Energy Security - The Times Of Central Asia

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Black Sea Tanker Attacks

Security Risks Around Kazakhstan’s Oil Exports Ripple Through European Markets

Europe’s oil market is becoming increasingly exposed to disruption as security risks rise along export routes used by Kazakhstan, which the European Union has long viewed as a reliable alternative to Russian supply. The risks extend far beyond Ukraine itself. “Russia continues escalating its attacks and targeting civilians and civilian infrastructures,” an EU spokesperson told The Times of Central Asia. “Russia’s brutal and unacceptable attacks have left people without hot water, heating and electricity in the current weather conditions. Russia’s war of aggression has also severely impacted Black Sea maritime security, including through its use of shadow fleet vessels to circumvent international sanctions, and the persistent attacks on civilian and port infrastructure in Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukraine has accepted an unconditional ceasefire in March 2025. It shows that Russia does not want peace. The EU and the entire international community need to put pressure on Russia to stop its war. “Kazakhstan plays a crucial role for Europe’s energy security and has been for years a reliable partner in diversifying energy sources and ensuring a stable supply for European markets. More than 12% of all the oil imported by the EU comes from Kazakhstan, contributing to the diversification of energy sources and reducing dependency on a limited number of suppliers. The continuous and safe functioning of the supply chain is hence key also for Europe. “Maritime safety and security in the Black Sea is a fundamental component of the new EU strategic approach to the region, adopted in May 2025. The Black Sea is a critical connector between Europe, the Southern Caucasus, Central Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean. Ensuring maritime security and safety in this region is vital not only for the littoral States but also for broader European interests and for many partner countries, as it supports trade flows, sustainable supply chains and enhanced connectivity.” Kazakhstan produced roughly 1.8 million barrels per day in 2024 and exported the bulk of that volume. More than 80% of its crude exports move through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, or CPC, which links oil fields in western Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. From there, tankers ship the oil mainly to European refiners. Under normal conditions, the pipeline carries roughly 1.3 million barrels per day, making it one of the most important single supply routes for non-Russian crude entering Europe. Recent events have shown how sensitive European markets are to any disruption along that corridor. On January 14, Bloomberg reported that oil prices in Europe strengthened after shipments of CPC Blend fell short of expectations. Traders cited reduced availability of the light, low-sulfur crude, which is favored by European refiners, forcing buyers to seek alternative grades at higher prices. Despite the recent tightening, traders say the market has so far absorbed disruptions without severe shortages, reflecting high inventories and flexible refinery operations, though that buffer could narrow if attacks persist. That supply pressure followed a series of security incidents in the Black Sea, where commercial shipping and port infrastructure have...

