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Strategic Cooperation Between Turkey and Turkmenistan Gains Momentum

Turkey and Turkmenistan have accelerated their cooperation in recent years, advancing economic, energy, and diplomatic initiatives that underscore their shared cultural and strategic interests. Their deepening of bilateral ties reflects and expresses both broader regional dynamics and shifts in global energy geopolitics. As The Times of Central Asia reports, the two countries signed a natural gas supply agreement in February 2025 that reinforces Turkey’s ambitions as a regional energy hub while providing Turkmenistan with a new export avenue. Turkmenistan will begin supplying 1.3 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) of natural gas to Turkey on March 1 through a swap agreement. Turkmenistan will send gas to Iran for consumption in the northeast of the country, in return for which Iran will transfer an equivalent amount to Turkey. Various press commentaries and diplomatic declarations touting the “export of Turkmen gas to Turkey” are therefore to be regarded skeptically as political grandstanding, even if such an assessment may be supported from a technical standpoint of how the industry calculates flows. Trade and investment relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan have recently seen steady growth, underpinned by Turkish business engagement in Turkmenistan’s infrastructure and construction sectors. Over 600 Turkish companies are active in Turkmenistan, and Turkish direct investment has surpassed $500 million. Turkish contractors have executed projects worth over $50 billion in Turkmenistan since its independence. In this context, the eighth meeting of the bilateral Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation took place in Ankara on February 25. Following the meeting, a large-scale protocol was signed, including 87 points and covering cooperation over a wide range of issues - areas such as trade and investment, energy, transport and logistics, scientific cooperation, agriculture, and healthcare. The bilateral trade turnover between the two countries reached $2.2 billion in 2024, and Turkey aims to more than double this level to $5 billion. However, reaching that target hinges on further liberalization of Turkmenistan’s economic policies and the expansion of investment-friendly regulations, both of which could be challenging. The two sides also discussed how to integrate Turkmenistan into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, “Middle Corridor”) as well as possible cooperation in the field of transport and logistics toward that end. Ankara has successfully positioned itself as a strategic economic partner, but Ashgabat’s tightly controlled economy presents structural barriers that may slow the desired growth. Ankara’s engagement with Ashgabat thus reflects its broader efforts to enhance connectivity across Central Asia. Turkey’s push to integrate Turkmenistan into the TITR aligns with its own ambition to position itself as a logistical bridge between Asia and Europe, complementing its Middle Corridor strategy, which seeks to create an alternative trade route bypassing Russia. However, Turkmenistan’s rigid economic model and cautious foreign policy limit the pace of integration. Practical challenges include regulatory misalignment, infrastructure bottlenecks, and geopolitical sensitivities. Turkey’s Vice-President, Cevdet Yilmaz, affirmed his country’s intention that Turkmen gas and electricity should reach European markets through Turkey. Turkish state-owned companies such as TPAO and BOTAŞ will also seek to develop hydrocarbon fields in Turkmenistan and...

Turkey Iran Natural gas

Turkmenistan to Start Natural Gas Shipments to Turkey

Long-discussed shipments of Turkmen natural gas to Turkey could be just weeks away. Several options have been discussed for bringing gas to Turkey, but news since February 10 indicates Turkmenistan and Turkey chose a swap agreement involving Iran. Turkmenistan’s state information agency TDH reported the head of the country’s Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov spoke with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian by phone. During that call, Berdimuhamedov “announced the agreement with (Turkey’s) BOTAS company on the transit of Turkmen natural gas through Iran to the Republic of Turkey..." Since there is no pipeline connecting Turkmenistan to Turkey, the agreement involves a swap deal whereby Turkmenistan ships its gas to Iran and Iran makes a like amount of its gas available to Turkey. However, on February 11, Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar posted on X (formerly Twitter) confirming an agreement between BOTAS and Turkmengaz. Bayraktar said “… gas flow is planned to start on March 1, 2025.” There were no details about the volume of gas to be delivered, but Turkish officials have previously been mentioning an initial volume of some 2 billion cubic meters (bcm). Turkish officials have been pushing for this deal for more than two years, with the ultimate aim of turning Turkey into a gas hub to shipments to Europe. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev traveled to Turkmenistan in December 2022 to meet with Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov (the son of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov). Erdogan and Aliyev were hoping for an agreement on construction of a pipeline to carry Turkmen gas to Azerbaijan and from there to Turkey. Those talks were inconclusive, but did lead to a series of other meetings of officials of the three countries to discuss alternative means to ship Turkmen gas to Turkey. The swap arrangement involving Iran was one of the possibilities raised during these meetings. However, Turkey is still clinging to the plan for construction of a pipeline that would eventually boost Turkmen gas supplies to Turkey up to 15 bcm. Turkish Ambassador to Ashgabat Ahmet Demirok said in September 2024 that his country was looking to purchase 300 bcm of Turkmen gas over the next 20 years. The agreement is good news for Turkmenistan, but it also shows again how dependent Turkmenistan is becoming on Iran for gas exports. When Turkmenistan became independent in late 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the only gas pipelines in Turkmenistan led north to Russia. Turkmenistan was exporting gas to Russia for most of the years after independence, but in 2024 the latest agreement between the two countries expired and both countries indicated they would not renew Turkmen gas exports. The first post-Soviet pipeline built in Turkmenistan connected to Iran. That pipeline started operations at the end of 1997. Another pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran was launched in 2010. The two pipelines have a combined capacity to carry some 20 bcm, but a pricing dispute between Turkmenistan and Iran in late 2016 led Turkmenistan to...

