21 May 2024

@Fergana

Central Asia, Turkmenistan Home, Turkmenistan Life & Culture, Turkmenistan, Turkmenistan International Affairs, International Affairs, Turkmenistan Local Politics, Local Politics, Turkmenistan Environment

Turkmenistan Bans People From Talking About The Weather

For almost ten days Turkmenistan’s capital Ashgabat has been flooded with rain, in what local meteorologists think have been the worst downpours since the 1970s. The rain has caused significant damage to the city’s infrastructure.

The Akhal province has also been badly affected, with agricultural land flooded. Mudflows hit the cities of Anev and Kahka, and in many areas electricity and part of the rail network were shut down.

However, there have been no reports in Turkmen media about the rains and the damage they are causing.

Turkmenistan’s law enforcement agencies have taken unprecedented measures to prevent photos and videos of the downpours from appearing on social networks. According to Radio Azatlyk, internet speed has slowed down, working VPNs are blocked, and IMO messenger has almost stopped working.

A Turkmenabad police officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said of the order from above: “We have been ordered to prevent the leakage of defamatory photos and videos abroad. It was explained to us that if defamatory information gets into the hands of the West or the U.S. State Department, this information can be used to destabilize the domestic situation.”

The situation is the same in Ashgabat. Security services are identifying and taking to police stations citizens who have shared photos and videos on social media of the rains, and the damage caused by the rains in Ashgabat and the provinces.

“In Ashgabat, cars could not move along the streets, people were swept away by the water pressure, and some of them were badly hurt. In the suburbs, houses and farms were flooded, farmers may be left without any income. There are many casualties, but there are no fatalities among the residents. Now the situation is gradually normalizing, and the authorities are eliminating the consequences of the flooding,” one Ashgabat resident told The Times of Central Asia.

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Times of Central Asia

21 May 2024
Central Asia, Kazakhstan Local Politics, Local Politics, Kazakhstan Life & Culture, Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan Opinions, Kazakhstan Featurees

A Demographic Phenomenon in Kazakhstan — the Population is Rapidly Getting Younger

Kazakhstan stands out sharply on the demographic map of the world, according to Alexei Raksha, a Russian demographer. The republic’s government supports high birth rates, which not only bring significant benefits but can also be a source of risk.

Independent demographer Raksha has repeatedly said that Kazakhstan does not fit into global fertility trends. By all parameters (relatively high GDP, rising living standards, urbanization, etc.), the republic belongs to countries that should have already completed the first demographic transition. This term means a decline in mortality and fertility due to improved nutrition and medicine, resulting in simple generational replacement. That is, women no longer give birth to 10-15 children, hoping that two or three of them will survive.

The first demographic transition has ended almost everywhere except in Africa, scientists believe. Nevertheless, according to Raksha, Kazakhstan — along with Israel — shows other indicators. In both countries, both religion and the desire for some kind of historical justice play a role. However, the demographer emphasizes that Kazakhstan’s fertility figures are unevenly distributed regionally and ethnically. The fertile southern and western regions contrast sharply with the north, where the population is aging.

Raksha recently commented on Kazakhstan’s birth rate by women’s ethnicity in 2022-2024. “If Kazakhs, Uzbeks and Uyghur women have birth rates at 2.9 to 4.2 children per woman, then representatives of European nations have an average of 1.3-1.5 children (average European level). It is obvious that there is a deep difference in cultural attitudes, both in the degree of social conservatism and in the level of religiosity,” he wrote online.

According to his data, in recent years, Kazakhstan has been steadily overtaking Uzbekistan, formerly considered the regional leader in population “production”. This is confirmed by the data of the study of the leading medical journal The Lancet “Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation” (IHME) on fertility in 204 countries and territories in the period from 1950 to 2021 with forecasts up to 2100. According to the report, Kazakhstan has surpassed all its neighbors in Central Asia and all countries in the Northern Hemisphere in terms of fertility over 70 years.

