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Anti-Migrant Wave Rises in Russia Following General’s Murder

Anti-migrant sentiment is intensifying in Russia following the murder of a high-ranking general, with calls from populist media outlets and bloggers urging the Kremlin to tighten its migration policies. Experts warn that this tension is likely to escalate. They argue that the Russian authorities are redirecting public frustration toward Central Asians as a means of improving domestic social stability. Anti-migrant rhetoric coming out of Russia is increasingly being wielded as a tool to exert leverage on Central Asian nations. General Kirillov Murder: Uzbeks Question Russian Narrative of Kurbonov's Arrest The recent arrest of an Uzbek citizen accused of committing a terrorist act - allegedly recruited by Ukrainian security services - has added fuel to the fire. This incident follows a long-standing pattern of discrimination against Central Asian labor migrants in Russia. In Uzbekistan, people are questioning the arrest in Moscow this week of 29-year-old courier Akhmadjon Kurbonov, who stands accused of murdering Russian general Igor Kirillov. The head of Russia's radiation, chemical, and biological defense forces, Kirillov was heavily involved in Russia's war with Ukraine. The media in Russia has claimed that Kurbonov carried out the assassination - and that of Kirillov's assistant Ilya Polikarpov - on behalf of the Ukrainian government in exchange for financial reward and residency in Europe. This version of events has sparked widespread debate in Uzbekistan. On social media, people have raised questions about the credibility of the allegations. Analyst Shuxrat Rasul described the accusation as “hard to believe.” On Facebook, Uzbek citizens such as Anvar Sagdullayev have questioned the narrative, commenting, “How can a man accused of murder appear so calm, as if reciting a prepared script? Perhaps this was orchestrated by interests closer to home.” Another Facebook user, Raimbergan Kuchkarov, speculated that internal conflicts are being stoked by using migrants as scapegoats. “The Russians themselves likely don’t know where their generals live. Why would a high-ranking officer be targeted by someone from Uzbekistan? This seems like a provocation,” Kuchkarov wrote. The case has also raised concerns among Uzbek immigrants in Russia, who fear that collective blame for the alleged actions of one individual may exacerbate prejudice and discrimination against their community. The Embassy of Uzbekistan in Russia has responded by stating that it is in contact with Russian law enforcement agencies and is working to verify details regarding the detained Uzbek citizen. On December 19, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held a phone conversation with Vladimir Putin to discuss bilateral and regional cooperation. The leaders highlighted the importance of close collaboration between their countries’ special services to combat security threats. The Kremlin noted that the discussion was initiated by the Uzbek side. During the call, Mirziyoyev expressed condolences for the deaths of General Kirillov and Polikarpov, condemning the attack as a “heinous act of terrorism.” Increasing Pressure The situation for migrants in Russia has worsened significantly since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Migrants have faced frequent raids, detentions, and the threat of deportation. Legislative changes have further tightened entry and residency rules....

Russia Export/Import Agriculture Economy Agricultural Export

Tomato Surplus in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan Amid Low Russian Demand

Greenhouse vegetable farmers in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are grappling with a significant oversupply of tomatoes due to a decline in demand from Russian buyers, according to analysts at EastFruit. Turkmenistan's greenhouse farmers are reporting extreme difficulties in selling their produce, with prices falling below $1 per kilogram. “Demand in the Russian market has dropped sharply, continuously exerting downward pressure on prices,” noted the EastFruit report. Turkmenistan has rapidly expanded its greenhouse farming sector in recent years, increasing production volumes of tomatoes. However, the sharp decline in Russian purchasing power is presenting a major challenge. Similarly, tomato prices in Uzbekistan have plummeted, averaging 32% lower than last year. Wholesale prices for red, round greenhouse tomatoes stand at $1.17 per kilogram for smaller quantities, with export prices similar to those in Turkmenistan. Despite these low prices, Uzbekistan often prioritizes exporting premium-quality tomatoes, which can fetch higher prices internationally than in the domestic market. Uzbek exporters have highlighted the negative impact of the depreciation of the Russian ruble and financial instability in Russia. These factors have complicated the export of greenhouse vegetables to one of the region's largest markets, exacerbating the difficulties faced by growers.

