, but the northern connection was still under development in July 2026. Turkmenistan remains outside the system. In an assessment published on August 16, Zhakyp Khairushev, chairman of the Public Council under Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy, called the incident a serious test of the country’s southern power system. He said emergency protection contained the disruption and allowed electricity to be restored in stages. Power restrictions in Kazakhstan were lifted by 5 p.m., but Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan continued to disagree over where the failure began.

Major Power Outage Hits Almaty as Blackouts Reported in Bishkek and Dushanbe

A major power outage hit Almaty and parts of the surrounding region on Friday afternoon after high-voltage transmission lines shut down, triggering automatic protection systems across the electricity network. The blackout affected Kazakhstan’s largest city, home to about 2.37 million people, and came amid reports of power cuts at around the same time in neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. According to Alatau Zharyq Company, the disruption began at 2:38 p.m. on August 14 when three 500 kV overhead transmission lines owned by national grid operator KEGOC shut down unexpectedly. The company identified the lines as L-5400, L-5300, and L-5320. Their shutdown activated special load-shedding and automatic frequency protection systems in Alatau Zharyq’s network, which the company said “led to the disconnection of electricity consumers in the city of Almaty and the Almaty Region.” The three lines form part of Kazakhstan’s North-South electricity transit system. There was no initial explanation from the company or KEGOC of what caused the three transmission lines to trip. Residents reported outages in communities across Almaty Region. Electricity failures were accompanied in some areas by disruption to internet and mobile services. TCA reporters on the ground confirmed outages across large parts of Bishkek. There was no immediate confirmation that the outages in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan had the same root cause. KEGOC later said preliminary operational data indicated that the disruption was caused by a power surge from the Unified Power System of Central Asia. The company said the disturbance caused southern Kazakhstan and the interconnected Central Asian power system to separate into isolated operation. The underlying cause of the initial surge had not yet been established. The timing caused an additional complication in Almaty, where one of the city’s largest entertainment events of the year is scheduled for Friday evening. Ye, formerly known as Kanye West, is due to perform at Almaty’s Central Stadium on August 14 as part of his 2026 world tour. The blackout quickly produced a wave of jokes on social media. One image circulating widely depicted the rapper dressed as an electrician beside a fuse box, with “Yeezy Electrical” on his overalls. Other users joked that the city’s electricity had been diverted to prepare for the concert. The blackout also struck during a period of intensely hot summer weather, increasing the potential disruption for households and businesses reliant on air conditioning.

Central Asia’s C6 Takes Shape in Washington as Ambassadors Push for Practical Integration

Less than two weeks after regional leaders gathered in Cholpon Ata, diplomats from the emerging C6 grouping used a discussion in Washington to shift the focus from declarations of unity to the mechanics of integration: customs, railways, digitalized trade, access to European markets, and stronger links across the Caspian. The sharpest political message came from Kyrgyzstan’s ambassador to the United States, Edil Baisalov, who said that Central Asian states were increasingly recognizing that they were “enough for each other,” and that resolving differences within the region had become a pragmatic national interest. His comments gave unusually direct language to a trend that has accelerated since the region’s consultative meetings began in 2018. The August 12 event at the Caspian Policy Center brought together the U.S.-based ambassadors of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan, the sixth country in the emerging C6 framework, was not listed among the participants. The event followed a late-July meeting in Cholpon Ata, where leaders concentrated on transport, energy security, investment, and foreign-policy coordination. The C6 label remains shorthand rather than the name of a formal organization. Its political basis, however, has become more concrete since Azerbaijan was admitted as a full participant in the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in November 2025. The shift extended a format once focused on relations among the five Central Asian republics across the Caspian Sea. From Regional Dialogue to Regional Agency Azerbaijan’s ambassador, Khazar Ibrahim, presented Cholpon Ata as evidence that the six states increasingly see themselves as part of one political and economic space. “We are finally holistic. We are all together,” he said. He argued that Azerbaijan’s presence changes the geography of the grouping by turning the Caspian from a dividing line into a connecting space between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. That idea has been developing for some time. TCA has previously examined how Azerbaijan’s entry could turn the C6 framework into a platform for common rules on transport, tariffs, customs systems, and digital data, rather than another layer of summit diplomacy. Kazakhstan’s ambassador, Magzhan Ilyassov, put the emphasis on building an “economically active neighborhood.” He pointed to the frequency of regional meetings and said the value of the current process lies partly in maintaining an inclusive conversation among the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan has also pushed for stronger coordination on transport planning as the consultative format develops. For Uzbekistan, the discussion was more explicitly about market access. Ambassador Furqat Sidiqov said cooperation with Azerbaijan could give Uzbekistan wider access to European and other export markets. He also called for further digitalization of the Middle Corridor. Sidiqov said Uzbekistan had close to 300 joint ventures with Central Asian countries in 2017, and now has about 1,500 with neighboring states. Corridors Become the Practical Core Digitalizing the Trans-Caspian route is not a new proposal. The countries of the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia, which already brings together the five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, endorsed a digitalization...

EU Deepens Central Asia Ties as Rights Record Varies Across Region

The European Union is rapidly deepening its trade, investment, and political ties with Central Asia, even as its latest assessment points to worsening human rights conditions across much of the region. The latest assessments are contained in the EU’s annual Human Rights and Democracy in the World country reports, which separately examine all five Central Asian states. In Kazakhstan, the EU notes judicial and political reforms, as well as continued implementation of measures aimed at strengthening protection against gender-based violence. Brussels also points to a shrinking space for civil society, growing pressure on journalists and independent media, increased oversight of NGOs, and continued restrictions on peaceful assembly. As part of the UN Universal Periodic Review, Kazakhstan accepted 259 of the 294 recommendations it received. The assessment of Kyrgyzstan is notably harsher. The EU says the human rights situation continued to deteriorate and highlights the new media law, mandatory registration for all media outlets, a 35% cap on foreign ownership, and prosecutions of media workers that it describes as seemingly politically motivated. Another source of concern was the closure of the National Center for the Prevention of Torture, whose functions were transferred to the Ombudsperson’s Office. In Tajikistan, the main concerns include pressure on independent media and human rights defenders, restrictions on freedom of expression and association, reports of torture and ill-treatment in detention, and the situation of Pamiri activists and journalists. Citing Human Rights Watch, the EU report says at least seven journalists were imprisoned on charges related to their reporting or coverage of protests. Turkmenistan remains subject to some of the region’s most extensive restrictions. Brussels points to continuing restrictions on freedom of movement, expression, the media, association, assembly, and religion, as well as reports of torture and ill-treatment in prisons. The EU also notes some improvements in detention conditions, gender equality and gender-based violence, and cooperation with the International Labour Organization on eliminating forced labor. The EU’s assessment of Uzbekistan is quite severe. According to the EU, the human rights and democracy situation continued to steadily deteriorate in 2025, with backsliding in nearly every area. Brussels points to legal action and imprisonment targeting journalists, bloggers, and human rights defenders, restrictions affecting NGOs, and worsening media freedom. The full report on the July 2022 protests in Karakalpakstan had still not been made public by the end of 2025. The EU nevertheless notes some positive developments, including new measures to protect children, changes to divorce law, and improved representation of women in parliament. The severity of these assessments contrasts with the pace at which Europe is expanding its relationship with the region. The first EU-Central Asia summit, held in Samarkand in April 2025, elevated relations to a strategic partnership. Brussels also announced a €12 billion Global Gateway investment package covering transport links, critical raw materials, digital connectivity, water, and energy. The Times of Central Asia has reported on efforts to move from political agreements toward specific projects. Human rights, however, remain part of the relationship with Brussels. This has been...