• KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
22 November 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 146

The Golden Crescent Is Shifting: Opium Returns as Synthetic Drugs Spread

Four years after the Taliban imposed a ban on opium poppy cultivation, poppy farming is expanding again in Afghanistan. In 2026, opium production increased nearly fivefold, with approximately 85% of poppy cultivation now concentrated in provinces bordering Central Asian countries. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) warns of a potential resurgence of drug trafficking along the Northern Route, which connects Afghanistan through Central Asia to Russia and other external markets. Meanwhile, Central Asia's own synthetic drug market is expanding, with some of these substances produced in local clandestine laboratories. The Changing Geography of the Golden Crescent According to a UNODC study presented in Tashkent in early November, the area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan increased over the past year from approximately 10,000 to 43,000 hectares, while estimated opium production rose from 300 to nearly 1,500 metric tons. Poppies are now cultivated in 16 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, compared with 11 a year earlier. Cultivation remains well below levels recorded before the Taliban imposed its ban in April 2022. At the time, approximately 233,000 hectares were under poppy cultivation. By the following year, that figure had fallen nearly 22-fold to 10,800 hectares. The geographical distribution of cultivation has changed substantially. Before the ban, Afghanistan's southern provinces were the main centers of poppy cultivation. Today, the northeast of the country accounts for 74% of opium production, with Badakhshan Province as its main growing area. The profitability of the crop remains one of the main factors behind the resurgence in cultivation. In 2026, the average price of a kilogram of opium in Afghanistan was approximately $500, compared with less than $100 before the ban. UNODC estimates that opium traders' revenues reached $525 million this year. Changes are also taking place elsewhere in the Golden Crescent, a historical opiate-producing region encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. British researcher David Mansfield, a specialist in Afghanistan's drug economy, points to satellite monitoring data from Alcis showing an expansion of poppy cultivation in Pakistan's Balochistan Province. More than 9,000 hectares were under cultivation in 2025, with researchers recording further growth in 2026. Similar developments have been observed in neighboring Iran's Sistan and Baluchestan Province. According to Mansfield, Afghan farmers are involved in poppy cultivation in both Pakistan and Iran. He links the geographical redistribution of production to economic decline, political instability, and armed conflicts across the region. Mansfield and UNODC differ in their assessments of the scale of opium production outside Afghanistan and the prospects for the depletion of stockpiles accumulated before the ban. Reliable data remain insufficient to establish the combined volume of production across all three countries. Afghan Drug Trafficking Through Central Asia Tajikistan is particularly exposed to the geographical shift in Afghan opium production. Its approximately 1,360-kilometer border with Afghanistan runs predominantly through remote mountainous terrain. According to Tajikistan's Drug Control Agency, 2.74 metric tons of drugs were seized along the Afghan border in 2025, up from 1.82 metric tons in 2024. The number of armed clashes with Afghan drug smugglers...

