• KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
11 October 2026

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 4158

Tajikistan Holds Fuel Talks With U.S. After Starting Imports From Iran

Tajikistan has discussed fuel supplies with the United States after beginning imports of petroleum products from Iran, whose oil sector is under U.S. sanctions. On October 8, Tajikistan's Minister of Energy and Water Resources Daler Juma met with Carson Relitz Rocker, chargé d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy, to discuss the country's petroleum supplies and other issues. Tajikistan depends almost entirely on imports of petroleum products. From January through September 2026, the country imported approximately 1.37 million metric tons of oil, petroleum products, liquefied gas, and related goods worth $1.13 billion. This included 333,200 metric tons of gasoline, 424,800 metric tons of diesel, and 321,300 metric tons of liquefied gas. Russia remains the country's main fuel supplier, accounting for more than half of its imports. It delivered approximately 708,000 metric tons worth $628.9 million over the nine-month period. Dushanbe purchases some of this fuel duty-free under intergovernmental agreements. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, accounts for a significant share of liquefied gas imports, supplying 225,600 metric tons worth $153.8 million. Imports of petroleum products from Iran totaled 15,600 metric tons worth $14.7 million over the nine-month period. In September, Tajikistan's Ministry of Energy and Water Resources confirmed that shipments of Iranian oil and petroleum products had begun in late August. The two sides had previously discussed potential purchases of up to 2.55 million metric tons annually, but this was a proposed volume rather than an existing contract. Tajikistan's authorities have not disclosed the exact composition of the shipments already received or how they were transported to the country. American restrictions cover Iran's oil sector and can affect international payments, insurance, and transportation. An official at the U.S. Department of the Treasury warned in comments to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in early October that companies operating in Iran's petroleum sector face sanctions risks, but declined to comment on specific possible violations. Washington has not publicly accused Tajikistan of breaching sanctions over the shipments. Separately, Tajikistan is preparing to host the third B5+1 Forum, bringing together business representatives and policymakers from the U.S. and the five Central Asian countries. The meeting is scheduled for April 20–21, 2027. It is being organized by the U.S.-based Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) in cooperation with Tajikistan's government. B5+1 complements C5+1, the diplomatic format between the same six countries, and is intended to address trade, investment, and barriers to doing business. Previous forums were held in Almaty in 2024 and Bishkek in February 2026. According to CIPE, more than 15 memorandums were signed between American companies and Central Asian partners at the meeting in the Kyrgyz capital. The forum is expected to build on discussions of critical minerals, transport, and digitalization. However, CIPE has not announced a detailed agenda for the Dushanbe meeting, and there is no indication that American fuel supplies will be discussed.

Central Asia and Azerbaijan Discuss Trade Expansion at Turkmenistan Summit

The leaders of Central Asia and Azerbaijan met in Turkmenistan on October 8, with expanding trade between their countries high on the agenda. Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for trade among the six countries to rise to at least $20 billion, up from approximately $13 billion in 2025. The eighth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan was held in the resort of Avaza, with Azerbaijan participating as a full member of the grouping for the first time. According to Tokayev, trade between the six countries accounted for just 8% of their combined trade turnover last year. He proposed that governments develop a joint action plan to increase that share. Other leaders put forward proposals for closer economic ties. Uzbekistan's President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for greater cooperation in manufacturing and a Central Asia-Azerbaijan Business Forum in 2027, while Kyrgyzstan's President Sadyr Japarov proposed creating a shared e-commerce platform to make regional products more accessible. One problem is the insufficient integration of national markets. Even where countries share a border, trade is hampered by logistical constraints and differences in business operating conditions. Tokayev proposed bringing existing and planned cross-border trade and logistics complexes and industrial centers into a single network. The idea is to enable businesses from different countries to sell finished products to one another and produce them jointly. However, Kazakhstan's major transport projects are not designed solely for its neighbors. Astana is investing in railways and highways to increase freight transit between China, Central Asia, and Europe. The projects include the Moyynty–Kyzylzhar, Darbaza–Maktaaral, and Bakhty–Ayagoz railway lines, as well as the Aral–Caspian highway project. The Middle Corridor holds a particularly important place in these plans, running from China through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to Europe. It allows freight to bypass Russian territory and is viewed as an alternative to traditional northern routes. Kazakhstan is now proposing to explore linking the Middle Corridor with the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a transport project through Armenia intended to connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan. Plans for the route were outlined during talks in Washington in August 2025, and Armenia and the United States signed a framework agreement in June 2026. The route is to remain under Armenian sovereignty and jurisdiction. Astana has already established a technical group to assess its potential participation in TRIPP. For now, Tokayev is proposing that the integration of the two transport initiatives be discussed only at the expert level. At the Avaza summit, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov emphasized the importance of developing North–South transport corridors alongside East–West routes. Turkmenistan also supports the eastern branch of the International North–South Transport Corridor, which connects Russia with Iran through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. However, an increase in freight traffic through Central Asia does not in itself mean that trade among its countries will grow. For that to happen, local producers need access to neighboring markets. The summit also addressed cooperation over shared water resources, with Tokayev proposing a regional framework...