Iran

Opinion: Iranian Unrest Creates Opening for U.S., Partners in Central Asia

As protests in Iran enter their third week, nationwide unrest is exerting political strain and societal pressure on the Islamic Republic. The nation’s current escalation reflects a level of sustained mobilization comparable to Iranian demonstrations that erupted in 2022 following the death of Mahsa Amini. While the outcome of these developments remains uncertain, ongoing unrest in Iran is more likely to impact Central Asia’s existing energy, transit, and security dynamics, rather than alter the broader regional landscape. This moment nonetheless offers the United States and its partners a strategic opportunity to advance long-term objectives in Central Asia while supporting regional resilience at a time when geopolitical alignments are rapidly shifting. Combined with ongoing disruptions caused by Russia’s War in Ukraine, the recent protests in Iran may create a heightened sense of uncertainty or risk perceptions in global energy markets. In particular, the current Iranian unrest may raise concerns regarding potential oil supply disruptions and broader geopolitical tensions. For neighboring producers like Kazakhstan, which maintains an oil-dependent economy, this elevated volatility could translate into higher revenues from existing exports. Increased fiscal flexibility from rising oil revenues may therefore provide Astana with the opportunity to expand its scope for economic cooperation with Western partners. The United States, which maintains long-standing bilateral energy ties with Kazakhstan, could draw on these existing partnerships to deepen its bilateral energy and technical ties. Beyond its impact on energy markets, ongoing instability in Iran may also affect regional connectivity initiatives. For example, disruptions could emerge along the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal network connecting India, Iran, and Russia, with branches that involve the Caspian and Central Asia. Although the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway sits along this route and facilitates the transport of energy resources and critical minerals across the region, the corridor currently plays a more limited role in regional transit across Central Asia. This route nonetheless remains of interest to Central Asia because it offers the region an opportunity to enhance long-term economic diversification through access to new markets in the Persian Gulf. Minor disruptions could therefore underscore the corridor’s growing geopolitical value as a connector for trade and energy transport across multiple countries and regions. This context creates a strategic opening for the United States and its partners to contribute to the region’s long-term trade and connectivity landscape. By supporting Central Asian nations in reducing reliance on Iranian transit, the United States can accelerate investment in alternative routes like the Middle Corridor that bypass both Russia and Iran. During an investors' forum in Tashkent late last year, Europe announced it would increase its investment in the Middle Corridor. However, the United States continues to remain on the periphery of this project. By collaborating with European partners to enhance infrastructure along this route during a critical time, the United States can help Central Asian nations position the Middle Corridor as the region’s most resilient and viable alternative for trade and exports. This would ultimately advance shared interests by enhancing Central Asia’s connectivity and facilitating greater U.S....

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Kazakhstan Opens Criminal Probe Over Calls to Attack CPC Oil Pipeline

Kazakhstan has opened a criminal investigation into public statements that authorities say encouraged attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the main export route for the country’s crude oil, after months of disruption at the system’s Black Sea terminal turned a foreign security risk into a domestic legal and political issue. Prosecutor General Berik Asylov confirmed the case in a written reply to a parliamentary inquiry on January 6. "On December 17, 2025, the Astana City Police Department launched a pre-trial investigation under Part 1 of Article 174 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (incitement of social, national, tribal, racial, class, or religious discord) into negative public comments regarding damage to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium," the Prosecutor General stated. The authorities have yet to name suspects, publish the posts under review, or announce any arrests. The file remains at the evidence-gathering stage, and prosecutors have left open whether any charges will ultimately be filed under Article 174, or reclassified under other provisions once investigators assess the intent and impact. The probe follows a request by Mazhilis deputy, Aidos Sarym, who said that some social media commentary crossed from opinion into encouragement of harm to strategic infrastructure, endorsed attacks on the CPC, and urged further strikes on critical sites. The political sensitivity is rooted in the 1,500-kilometer pipeline’s central role in Kazakhstan’s economy. CPC carries crude from western Kazakhstan to a marine terminal near Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, where the oil is loaded onto tankers for delivery to global markets. The pipeline is owned by a consortium that includes Kazakhstan, Russia, and several international energy companies. The system dominates Kazakhstan’s oil export economy. More than 80% of the country’s crude oil exports move through the CPC route, which also carries more than 1% of global oil supplies, making it a pressure point for both markets and state revenue when operations are disrupted. The investigation follows a period of repeated disruption at the Novorossiysk terminal in late 2025, after a naval drone strike damaged one of the offshore loading points used to transfer oil from the pipeline to tankers. The damage forced operators to suspend loadings and move vessels away while inspections and repairs were carried out, sharply reducing export capacity. The CPC relies on single-point moorings positioned at sea to load crude onto tankers, a critical constraint on the entire system; when one goes offline, capacity drops quickly. The pipeline cannot store large volumes, forcing upstream producers to cut or slow output. By late December, the impact was visible in Kazakhstan’s production figures. Oil output fell by about 6% during the month after the late November strike constrained exports. Production at the Tengiz oilfield, the country’s largest, dropped by roughly 10%. Exports of CPC Blend crude fell to about 1.08 million barrels per day in December, the lowest level in more than a year, as the terminal operated with only one functioning mooring while others remained offline due to damage and maintenance. Operational pressures continued as...

