Uranium - The Times Of Central Asia

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Banking

Kazakhstan’s Banking System and the Logic of Early Enforcement

Kazakhstan’s growth model depends on uninterrupted access to international finance. Because its largest energy and mining projects rely on foreign capital, hard-currency financing, and offshore banking channels, confidence in the integrity of its banking system is not just a regulatory issue; it is a macroeconomic constraint. This reliance is structural. Export revenues are concentrated in globally-priced commodities—especially oil (up to 60% of total exports in recent years), and uranium (40%+ of global output)—linking fiscal stability directly to hard-currency liquidity and correspondent banking access. In that context, correspondent banking is a systemic requirement underpinning international payments and trade. Because international banks incorporate sanctions exposure and AML/CFT risk into their assessments, adverse risk perceptions can trigger de-risking behavior that raises costs and slows flows. Astana is now courting U.S. and European investment in multibillion-dollar initiatives, including the Trans-Caspian/Middle Corridor and projects related to rare earth and critical minerals supply chains. This further increases Kazakhstan’s exposure to Western compliance standards and regulatory scrutiny. With a growth model heavily driven by foreign capital, Kazakhstan understands that perceived weaknesses in banking system compliance would not halt investment outright, but would translate into higher funding costs and reduced appetite in international capital markets. Sanctions Exposure After 2022: Structural, Not Tactical Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sharply increased Kazakhstan’s exposure to global sanctions enforcement. Geography, membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, and dense trade and infrastructure ties with Russia made Kazakhstan a focal point for concerns over re-exports and sanctions leakage. At the same time, its border with China—an important source of dual-use goods—has added another layer of scrutiny, even as reporting later showed that China-origin cargo bound for Russia was, in documented cases, routed without physically entering Kazakhstan, despite being linked to it in trade flows. Western sanctions reshaped logistics faster than enforcement capacity could adapt. Restrictions on shipping, insurance, and financial services increased reliance on overland transit routes through Central Asia, drawing attention to Kazakhstan, even where violations were difficult to substantiate. Western investigations later showed that EU-origin dual-use goods continued to reach Russia through intermediary channels, underscoring enforcement gaps beyond Kazakhstan itself. For Kazakhstan, however, heightened scrutiny translated directly into financial risk, regardless of intent. In the logic of global compliance, perception can be as consequential as proof. Early Intervention as Risk Management Since 2022, Kazakhstan’s response has evolved from declaratory neutrality to early, containment-oriented enforcement. This shift has been driven less by foreign-policy alignment than by a calculation that even isolated violations can carry disproportionate financial consequences. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has repeatedly emphasized that sanctions violations carry direct economic consequences for Kazakhstan, warning in public remarks that non-compliance could expose the country to secondary sanctions affecting trade, finance, and investment flows. By framing compliance as a matter of macroeconomic risk management rather than geopolitical positioning, the government signaled that enforcement would prioritize financial stability over short-term commercial convenience. That logic has translated into practice. When Western sanctions were imposed on Sberbank in 2022, Kazakhstan approved the sale and restructuring of...

Uranium

Kazakhstan Increases State Control Over Uranium Industry

Kazakhstan has introduced significant amendments to its Subsoil Use Code, reinforcing the role of the national atomic company Kazatomprom in the uranium sector and tightening state control over exploration and production rights. Kazatomprom, the world’s largest uranium producer, accounted for approximately 21% of global primary uranium output in 2024. Signed into law by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on December 26, 2025, the amendments grant Kazatomprom priority rights to obtain exploration licenses in prospective areas, as well as the authority to reserve blocks containing uranium mineralization and deposits. If uranium is discovered within solid mineral blocks licensed to other subsoil users, those licenses may only be extended if the relevant blocks are returned to the State. Importantly, private subsoil users who discover uranium deposits within their licensed areas will not receive priority rights for uranium production. If Kazatomprom is awarded a new subsoil use agreement, any transfer of that agreement is now limited to entities in which the company holds a direct or indirect stake of over 75%. This is a marked tightening from the previous threshold of 50%. These changes apply only to newly issued agreements and do not retroactively affect existing ones. Extensions of existing subsoil use agreements or increases in approved production volumes and reserves, are now permitted only if Kazatomprom holds at least a 90% stake in the joint venture. As an alternative, foreign partners may fulfill this condition by transferring uranium conversion and enrichment technologies to Kazatomprom or to a jointly established legal entity. Such transfers must include the construction of a processing facility and a guaranteed offtake contract covering at least 50% of its output over the life of the extended agreement. The revised legislation also expands the grounds for early termination of subsoil use agreements. These now include the depletion of uranium reserves and failure to meet obligations related to Kazatomprom’s ownership share or the required transfer of nuclear fuel cycle technologies. Additionally, the exclusive right to conduct further exploration at existing uranium deposits is reserved for Kazatomprom or entities in which it holds at least a 90% stake. The strengthened regulatory framework is widely seen as part of Kazakhstan’s strategy to assert greater state control over its uranium sector, as the country seeks to grow its presence in global nuclear fuel markets, particularly in Asia and Europe and advance domestic plans to build a nuclear power plant. In contrast, the same legal amendments introduced a more investor-friendly contract regime for hydrocarbon exploration and production in underexplored territories, as previously reported by The Times of Central Asia. According to the World Nuclear Association, Kazakhstan holds approximately 14% of the world’s uranium resources and produced about 23,270 tons of uranium in 2024. The country became the leading global uranium producer in 2009 and currently accounts for over 40% of worldwide output. Of Kazakhstan’s 13 uranium mining projects, three are wholly owned by Kazatomprom, while the remaining 10 are joint ventures with foreign partners. In 2024, Kazatomprom’s share of national uranium production totaled 12,286 tons.