West2West: Kazakhstan Adds a Regional Dimension to Trade with Afghanistan

In late September, a Kazakhstani official and business delegation led by Yerkin Tukumov, the Special Representative of the President of Kazakhstan for Afghanistan, visited Herat. The delegation included trade officials, representatives of the Mangystau and West Kazakhstan regions, and businesses. Officials called the new approach West2West, meaning cooperation between Kazakhstan's western regions and western Afghanistan. Kazakhstan and Afghanistan have held several business forums and exhibitions in recent years. However, the choice of Herat and the attempt to shift some cooperation from the intergovernmental to the interregional level make this initiative different. Since 2021, Kazakhstan’s economic dialogue with Afghanistan has developed mainly from the top down. The two governments set ambitious trade targets and sought to turn political engagement into commercial deals. The results looked impressive on paper. In October 2024, the two countries adopted a road map to raise mutual trade to $3 billion. In April 2025, documents worth $140 million were signed in Kabul, followed by 15 documents worth $303 million in Shymkent that October. Actual trade, however, grew much more slowly. In 2024, it totaled $545.2 million, while in 2025 it slipped slightly to $541.6 million. The $3 billion target remains more of a strategic benchmark than a near-term goal. According to official data from Kazakhstan, trade reached $581.1 million in January-July 2026, exceeding the total for the entire previous year. Kazakhstan’s exports accounted for $572.9 million, while imports from Afghanistan were just $8.2 million. Trade is therefore growing rapidly, but remains overwhelmingly one-sided. West2West is partly an attempt to broaden that relationship. Herat's Strategic Location Herat is one of Afghanistan’s main industrial and commercial centers, situated near several important transport routes. To the north is Torghundi, a rail border crossing with Turkmenistan. To the west runs the Khaf-Herat railway, which connects Afghanistan to Iran’s railway system. Herat could eventually become part of longer routes toward Kandahar and Pakistan, although much of the necessary infrastructure remains at the planning stage. During the September visit, officials opened a 43-kilometer section of the Khaf-Herat railway. Afghan sources estimate its cost at approximately $58 million. The section was built with the involvement of Kazakhstani company Integra Construction KZ. In August 2026, freight transported along the Khaf-Herat line totaled approximately 137,700 metric tons. Discussions have also focused on increasing its monthly capacity to 150,000 metric tons. Together with Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan has begun working on the Central Asia–South Asia railway project, which envisages a trans-Afghan connection to Pakistan’s ports. So far, the parties have agreed to conduct technical and economic studies, and no final route has been approved. The route through Turkmenistan is developing separately. Ashgabat views Torghundi-Herat as a joint project with Afghanistan linked to the expansion of the Serhetabat-Torghundi crossing and other infrastructure in western Afghanistan. Kazakhstan’s interest in Herat predates West2West. In 2023, Astana announced plans to establish a Kazakhstan Trade House in Afghanistan, with its main office in Herat. It opened in May 2024. Arman Yessentayev, its head, described Herat in 2023 as a...

Farewell to Russia: An Interview with Joe Luc Barnes on Central Asia’s Changing Role