Rare Earth Elements

Central Asia, Vanadium, and the U.S. National Security Strategy

Dated November 2025 and released publicly in early December, the U.S. National Security Strategy links overseas trade and investment, but overlooks Central Asia as a target region for critical minerals. This oversight merits reconsideration in the NSS’s next iteration, given the region’s known natural resource base, openness to foreign investment, proficiency in mining operations, low processing costs, and manageable geopolitical risks. As governments and businesses review supply-chain resilience for critical minerals, vanadium – not one of the 17 rare earth metals – has increasingly become a strategically relevant rather than optional or cyclical commodity. It is widely used in high-strength steel, grid-scale energy storage functions such as redox flow batteries, and infrastructure with defense and industrial applications. A recent letter from the U.S. Congress highlights a critical shortfall of vanadium in the United States: with 14,000 metric tons consumed in 2024, only 3,800 tons were produced domestically. Imports, mainly from Brazil and South Africa, are at risk due to shifting market conditions, meaning the U.S. needs a more structured and focused industrial-like approach to counter unnecessary import dependencies and geopolitical stresses. U.S. supply is secured solely through imports and recycling, given that the mining of vanadium-bearing mineral precursors is minimal to non-existent in the United States. With mining dominated by China and Russia, and with South African production in decline, today’s need to secure primary materials and supply chains means the U.S. must invest overseas until domestic mining is viable. What is needed is vertical integration from mine to final product – vanadium pentoxide (V205), vanadium trioxide (V2O3), and vanadium sulfate (VOSO₄ / V₂(SO₄)₃) for batteries. In an October Development Finance Corporation media release, DFC CEO Ben Black said that “Securing critical minerals is a paramount matter of U.S. strategic interest and economic prosperity.” That’s clearly beyond dispute. Central Asia and Vanadium Central Asia as a region fits within the U.S.’s broader geostrategic goals and geographic diversification plans aimed at building solid asset-based partnerships that go beyond raw material extraction and precarious trading arrangements. Last November's gathering of Central Asia’s five presidents at the White House finally placed the region firmly on the global map. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Paul Kapur has also been clear: “Under President Trump’s and Secretary Rubio’s leadership, we’re elevating the C5+1 partnership as a priority — a strategic priority and an economic priority.” Here, amongst critical minerals, vanadium surely emerges as a priority commodity, given the near absence of U.S. domestic mining. Kazakhstan leads Central Asia in vanadium mining and production, hosting the region’s most productive deposits. Established operations, strong infrastructure, cost advantages, supportive laws, tax incentives, and a free FX regime make the country highly attractive to investors. Kazakhstan has three vanadium assets—Balasausqandiq in advanced production and Lisakovsk and Kurumsak in exploration—making them attractive targets for miners or funds with long horizons and low-cost capital. Kyrgyzstan has scattered, under-explored vanadium deposits, including in the Jetim Mountain Range. Uzbekistan is expanding exploration, but the value is yet to...

