The current polycrisis fundamentally damaged the whole architecture of the Modern World Order, in particular, the Economics and Global Governance.
Global tensions peaked during the 2019 pandemic crisis, and the 2022 war in Ukraine not only reduced the post-Cold War dynamics of international cooperation but changed its very nature. The Global Risks Report, issued by the 2023 Davos World Economic Forum, explains that a polycrisis dominated by the cost-of-living crisis, climate crisis, and political instability threatens to reverse hard-fought gains in development and growth, “The biggest turmoil is geopolitical… We have already entered a multipolar world in which each region has its own issues and role in global politics” (Jeffrey Sachs, The New World Economy, January 10, 2023).
The era of a favorable climate for international trade, investment promotion in emerging markets, and the liberalization of international cooperation—beginning with the breakdown of the socialist bloc—is likely coming to an end. We have now entered a poly-crisis in which multiple risks exert force equally. The increasing number and dynamics of these crises are of deep concern for global governance actors, as unresolved old threats are now compounded by new ones, creating additional difficulties. What is essential is the widening imbalance between crisis management and development in global governance. Global management today focuses primarily on crisis regulation while playing a diminishing role in development programs. This is evident in the financial resource allocation for the Ukrainian crisis and UN funds for sustainable development: total bilateral aid from the US and EU for Ukraine between January 24, 2022, and June 30, 2024, amounts to $75.1 billion and $39.38 billion, respectively. In contrast, as of January 2017, only 22 joint UN programs had been approved with a total budget of $69.36 million.
Global governance priorities are increasingly skewed toward security, while the socio-economic component steadily declines due to rising global conflicts.
We have entered a fragmented, polarized world that lacks consensus on many critical international issues. Globalization is taking on features of deglobalization. The war in Ukraine has divided the world into two camps—the Global North (Western nations) and the Global South (Eastern nations)—each with differing visions for the contemporary world order. This division now permeates nearly all aspects of international and national life.
The return of President Trump’s Administration in January 2025 raises several new questions and expectations regarding the future status of global partnerships.
The updated American strategy urgently requires a deep and comprehensive political and academic analysis. This includes recent US actions such as withdrawing from certain UN institutions (e.g., the UN Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization, with UNESCO possibly following), imposing trade tariffs among major global trading partners, and introducing other new initiatives. These changes have already become a reality.
At the same time, we observe a decline of the United Nations’ effectiveness in resolving the acute problems of Global Security and Sustainable Development. Consequently, new global development initiatives have emerged, spearheaded by the United States and the European Union (PGII), as well as China (GDI, GSI, GHI). In practice, international cooperation formats such as the G7 and G20 have increasingly assumed the functions originally mandated to UN bodies.
The rising importance of the Global South in global cooperation and the growing influence of emerging Asian markets reflect shifts in the current balance of power, necessitating separate and comprehensive analysis.
Regional models of cooperation are on the rise. They demonstrate greater activity in conflict resolution and business development. The development of intraregional models of cooperation, like BRICS, and APEC, underscores this trend.
In this changing landscape, middle-income developing countries are playing a more active role in crisis management and global economic projects, asserting themselves as middle and small power players.
At the same time, the comprehensive Global Crisis is prompting a search for alternative solutions or a revival of past approaches, opening new opportunities for mitigating emerging global risks.
Middle-power diplomacy could be one such opportunity to de-escalate global confrontations. Middle power Diplomacy is not a new phenomenon in international relations, but it has acquired new relevance in the current geopolitical context. It is characterized by increasing multipolarity and US-China competition (Maleena Lodhi, “Era of Middle Powers?” in e-newspaper Dawn, as of September 11, 2023).
The 2024 Davos Economic Session, “Middle Powers in a Multipolar World,” released a white paper titled “Shaping Cooperation in a Fragmenting World.” It states that “Middle Powers–which have long played an important role in international innovation and mediation–could be key to realizing this vision [a new multipolar global order].”
In this fragmented and turbulent environment, the role of middle-power diplomacy is expanding. As President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev wrote, “Global peace and stability are currently under threat by tensions between major world powers.” He calls for solidarity among middle powers to prevent a global catastrophe. He explains, “It is time for an informal alliance of middle powers that are interested in supporting a global rules-based order… Collectively, they have a chance of working together to preserve a world based around rules and rights, rather than power and force.” (Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, May 28th, 2023)
Trends in Middle Power Diplomacy
Several trends are emerging in middle-power diplomacy. We are witnessing the drive of the middle power countries towards individual initiatives or regional models of cooperation rather than global forms of activities (under the umbrella of the United Nations, for example). As a result of global confrontation, political cooperation has been transferred to the regions, where shared historical backgrounds, cultural traditions, and border trade interactions create more conducive conditions for understanding and trust. The rise of new formats of cooperation in Central Asia, such as the US+, China+, EU+, Russia+, and India+, illustrates this trend.
