• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09687 0.21%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09687 0.21%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09687 0.21%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09687 0.21%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09687 0.21%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09687 0.21%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09687 0.21%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09687 0.21%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
19 May 2025

Tajikistan Decriminalizes Likes and Other Reactions to Provocative Social Media Posts

Tajik citizens need no longer fear that they will be imprisoned for clicking “like” on social media posts that the Tajik authorities do not like.

Among several laws that Tajik President Emomali Rahmon signed on May 14 was one that decriminalized liking posts on social networks that originate from individuals or organizations the Tajik government considers extremist.

Crackdown on Social Media

In 2018, President Rahmon signed amendments to Article 179 of the Criminal Code, making it a crime to repost, comment favorably on, or like posts that, in the opinion of Tajik authorities, are public calls to commit or justify acts of violence and terrorism. According to that law, those found guilty of liking such posts face up to 15 years in prison. Since the law came into effect, 1,507 Tajik citizens have been imprisoned.

The Tajik authorities often have a broad interpretation of what constitutes public calls to commit or justify serious crimes or acts of terrorism, but it usually boils down to comments that are critical of the Tajik government.

Weeks after the law was passed, Alijon Sharipov, a resident of the Vakhsh district in Tajikistan’s southern Khatlon Region, was sentenced to 9.5 years in prison for reposting a video of an interview with the leader of the banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, Muhiddin Kabiri. In July 2019, Ibrohim Kosimov from the western Tajik city of Panjakent received the same prison sentence for “pushing ‘likes’ and ‘shares’ on the posts belong[ing] to opposition figures.”

An activist of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Rustam Mamajonov, was sentenced to seven years in prison in June 2021 for reposting a video of Sharofiddin Gadoyev, a leader of the banned organization, Group 24. Mamajonov, who was 59 years old at the time, said he did not know how the video appeared on his Facebook page and the repost was a mistake caused by his poor knowledge of how to use the platform.

Tajik political activist Abdullo Shamsiddin was deported from Germany back to Tajikistan in January 2023 and was convicted weeks later in March of sedition and sentenced to seven years in prison. Shamsiddin’s trial was held behind closed doors and it was difficult to obtain details about the case, but apparently, he was convicted for clicking “like” on a social network post, though there is no information about what was in the post.

Shamsiddinov’s case shows the social network use of Tajik citizens who are outside Tajikistan is also being monitored by Tajik authorities.

A Strange Change of Heart

The reasons for the decision to decriminalize “posting a like or other sign on social networks,” as it officially reads in the law Rahmon signed, is unclear.

Certainly, rights groups have called on the Tajik authorities to overturn the decision to criminalize likes, comments, or reposts of what to the Tajik government are undesirable posts on social networks. However, for years Tajikistan’s government has ignored appeals from rights organizations, the United Nations, and individual governments over the Tajik authorities’ rights abuses.

A more likely explanation is fear that the people being sent to prison for liking or reposting material on social networks are being radicalized by genuine extremists or Islamic radicals who are incarcerated in the same prisons. It might have occurred to some Tajik officials that people being imprisoned on dubious charges related to their social network usage could leave prison as hardened criminals.

Whatever the reasons, in October 2024, President Rahmon criticized law enforcement agencies for groundlessly arresting people for likes on social media posts and called for “this practice to end.”

Tajikistan’s parliament finally took up the issue in April this year, passing the legislation that Rahmon signed in May.

Amnestied, Exonerated, or Retrial?

While revoking the law on reactions to social media posts seems to free Tajik citizens from worries about liking or otherwise responding to provocative – in the eyes of the government – posts, there are still more than 1,500 people in Tajik prisons for violating the now revoked law. There is speculation they could be given an amnesty. Others believe they will have to file appeals against their convictions and go through a court process before they can be freed.

No one has spoken about whether their convictions will be annulled, and the records of those convicted would be cleared, meaning they could be released, but their records would still show they had been imprisoned. That could make finding employment difficult in the future.

The issue of compensation for being imprisoned under a law that was later revoked is not even being raised.

While the changes to Article 179 remove criminal liability for likes and reactions on social media, there are still laws on joining or supporting extremist or terrorist groups. The Tajik government often views Tajik opposition parties and movements and religious organizations acting without clear state approval as falling into the categories of extremist or terrorist groups.