Russia's War migrants rights Criminal Responsibility Migrants Crime Migration Russia

Killing of Russian General Kirillov: Arrest of Uzbek Suspect Raises Fears Among Central Asians

In the early hours of Tuesday, December 17, an explosion occurred at the entrance of an apartment building in a modest Moscow district, killing two people: Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant. Kirillov was the head of the Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense (RCBD) troops of the Russian Armed Forces. A briefing by him had reportedly been scheduled for later that day. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced the arrest of a suspect: a 1995-born citizen of Uzbekistan. According to the FSB, the suspect was identified and detained through joint operations with Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Investigative Committee. According to investigators, the explosive device had been attached to an electric scooter parked near the building's entrance. Surveillance was allegedly conducted via a video camera placed inside a carshare vehicle parked nearby for several days. While the Ukrainian side has not officially claimed responsibility for the attack, some sources linked to Ukraine’s Security Service have reportedly done so. Russian officials quickly blamed Ukraine. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated, “The Kiev regime does not shy away from such methods,” without providing evidence. Soon after, Investigative Committee spokesperson Svetlana Petrenko claimed that the suspect had confessed to being recruited by Ukrainian special services, who allegedly promised him an EU passport and $100,000. However, a video of the confession released by the FSB raises doubts. The suspect, who appears to struggle with Russian, delivers statements that suggest he may not fully understand what he is saying. While the confession's credibility is unclear, the nationality of the suspect - another migrant from Central Asia - is what resonates most in the short term. The incident follows a previous terrorist attack at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, after which migrants from Central Asia faced intensified scrutiny. Over the past six months, many Central Asian workers living in Russia have felt treated not as second-class but as third-class citizens. Document checks, lengthy detentions, and increasingly restrictive rules for entry and residency in Russia have become commonplace. In August, Russia’s Interior Ministry reported that almost 92,800 foreign citizens were expelled in the first half of 2024 - a 53.2% increase compared to the same period in 2023. In response to the attack, nationalist groups and patriotic public figures are once again urging the Russian government to introduce a visa regime for Central Asian countries, particularly Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Similar measures have been observed in Turkey after the Crocus incident involving Tajik citizens, and in the UAE following a high-profile crime involving Uzbek nationals. It is highly likely that anti-migrant sentiment in Russia will intensify in the coming months. Coupled with increased security operations, this trend could escalate into new forms of repression targeting migrants. Such measures are likely to strain Russia's relations with Central Asian republics, where the treatment of migrant workers remains a sensitive issue.

Rosatom Russia Mining Uranium Resource Management Nuclear Energy

Rosatom Exits Key Uranium Ventures in Kazakhstan Amid Strategic Shifts

Uranium One Group, a subsidiary of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom. has announced its withdrawal from uranium projects in Kazakhstan. This decision coincides with Kazakhstan’s ongoing selection of operators for a consortium tasked with constructing the country’s first nuclear power plant. According to Kazatomprom (KAP), Uranium One Group has sold its 49.979% stake in the Zarechnoye joint venture to SNURDC Astana Mining Company Limited. The ultimate beneficiary of the acquiring party is China’s State Nuclear Uranium Resources Development Co., Ltd. Kazatomprom retains its 49.979% stake in the venture. The Zarechnoye joint venture, operational since its discovery in 1977, extracts uranium from the Zarechnoye deposit in Kazakhstan’s Turkestan region. As of early 2024, the deposit holds approximately 3,500 tons of uranium ore, with mining operations expected to conclude by 2028. In addition, Uranium One Group is set to divest its 30% stakes in the Khorasan-U and Kyzylkum joint ventures to China Uranium Development Company Limited, a subsidiary of China General Nuclear Power Corporation (CGN). The transaction awaits the completion of closing procedures. Kazatomprom’s share in these ventures remains unchanged, with 50% ownership in Khorasan-U and a 50% indirect interest in Kyzylkum. Khorasan-U operates in the Zhanakorgan district of the Kyzylorda region, mining uranium from the Khorasan-1 section of the North Khorasan deposit. This deposit contains reserves of approximately 33,000 tons of uranium as of 2024, with mining projected to continue until 2038. Meanwhile, Kyzylkum focuses on processing uranium from Khorasan-U but does not hold subsoil usage rights, restricting its activities to processing. Kazatomprom has prioritized replenishing its mineral resource base, recently securing four new licenses for uranium exploration. These areas are estimated to contain over 180,000 tons of uranium, which Kazatomprom plans to develop independently. In November 2023, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources reported environmental violations at the Zarechnoye joint venture. Soil samples revealed excessive concentrations of sulfuric acid, prompting authorities to issue directives for remediation. Kazakh political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev highlighted that Kazatomprom oversees 14 subsidiaries, including joint ventures with Japan, France, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and China. These partnerships underscore Kazakhstan’s significant role in the global uranium market. China and Russia remain the largest importers of Kazakh uranium. From January to October 2023, Kazakhstan exported $2.46 billion worth of uranium, with $922.7 million going to China and $1.2 billion to Russia. Several nations are vying for inclusion in the consortium that will construct Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant. During a state visit to Kazakhstan, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized Rosatom’s advanced nuclear technologies. Valentina Matvienko, Speaker of Russia’s Federation Council, underscored Kazakhstan’s interest in Rosatom’s involvement. However, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has yet to finalize the decision. Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister, Almasadam Satkaliyev, has recently visited South Korea, France, and China to explore nuclear energy partnerships. Political analyst Gaziz Abishev affirmed this diplomatic outreach as a strategic effort to secure the most advantageous terms for Kazakhstan, ensuring that competing nations present their best proposals.