Gorno-Badakhshan Faces a Population Exodus

Tajikistan’s eastern Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) has frequently been described as sparsely inhabited. According to the human rights organization ADC Memorial, tens of thousands of people have left this sparsely inhabited region since the Tajik government’s crackdown in 2021–2022. The estimated departures amount to more than 20% of GBAO’s pre-crackdown population, and conditions continue to worsen, so the exodus looks set to continue. Life at the Rooftop of the World GBAO makes up about 45% of Tajikistan; nearly all of the region is mountainous, with some peaks climbing to more than 7,000 meters. What is now GBAO was one part of a network of communities in the Pamir Mountains that stretched into present-day China, Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan. People have lived there for thousands of years. The ancient fortresses of Yamchun, built in the 3rd century BC, and Kaakha, built in the 2nd century, are the remains of a network of fortresses that once guarded trade through this area. [caption id="attachment_60717" align="aligncenter" width="2048"] White Horse Pass in Tajikistan’s Pamir Mountains. Image: Stephen M. Bland.[/caption] The small population was scattered across river valleys of the Pamir Mountains and developed in isolation from one another, so, unsurprisingly, there are several different languages spoken in the region. The GBAO capital is Khorog, at an elevation of some 2,200 meters, which is also the biggest town in GBAO with a population of some 30,000. Russia established Khorog as a garrison town at the end of the 19th century. The town looks down on the Pyanj River, and on the other side of the river is Afghanistan. Only two roads connect Khorog to the outside world: one leading to the Tajik capital Dushanbe to the west, and now to the Chinese border in the east, and another road that comes from southern Kyrgyzstan and passes through GBAO’s second-largest city, Murgab, at an elevation of some 3,650 meters, and with a population somewhere between 7,500 and 8,000. [caption id="attachment_60715" align="aligncenter" width="2048"] Murgab Bazaar; image: Stephen M. Bland.[/caption] Both roads face sudden and sustained closures during winter months due to avalanches and snowfall. Storms in the mountains can prevent planes from travelling to or from GBAO for weeks at a time. Despite these challenges and more, by 2021, the population in GBAO had grown to some 230,000, which is still only about 2% of Tajikistan’s population. Not Fully Part of Tajikistan Customs and language distinguish “Pamiris” of GBAO from Tajiks, but perhaps the most important difference is religion. The Pamiris are Ismailis, Shi’ites, followers of the Aga Khan. Most Tajiks are Sunni Muslims. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan declared independence on September 9, 1991. In spring 1992, a civil war broke out that pitted Tajik government forces backed by Russia and Uzbekistan against the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), a coalition of domestic opposition groups that included the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, and La’li Badakhshan (Rubies of Badakhshan), a Pamiri group seeking greater autonomy for GBAO. The UTO established...

Tajik Prisoners in Russia Say They Face Pressure to Fight in Ukraine

Tajik citizens imprisoned in the Russian city of Volgograd say they are being put under pressure to sign military contracts and fight in Ukraine, allegations which the Russian prison authorities have rejected. The prisoners are asking Tajikistan to facilitate their transfer home. Two inmates contacted Radio Ozodi, the Tajik service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, on October 29. They said about 150 prisoners from Central Asia were facing pressure, including approximately 60 Tajik citizens. The outlet said it knew the men's identities but had withheld them for their safety. The men said that despite difficulties, they had obtained a mobile phone, contacted Tajikistan's embassy in Moscow, and hoped to complete their prison sentences in Tajikistan rather than face military service. “We want to go home. We are ready to serve our sentences there,” one prisoner said, even offering to work without pay on Tajikistan's Rogun hydropower project if that would secure his return. “Here they are taking us to our deaths,” he added. The inmates said Central Asian prisoners were being held in blocks with particularly harsh conditions. They described facilities used for inmates considered dangerous and claimed many convictions were based on false accusations. More seriously, the men alleged that over 100 Central Asian inmates had left one Volgograd prison for the Ukraine war during the previous year. They said about 40 were Tajik citizens and claimed none of those sent had survived. There is no independent confirmation of those figures, the alleged deaths or the circumstances in which the men entered military service. The original report did not identify the prison by name. On October 31, the Federal Penitentiary Service's Volgograd regional directorate issued a denial, stating that claims Tajik inmates were being pressured to sign military contracts “do not correspond to reality.” The outlet said its calls to Tajikistan's embassy on October 30 went unanswered. Earlier Warnings from Volgograd The latest allegations follow an earlier warning from the same Russian city. In April 2025, relatives said eight Tajik prisoners had been taken from Correctional Colony No. 26, apparently for deployment to Ukraine. Another inmate at that facility described attempts to secure military contracts. “First they try to persuade us, then they start threatening us,” he said. He alleged that prisoners who refused were put in punishment cells and denied calls or visits. Russia has recruited prisoners for its war since the invasion began in February 2022. The Wagner private military group initially conducted much of that recruitment before the Defense Ministry took a larger role. Changes to Russian legislation in 2023 and 2024 expanded opportunities for convicted people and criminal defendants to sign military contracts to gain relief from criminal prosecution or punishment under specified circumstances. An August 2026 UK government assessment summarized reports of coercion in Russian detention facilities, including beatings and threats. A Request to Serve Sentences at Home The prisoners are not asking for their convictions to be overturned, but to serve out the remainder of their terms in Tajikistan, beyond the reach of...