In Moscow, before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Joe Luc Barnes met residents who distrusted their government but believed its assurances that war was not coming. The shock that followed opens his book, Farewell to Russia: A Journey Through the Former USSR. Barnes, a journalist, editor and contributor to The Times of Central Asia, has visited all 15 former Soviet republics since February 2022. His book explores how people have built their lives since independence, and how deeply Russia remains woven into them. Speaking to TCA, Barnes recalls meeting rural residents in Central Asia who were more supportive of Russia than their urban, Russian-speaking counterparts. He also reflects on why Russia remains a destination for young people seeking opportunities, despite the discrimination many face there. TCA: At the start of the book, you describe Muscovites’ conviction that Russia would not invade Ukraine. What sustained that certainty, and how did people respond when events shattered it? Joe Luc Barnes: I think it was mainly down to people not wanting to believe it. The amazing thing is that Muscovites (and Russians at large, in my experience) are fully aware that their government is full of crooks whom they wouldn’t trust with anything, but simultaneously most of them are in lockstep with the Kremlin’s foreign policy position. The war started just as Russia was trying to get the country vaccinated against Covid. In the end, the government struggled to persuade even 50% of people to have a single dose of the vaccine, but meanwhile those same people were sure the Kremlin was telling the truth when it said that its soldiers were massing on Ukraine’s borders as part of “routine exercises”. When the war did begin and that illusion collapsed, the main reaction was shock. For the first few days, there was a kind of numbness over the city. Many people had friends or relatives in Ukraine; others were stunned that something they had been denying had actually come to pass. Many in their 20s or 30s were disgusted with their government and began to look for a way out of the country. But people were generally focused on looking after themselves – worrying about things like finances, getting money out of their bank accounts, things like that. I think there was also a belief among many that it would be a short war. When I left Russia in March 2022, I don’t think I, or anyone around me, expected the war to still be raging four and a half years later. [caption id="attachment_58058" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Lenin still stands in Bishkek, though not on his original plinth. Image: Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] TCA: Your title suggests a departure from Russia. Where in Central Asia did that feel most real, and where did everyday life complicate the idea? Joe Luc Barnes: I think in urban Central Asia, you can often feel like you’re in a Russian city. People speak Russian, you get around using Yandex Taxi, your mobile provider is Beeline, and architecturally you still...

Uzbekistan Tourism Plan Targets Caves and a Salt Mine

Uzbekistan has approved a plan to develop nine caves and a salt mine for tourism. The program announced by the Tourism Committee on October 5 covers development work through 2028 at sites in Jizzakh, Samarkand, Surkhandarya, and Kashkadarya. Alongside work on visitor routes, regional authorities are to help nearby residents establish family guesthouses, while local guides will be able to take specialist training courses. Travel and tourism contributed $8.3 billion to Uzbekistan’s economy in 2025, equivalent to 6% of GDP, according to World Travel & Tourism Council estimates. Annual forums for domestic and foreign investors are planned from 2027 to attract private funding. Boybuloq in southern Surkhandarya, one of the selected caves, has deep shafts and water-filled passages that make exploration technically demanding. Under the September 30 government resolution, the Ministry of Emergency Situations has three months to draft rules for visits, and a certification system for guides and instructors is due in June 2027. Among the other sites is Teshiktosh in the same region, where the discovery of a Neanderthal child’s remains in 1938 established the cave’s archaeological importance. Construction at sites with cultural heritage status will require approval from the Cultural Heritage Agency, while work in protected natural areas must be cleared by environmental authorities. Khojaikon, the selected salt mine in Sherabad district, has salt-coated galleries leading to an observation deck overlooking the Surkhandarya mountains. The roadmap sets April 2027 as the deadline for approving tourist routes. The completed visitor infrastructure is scheduled to enter service in January 2029.

Uzbekistan’s Centrum Air Apologizes After Uzbek-Language Dispute

Uzbekistan's Centrum Air has apologized to a passenger removed from a flight after a dispute over his request to be addressed in Uzbek. The airline initially accused the man of aggressive behavior but later acknowledged that the flight attendant had been at fault. The incident occurred on October 5 during boarding for flight C6468 from Samara to Tashkent. Daryo reported that a passenger named Komiljon had asked a flight attendant to speak to him in Uzbek after she requested his boarding pass in Russian. According to Komiljon, an argument followed, and the captain refused to allow him to travel. In an October 5 statement, Centrum Air disputed his account, alleging that he had behaved aggressively and insulted the flight attendant. It said he had disrupted boarding and defended the captain's decision on safety grounds. The airline also said it was considering contacting law enforcement. Komiljon denied insulting the employee. Centrum Air said its flight attendants speak Uzbek, Russian, and English and can communicate with passengers in their preferred language. Komiljon traveled from Samara to Moscow before taking another flight to Tashkent, incurring additional expenses. Following a review, senior airline executive Ma'murjon Mamadaliyev acknowledged that the flight attendant had been wrong and had admitted her mistake. He said the airline would cover the passenger's additional travel costs. In a later video, the flight attendant apologized to Komiljon in Uzbek, according to Batafsil.uz. Komiljon accepted the apology and said that he had received compensation. The airline's later statement did not clarify whether it had withdrawn its original allegations about the passenger's behavior.