For contrast, Raksha constantly cites data on prolonged depopulation in Europe, North America, China, Korea, and Japan. Countries whose population is inexorably aging and whose birth rate is below the level of simple reproduction (less than two children per woman) are doomed to attract labor migrants, the expert believes. In addition, the SWO plays a destructive role in the post-Soviet space. Russia has faced precisely unrecorded but obvious demographic losses, while Ukraine is on the verge of social catastrophe.

Kazakhstan will not face the fate of an endangered country in the coming generations. In late April, the Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan reported that the total fertility rate in 2023 amounted to 19.52 per 1000 people. In 2022 it was at the level of 20.57 births per 1000 people. The highest birth rates are noted in Mangistau region (26.74 people per 1000 people), Turkestan region (26.18) and Shymkent city (25.70). For comparison, the birth rate in Russia is 8.9 per 1,000 people; in Italy – 6.2; in South Korea and Hong Kong – less than 6 people.

In surveys, many Kazakhstani women say they want to have “as many children as God gives”. Raksha in one of his interviews pointed out that women are pushed to increase the number of children by the memory of mass deaths during the famine of the 30s (the so-called “Great Dzhute”, when many Kazakhs died of hunger due to collectivization or were forced to flee to China). In addition, the republic also remembers that during the Soviet period, due to the mass, albeit often involuntary migration to Kazakhstan of Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians and other peoples, Kazakhs were a minority in their own land.

Nevertheless, political scientists and sociologists warn against blind enthusiasm about birth rate records. In particular, the situation in Mangistau and Turkestan regions and the city of Shymkent is dire. Political scientist Daniyar Ashimbayev said recently: “The southern regions dump their excess population into megacities, where opportunities for socialization and employment have long been exhausted. It should be recalled that we are talking about the population of not even “labor-surplus” regions, but frankly poor, poorly educated and unemployed.

We can talk all we want about the state’s obligation to develop the social sphere and create jobs, but the fact is that population growth is systematically outpacing both. Resettlement programs in the northern regions, where birth rates are falling and death rates are rising, are not working”.

In addition, Kazakhstan continues to receive ethnic migrants mainly from similarly poor and overpopulated regions of Central Asia. In fact, the only scenario to avoid further “Palestinianization” of Kazakhstan is to regulate population growth. A complete transition from ethnic migration to professional migration.

While the government realizes that encouraging the birth rate leads to a weakening of the social infrastructure, it will not give up its dream of increasing the population to 35-40 million in the next few decades. Kazakhstan is the world’s ninth-largest country by territory and should have a population to match, officials have said.

The government is actively encouraging this strategy through child allowances. Although the number of payments is small, if a family has 5-7 children, they allow parents not to work.

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Times of Central Asia

21 May 2024

Image: TCA, Aleksandr Potolitsyn

Central Asia, Opinion Head, Home, Features

Central Asian Views on Pro-Palestinian Protests in the West

Pro-Palestinian protests erupted in university campuses and other locations worldwide in response to the ongoing conflict involving the Israeli Defense Forces and Palestinians in Gaza. European cities, including in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, and Belgium, have been major flashpoints where, in some cases, the police resorted to using batons, shields and tear gas on protestors. In the U.S., The New York Times has reported on May 13 that since April 18, over 2,500 individuals had been arrested or detained at 54 college campuses nationwide.

The increasingly violent nature of the protests causes alarm. A poll conducted by USA Today and Suffolk University, published on May 8, has revealed that almost 32% of Americans express “very concerned” sentiments about the potential for the protests to lead to violence, while slightly over 35% say they are “somewhat concerned”.

Some of the messaging coming out of the protests has also been characterized as antisemitic, leading to a congressional bill in the U.S. known as the Antisemitism Awareness Act, which aims to expand the legal definition of antisemitism to curb any speech that provokes violence. Free speech advocates, including some international human rights organizations, have challenged these measures.

 

Remembering their own turbulent times, Central Asians generally support state measures to maintain order

Central Asians’ perspectives on the pro-Palestinian protests sweeping through Western cities, and the way various governments respond to them, are naturally influenced by their own historical and political contexts, shaped by decades of political transition and international rivalry. Emerging as new democracies just three decades ago, these nations have witnessed a tumultuous mix of violent power struggles among oligarchs, and intense competition from foreign actors vying for control over the region’s abundant natural resources and strategic geopolitical position.