Tajik citizens have learned to be careful about what they post on social media networks, and they would be well advised to continue exercising caution despite the official lifting of criminal liability for social media reactions.

Astana International Forum: Not Just Another Davos

Kazakhstan’s Astana International Forum (AIF) has quietly entered a new phase in its development. Set to convene again this month, it began in 2008 as a targeted economic forum. Over time it has gradually evolved into a broader diplomatic platform aspiring to serve the so-called “Global South” as a whole. The AIF seeks to offer a deliberately open space for structured yet flexible dialogue across economic, political, and security domains, in a world full of international gatherings either overdetermined by legacy institutions or narrowly focused on crisis response.

The AIF does not model itself on any existing institution. It is meant neither to replicate global summits nor to impose consensus, nor to replace regional blocs or legacy mechanisms. Rather, it reflects Kazakhstan’s own diplomatic philosophy — what President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev calls “multi-vector foreign policy” — seeking to extend this philosophy outward through a forum that prioritizes engagement over alignment and dialogue over doctrine.

The AIF’s early period, from 2008 through roughly 2015, was defined by foundational work. Then called the Astana Economic Forum, it brought together central bankers, financial policymakers, and development agencies. The scope was technocratic, focusing on macroeconomic modernization and public-sector reform. Even in this limited format, however, the initiative revealed Kazakhstan’s national aspiration to connect with wider global trends in institutional development and governance.

Those formative years correspond to what, in terms of complex-systems theory, might be called the Forum’s phase of “emergence”: a period of assembling functions, testing formats, and learning the rhythms of international convening. These years were not marked by geopolitical ambition, but they did set in motion a process of institutional self-recognition. Kazakhstan was not just hosting events; it was experimenting with a type of global presence that would grow more distinct in later years.

From 2015 to 2022, the Forum entered a more self-defining stage. It retained its core economic focus, but it increasingly attracted participants from beyond financial and development sectors. This broadened its scope to include questions of connectivity, regional stability, and sustainable development. The shift was not an accident. It accompanied Kazakhstan’s growing involvement in regional diplomacy and its active participation in a range of other multilateral structures.

During this second period, the Forum took on the character of an institution with internal momentum. (This is what complex-systems theorists might term “autopoiesis,” i.e., the ability of a system to reproduce and maintain itself.) By adapting to a wider field of participants and issues, the AIF began to articulate a mission no longer limited to showcasing Kazakhstan’s domestic reforms but extending toward the creation of new transnational linkages. The rebranding of the old Astana Economic Forum as the Astana International Forum affirmed this shift in mandate, scope, and ambition.

That rebranding marked the beginning of what now appears to be a critical inflection point. The cancellation of the 2024 edition due to catastrophic flooding created a rupture; but the organizers, rather than rush a replacement, deferred the Forum and used the intervening time to clarify its structure and message. The thematic architecture of the 2025 edition has been streamlined, reducing four policy tracks to three: Foreign Policy and International Security, Energy and Climate Change, and Economy and Finance.

The AIF shares thematic ground with other Global South initiatives, but its structural logic differs. Probably the UN-led South-South Cooperation Forum (SSCF) has the most in common with it. Like the AIF, the SSCF functions as a coordination mechanism for development partnerships; however, it is embedded within multilateral architecture and guided by established institutional mandates. It also differs from the AIF through its emphasis on technical capacity-building and policy harmonization.

By contrast, the AIF is not development-focused and not multilateral in the traditional sense. It does not implement frameworks; rather, it constructs spaces wherein frameworks may emerge. It is not procedural like the SSCF, but instead diplomatic. It is driven less by an operational agenda than by the search to prototype new modes of cross-regional engagement. One may say that whereas the SSCF presumes a normative grammar rooted in shared postcolonial trajectories, the AIF seeks instead to write a new syntax of cooperation for a fragmenting international order. It is, in this sense, not a derivative platform but a generative one.

The new reconfiguration of the AIF’s agenda is more than logistical. It signals a willingness to redesign the Forum’s internal logic in response to changing global conditions. Its 2025 vision statement explicitly acknowledges the current global environment as one of “unprecedented complexity,” calling for actionable collaboration that “transcends borders and sectors.” The AIF has thus begun to address the demands for “organizational antifragility,” the threshold phase where any institution must reconfigure and reorient itself for new tasks and new relevance, or else risk stagnation.