Uranium

IAEA Extends Central Asia Uranium Cleanup Plan Through 2030

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has released a new Strategic Master Plan extending its cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, alongside international partners, for the remediation of uranium legacy sites in Central Asia through 2030, according to World Nuclear News. Central Asia served as a key uranium source for the former Soviet Union, with mining and processing conducted over more than 50 years. In addition to local production, uranium ore was imported for processing, leaving vast amounts of radioactive waste stored in tailings and mining dumps. Most sites were shut down by 1995, but limited remediation both pre- and post-closure, has left behind long-term environmental and public health risks, including the threat of groundwater and surface water contamination in agriculturally vital areas. Since 2012, the IAEA’s Coordination Group for Uranium Legacy Sites has supported Central Asian countries with expert missions, legal and regulatory framework development, and remediation strategies. In 2017, the IAEA, the European Commission, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the CIS Economic Council, and the governments of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan adopted a Strategic Master Plan. Published in May 2018, it identified seven former uranium sites as the highest priority, with initial remediation costs estimated at €85 million. A revised plan was signed in September 2021, and the most recent version was presented in Tashkent in October 2025. It emphasizes long-term monitoring, maintenance, recordkeeping, and ongoing engagement with local communities to ensure the safe reuse of remediated land. “The new plan, an extension of our collaboration since 2017, focuses on enhancing the regulatory, technical, financial, and human resources for the long-term management of the remediated sites, according to IAEA safety standards,” said Hildegarde Vandenhove, Director of the IAEA Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety. The updated plan puts the total cost of the Environmental Remediation Account programme at €113 million. This includes remediation work, project management, and contingencies. Since 2017, four of the seven high-priority sites have been fully remediated, two in Kyrgyzstan and two in Uzbekistan, while work continues at a fifth site in Kyrgyzstan. In Tajikistan, one site has been partially remediated, and another remains untouched. Lower-priority sites are also covered under the new plan, with some funding secured through bilateral agreements with Russia. Sardorbek Yakubekov, Deputy Chairman of Uzbekistan’s Industrial, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Committee, said the programme “stands as a vivid example of how the collective efforts of the international community… can yield tangible and lasting results.” As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia last December, Tajikistan still faces tens of millions of tons of radioactive waste from Soviet-era uranium mining, highlighting both the scale of the challenge and the critical need for sustained international support.

Energy Policy

Tokayev Calls Nuclear Power a Correction of Kazakhstan’s “Historical Absurdity”

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has described Kazakhstan’s push to build nuclear power plants as a correction of a “historical absurdity”, namely, that a nation which ranks among the world’s top producers and exporters of uranium has yet to harness this resource for domestic electricity generation. In October 2024, a nationwide referendum showed broad public support for the development of nuclear energy. Following the vote, Tokayev announced plans to construct at least two nuclear power plants, with a third to follow. In June 2025, Russian state corporation Rosatom was selected to build the country’s first nuclear power plant near the village of Ulken, on the western shore of Lake Balkhash, about 400 kilometers northwest of Almaty. Contracts for the second and third plants were later signed with the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). “The construction of several nuclear power plants is, on the one hand, a correction of the historical absurdity – to be a world leader in the production of uranium and not to build any nuclear power plants, on the other, it is the prestige of Kazakhstan,” Tokayev said in an interview with Turkistan newspaper, published on the official Akorda website. According to Tokayev, reliable electricity generation is essential for Kazakhstan’s transition to a new technological model of the economy. He emphasized that the development of supercomputers, data centers, and automated industrial systems requires substantial energy resources. “This is the reality of the new global technological order,” he stated. Tokayev has consistently argued that Kazakhstan must become a digital power, framing digitalization as a matter of national survival. He believes society is mentally prepared for innovation, citing the success of fintech companies and the expansion of digital government services. “We have good starting conditions and have made progress in the digitalization of public services, fintech, and several sectors of the economy. The ecosystem supporting IT startups is functioning effectively,” the president noted. He added that for continued progress, Kazakhstan requires stable, environmentally friendly, and high-capacity energy sources, needs best met by nuclear power. Tokayev also highlighted the importance of personnel in building a nuclear energy sector. He said the development of nuclear power will contribute to the emergence of a new class of technical intelligentsia, which could ultimately influence state policy. “Qualified specialists are needed to create modern energy sources. The head of NVIDIA, the world's largest company by market capitalization, predicts that in the near future, multimillionaires will include representatives of technical professions, the so-called ‘blue-collar workers’,” Tokayev said. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Kazakhstan plans to train nuclear energy specialists abroad through the Bolashak state program.