At the same time, the region hosts a large Muslim population who may sympathize with the Palestinians, even though many do not know the history of the conflict in the Middle East, according to Daniyar Kumpekov, a 46-year-old economist in Kazakhstan. “The Arab-Israeli conflict is beyond the attention of most citizens,” says 21-year-old Kazakhstani student, Anar Zhakupova, adding that they are more concerned about the confrontation between Ukraine and Russia. In Kyrgyzstan, 29-year-old merchant, Dmitry Povolotsky, says that there were only small rallies in support of the Palestinians.

There also seems to be a sense of skepticism towards the protests. Kumpekov, for instance, draws attention to a trend of “Islamization” in Kazakhstan’s society”.  Mahmut Orozbayev, a Kyrgyz civil servant in his 50s, cautions about terrorist cells in the country, which, he says, “should be feared” from a security perspective. “We have a majority of Muslim citizens. They can gather and condemn Israel’s actions. But all this [should be done] within the limits of what is permissible, so that there is no unrest,” he adds. According to Donokhon Ruziboyeva, an Uzbekistan resident in her 20s, pro-Palestinian protests raise awareness, but “they don’t stop the conflict in Palestine”. While the devastation in the Gaza Strip seen on social networks deeply moves Ruzboyeva, she thinks holding demonstrations calling for an end to the war will not benefit the Palestinians. “I don’t think it’s the right decision to hold protests in Uzbekistan either,” she asserts.

The region is no stranger to widespread (and often violent) unrest. The Andijan events in Uzbekistan in 2005, for instance, was triggered by protests over the trial of 23 businessmen for alleged Islamic extremism, escalating into a violent confrontation. In the same year, Kyrgyzstan’s “Tulip Revolution” saw protesters seizing government buildings, resulting in President Akayev fleeing the country, followed by the 2010 uprising that led to over 80 deaths. In January 2022, Kazakhstan experienced a violent insurrection incited by coup organizers, where government buildings were stormed and burned, causing over 200 fatalities. Tajikistan witnessed violent clashes in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) in 2012 between government forces and local groups after a security official’s murder. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan’s authoritarian regime maintains strict media control and swiftly quells dissent, effectively suppressing public protests.

The views of the region’s citizens reflect these memories. Kumpekov points out that authorities are notified of all rallies in Kazakhstan, and they have a right to refuse if the procession is destructive in nature. “This is a preventive practice,” he says, as “all the more Kazakhstanis remember the events of January 2022 when peaceful rallies turned into uncontrolled pogroms”. Authorities have the right to stop actions that lead to violence “so that the actions, for example, do not turn into anti-Semitic pogroms, as in the airport in Makhachkala [in Russia]”, he adds. Sharing a similar view, Zhakupova says that “Kazakhstanis do not want a repeat of the January 2022 events. The coup attempt and the ensuing chaos frightened citizens. The authorities are trying to establish a dialog with the residents [and] prevent social unrest”. In contrast to the January 2022 events, pro-Ukraine gatherings in Kazakhstan were peaceful, where citizens expressed their opinion and dispersed, and the police simply observed law and order, according to Kumpekov.

 

Freedom of expression should be allowed but not at the expense of national security

In Zhakupova’s opinion, any calls for violence should be condemned and it is unacceptable for a group of people to demand infringement on the rights and freedoms of others, but peaceful demonstrations should not be censored. “A person should realize that aggressive actions will cause a response,” Kumpekov argues. This sentiment is repeated elsewhere in the region. According to Ruziboyeva in Uzbekistan, “Speech that encourages violence should be restricted to prevent harm”; however, there is a balance; “censorship should be handled cautiously to maintain order while respecting freedom of speech”. Anwar, an Uzbek teacher in his 50s (who chose not to provide his last name), agrees: “Any speech inciting violence should be prohibited. I admit the need for censorship during aggressive protests in order to prevent threats and danger to the civilians.” In Kyrgyzstan, which has an article in its Criminal Code that punishes incitement of discord, Povolotsky says, “this is right, you can’t call for violence”, but adds that people should be allowed to “speak the truth” and be able to “see and hear everything” when it comes to protesting.