The Forum’s new mission leans into that challenge with pragmatic optimism. It describes itself as a space where “vision meets action,” aiming to “reignite multilateralism” and to catalyze a movement toward “future-focused” solutions. The AIF’s expanded topical scope now includes climate action, technological innovation, sustainable development, and supply-chain resilience. These adjustments reflect the growing confidence of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, which sees in the Forum not only a convening tool but a projection of national strategy into a shared international format.

To say that the AIF is not the World Economic Forum (WEF) is not to denigrate it. Such a comparison would simply miss the point. The WEF seeks mainly to reinforce global economic consensus and convene elite stakeholders from advanced industrialized systems. The AIF, by contrast, is a diplomatic instrument shaped by a mid-sized country offering a venue that intentionally includes underrepresented states and perspectives. It does not aim to replace existing institutions but to complement them with a platform more attuned to the network-distributed complexities of the contemporary world.

The AIF’s distinctiveness lies in its state-led but non-hegemonic structure. It is both sovereign and collaborative, national in origin but multilateral in aspiration. This is why it resonates with parts of the Global South that find few opportunities for serious, non-aligned dialogue across sectoral and ideological lines. Kazakhstan’s ambition with the AIF is to create a reliable convening node for political, business, and academic voices that otherwise lack a coherent shared venue.

What happens next depends not only on the Forum’s thematic continuity, but also on its institutional maturation. Will it develop memory, procedures, and expectations that persist beyond annual meetings? Will it build partnerships that last across cycles of participation? Will it decide to convene only every other year and, if so, how will it use the intervening year to prepare outcomes and strengthen effectiveness? If Kazakhstan succeeds in making the AIF more durable in these respects, it may well enter a new phase of evolution, in which Kazakhstan adds to its diplomatic profile the capacity to design international norms.

Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal Could Impact Kazakhstan’s Water Security

The construction of the Qosh-Tepa Canal in Afghanistan and its potential implications for Central Asia’s water security were central topics at the recent international conference, Water Security and Transboundary Water Use: Challenges and Solutions, held in Astana. Delegates from Turkey, Israel, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan convened to address the canal’s possible repercussions and broader issues of regional water distribution.

Potential Threats to the Syr Darya

Kazakhstan’s Deputy Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, Aslan Abdraimov, warned that the Qosh-Tepa Canal could significantly reduce the flow of the Syr Darya River, with direct consequences for the already depleted Aral Sea. While Kazakhstan does not share a border with Afghanistan, the canal’s impact is expected to ripple across the region.

“No sharp fluctuations in water resources are expected in the near term, but in the long term, a reduction in the Syr Darya’s flow is inevitable,” Abdraimov stated. He emphasized that this would further strain the fragile water balance in the Aral Sea basin.

The Aral Sea’s degradation has been ongoing for decades, largely due to the diversion of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers for agricultural use, primarily for irrigating cotton and wheat fields. These diversions have contributed heavily to the sea’s dramatic shrinkage.

Azamatkhan Amirtayev, chairman of Kazakhstan’s Baytak Party, expressed concern that the Qosh-Tepa Canal could divert 25-30% of the Amu Darya’s flow. “This means that Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan will receive less water. Consequently, Uzbekistan may draw more from the Syr Darya, leading to reduced water availability for Kazakhstan, potentially by 30-40%,” Amirtayev said. He urged for regional cooperation and scientifically informed policymaking to mitigate water losses.

The Qosh-Tepa Canal and Its Regional Consequences

The Qosh-Tepa Canal, under construction in northern Afghanistan, is designed to stretch 285 kilometers and span approximately 100 meters in width. Once operational, it is expected to irrigate over 500,000 hectares of farmland by diverting up to 10 cubic kilometers of water annually from the Amu Darya, roughly a quarter of the river’s average flow.

Such a significant withdrawal could disrupt the hydrological balance across Central Asia. Reduced flows in the Syr Darya may accelerate the desiccation of the Aral Sea and exacerbate ecological degradation in Kazakhstan’s downstream regions.

Experts at the conference underscored the urgency of strengthening regional water diplomacy and establishing new cooperative frameworks to ensure sustainable water usage and prevent environmental disasters.

Hope for Dialogue

Afghan representatives have previously signaled a willingness to engage in dialogue on water resource management. Observers suggest that joint initiatives in water management could play a key role in easing regional tensions and improving environmental outcomes.