Another notable trend is the growing importance of behavioral factors in middle-power diplomacy, compared to economic strength alone. Although economic power remains relevant, the effectiveness of middle-power diplomacy now depends more on strategic positioning and soft power influence. Kazakhstan, for example, ranks among the top 50 middle-power countries by GDP while also actively contributing to international peace and development projects.
Nevertheless, the importance of economic criteria, as a major characteristic of the established middle-power policy, has been sharply diminished due to global economic sanctions and the consequences of COVID-19.
We also observe that individual middle power influence (one country acting independently) is increasingly being replaced by the consolidation of multiple middle power countries (MPCs) around a new cooperative agenda driven by commercial motivations and healthy market competition. In this respect, we are witnessing an increased importance of countries located at the crossroads of distant marketplaces. These so-called bridge or transit countries—such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and other nations in the South Caucasus and Central Asia—play a crucial role in cementing the strategically significant East-West communication corridor, spanning from China to Europe. In recent years, the term “Central Eurasia,” which refers to Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, has been attracting attention as a distinct geopolitical area. (Vladimer Papava, Becoming European. Challenges for Georgia in the Twenty-First Century, Universe, p.27, 2021)
In classical terms, middle-power countries are typically identified within the China-U.S. geopolitical sphere, where the interests of major global players intersect and shape the political and economic stability of both the region and the world. At the same time, the global significance of this region is increasing, as it offers opportunities to bridge gaps in trade and economic relations caused by the Ukraine crisis and the aftermath of the pandemic. In fact, the middle and small-power countries are becoming active contributors toward the reduction of global confrontation risks.
What underpins this observation? In our view, the region has the potential to introduce a new model of cooperation that transforms global tensions into healthy commercial competition, involving diverse participants from both the East and the West. The South Caucasus and Central Asia present particularly suitable environments for activating this model. This region hosts a range of players—global powers, middle powers, and smaller nations—each with distinct functions as producers, traders, and transit providers. Such diversity facilitates the advancement of projects with clear commercial interests. One prominent example is the Middle, or Trans-Caspian, International Transportation Corridor. Despite its high commercial cost at present—due to limited capacity, underdeveloped soft security infrastructure, and gaps in legal and technological frameworks—the corridor remains a strategically motivated initiative with long-term potential. This is particularly relevant given the recent surge in cargo shipments from China to Europe.
The Middle Corridor offers several distinct advantages. It provides the shortest land route for transporting goods from China to Europe (approximately 12–14 days compared to 35–40 days by sea), and, importantly, it is also the safest.
Another argument in favor of this cooperative model is the relatively balanced international relations and long-standing partnerships maintained by South Caucasus and Central Asian countries with both global and regional players. Additionally, the region is at the center of post-pandemic recovery efforts in international cooperation. As a result, we can anticipate a further increase in the transportation of goods and services, particularly in the health industry, social sectors, food supply, and other essential commodities. This trend is already evident, as cargo transportation along the Middle Corridor increased by 35% from January to April 2024. This growth suggests that, despite its current infrastructure limitations, the Middle Corridor holds promising commercial potential.
Furthermore, the region is emerging as a platform for new large-scale projects sponsored by international organizations. One notable example is the post-conflict economic rehabilitation of Afghanistan. The relocation of the UN Mission on Afghanistan to Kazakhstan underscores the country’s growing international role as a middle power. Another example is the EU-co-sponsored Black Sea submarine electric cable project, linking Azerbaijan and Georgia to Europe, further reinforcing the region’s increasing global significance.
The case of the South Caucasus and Central Asia highlights the expanding geopolitical and geo-economic importance of transit economies, demonstrating the successful application of middle power policy. In an increasingly globalized yet fragmented world, transit economies not only facilitate economic interactions but also serve as bridges between diverse communities, fostering global cooperation through pragmatic, multipurpose projects. These initiatives generate employment, create new business opportunities, and instill greater confidence in international commerce.
Emerging middle-power countries are also taking on the role of organizing large-scale international forums, often on par with the UN General Assembly or the World Economic Forum in Davos. Examples include the 2024 COP-29 International Conference in Azerbaijan and the annual Astana International Forum, both of which highlight the growing influence of middle-power diplomacy in modern international politics and economics.
When identifying middle-power countries, two well-established criteria are typically considered: natural, economic, and military resources, and the ability to contribute to global peace and stability through active international engagement and initiatives. We propose adding a third criterion—political leadership. This factor is particularly relevant today, as there appears to be a shortage of highly skilled, internationally recognized political leaders.
The specifics and renewed role of small power countries (for example, Georgia) also should be a matter of separate consideration in the context of new mechanisms of cooperation.
In response to the weaknesses of traditional multilateral cooperation models, we suggest establishing a Middle and Small Power Transit Countries Network. This initiative would further advance the cooperative framework discussed here, promoting economic integration and enhancing global stability.
Sergey Kwan