 

A familiar woe for Central Asia plagues the West: Suspicions of external involvement and prejudiced campaigns

Protests in the West, while overall more peaceful than those in Central Asia, have also seen protestors openly defy government orders and make statements that incite violence. In general, both Western and Central Asian supporters of protestors have used video footage from such confrontations to construct a narrative that accuses government forces of human rights violations and portray all protestors as victims. These clips, usually showing forceful detentions and altercations between the security apparatus and the civilians, are seen as use of excessive force undermining the right to peaceful assembly. The depiction of tear gas and water cannon use as well as the handcuffing of individuals is often framed not as a crowd control tactic, but as state oppression.

The current situation presents Western officials with a scenario reminiscent of the more tumultuous protests Central Asian authorities have handled in the past. The ongoing challenge for Western governments remains how to curb the escalation of such protests, combat increasingly harmful disinformation campaigns, and prevent a dangerous spread of violence while simultaneously protecting the rights of assembly and free speech.

Adding to the difficulties of managing this process, the commercialization of the human rights arena, and the resulting bias in what is reported on the protests, spark worry given the apparent involvement of NGOs and foreign actors in providing financial and other support. These concerns prompt scrutiny over whether their contributions are driven by interests that are contrary to those of Western host countries. In the U.S., questionable sources of funding used to mobilize non-students at university campuses as well as for the procurement of uniformly colored tents point to a well-coordinated and sponsored operation, possibly with the involvement of outside actors. Adding a layer of complexity, a report by Wired has suggested that Russia is capitalizing on college campus protests to foment unrest in the U.S., repeating claims that foreign assistance may be bolstering the agitators.

For their part, Central Asian countries have previously raised concerns about the weaponization of human rights activism as a tool used by kleptocrats and foreign states to gain diplomatic leverage over regional governments. These worries have a basis. The so-called “Qatargate” scandal in the EU that broke out in 2022 exposed how European officials have been compromising their authority on human rights issues by selectively condemning or endorsing human rights records of third-party states in exchange for cash payments and other perks from outside actors.

 

No perfect path, but possibility for progress

Regardless of a country’s East-West alignment or its position on the democratic spectrum, it should remain a universally accepted fact that when protesters flout a country’s laws and engage in frenzied acts, they encroach on the rights of other citizens and threaten peace and security. The balancing act for governments between protecting fundamental rights and maintaining the safety of state institutions and all its citizen remains precarious. So far, few (if any) have been able to get it just right. In the wake of its own recent large-scale protests, the West can perhaps better relate to Central Asia’s challenges. With such empathy, all sides may be able to give credence to the historical context as well as to the influences of internal and external bad actors in defining such events and the risks they bring to each country’s domestic peace and security.

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Times of Central Asia

21 May 2024

A stateless person in Darvaza, Turkmenistan; image: TCA, Aleksandr Potolitsyn/Stephen M. Bland

Central Asia, Lead Story, Home

Lost Identities: Tackling Statelessness in Central Asia

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of 15 new countries transformed what was once considered internal migration, leaving an extraordinary number of people marooned across newly established borders. Many found themselves holding obsolete Soviet passports or lacking any documentation with which to verify their birthplace. Such was the scale of the problem that in its 2014 Special Report: Ending Statelessness Within 10 Years, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimated that “more than two decades after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, over 600,000 people remain stateless.”

This was the case for Vladi, a forty-year-old man with a learning disability, bright blue eyes and a shock of blonde hair, who The Times of Central Asia spoke with at a truck stop in the hamlet of Darvaza in Turkmenistan’s Karakum Desert. When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, Vladi was with his father in Ashgabat. With non-ethnic Turkmen not feeling particularly welcome in the chaotic early days of independence, most Russians went home, but during their passage back to Kazan in Tatarstan, Vladi and his father became separated. With no passport, Vladi had become landless, an illegal alien unable to return home. Having drifted from village to village ever since, he’d been in Darvaza for eleven years, now, serving as little more than a whipping boy.

