• KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
29 August 2026

Viewing results 61 - 66 of 13498

Russia’s Fuel Crisis Deepens as Queues and Rationing Return

Russia’s fuel shortages have worsened again after easing in late July, with queues returning to filling stations and sales restrictions reappearing across several regions. In early August, hours-long queues were reported in at least 12 regions. Orenburg and Lipetsk reinstated systems allowing motorists to buy fuel on alternate days according to their license plate numbers. Similar restrictions had been used during the first wave of shortages in June and July. The shortages have been linked to refinery outages following Ukrainian drone attacks, high seasonal demand, and problems moving fuel between regions. Russia’s government has acknowledged difficulties with fuel supplies in several regions and ordered officials and oil companies to keep working to stabilize the domestic market. The pressure has also led to confrontations. In Volgograd on July 17, police detained five residents who were recording a video appeal to Alexander Bastrykin, head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, about fuel shortages and priority access at filling stations. One participant was later jailed for five days after the authorities said he resisted police. Local reporting said officials treated the recording as an unauthorized public gathering. Moscow has meanwhile taken increasingly broad steps to protect domestic supplies. The government extended restrictions on fuel exports from August 1, with the gasoline ban due to remain in force until January 31, 2027. It has also temporarily allowed production and imports of lower environmental-grade gasoline as it tries to increase availability. The effects are already reaching Central Asia. Kazakhstan is tightening controls on its own fuel market as Russia looks for additional supplies, while Kyrgyzstan has opened direct talks with China as Russian deliveries become less reliable. A second wave of shortages in Russia adds further pressure on governments that have long depended on Russian petroleum products.

Tajikistan Seeks 2.55 Million Tons of Iranian Oil and Fuel as Russian Supplies Falter

Tajikistan has asked Iran to supply 2.55 million metric tons of crude oil and petroleum products as Dushanbe looks for alternatives to increasingly unreliable Russian fuel supplies. The request includes 2 million tons of crude oil, 300,000 tons of diesel, 150,000 tons of gasoline, and 100,000 tons of aviation fuel, according to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport. The ministry said the volume would require about 51,000 railway tank cars. The proposal was discussed in Tehran on August 15 during talks between Tajik Transport Minister Azim Ibrohim and Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh. It is not yet a purchase agreement, and Tajikistan has not announced a delivery timetable, price, or supplier. The timing, however, places the proposed trade directly inside a worsening sanctions environment. On August 20, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened economic consequences for countries providing support to Iran, promising “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not announced specific new measures linked to that statement. Significant purchases and transport of Iranian petroleum already carry U.S. sanctions exposure. Executive Order 13846 authorizes sanctions against people and financial institutions involved in significant transactions for the purchase, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum from Iran. A temporary U.S. authorization covering Iranian crude and petroleum products, issued in June, was revoked on July 7, with its wind-down period ending on July 17. Russia’s Fuel Crunch Reaches Tajikistan Dushanbe’s request to Iran is driven by a more immediate problem: dependence on Russian fuel. In 2025, Tajikistan imported about 1.7 million tons of fuel and lubricants, more than 1.2 million tons of which came from Russia. Tajik officials said in July that Russia supplied 84% of imported petroleum products. That dependence has become more difficult to manage as Ukrainian drone attacks have reduced Russian refinery output and forced Moscow to protect its domestic market. Russian fuel shortages began spilling into Central Asia in early summer. Tajikistan’s fuel imports fell sharply in July, pushing Dushanbe to seek additional supplies from China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Iran. Russia still accounted for 72.3% of fuel supplied to Tajikistan in the first half of the year, while talks with Kazakhstan had reached presidential level by the end of July. The pressure was already visible in Dushanbe. In early July, diesel disappeared from some filling stations, while others imposed sales limits. On July 10, Energy and Water Resources Minister Daler Juma said Tajikistan had roughly two months of petroleum reserves and was seeking alternative suppliers. The scale of the request is striking. At 2.55 million tons, it exceeds Tajikistan’s total fuel and lubricant imports in 2025, although 2 million tons of the proposed volume is crude oil rather than finished fuel. The Ministry of Transport has asked Iran to help organize dedicated tanker trains and create a “green corridor” giving Tajik fuel cargoes priority on the Iranian rail network. Further transit arrangements would still be needed because Tajikistan and Iran do not share a border. The Refinery Question The large crude component also highlights...