International Finance US sanctions Infrastructure Development EU Sanctions Sanctions Russia

U.S. Sanctions on Gazprombank Put Uzbekistan’s $4.8 Billion Copper Ambitions at Risk

Uzbekistan faces a significant economic challenge as U.S. sanctions on Russia’s Gazprombank disrupt the $4.8 billion Yoshlik mine expansion project. The project, managed by state-owned Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Combine (MMC), is critical to Uzbekistan’s plan to nearly double its copper production by 2026, according to The Diplomat. However, with Gazprombank now excluded from the international payments system, the project’s financing is at risk. The Russian Government directly owns 36.44% of Gazprombank's capital. Financing Challenges The Yoshlik mine expansion aims to increase copper output by 78% and gold production by 50%, making it a cornerstone of Uzbekistan’s economic development strategy. However, Almalyk MMC’s reliance on Gazprombank leaves it vulnerable to delays and potential secondary sanctions. This situation exacerbated earlier difficulties after U.S. and EU sanctions in 2022 suspended an $800 million tranche from Russian development bank VEB.RF, another key financial backer. Almalyk MMC must now urgently secure alternative financing to keep the project on track. Russia’s Role in Uzbekistan’s Economy Russia remains Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner, and remittances from Uzbek workers in Russia account for 18% of Uzbekistan’s GDP. Russia’s involvement in the Yoshlik project began in 2021 when Gazprombank and VEB.RF pledged $2 billion to finance mining equipment purchases. Impact on European and British Partners The Yoshlik project also involves significant participation from European and British firms: Germany: Engineering firms such as Thyssenkrupp have supplied critical equipment. Germany’s KfW IPEX-Bank recently arranged $2.55 billion in financing for the project. However, U.S. sanctions on Gazprombank could create legal and logistical hurdles, putting pressure on Germany’s government to reassess its support for exports to Uzbekistan. United Kingdom: The UK has taken a complex position. While it sanctioned Gazprombank in 2014, British firms, including Weir Group, remain involved in the project. In 2024, the U.K.’s export credit agency guaranteed a refinancing deal through Spain’s Santander Bank, reflecting the mine’s importance to British exporters. As reported by TCA, earlier this week, the UK Export Finance (UKEF) guaranteed a €12.6 million ($13.25 million) loan to the Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex to refinance the purchase of fully automated vehicles. Urgency for Alternative Financing For Uzbekistan, securing alternative sources of funding is critical. Almalyk MMC must navigate a challenging sanctions landscape while keeping the Yoshlik project on schedule. Failure to do so could not only isolate the company but also hinder Uzbekistan’s broader economic goals, particularly its ambitions to expand its mining sector and boost foreign investment.

Russia Digital Service visas Digitalization Legislation Tourism

Citizens of Turkmenistan Can Apply for Simplified Entry to Russia

Citizens of Turkmenistan are now eligible to apply for a single-entry electronic visa (e-visa) to travel to Russia. This opportunity became available following an order by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, which expanded the list of countries eligible for simplified entry. The list now includes 64 countries, with Turkmenistan among the latest additions. The e-visa allows entry to Russia for purposes such as tourism, business, humanitarian activities, or visiting relatives and friends. The application process is conducted online through the official portal of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Notably, applicants are not required to provide invitations, hotel bookings, or additional documentation justifying the purpose of their travel.