G20 Summit

Trump’s G20 Invitations: Why Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Matter

On December 23, President Donald Trump said he would invite Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to attend the United States–hosted 2026 G20 summit in Miami. The meeting is planned at Trump National Doral. The announcement followed separate telephone calls with Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, which Trump described as focused on peace and expanded trade, and cooperation. The G20 is a group of major economies, with membership based mainly on large nominal GDP and global economic importance, collectively representing about 85% of global GDP. Kazakhstan is ranked roughly 50th in the world by nominal GDP, at approximately $300 billion, while Uzbekistan is ranked around 62nd, with a nominal GDP of about $137–140 billion. According to Polish radio, the president of Poland stated that his country would also be on the guest list. Poland is the world’s 21st-largest economy. The G20 is a forum, not a treaty body. Leaders’ summits include member governments and a limited number of host-selected guest countries. Invitations to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan would place their leaders physically at the table with G20 heads of state, allowing them to be seen, heard, and recognized by other leaders, without conferring membership or a formal role in shaping the summit agenda. On average, the host invites six to seven guests. One official host-country explainer notes that guest invitations allow non-members to bring their own perspectives. For them, the significance of attending is access, not membership. What Washington Wants and What Can Be Transacted The host typically uses the guest invitations to signal which countries and regions they regard as priorities. U.S. interest in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan rests on an immediate material basis. The United States is rebuilding its nuclear-fuel supply chain away from Russian-origin material. Federal law now bans imports of certain Russian uranium products, with waivers terminating no later than January 1, 2028. U.S. agencies have been explicit that supply diversification is a policy objective. In 2024, Kazakhstan-origin material accounted for 24% of uranium delivered to U.S. owners and operators, while Uzbekistan-origin material accounted for about 9%. Kazakhstan’s structural advantage is scale and reliability. It remains the world’s leading uranium producer, with 2024 output around 23,270 metric tons of uranium and the largest share of global mine production. Astana has also signaled an interest in moving beyond extraction toward higher value-added fuel-cycle activity. Uzbekistan’s advantage is growth potential and its fit with Western joint-venture structures. Its uranium sector has attracted major external entrants, including Orano’s South Djengeldi joint venture Nurlikum Mining with the state partner Navoiyuran to develop a new mine alongside an Itochu (Japan) minority stake. The second instrument is the resource-focused diplomacy under the C5+1 umbrella. The State Department frames the C5+1 as organized around economy, energy, and security, within which framework it has elevated critical minerals to a dedicated track. The United States launched a C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue in early 2024, and subsequent U.S. statements have described it as a vehicle for geological exploration, mining, processing, and investment opportunities across the region. This...

Environment

Tajikistan Struggles to Fund Cleanup of Soviet-Era Uranium Waste

Tajikistan continues to grapple with the extensive environmental legacy of the Soviet-era uranium industry. Tens of millions of tons of radioactive waste still pose serious risks to human health and the environment. Addressing this legacy will require hundreds of millions of dollars and sustained international support. Uranium mining in Tajikistan began in the 1940s in areas including Taboshar, Adrasman, and nearby settlements. After mining operations were shut down, the country was left with abandoned mines, underground tunnels, and extensive tailings ponds containing more than 55 million tons of radioactive waste across an area exceeding 170 hectares. In 2023, partial rehabilitation work was completed in Taboshar, where 7.6 million tons of waste, representing 17.5 percent of the total, were remediated. The Tajik government has agreed to continue cooperation with Russia, which is expected to allocate approximately $17 million for the reclamation of selected facilities. However, the most hazardous areas remain unaddressed. These include early-stage Taboshar tailings ponds, underground workings, and the Degmai complex. International consultants Wismut GmbH, WISUTEC GmbH, and GEOS estimate that restoring the Taboshar facilities will require approximately $9.5 million, while reclamation of the Degmai tailings pond is expected to cost about $27 million. All of these sites are included in the International Atomic Energy Agency master plan and have been designated as funding priorities. Progress remains slow, largely due to limited financial resources. Despite some external support, current funding levels fall far short of what is required. To date, only 17 percent of contaminated sites have been decontaminated. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development special environmental rehabilitation account for Central Asia has yet to become fully operational. In 2025, the government approved a national rehabilitation program covering the 2025 to 2030 period. The plan includes legislative updates, project design, implementation, and ongoing monitoring. Preliminary estimates suggest Tajikistan will need more than $110 million by 2030 to complete its remediation objectives. Given the scale of the required investment, international financing remains essential. Tajikistan is working to transform its uranium legacy into a manageable and transparent project, but without sustained international partnership, the challenge is unlikely to be resolved.