Whilst the number of those with expired or invalid papers is difficult to gauge, particularly badly affected are so-called “border brides” who’ve married across national frontiers and found themselves legal in neither country. For years now, though, Central Asia has sought to tackle the issue of statelessness head-on. Thus, for example, in 2020 Tajikistan adopted an amnesty law which granted official status to some 20,000 people. In the same year, a new provision in the law allowed 50,000 stateless people in Uzbekistan to acquire citizenship.

TCA spoke with Azizbek Ashurov, the Executive Director of Ferghana Valley Lawyers Without Borders, who in 2019 received the Nansen Refugee Award for his work, which saw the Kyrgyz Republic declared by the UNHCR and UNICEF to be the first country in the world to have eradicated the issue of statelessness.

 

TCA: How did you first become involved in the question of statelessness, and what brought the issue to your attention?

Ashurov: I was born during the days of the Soviet Union, when we all had a unified citizenship; the population was very mobile at that time. There were just administrative borders; there was no need to obtain any authorization documents in order to cross these. When the collapse of the USSR occurred in 1991, a lot of people were caught in another state, studying, working, temporarily residing, etc. So, when the 15 new states were formed, along with many other things, each state faced the question: out of the population on the territory at that moment, who should be recognized as our citizens?

All these things had to be linked to the legislation emerging in the states. Many adopted their constitutions two or three years after independence. Kyrgyzstan only adopted a constitution on May 5, 1993. The first law that defined who are citizens in the Kyrgyz Republic came into force on February 18, 1994. The approach was similar in all the states, but there was a deadline. The law said that at the time it came into force, those citizens of the former Soviet Union who permanently reside in the country and had a propiska (permit issued by the authorities that registers the bearer’s place of residence) automatically became citizens of Kyrgyzstan.

I was born in the Uzbek SSR, but our family came from Kyrgyzstan. My parents worked in Uzbekistan, and we were in this state when the Soviet Union collapsed. In the 90s, we moved from one country to another. And it so happened that we moved after the law on Kyrgyz citizenship came into force, but before the Uzbek law had come into force [1995]. Consequently, we found ourselves in a netherworld. In Uzbekistan, we weren’t recognized as citizens, so we came to Kyrgyzstan, but here the deadline had passed.

When new passports of the independent states started to be issued, people became concerned. That’s when I something was deeply wrong.

I finished school and studied to become a lawyer. When I started my first legal practice, unlike other lawyers, I paid attention to the issue of statelessness, probably because of my personal experiences. In 2003, we created a new organization called Lawyers of Fergana Valley, and I was one of its founders. When we were defining our remit, one of problems we included in the list of our services was assistance to stateless people and those who have problems with their legal status. Still, we didn’t understand the scale of this problem, and the state didn’t either. It’s very difficult to count how many people have this status, because most of them aren’t documented or registered. That’s why the authorities don’t have exact figures.

We were providing assistance, and we saw many people dealing with this issue, so we turned to the UNHCR, which had a mandate to reduce the number of stateless people. In 2008, we conducted a study which showed the problem was urgent. The law at that time didn’t allow people to legalize their status quickly and effectively, so we started working with the state to assist people, many of whom didn’t have access to the procedure for determining their citizenship. There were also difficulties in registering the birth of children to parents who were undocumented.

So, we promoted changes in the legislation, and the citizenship law of 2007 ended up being quite progressive. Then, in 2013, we made more changes which allowed a large group of people in difficult situations to apply for a simplified procedure for citizenship. In 2014, together with the state and the UNHCR, we launched a countrywide campaign to identify and document stateless people. After 14 years, our organization, together with the UNHCR and passport offices, created more than 60 mobile passport offices which included our lawyers. We traveled to all regions of the country, even remote ones. There were cases where we couldn’t reach people by car who had problems with their legal status, so we went on horseback. By 2019, we identified over 13,000 stateless people, all of whom eventually received documents.

In 2019, the UN recognized Kyrgyzstan as the first country to conduct a universal campaign and eliminate all known cases of statelessness at that time. In honor of this, our organization was awarded the Nansen Prize. We’re very proud of this award; it was a team effort. The first recipient of this award was Eleanor Roosevelt, and after us, Angela Merkel received this prize.

