Uzbekistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Iran

Turkmenistan Opens Additional Crossings as Uzbekistan Evacuates Citizens from Iran

Turkmenistan has opened several additional checkpoints on its border with Iran to allow foreign citizens to leave the country as fighting in the Middle East continues. The Russian Embassy in Ashgabat said the Turkmen authorities have opened four additional crossings along the Turkmen-Iranian frontier: Artyk–Lutfabad, Gaudan–Bajgiran, Akyayla–Incheburun, and Altyn Asyr–Incheburun. These operate alongside the Sarakhs crossing, which had already been used for evacuation transit. The move expands an overland route through Central Asia for foreigners seeking to leave Iran while air travel across parts of the Middle East remains disrupted. Uzbekistan has begun using this corridor to assist its citizens. The country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said diplomatic staff and official vehicles have been deployed to the Sarakhs crossing to receive Uzbek nationals arriving from Iran and organize their onward transport across Turkmenistan toward Uzbekistan. Uzbek outlet Daryo reported on March 4 that Uzbekistan had already repatriated 13 citizens from Iran via Turkmenistan. Russia has also pointed citizens toward the Turkmen route. The Russian Embassy in Ashgabat said its citizens unable to leave Iran by air could exit through Turkmenistan and should register with the Russian Embassy in Tehran, which is coordinating assistance for citizens inside Iran. The embassy noted that Turkmenistan maintains strict entry rules and normally requires special permits for foreign visitors. Despite those restrictions, the country has previously allowed evacuation transit from Iran during earlier regional crises. The additional crossings create another evacuation corridor alongside the route from Iran into Azerbaijan through the Astara border crossing on the Caspian coast. Foreign nationals have already used that crossing to leave Iran in recent days, including citizens from Central Asia. The Turkmenistan route provides a more direct path back into the region for evacuees traveling toward Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries. Turkmenistan shares a 1,148-kilometer border with Iran. Ashgabat, the Turkmen capital, sits only about 25 kilometers north of the frontier, and several transport links connect the two countries. Sarakhs functions as an established rail and road gateway used for trade and freight movement between the two countries. In recent years, Turkmenistan and Iran have also discussed expanding rail and freight transit through the Sarakhs crossing as part of broader regional transport corridors linking Central Asia to southern markets. Turkmenistan also exports natural gas to northern Iran under swap arrangements in which Tehran delivers equivalent volumes to Azerbaijan, which could disrupt regional logistics and energy flows. The expansion of border crossings increases the capacity for organized departures from Iran and provides foreign governments with an additional land route when other exit corridors become congested. For Central Asian governments, the immediate priority remains the safe movement of their nationals out of the conflict zone. The opening of additional Turkmen checkpoints provides another corridor linking Iran to Central Asia and may ease pressure on evacuation routes through the South Caucasus.

Middle East

Middle East Conflict May Slow Growth, but Gold and Oil Dynamics Could Cushion Impact

The escalating conflict in the Middle East could weigh on Uzbekistan’s economic growth if it persists, though higher gold prices and oil-driven gains in key partner economies may soften the impact, according to Uzbek economist Mirkomil Kholboyev. Kholboyev shared his analysis on his Telegram channel, examining both the direct and indirect channels through which the crisis could affect Central Asia’s largest economy. “Several days of geopolitical tensions in the Middle East have already turned into open military confrontation,” he wrote. “It is still difficult to say how long this situation will last. If it is short-term and the previous status quo is restored, the impact on our economy will likely be limited and temporary. But if the war continues for a longer period, the consequences could be more significant.” Direct trade exposure appears limited. According to data from Uzbekistan’s national statistics portal, the country exported $157 million worth of goods to Iran in 2025, accounting for just 0.5% of total exports. Imports from Iran totaled $421 million, or 0.9% of overall imports. Trade with Israel was even smaller, with exports of $33 million and imports of $22 million. “Even a complete halt in trade with these countries would not significantly affect total exports,” Kholboyev wrote, though he noted that export and import growth could slow. Iran also plays a role as a transit hub. Its ports are part of broader regional logistics networks, including the Central Asia-India corridor via Chabahar and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). According to a regional analytical report, Uzbekistan accounts for 5.5% of total traffic along this route, compared with 61.1% for Kazakhstan and 29.4% for Turkmenistan. Kholboyev pointed out that while some of Uzbekistan’s trade passes through Iranian ports, the country is less dependent on them than other Central Asian countries. Still, he cautioned that prolonged fighting would inevitably disrupt both direct trade and transit flows. “I do not have precise data on how much of our total foreign trade passes specifically through Iranian ports,” he wrote. “That makes it difficult to assess the full effect. But if the war continues, both direct trade and transit through Iran will suffer serious damage.” Even if trade with the wider region, including Iran and other countries affected by hostilities, were to stop entirely, Kholboyev estimates the impact would remain moderate. The region accounts for about 2.4% of Uzbekistan’s exports and 1.5% of imports. A complete halt could slow export growth by roughly 3% and imports by about 2.5%, reducing overall GDP growth by around 0.6 percentage points. A 50% reduction in trade with the region would shave an estimated 0.2-0.3 percentage points off GDP growth. Energy markets represent a more significant risk channel. As trading resumed after the latest escalation, global oil prices rose by about 9%, driven by concerns over potential disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption passes. “If tensions escalate further and oil flows are restricted, or if prices continue rising amid uncertainty, this could slow...