German Spy Scandal Puts Central Asian and Caucasus Espionage Cases in Focus

The arrest of former German intelligence chief August Hanning has drawn attention to Azerbaijan. German journalists reported that he allegedly had contacts with Azerbaijan's intelligence service. Baku rejected the allegations, while German prosecutors have not confirmed any Azerbaijani involvement. In recent years, citizens of Central Asia and the South Caucasus have repeatedly been implicated in espionage and treason cases. The accused and suspects include former intelligence chiefs, military personnel, officials, scientists, and foreign nationals. Some have received lengthy prison sentences, while others remain under investigation. In many cases, information about alleged foreign intelligence connections is limited to media reports. German Scandal and Ties to Baku On October 6, 2026, the German authorities detained 80-year-old August Hanning, who headed the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) from 1998 to 2005. Former BND employee Manfred D. was also taken into custody. Hanning is suspected of attempted treason, obtaining state secrets, and acting on behalf of a foreign intelligence service. Manfred D. is suspected of assisting in the alleged offenses. Both were placed in pretrial detention on October 7. According to federal prosecutors, in the spring of 2010, Hanning reached an agreement with his former subordinate to obtain intelligence documents in exchange for money. By June 2022, Manfred D. had allegedly provided him with approximately 2,000 documents, including classified materials. By then, Hanning was working as a private consultant and, investigators believe, used the information for commercial purposes. According to German media reports, the documents included materials on Iran's nuclear program, Russia's armed forces, and information received from partner intelligence agencies. Investigators also allege that Hanning prepared an analytical memorandum for an officer of a foreign intelligence service. It remains unknown whether the intended recipient received it. Der Spiegel reported alleged contacts between Hanning and a representative of Azerbaijani intelligence. The investigative outlet CORRECTIV examined his longstanding ties to Baku, including his participation in the German-Azerbaijani Forum. German prosecutors have not identified the foreign intelligence service involved in the investigation. Azerbaijan rejected reports of its involvement and warned of damage to relations with Berlin. An Azerbaijani official also claimed that German intelligence representatives had assured Baku that the investigation was unrelated to Azerbaijan, although this has not been publicly confirmed by the German authorities. The classified documents were discovered during a separate investigation. In September 2025, police searched Hanning's premises in connection with the alleged abduction of the children of German businesswoman Christina Block from Denmark. The discovery led to a separate criminal investigation opened in May 2026. Hanning's lawyer acknowledged that his client possessed confidential documents, but rejected allegations he had passed on information to Germany's detriment or received payment for doing so. Kazakhstan’s Espionage and State Secrets Cases In Kazakhstan, one of the best-known treason cases of recent times involved the prosecution of China expert Konstantin Syroyezhkin, who worked for many years at the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the president. Syroyezhkin was detained in February 2019 and sentenced to ten years in prison in October. The trial was held behind closed...