 

TCA: Do you believe that statelessness has now been completely eradicated in the Kyrgyz Republic?

Ashurov: The eradication of this legal problem, and I consider it a legal problem, has two components; one is addressing current cases, and secondly is preventing future cases. What we’ve been able to do is a big step in the first component. In 2019, we were able to help get citizenship for all the people we identified; but states have borders with other states – people come and go. People come to Kyrgyzstan and find themselves in this situation, and Kyrgyz citizens can also find themselves without citizenship – there are many reasons for this.

Now, we’re focusing our work on preventing future cases of statelessness. For example, the Uzbek law on citizenship has a provision that requires its citizens to register with consular offices if they leave their country. If they don’t register within five years for one reason or another, they lose their citizenship. Why does this happen? Well, Uzbekistan doesn’t have consulates in all countries, and this situation is also connected with migration issues. For example, a woman from Uzbekistan marries a Kyrgyz man and moves to a Kyrgyz village. Often, such people don’t know the migration rules and miss the deadline for registering. Thus, these people become illegal migrants. We call such people stateless persons with de facto status. That is, they don’t even have the official status of a stateless person. These are the kinds of laws that cause new cases of statelessness.

Previously, we also had a gap in the law wherein any citizen of Kyrgyzstan leaving the country with the intention of obtaining citizenship of another state could write an application to renounce their citizenship. There were examples with migrants who went to the Russian Federation, but some applications were refused there – no state gives a 100% guarantee. Upon returning home, such people found themselves in a difficult situation. Some were stopped at the border because their passport was canceled as they’d renounced their citizenship, and others found out after arriving home when applying for a new passport.

There are two UN international conventions on the status of stateless persons which stipulate that all countries should create such provisions to prevent new cases of people losing their citizenship. For example, when a person leaves one nationality, they must have another in place. Last year, with our partners from the UNHCR, we were able to achieve the adoption of this norm in Kyrgyzstan; now, Kyrgyz citizens can’t renounce their citizenship without presenting evidence that they have another.

 

TCA: According to the UN Refugee Agency, as of December 2021, 56,814 people were “known to be stateless across Central Asia [with] 38,000 of these are located in Uzbekistan, alone.” What can be done to end the problem of statelessness?

Ashurov: The UNHCR collate these figures based on information from government agencies, but at the same time they collect information from parallel sources which are closer to the real picture. As for Uzbekistan, most stateless people don’t have any official status; that is, the mechanisms for registration are very strict. For example, even to leave their country an Uzbek citizen must obtain an exit permit.

Now, though, Uzbekistan is showing a very positive dynamic in solving the issue. Five years ago, there were more than 100,000 people who didn’t have citizenship – then a change in the law was made which gave over 50,000 people access to naturalization procedures. These are people who’d previously missed the deadline and still had Soviet-era passports. Thanks to this, there are fewer and fewer stateless people there every day.

In Tajikistan, the authorities identified twice as many stateless people as in Kyrgyzstan. As a result, they adopted the necessary laws, and are now working on further legalization with regard to such people. In Kazakhstan, there was also a national campaign to eradicate this problem. There is positive momentum, and they created a procedure to identify stateless people.

In Kyrgyzstan, there isn’t a unified procedure. Stateless people don’t have a certificate which meets international standards, and such a document can’t be used to cross the border. Now, the authorities are working to ensure that stateless persons have digital and biometric documents which guarantee freedom of movement. Of course, they won’t fall under any interstate agreements on simplified entry, but they will be able to get visas for the countries they want to go to.

In addition, against the background of the war in Ukraine, a lot of migrants are returning from Russia with canceled Russian passports. Our citizens who obtained citizenship there and wanted to avoid mobilization – such measures were taken against them. We’re working to help these people restore their Kyrgyz citizenship.

Azizbek Ashurov; image: UNHCR

 

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Times of Central Asia

20 May 2024

Image: otyrar.kz

Central Asia, Home, Life & Culture, Kazakhstan Justice, Kazakhstan, Features, Kazakhstan Featurees

Why Have Cases of Abduction of Women for Marriage Not Decreased in Kazakhstan?