Islamic State – Khorasan

Opinion: Islamic State Khorasan Province and the Strategic Risks for Central Asia

In modern Eurasia, threats are increasingly becoming part of the strategic environment. At times, they even turn into political instruments. When discussing terrorism, analysis usually focuses on the level of danger it poses. Far less attention is given to whether such threats are assumed to be manageable. The problem lies not only in the existence of radical groups, but also in the illusion that they can be controlled or used to serve someone’s strategic interests. Iranian analyst Nozar Shafiee, writing for the Tehran-based Institute for East Strategic Studies, describes ISKP as a decentralized and transnational network that can continue operating even after losing territorial control. This perspective is rarely discussed in public analysis of the region, which is precisely why it deserves attention. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with demonstrated intent for external operations, has long ceased to depend on localized footholds. Even after losing territorial control, the organization did not disappear. Instead, it transformed. Today, it functions as a flexible network of small cells. It no longer needs to control a city or province to remain dangerous. It relies on the internet for recruitment and propaganda, operates through autonomous groups, and conducts high-profile attacks designed to attract attention and create an atmosphere of instability. However, there is another aspect that receives far less attention. In the context of regional competition, there is sometimes a temptation to view such structures as potential proxy forces, instruments of pressure that could theoretically be restrained or directed in a desired direction. The logic is simple: as long as the threat is not directed at us, it can be treated as part of a broader geopolitical game. History, however, demonstrates that this is a dangerous illusion. Radical networks do not function as controllable instruments. They operate according to their own logic and eventually move beyond the limits within which they were meant to be contained. There are numerous historical examples in which support for radical groups as a temporary strategic tool has “backfired.” Organizations created or supported for tactical purposes eventually began acting autonomously and turned their weapons against their former patrons. As Western analysts often note, supporting proxies who do not share your ideological legitimacy inevitably carries the risk that they will eventually turn against you. This represents a key risk for neighboring regions. Unlike traditional conflicts, networked extremist structures are not confined to a single territory. Their influence spreads through digital platforms, ideological narratives, and transnational connections. Even if attempts to instrumentalize such groups occur far from the region’s borders, the consequences can still affect it directly. This discussion is particularly relevant for Central Asia. First, modern terrorism no longer depends on physically crossing borders. In the mid-2010s, several thousand individuals from Central Asian countries became involved in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Recruitment did not take place primarily through physical training camps but through online networks. Geographic distance offered little protection. Second, ISKP propaganda materials are distributed in Central...

Environmental Pollution

Uzbekistan Introduces Incentives for Major Industrial Polluters to Reduce Environmental Impact

Uzbekistan’s government has approved new measures aimed at encouraging large industrial enterprises to reduce their environmental footprint. Resolution No. 85 establishes regulations to incentivize environmental impact reduction efforts by industrial enterprises classified as Category I and Category II facilities based on their level of environmental impact. These categories include enterprises considered to have significant or moderate effects on the natural environment. Under the new framework, incentives will be introduced in two stages. At the first stage, an enterprise that installs a background air pollution monitoring station will be eligible for relief from previously assessed outstanding compensation payments for environmental damage. In addition, 50% of compensation payments allocated to the state budget for environmental harm will be refunded over a two-year period. At the second stage, if the enterprise installs dust and gas cleaning equipment as well as local wastewater treatment facilities within one year after commissioning the monitoring station, 70% of the compensation payments directed to the state budget will be refunded over two years. Enterprises seeking to benefit from these incentives must notify the Ecology Committee through Public Service Centers or via the government’s online portal. The committee will review submitted documentation within 15 working days and issue a formal conclusion on whether the enterprise qualifies for state support. The Times of Central Asia previously reported, that more than a dozen valuable trees were cut down at the construction site of the Ritz-Carlton Tashkent project in central Tashkent. Environmental damage in that case was officially assessed at 351,230,000 Uzbek sum (approximately $29,000), according to documentation cited by officials.