As the region faces mounting water stress due to climate change, population growth, and infrastructure development, coordinated action among Central Asian states and Afghanistan is increasingly seen as essential for long-term water security.

Ukraine Appoints New Ambassador to Türkiye, Born in Uzbekistan

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has appointed Nariman Dzhelal as Ukraine’s new ambassador to Türkiye, according to RBC-Ukraine. The appointment was formalized in a presidential decree signed earlier this month, the president’s press service reported.

Dzhelal, a Crimean Tatar politician, journalist, and human rights advocate was born on April 27, 1980, in Navoi, Uzbekistan. His family returned to Crimea in 1989.

According to Ukrainian media, Dzhelal graduated from the Political Science Department at Odesa National University. He began his career as a journalist at Avdet, a Crimean Tatar newspaper, and later worked for the ATR television channel. He also taught history and law at an international school in Simferopol.

Dzhelal entered politics in 2013 when he was elected first deputy chairman of the Mejlis, the representative body of the Crimean Tatar people. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Dzhelal remained in the region, where he continued to advocate for the rights of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians. He monitored human rights abuses and participated in trials widely regarded as politically motivated.

In 2021, after attending the inaugural Crimea Platform summit, Dzhelal was detained by the Russian security services and accused of sabotage. In 2022, he was sentenced to 17 years in prison. Ukrainian authorities confirmed that he was released in a prisoner exchange in June 2024 and returned to Ukraine.

Dzhelal’s appointment to the post in Ankara underscores Türkiye’s pivotal role in Ukraine’s diplomatic strategy.

Baikonur Cosmodrome Gears Up for 70th Anniversary; Trespassers Detained

Two European tourists have been detained while trying to take photographs at the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, Russian media reported on Thursday, as officials prepare to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Russia-operated spaceflight center on June 2.

“The men were trying to sneak to the Buran rocket and take photos,” an unidentified law enforcement official told Russia’s state news agency TASS, which reported on Thursday that the men, who were from Czechia, also known as the Czech Republic, were released after being fined 5,000 rubles, or $60.

The trespassers were the latest in a long list of space enthusiasts and adventure-seekers who have tried to get close to a Soviet-era facility that pioneered early space exploration and remains a vital if aging part of Russia’s space program. The disused Buran spacecraft, a space shuttle that was developed in the 1970s and 1980s by the Soviet Union, is an object of particular fascination. The Buran flew once in 1988, but the program was abandoned because of high costs and a lack of purpose.

Russian and Kazakh media, meanwhile, are reporting on plans for anniversary celebrations at the cosmodrome, which is serviced by a city of the same name in the desert environment in southern Kazakhstan.

Some rocket mock-ups will be on display and an open-air museum is being set up, the Kazinform news agency reported.

One of the mock-ups is 22 meters high and is a model of the Soviet N1 lunar rocket that failed in its four test launches in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Space journalist Anatoly Zak was not impressed by the planned display, saying on X that he is concerned about reports that Russia is destroying “artifacts and documents” that illuminate the historical record of the Soviet space program.

Another piece of Baikonur history occurred on Saturday when a Venus-bound lander probe, which launched from the cosmodrome in 1972 but never got out of Earth’s orbit, made an uncontrolled re-entry into Earth’s atmosphere. Russian space agency Roscosmos said the lander fell in the Indian Ocean west of Jakarta, though questions remain about its fate, including whether it burned up during re-entry or somehow remained intact.

Afghanistan Delivers White Marble to Uzbekistan for Imam Bukhari Complex

Afghanistan has delivered 16 truckloads of white marble from Herat to Uzbekistan for use in the construction of the Imam Bukhari complex in Samarkand, according to the Surkhandarya regional administration. The marble will contribute to the ongoing development of the religious and cultural site dedicated to the revered Islamic scholar.

The marble was officially transferred at the Termez International Trade Center during a meeting between Uzbek and Afghan officials.

According to Uzbekistan’s state news agency UzA, the first shipment comprises 324 boxes of rare white marble, with each slab measuring 3.5 to 4 centimeters thick.

Expanding Bilateral Relations

Uzbekistan and Afghanistan have been expanding bilateral relations in recent years. In March, Uzbekistan sent nearly 200 tons of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, including flour, pasta, oil, sugar, and other essential supplies.

Looking ahead, the two nations aim to boost annual trade to $3 billion. In 2023, trade turnover between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan totaled $866 million.