In Kazakhstan, the statistics related to criminal cases regarding the abduction of women as brides does not show material change, a study conducted by analysts at Ranking.kz shows.

Referring to the data of the Committee on Legal Statistics and Special Records of the General Prosecutor’s Office of Kazakhstan, the authors of the study report that last year, 18 such criminal cases were recorded. Of these, two-thirds (12 cases) were registered in the southern regions, and two cases each in the eastern, western and central parts of the country.

The report notes that the problem is characteristic not only of remote rural settlements, but also of large metropolitan areas. Thus, 6 out of 12 ‘southern’ criminal cases of abduction of women were in Almaty, and a single case was registered in Astana.

But the number of registered criminal cases on another related criminal offense, namely illegal deprivation of liberty that occurs when a woman is forcibly kept in the house of her fiancé, has noticeably decreased since 2018 from 71 to 13 cases nationwide.

It is worth noting that these statistics only partially reflect the situation on the ground as some Kazakhs continue to disguise this criminal offense as the ancient custom of “qyz alyp qashu” (bride kidnapping).

According to Artur Lastaev, the Commissioner for Human Rights in Kazakhstan, at least two factors affect the situation. Firstly, Kazakhstan does not have a separate article for abducting women for the purposes of marriage, and therefore all abductions of women are registered under one crime, i.e. Article 125 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Secondly, most of the abductions of women for marriage are not even included in statistical reports as they are often covered up. In his report last year, Lastaev wrote: “We can only guess about the real figures of bride theft. Stereotypes persist in society that do not allow women to report the use of this type of coercion. In most cases, perpetrators and victims are not even aware of the criminal nature of such acts and criminal responsibility for them.”

According to the data published by the Ombudsman within the framework of the International Scientific and Practical Conference, “Countering domestic violence: problems and solutions”, 214 criminal cases have been initiated in Kazakhstan since 2019 for the abduction of women. Of these, 94.3% were terminated due to lack of corpus delicti. Only 10 cases were sent to the courts, and 27 people were brought to bear responsibility for their actions.

The Commissioner for Human Rights believes that a separate article for abduction of women for forced marriage should be introduced into the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan. According to Lastaev, this should have a preventative effect and reduce the level of crime against women. The General Prosecutor’s Office, where the proposal has been sent, supported the initiative, but amendments to the laws have not yet been adopted.

More than a year ago, experts from Kazakhstan’s Institute for Social Development conducted a sociological study on gender policy that also touched on “bride kidnapping”. Surveys of the Kazakhstani population showed mixed results. Although 76.4% of respondents have a negative attitude towards kidnapping a bride against her will, another 11.7% responded that in such a situation, the bride should stay and marry her kidnapper.

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Times of Central Asia

20 May 2024

Image: TCA, Aleksandr Potolitsyn

Central Asia, Opinion Head, Home, Features

Central Asia’s “C5” Security Bloc Can Become a Reality

Central Asia is an emerging economic region that offers the world immense natural resources, a viable trade corridor, and a young, educated workforce. On a diplomatic level, major global powers have sometimes chosen to engage with the five Central Asian nations (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) as a bloc rather than individually, thus giving rise to the term C5+1.

The United States, Germany, Japan, and the European Union have C5+1 initiatives grouping the five countries as a block. The C5+1 is not entirely a Western construct as, in addition to Japan, China also has its own C5+1 launched in 2023 that mirrors the U.S. version. Russia’s economic and security cooperation platforms are not all-inclusive when comes to Central Asia and include other CIS countries, such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Moldova.

 

Cooperation vis-à-vis Afghanistan shows a united front on regional security

On May 18, 2024, the heads of the Security Councils of Central Asian countries gathered in Astana, Kazakhstan, for a meeting aimed at enhancing regional security and cooperation. This high-level assembly brought together senior officials from the five states to discuss pressing security challenges and explore collaborative solutions. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who chaired the meeting, impressed that Afghanistan should be the focus of the region’s common attention as Central Asia’s most dire security challenges relate to this southern neighbor.