Ancient Royal Seal Discovered in Tajikistan

Archaeologists from Tajikistan’s National Museum say they have made a significant discovery, a royal seal made of fired clay from the Kushan period, which began about 2,000 years ago and lasted for several centuries. The circular, pea-green seal has a perforation for threading a cord and was found in very good condition in the Abdurahmoni Jomi district of Khatlon region in southwest Tajikistan, the museum said on August 14. “This discovery may mark a new stage in the study of the Kushan period in the region, providing a solid scholarly basis for reassessing certain existing theories and interpretations concerning its history,” the museum said in a statement. The Kushan Empire extended across a vast area at the height of its power, including swaths of present-day Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and northern India. It emerged from the Yuezhi, a nomadic people who had migrated from what is today northwestern China and established themselves in Bactria, an ancient Central Asian region. The decorated surface of the newly discovered seal, engraved within a circular field measuring six centimeters in diameter, features what the museum’s archaeologists describe as significant political, cultural and artistic elements of the Kushan period. “The composition includes a Bactrian inscription, geometric ornamentation, a bust of a king wearing a crenellated crown, depictions of mountain goats, symbols associated with the royal authority and statehood of the Kushan rulers, as well as motifs associated with the authority of local rulers and other symbolic elements,” the Tajik museum said. Specialists from the Department of Archaeology and Numismatics at the National Museum are analyzing the seal and, once finalized, their findings will be shared with a wider circle of researchers. Arkeonews, an archaeology news platform, said the Bactrian inscription on the seal could be especially important because it might “help determine whether the seal belonged to a royal official, a local ruler or another figure operating within the Kushan political system.” The platform said “the seal may ultimately provide evidence for the relationship between Kushan rulers and regional elites in what is now southern Tajikistan.” Arkeonews said that until the museum’s analysis is complete, some of the “most important questions -- who used the seal, what it was intended to authenticate, and how it functioned within Kushan administration -- remain unanswered.”

Kazakhstan Middle Corridor Railway Cuts Detour, but Caspian Bottlenecks Remain

Kazakhstan expects to complete the roughly 323-kilometer Moyynty-Kyzylzhar railway across the Karaganda and Ulytau regions of central Kazakhstan by the end of 2026. The new line will shorten the Middle Corridor by 149 kilometers and ease congestion on the existing route via Zharyk. Kazakhstan Temir Zholy said in July that 202.5 kilometers of track had been laid. For the China-Europe route, however, the next test is the Caspian Sea. Containers must be transferred from trains at ports in Kazakhstan to ships bound for Azerbaijan, then returned to rail. The speed and regularity of these transfers will determine whether the hours saved within Kazakhstan translate into shorter delivery times. What the New Line Changes Moyynty-Kyzylzhar will give transit trains a more direct route from the Chinese border toward the Caspian and ease pressure on the Moyynty-Zharyk section, where east-west freight competes with domestic traffic. The project is designed to accommodate double-stack container trains and includes provisions for future expansion and electrification. The World Bank projects that capacity on the section will rise from 14 to 28 pairs of freight trains per day, while transit time via the new route is targeted to fall from eight hours to six by 2031. In February, the World Bank approved an $846 million guarantee intended to mobilize $1.41 billion in commercial financing for the project. Across Kazakhstan, the time savings will be more modest. Transit from Dostyk, on the Chinese border, to Aktau is expected to fall from about 72 hours to 68 hours by 2031. Farther west, the country is also modernizing the Shalkar-Beineu and Beineu-Mangystau sections leading toward the Caspian ports. The Caspian Remains a Bottleneck The European Union (EU) aims to reduce transit time along the Trans-Caspian route to no more than 15 days. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has estimated that the route has the potential to move cargo between China and Europe in around 18 days, but infrastructure and connectivity constraints have produced transit times ranging from 14 to 60 days. For shippers, reliability is as important as speed. Freight Is Growing Faster Than Caspian Capacity Pressure on the Caspian section is already increasing. In 2025, Kazmortransflot carried 59,400 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) on the Aktau-Baku-Aktau feeder route, more than 15% above the 2024 level of 51,400 TEU. In May 2026, container traffic between Aktau and Azerbaijan reached a company record of 7,451 TEU. Kazakhstan is expanding its port infrastructure as well. The EBRD and the EU are financing upgrades at Aktau, including two dedicated container berths and new handling equipment. The project is expected to double the port’s container-handling capacity. Caspian fleet capacity is another constraint as rail freight grows. Falling Caspian Sea levels are also limiting how fully some vessels can be loaded. From an Alternative to Russia to a Commercial Route After 2022, geopolitics increased demand for the Middle Corridor. It offered Europe a route to Central Asia and China that bypasses Russia, while providing Kazakhstan with another connection to European markets. The corridor increasingly has to compete on commercial terms....