FLEX Exchange Program

Uzbek FLEX Finalist Returns Home After Alleged Harassment by Host Father in Indiana

An Uzbek high school student selected for the prestigious FLEX exchange program has returned home after her family alleged she was subjected to sexual harassment by her host father in the United States. The claims were made public by her father, Dr. Aziz Boltayev, in a detailed Facebook post. Uzbek officials have confirmed that they requested explanations from program representatives, while the U.S. side has not issued a public statement. Dr. Boltayev’s daughter was one of nearly 60 finalists from Uzbekistan selected in 2025 for the Future Leaders Exchange Program (FLEX), had traveled to the United States to complete her final year of high school. The fully funded initiative, supported by the U.S. Department of State, enables students from participating countries to study at American high schools and live with volunteer host families for one academic year. According to Boltayev’s account, his daughter was placed in a small town in Indiana with a childless couple, both music teachers, who had previously hosted exchange students. Initial video calls reportedly reassured the family prior to her departure. “After graduating from medical school, I received a U.S. Department of State grant and spent time in the United States for professional development,” Boltayev wrote. “I returned to Uzbekistan with a deep sense of gratitude and a positive impression of American values. Naturally, when my eldest daughter won the FLEX grant in 2025, I was proud and supportive.” He said the situation changed approximately a month after her arrival. According to his post, the host father allegedly began making inappropriate remarks and advances when his wife was not present. “He told my daughter that it was ‘necessary to gain sexual experience’ before marriage,” Boltayev wrote. “To her credit, [his daughter] firmly resisted and immediately informed her assigned FLEX coordinator.” According to Boltayev, the local coordinator relocated his daughter shortly after the complaint was filed. However, he criticized the way communication with the family in Uzbekistan was handled. “The coordinator moved [his daughter] out of the house immediately, but in doing so, they completely bypassed us, her parents,” he wrote. Due to the time difference, he said he was informed the following day by the FLEX office in Tashkent. Boltayev further alleged that during this period his daughter’s phone was switched off and her parents’ messages went unanswered. He claimed that the coordinator had instructed her to turn off her phone for “security reasons,” which he described as isolating a minor from her parents. He also asserted that neither the temporary host family nor U.S.-based program representatives agreed to speak directly with him. According to Boltayev, his daughter was told that program officials were not obligated to provide information to her parents. Seeking reassurance, Boltayev contacted a friend, a faculty member at the University of Michigan, who lives several hours from his daughter’s location, and asked him to check on her in person. “Even then, FLEX representatives tried to block him, telling my daughter: ‘He needs our permission to see you, and for now, permission is...

CA5+UK

UK Expands Strategic Engagement in Central Asia Amid Growing Global Competition

The world’s largest economies have recently increased their focus on Central Asia. The United Kingdom, alongside the U.S., the European Union, and China, is seeking to strengthen partnerships in a region that was previously not among its top foreign policy priorities. Britain Replicates an Established Format Throughout the years of independence, Kazakhstan and its regional neighbors were often perceived as operating within Russia’s sphere of influence. The war in Ukraine and broader geopolitical shifts have altered international attitudes toward Central Asia. Major powers are now intensifying dialogue with the region, with particular emphasis on economic cooperation. At the end of February, foreign ministers met in London under the Central Asia-UK (CA5+1) format. Although this was the first meeting of its kind in the British capital, the format mirrors similar mechanisms already used by the U.S., the European Union, Russia, China, and Japan. Participants noted that the CA5+1 format has proven to be an effective mechanism for structured and substantive engagement with external partners. The regional agenda is addressed comprehensively, reflecting Central Asian priorities while creating additional opportunities to advance economic initiatives and implement joint projects. Particular attention has been paid to trade diversification, industrial cooperation, sustainable infrastructure development, and unlocking Central Asia’s potential in critical minerals and renewable energy. The meeting also covered economic growth prospects, key challenges facing Central Asian economies, and the expansion of trade and investment. Logistics was a central topic, including the development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, widely known as the Middle Corridor. British Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper emphasized the strategic importance of Central Asia as a dynamically developing region characterized by sustained economic growth, expanding regional cooperation, and a growing role in international affairs. According to the British participants, the region’s countries are pursuing a pragmatic approach, strengthening connectivity and expanding their participation in shaping a modern architecture of economic and political cooperation. Education and Finance Interest in British education continues to grow across all five Central Asian countries. Four branches of British universities are operating in Kazakhstan, and nearly 6,000 students have earned British degrees through the Bolashak international scholarship program. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have announced plans to establish international financial centers modeled on the Astana International Financial Centre in Kazakhstan. British Ambassador to Uzbekistan Timothy Smart said that work is underway to create an international financial center in Tashkent based on international arbitration standards. Like the Astana model, the new center will operate under English common law. British Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Nicholas Bowler highlighted London’s role in assisting with legislation for the International Dispute Resolution Center, which will operate under English law and be located in the Issyk-Kul region. Greater participation by Central Asian companies on the London Stock Exchange is also anticipated. Logistics and Resources British diplomats have placed particular emphasis on cooperation in critical minerals, a priority within the United Kingdom’s global strategy. Projects are underway across the region, accompanied by new agreements and industrial partnerships. Agreements have reportedly been reached between the Kazakh producer Zhezkazganredmet and the British...