Afghanistan has been a focal point for the spread of violent extremism and oppressive ideologies, impacting global peace and security. The country’s history of conflict and provision of safe havens to extremist groups to train fighters and spread their ideologies have long posed threats to neighboring countries and beyond. In Central Asia, this has led to increased terrorism, with groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and ISIS-Khorasan exploiting Afghanistan’s instability to establish bases and train fighters. They have carried out cross-border attacks, spreading violence into countries such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Additionally, the dissemination of radical ideologies from Afghanistan has recruited and radicalized individuals in Central Asia, contributing to other local insurgencies and destabilizing the region. An attack on a Russian concert hall in March 2024 by ISIS resulted in 144 deaths.  This event led President Tokayev to note that “there remains high risks associated with the activity of international terrorist organizations”.

Narcotics trafficking funds terrorist operations in Afghanistan, fuels region-wide organized crime and increases addiction rates. Effective border control is essential to prevent the movements of militants and drug traffickers from Afghanistan into Central Asia, and thus enhance regional security and stability.

In addition to combative and preventive measures, the UN wants Afghanistan to be brought into the international fold to manage these threats. Central Asian countries can facilitate this transition and have already made their own individual bilateral efforts to integrate the “Islamic Republic” into the international arena. Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev, for instance, proposed the creation of a UN Regional Center for Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan, to be based in Kazakhstan.

 

Regional unity helps withstand unwanted external interference

Historically, Central Asia has received great attention from international powers vying for influence and control over its resources and its geopolitical position. Central Asian communities have been at risk of becoming collateral damage in this contest for influence.

President Tokayev called on the Central Asian states to work together to “resist external forces that seek to pit the states of the region against each other and divide them.” A surge in disinformation campaigns has hit the region’s social media space. Unsurprisingly, cybersecurity was raised as a theme of cooperation at the May 18 meeting of Security Council heads.

Outside countries with strategic interests in Central Asia may cause unforeseen divisions when they focus on executing their own agendas. Historically, Russia reinforced its alliances with Central Asia by asserting cultural asymmetries through a shared Russian culture and language. In September 2023, Moscow announced plans to build nine Russian-language schools in Kyrgyzstan by 2029 with a $5.5 million budget, and an additional ten schools in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. However, Russian soft power is waning in the wake of Russia’s conflict with Ukraine and a resurgence of ethnic-based nationalism. As a result, ethnic tribalization risks pitting the region’s minority Russians against other dominant ethnic groups.

On the other hand, a U.S. push for a more liberal world order, including its blanket provisions for religious expression, may inadvertently allow the rise of extremist and oppressive ideologies that in turn breed terrorism while also eroding the secular principals that a liberal order is intended to protect. In a May 2024 report by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, all C5 countries were criticized in some form. Tajikistan, for instance, was included in the list of Countries of Particular Concern (CPCs) along with Iran and Afghanistan, among others. Representing the inherent dilemma in its strategy, however, in May 2024, the U.S. deepened cooperation with Tajikistan to combat terrorism, which derives mainly from extremist religious ideologies that the country deems an existential threat.

On a different note, China’s pressure for Central Asian nations to deport Uyghur activists can go against public support among local populations who share strong ethnic and cultural ties with the Uyghurs and can thus shatter notions of solidarity.

 

Conclusion

The “C5” construct has the potential to benefit all parties as long as divisive policies do not get in their own way. The recent meeting of the heads of Security Council of Central Asian states was a prelude to the upcoming Sixth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, which will be held in Astana on August 9, 2024. Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev further announced a strategy for the Development of Regional Cooperation “Central Asia – 2040”, with its adoption expected to be a significant boost for the region. The plan builds on another agreement, the “Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation for the Development of Central Asia in the XXI Century,” signed by three Central Asian states in 2022.

Overall, the formation of the C5 platform is a good opportunity for the region and the world. With the ingestion of Afghanistan, soon it may even grow to be C6, bringing further predictability to a global order that is experiencing increasing insecurity and instability.

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Times of Central Asia