Why Central Asian Governments Are Regulating Religious Life

Kyrgyzstan is requiring bloggers and other social media users who publicly preach religion online to obtain a special certificate. The website of the National Agency for Religious Affairs and Interethnic Relations includes an application form for registration as a “religious preacher.” Nurgazy Kyrgyzbaev, a chief specialist at the agency, announced the measure on local radio. He said the requirement stems from the country’s new religion law, which introduced the legal category of “religious preacher.” “People who want to publicly call others to religion must obtain a special certificate. Their religious education will be considered first and foremost. Recently, people have appeared online who call themselves bloggers and create religious content,” Kyrgyzbaev said, adding that their religious qualifications had previously gone unchecked. This, he argued, created a risk of inaccurate or misleading religious information being spread. Under the new system, applicants must have higher or secondary religious education and obtain the consent of the relevant central religious authority before registering with the agency. For Muslim applicants, this means approval from the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, or Muftiate. Kyrgyzbaev said Muftiate employees engaged in preaching are automatically treated as religious preachers. Kyrgyzstan has traditionally allowed greater religious diversity than most of its Central Asian neighbors, including a wider range of Islamic movements. It remains the only country in the region where Tablighi Jamaat and the Nurcular movement can operate legally. Tablighi Jamaat, for example, is banned as extremist in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Religious Freedom Concerns Across the Region Central Asia has long attracted criticism from international religious-freedom monitors. In its 2026 annual report, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) recommended that the U.S. State Department place Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan on its Special Watch List for severe violations of religious freedom. It recommended that Tajikistan and Turkmenistan be designated Countries of Particular Concern, a higher category reserved under U.S. law for governments accused of particularly severe violations. According to USCIRF, Tajik authorities continued to use the country’s law on traditions and ceremonies to regulate religious life, including through fines and public campaigns. After amendments adopted in 2024 prohibited the import, sale, promotion, and wearing of clothing deemed “alien to national culture,” authorities also campaigned against what they described as foreign styles of dress. USCIRF and other religious-freedom monitors have reported even tighter state control in Turkmenistan, where religious activity outside officially approved structures remains heavily restricted. Reports have described pressure on religious leaders to provide information to the authorities about believers practicing outside state-sanctioned forms of Islam. USCIRF has argued that Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, like other Central Asian states, apply extremism laws to religious practices that involve neither violence nor incitement. Religion Moves Online in Kazakhstan In Kazakhstan, as in Kyrgyzstan, mosques are no longer necessarily the primary source of religious knowledge for younger people. At independence in 1991, Kazakhstan had only 68 mosques. The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan reported 2,945 functioning mosques at the beginning of 2026. The expansion reflects the extraordinary revival of...

Dombra Dispute and Niqab Bans Fuel Religious Debate in Central Asia

Standing before a court in Aktobe in June, 35-year-old Azat Konys apologized to “the entire Kazakh people” for insulting one of the country’s most cherished cultural symbols. Two months earlier, during a TikTok livestream, he had declared the dombra forbidden under Islam, compared the two-stringed instrument to part of the devil’s anatomy and called clerics from Kazakhstan’s official Islamic authority “dogs of hell.” Konys asked the court not to imprison him. The judge instead sentenced him to three years and six months for inciting religious and national hatred. The controversy began when Konys cited the Hanafi school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, the dominant legal tradition among Muslims in Kazakhstan, to argue that the dombra and other stringed instruments, including the guitar and balalaika, were haram, meaning forbidden under Islamic law. The remarks caused particular anger because the dombra is more than a musical instrument in Kazakhstan: it has accompanied oral poetry and storytelling for generations and is officially celebrated as a symbol of cultural heritage and national  identity. Police identified Konys after clips from the livestream circulated on social media and detained him in April. The case is an unusually stark example of how online religious disputes are spilling into legal and political life across Central Asia. Arguments that might once have remained within mosques or religious communities are now spreading through social media, forcing governments and official Islamic authorities alike to decide where religious expression ends and attacks on national culture begin. A more recent controversy arose in Kazakhstan’s Turkestan Region, where a 66-year-old guest at a toi, a traditional wedding feast, called for stricter adherence to Islamic law. He urged the organizers to separate men and women and remove music and alcohol from the celebration, while describing musicians as “heralds of Satan.” The video spread rapidly on social media, prompting nationwide debate. The man was detained and placed in a temporary detention facility for incitement of religious and social hatred. In a statement, the Ministry of Internal Affairs said that freedom of expression does not extend to statements that degrade the dignity of others or could provoke religious or social hostility. The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan (SAMK), the country’s main official Muslim body, later issued its own response. It stated that Islam does not prohibit music in itself and stressed that publicly insulting artists or women is inconsistent with Islamic ethics. Another controversy centered on Nauryz, the spring equinox holiday celebrated throughout Central Asia and across much of the Turkic and Iranian cultural world. In March, a blogger in the Almaty Region described the holiday as “non-Muslim” and argued that it should not be celebrated. Police opened a criminal case against him on suspicion of inciting religious hatred. Kazakhstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office subsequently warned of legal liability for statements attacking Nauryz and other national traditions. The SAMK, meanwhile, publicly celebrated Nauryz as a national holiday promoting social harmony and charitable acts. The debate soon spread beyond social media into politics and the entertainment industry. Producer and television presenter Bayan Alaguzova said...