Bilateral Cooperation Trade Iran Regional Cooperation Bilateral Trade Foreign trade turnover

Iran’s Non-Oil Exports to Uzbekistan Rise by 18%

Iran’s non-oil exports to Uzbekistan increased by 18% in value and 14% in weight during the first nine months of the current Iranian year (March 20 - December 20, 2024), compared to the same period last year (March 21 - December 21, 2023), Trend reported, citing data from the Iranian Customs Administration. According to the report, Iran exported 414,000 tons of non-oil goods worth $292 million to Uzbekistan during this period. In the corresponding months of the previous Iranian year, exports totaled 364,000 tons, valued at approximately $248 million. Key Iranian Exports to Uzbekistan Iran’s main exports to Uzbekistan included: Milk and dairy products Petrochemicals Various types of pipes Glass containers Agricultural equipment Overall, Iran’s total trade turnover with Uzbekistan during the nine-month period reached 444,000 tons, valued at $358 million. Expanding Trade Ties with Kazakhstan In addition to strengthening economic relations with Uzbekistan, Iran is also deepening trade ties with Kazakhstan. As The Times of Central Asia reported, on January 30, Iranian Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref met with Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov in Almaty to discuss trade and transport cooperation. Kazakhstan’s trade with Iran reached $296 million in 2024, an 8.1% increase from the previous year. Notably, Kazakhstan’s exports to Iran grew by 29.1%, reaching $100.6 million. Kazakhstan plans to expand exports of wheat and barley, while both sides discussed increasing cargo traffic and upgrading port terminals to facilitate trade.

Iran Caspian Region EAEU Economic Cooperation

Iran Expands Economic Cooperation with EAEU and Kazakhstan

In recent years, Iran has strengthened its trade, economic, and transport ties with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), an economic bloc comprising Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. In December 2024, Iran was granted observer status in the EAEU, joining Cuba and Uzbekistan as the bloc’s third observer state. This status allows Iran to attend EAEU meetings and access non-confidential documents but does not grant decision-making rights. A year earlier, in December 2023, the EAEU and Iran signed a full Free Trade Agreement (FTA), establishing duty-free trade for 90% of goods and covering more than 95% of mutual trade between the parties. According to official statistics, the EAEU plays a significant role in Iran's foreign trade. In 2023, the bloc accounted for 10.1% of Iran’s exports, making it Iran’s third-largest trading partner after China (30.4%) and Turkey (14.5%). [caption id="attachment_28237" align="aligncenter" width="800"] Image: Marko Bukorovic[/caption] Strengthening Ties with Kazakhstan Iran has also worked to deepen bilateral cooperation with EAEU members, particularly Kazakhstan. On January 30, Iranian First Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref visited Almaty to attend a meeting of EAEU prime ministers. He also held bilateral talks with Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov, focusing on expanding trade, economic, agricultural, transport, and logistics cooperation. According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade and Integration, in the first eleven months of 2024, trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Iran reached $296 million, an 8.1% increase compared to the same period in 2023. Kazakhstan’s exports to Iran rose by 29.1% to $100.6 million. Bektenov described Iran as a friendly neighbor in the Caspian region and emphasized Kazakhstan’s interest in diversifying and increasing exports to Iran. The country has identified 60 types of goods worth over $132 million for potential export and is prepared to meet Iran’s demand for grain products, including wheat and barley. Expanding Transport and Logistics Cooperation Discussions also covered transport and logistics cooperation, with a focus on increasing cargo traffic along the North-South Corridor, which connects Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. Both sides expressed interest in expanding transit capacity and modernizing key port terminals in Kazakhstan (Aktau and Kuryk) and Iran (Anzali and Amirabad). The Iranian Vice President stressed the geographic and economic importance of the Iran-Kazakhstan partnership and reaffirmed both countries’ commitment to increasing bilateral trade to $3 billion annually.