Kazakhstan Targets End to Electricity Deficit by 2027

Just days after a major disruption hit power systems across Central Asia, Kazakhstan reaffirmed its plan to fully cover domestic electricity demand by the first quarter of 2027. By the end of next year, the Energy Ministry expects the country to have a surplus of about 1.3 billion kWh. That margin would still leave relatively little room for error because it is equivalent to only about 1% of the electricity Kazakhstan consumed in 2025, when demand grew by 3.8%. The August 14 outage affected parts of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Power was cut to some consumers in Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city, which has a population of about 2.4 million. The precise chain of events remains unclear. Kazakhstan’s national grid operator KEGOC said the disruption began when two hydrogenerators at Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul Hydropower Plant shut down, sharply changing power flows and overloading Kazakhstan’s North-East-South transmission corridor. Kyrgyzstan’s Energy Ministry later acknowledged that the Toktogul shutdown was the initial disturbance but said it should not automatically be treated as the direct cause of the subsequent outages elsewhere in Central Asia. A special commission is investigating the incident, although public statements so far have not identified its chair. The outage exposed a risk in regional grid connections. Kazakhstan’s grid is connected to Russia and neighboring Central Asian systems. These links allow electricity to move across borders, but a sudden loss of generation or a major transmission failure can also affect several countries in quick succession. Kazakhstan has been a net electricity importer for several years. In 2025, the country generated 123.1 billion kWh and consumed 124.6 billion kWh. Electricity imports from Russia totaled 4.64 billion kWh, compared with exports of 2.16 billion kWh in the opposite direction. The net inflow from Russia fell from 3.41 billion kWh in 2024 to 2.48 billion kWh in 2025. Electricity consumption increased by 3.8% in 2025, while peak demand reached a record 17.724 GW on December 18. Kazakhstan is also seeking to attract energy-intensive industries and large data centers. Those expectations are reflected in longer-term development plans, which already include 7.8 GW of new and modernized coal-fired generation by 2030, with investment estimated at more than $15.5 billion. The authorities expect to close the remaining short-term deficit by rapidly commissioning new generating capacity. Around 2.6 GW is scheduled to come online in 2026. Four gas-fired power plants and expansion projects at two existing power stations account for part of that capacity, while ten new renewable energy facilities are also planned. The Energy Ministry says these projects should allow Kazakhstan to fully meet its electricity needs by the end of the first quarter of 2027. A further 845 MW is planned for 2027, of which 570 MW would come from renewable projects. By the end of that year, the ministry expects an electricity surplus of around 1.3 billion kWh. Renewable energy is expanding alongside Kazakhstan’s continued reliance on conventional generation. Thermal power plants accounted for 74.4% of electricity generation in 2025. Solar and wind facilities, along with biogas plants, provided 6.1%. The...

Uzbekistan’s Alphabet Reform Revives a 33-Year-Old Debate

Uzbekistan began switching from Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet in 1993 and initially planned to complete the transition by 2000. Nearly 33 years later, both scripts are still widely used, and the country is preparing to revise its Latin alphabet again. On July 7, the lower house of Uzbekistan’s parliament approved a bill introducing a new version of the alphabet, with 28 letters and one apostrophe instead of the current 26 letters and three letter combinations, and sent it to the Senate. Literary scholar Dilbar Khaydarova told The Times of Central Asia that a reform originally intended to take seven years has stretched across a generation. She attributes the delay mainly to an inconsistent transition, with schools moving faster than publishers and much of the government. “After 30 or 31 years, these small corrections have prompted another reform,” she said. A Reform That Stretched Across Decades Uzbekistan adopted the law introducing a Latin-based alphabet in 1993. Schools were to use the new script first, while adults were expected to have opportunities to study it at workplaces and institutions. The transition was initially due to be completed by 2000. In 1995, the deadline was extended to 2005 and later postponed to 2010. The original alphabet was revised in 1995, when sh and ch were adopted and ng was listed separately. That revision also introduced the forms o‘ and g‘, establishing an alphabet of 26 letters and three letter combinations. Two Alphabets for One Country Schools switched to Latin, while Cyrillic remained common in government and the publishing industry. The media also continued using the script for years, and the Soviet-educated generation remained active in public institutions after 1993. As a result, children learned to write in Latin but continued to encounter Cyrillic in publications and official documents. The same script remained in use when they entered the workplace. “Even if we became literate in Latin, we also developed the ability to read and write in Cyrillic,” Khaydarova said. “Because the situation required it.” She describes this as the coexistence of “two policies or practices that did not correspond to each other.” This mismatch, she believes, largely explains why the transition has lasted for decades. That pattern persists, with some major publications using Latin while others continue publishing in Cyrillic. Khaydarova says the difference does not necessarily reflect opposition to the reform because publishers must consider their audiences’ habits. The Cost of the New Alphabet Implementing the revised alphabet will involve costs beyond school textbooks. Since 1993, Uzbekistan has accumulated a vast body of material in both Cyrillic and the current version of Latin. For publishers, this raises questions about whether existing publications should be converted to the revised script and who will pay for the work. “If they lose a significant share of their audience, there will be serious financial risks in the future,” Khaydarova said. Khaydarova believes the state will have to bear some of the cost by supporting publishers that convert existing materials to the revised script. “The more sources of...