Geopolitics

2025: The Year Central Asia Stepped Onto the Global Stage

For much of the post-Soviet era, Central Asia occupied a peripheral place in global affairs. It mattered to its immediate neighbors, but rarely shaped wider debates. In 2025, that changed in visible ways. The region became harder to ignore, largely not because of ideology or alignments, but because of assets that the world increasingly needs: energy, minerals, transit routes, and political access across Eurasia. One of the clearest signs came in April, when the European Union and the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in Samarkand for their first summit at the head-of-state level. The meeting concluded with a joint declaration upgrading relations to a strategic partnership, with a focus on transport connectivity, energy security, and critical raw materials. The document marked a shift in how Brussels views Central Asia, moving beyond development assistance toward geopolitical cooperation, as outlined in the official EU–Central Asia summit joint declaration. European interest is rooted in necessity. Russia’s war in Ukraine has forced EU governments to rethink energy imports, supply chains, and overland trade routes. Central Asia sits astride the most viable alternatives that bypass Russian territory. It also holds resources essential to Europe’s green transition, including uranium and a range of industrial metals. The region’s leaders spent much of the year framing their diplomacy around these tangible advantages, rather than abstract political alignments. The United States followed a similar track. Through the C5+1 format, Washington deepened engagement with all five Central Asian states, with particular emphasis on economic cooperation and supply-chain resilience. A key element has been the Critical Minerals Dialogue, launched to connect Central Asian producers with Western markets. This initiative formed part of a broader U.S. effort to diversify access to strategic materials and reduce dependence on Russia and China. Russia remained a central but changing presence in Central Asia throughout 2025. Economic ties, labor migration, and shared infrastructure ensured that Moscow continued to matter across the region. At the same time, however, Russia’s war in Ukraine constrained its ability to act as the dominant external power it once was. Central Asian governments maintained pragmatic relations with Moscow, but they increasingly treated Russia as one partner among several rather than the default reference point. Trade continued, security cooperation persisted, and political dialogue remained active, yet the balance shifted toward hedging rather than dependence. Uranium sits at the center of this shift, with the United States having banned imports of certain Russian uranium products under federal law, with waivers set to expire no earlier than January 1, 2028. As Washington restructures its nuclear fuel supply chain, Central Asia’s role has grown sharply. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2024 Uranium Marketing Annual Report, Kazakhstan supplied 24% of uranium delivered to U.S. reactor operators, while Uzbekistan accounted for about 9%. Canada and Australia remain major suppliers, but the Central Asian share is now strategic rather than marginal. That economic weight translated into political visibility. In December, U.S. President Donald Trump said he would invite Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to attend...

Energy Security

Central Asia Considers Single Gas Ring to Link Regional Energy Systems

A proposal to connect the five Central Asian capitals into a unified, synchronized gas network has generated widespread debate among regional energy experts following a major industry forum in Tashkent. The idea, referred to as the “Central Asia Gas Ring,” was introduced by Kazakh oil and gas analyst Askar Ismailov during the Central Asia Oil & Gas Forum in early November. An analysis of the proposal was later published by the Uzbek outlet Upl.uz, citing assessments from regional and international experts. The concept envisions physically linking the gas transportation systems of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan into an integrated regional ring, modeled on the existing Central Asian Unified Power System, which already enables cross-border electricity coordination. According to Ismailov, natural gas should be seen not only as a tradable resource but as a strategic instrument for regional integration and energy security, especially in the context of growing geopolitical volatility. Experts cited by Upl.uz argue that a gas ring could help countries better manage seasonal fluctuations in demand and reduce the risk of widespread energy shortages. Recent winter blackouts, particularly in Uzbekistan, have heightened concerns about supply resilience. The proposed system could also ensure more stable gas flows to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which lack significant domestic hydrocarbon resources and frequently experience shortages. The initiative has attracted interest beyond Central Asia. Valérie Ducrot, head of the Global Gas Center, described the plan as a new model of energy cooperation that could attract international investment if the five participating states align their energy policies. Research groups such as SPIK and SpecialEurasia, also cited in the analysis, view the project as a potential cornerstone of regional infrastructure, aligning national interests around shared goals for stability and integration. Economic incentives vary across the region. For Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, the ring could provide enhanced flexibility in export routes and pricing mechanisms. For gas-dependent Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the proposal promises greater energy security, seen as essential for long-term economic and social development. External stakeholders, including China and the European Union, are expected to show interest in financing the project, while Russia is likely to seek continued influence over pricing structures and logistics. Ismailov estimates the total cost at between $4 billion and $5 billion, with most of the funding needed for modernization of aging Soviet-era pipelines and construction of select new infrastructure segments. While Upl.uz notes that technical and political hurdles remain, the proposal highlights growing momentum toward collective energy solutions in Central Asia.