Bilateral Relations Bilateral Trade Russia Iran

Exploring What’s Behind Iran’s Push in Tajikistan

As Turkey increases its influence among Turkic Central Asian nations, Tajikistan – the only Persian-speaking country in the region – is looking to Iran as a potential strategic partner. Dushanbe is aiming to significantly strengthen bilateral ties with Tehran, hoping that such a move will have a positive impact on its economy; but what are the Islamic Republic’s interests in Tajikistan? On January 15, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian paid an official visit to Dushanbe, where he met with his Tajik counterpart Emomali Rahmon. The fact that he led a delegation of the Iranian business community suggests that Tehran plans to increase its economic presence in the landlocked Central Asian state. In 2024, the two nations increased their trade volume by nearly 50% compared to 2023. The problem, however, is that their total trade turnover reached “only” $378 million, which is rather modest compared to the $1,12 billion trade volume achieved by Tajikistan and Russia in the first seven months of 2024. From 1995 to 2013, the Islamic Republic actively invested in the economy of Tajikistan, which led to the construction of the Sangtuda-2 Hydroelectric Power Plant and the tunnel at the Anzob Pass. However, between 2013-2021, economic relations between Tehran and Dushanbe deteriorated significantly. Now, Tajikistan hopes to see more Iranian investments in its economy. "Trade and the economy are among the priority areas of our bilateral relations. We voiced our interest in developing investment cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Rahmon said at a press conference after talks with Pezeshkian. As a result of their summit, Tajikistan and Iran significantly deepened their bilateral ties by signing 23 memoranda of understanding in sectors such as trade, energy, infrastructure, cultural exchange, and security. Since Daler Juma, Tajikistan's Minister of Energy and Water Resources attended the meeting between Tajik and Iranian delegations, it is almost certain that energy was one of the main topics that was discussed. For Dushanbe, it is crucial to secure funding for the completion of the Rogun Hydroelectric Power Plant, the Istiklol tunnel (also known as the Anzob Tunnel), where the Iranian company Farob is engaged in the construction, as well as a number of small and medium-sized projects. For Tehran, the economic aspect of cooperation with Tajikistan is undoubtedly very important, although it seems to have other ambitions in the Central Asian state as well. “Iran’s primary interest in Tajikistan is related to cultural and religious bonds, as it sees the country as part of its Persian-Iranian-Islamic civilization,” Fereshteh Sadeghi, a Tehran-based journalist who has worked with Iran's Press TV and Al Jazeera English, told The Times of Central Asia. In her view, by maintaining a good political relationship with Dushanbe, the Islamic Republic can significantly strengthen these cultural connections. “Tajiks speak Farsi, love Farsi literature, and are said to be able to recite poems by Persian or Farsi-speaking poets from memory more easily than Iranians themselves can,” she explained, pointing out that religious aspect also plays an important role in Tajik-Iranian relations. Although Tajikistan is...

Regional threats Regional Security Islam Taliban Afghanistan Iran Diplomacy Threats to central Asia Pakistan

Afghanistan as Part of Central Asia: Expectations, Reality, Challenges, and Threats

Afghanistan has increasingly been regarded in expert and journalistic circles as part of Central Asia, which is justifiable from a physical-geographical perspective. However, given current regional realities, it is still premature to classify the country as part of Central Asia in terms of being internationally recognized as such. The outcome of the 19th-century rivalry between the British and Russian Empires for influence in Central Asia, known as the "Great Game," not only established the modern southern borders of the region but also set Afghanistan and its northern neighbors on entirely different social and historical paths. The countries differ in value systems, ideologies, public consciousness, and, of course, economic development. At the same time, experts from the Russian Institute for Central Asian Studies note that "In the early 21st century, approaches to analyzing regional realities shifted towards geo-economics. The spatial dimension of Central Asia began to be seen as a zone for pipeline transit." This perspective is hard to argue against — Afghanistan’s current geopolitical interests and challenges are largely tied to the economic interests of countries at the regional level. This includes India, Iran, China, the UAE, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, and the Central Asian states, for whom Afghanistan's prospects are evident. Chiefly, these prospects concern its transit potential as a territory connecting various parts of Asia. Four out of the six logistics corridors under the Asian Development Bank’s Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC) pass through Afghanistan into Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Other relevant projects include the "China–Pakistan Economic Corridor" under the "One Belt One Road" initiative, the "Trans-Afghan Corridor," and the TAPI Gas Pipeline. However, Afghanistan's current situation, particularly given the stagnant Afghan-Pakistani conflict, casts doubt on the feasibility of these and other major projects involving Afghanistan. As previously stated by TCA, the future of these large-scale projects involving Central Asian countries, as well as regional stability, a fundamental condition for steady economic development, depends directly on whether an understanding is reached between these two nations. Thus, a geo-economic approach to redefining Central Asia’s new boundaries still requires a different reality. Meanwhile, within Central Asia itself, there is little enthusiasm for political rapprochement with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The primary focus is on trade/economic and humanitarian cooperation, with no broader agenda, particularly at a regional level. Tajikistan’s position is significant here, as its authorities continue to view the Taliban as a threat and tread cautiously in building relations with them. What Prevents Central Asian Countries from Accelerating Relations with Afghanistan? The answers lie not only in different developmental trajectories and scenarios. First and foremost, Afghanistan is still associated with "uncertainty" and numerous risks, particularly in terms of security. According to many assessments, the Afghan-Pakistani zone will, in the long term, remain a source of terrorist and religious-extremist threats to Central Asia. These conclusions are based on a retrospective analysis of escalating tensions, current processes in Afghanistan, and the geopolitical confrontation of global powers in the area. For example, the Soviet invasion in 1979 fostered the consolidation of the Afghan mujahideen,...