• KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00188 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10390 -0.86%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00188 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10390 -0.86%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00188 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10390 -0.86%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00188 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10390 -0.86%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00188 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10390 -0.86%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00188 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10390 -0.86%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00188 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10390 -0.86%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00188 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10390 -0.86%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%

“Be a Man”: Bishkek Vice Mayor Detained in Public Showdown

The Vice Mayor of Bishkek, Zhamalbek Yrsaliev, has been detained during a public meeting in the Tunguch neighborhood, presided over by Kamchybek Tashiyev, the controversial Chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security (GKNB).

Residents at the July 16 meeting accused Yrsaliev of illegally occupying a 1,500 m² municipal land plot where unauthorized commercial kiosks and children’s attractions had been operating for six years without any lease payments. According to Economist.kg, this misuse cost the city budget over 2.9 million Kyrgyz som ($33,160), and stalled the planned development of a public square and playground.

During the meeting, Tashiyev confronted Yrsaliev directly. In a moment caught on video, he told the vice mayor to take responsibility for his actions and “Be a man,” ordering the security services to detain him immediately. Officers escorted Yrsaliev from the event to the GKNB headquarters. According to Sputnik Kyrgyzstan, Yrsaliev admitted responsibility and apologized, but Tashiyev continued to reprimand him, telling Yrsaliev, “You will not deceive the people.” The investigation is ongoing.

The charges against Yrsaliev include abuse of office and corruption. Alongside him, officials from the Lenin and Oktyabr district administrations were also detained during the same operation, according to preliminary reports.

Appointed as vice mayor in May 2024, Yrsaliev previously served as vice-mayor of Bishkek for housing and communal services, and akim of the Pervomaisky district.

The arrest marks another chapter in Kyrgyzstan’s sweeping anti-corruption campaign under President Sadyr Japarov. In January 2023, former Deputy Prime Minister Zhenish Razakov was detained on suspicion of a $1 million fraud and abuse of office, and in December 2024, the authorities arrested the head of the state tax service and his deputy.

While Yrsaliev’s detention has been officially framed as part of an anti-corruption effort, it unfolds within a broader political climate in Kyrgyzstan marked by increasing executive consolidation and the expanded role of the GKNB in domestic affairs. Independent watchdogs, including Freedom House, have noted a rise in politically motivated prosecutions and diminished judicial independence in recent years, raising concerns that cases such as this may serve not only legal but also political purposes.

Further updates are expected as the investigation continues.

Kazakhstan in Afghanistan: From Rhetoric to Infrastructure

The visit of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu to Kabul (July 10–11) was a turning point not only for bilateral relations but also for the entire regional logistics agenda. While Astana’s previous statements about its readiness to participate in the Trans-Afghan Corridor were viewed by many with skepticism as a demonstration of goodwill without practical substance, these doubts have now been dispelled.

Kazakhstan has not only reaffirmed its commitment to the project but also reinforced it with concrete commitments. An interdepartmental memorandum on the implementation of the Torgundi-Herat railway line has been signed, and Astana has confirmed its readiness to invest up to $500 million in the Trans-Afghan railway project. This is an important step in the formation of future transport corridors within the Central Asia to South Asia (CA2SA) initiative. Practical matters such as tariff policy, border crossing procedures, logistics, and digitalization were also discussed.

The visit also carried diplomatic weight. Kazakhstan is demonstrating its willingness to engage pragmatically with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities. This is not a step towards recognizing the Taliban regime, but an effort to involve Kabul in economic processes without altering Kazakhstan’s legal or political stance.

Attempts to link this visit to Russia’s recognition of the Taliban appear superficial. Such trips are not planned spontaneously — in diplomatic practice, visits at this level are prepared for weeks, if not months. The very structure of the negotiations made it clear what the priorities were: infrastructure, transport security, and economic cooperation, not political recognition.

Given Kazakhstan’s balanced foreign policy, formal de jure recognition of the Taliban regime is unlikely in the foreseeable future. The current status quo — practical cooperation without political legitimization — is acceptable to all parties, regional states, and Afghanistan alike.

At most, we may see an elevation of diplomatic representation. Currently, both countries are represented by temporary chargés d’affaires. After the visit, extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassadors may be appointed. However, even this would not mean recognition. Diplomatic missions are a means of communication, not a political endorsement.

Kazakhstan’s position continues to be guided by that of the United Nations. Until the Credentials Committee changes its position on the Afghan side’s participation in the General Assembly, Astana will not force events. From 2021 to 2024, the committee rejected the Taliban’s applications for accreditation, which de facto means a refusal of international recognition at the global level. Although these decisions are not legally binding, they serve as the main political guideline for states that adhere to a collective approach. In matters of recognition, it is essential not to get ahead of geopolitical realities.

It is important that Kazakhstan’s actions are not isolated: they are in line with other countries in the region, especially those bordering Afghanistan. Whereas previously the policy of Central Asian countries towards their southern neighbor was determined by security issues, the focus is now shifting to trade, logistics, and infrastructure development.

Across all regional capitals, there is growing recognition that supporting Afghanistan is not a formality, but a rational strategic choice. After more than 40 years of instability, Central Asia needs a stable neighbor, not a “burning heart of Asia.”

Approaches to the Trans-Afghan Railway differ somewhat among the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are actively promoting the western route — from Herat to Kandahar and on to the port of Gwadar. Uzbekistan, on the other hand, is betting on the eastern corridor, which is supposed to connect Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul, and Peshawar, providing access to Pakistan’s seaports. The first project is already being implemented, while the second is still under discussion due to its engineering complexity and high costs.

However, both routes are complementary, especially in light of proposals to link Termez and Herat. This would give Uzbekistan access to Iran and the Persian Gulf via western Afghanistan.

From a regional standpoint, both rail lines are elements of the Open Road Initiative, which seeks to transform Afghanistan into a central hub of a new Eurasian logistics network.

Tajikistan remains on the sidelines for now: its relations with the Taliban government remain politically charged. However, there are increasing signs that Dushanbe is shifting towards pragmatism.

Tajikistan has a direct interest in regional energy and transit projects. One example is the CASA-1000 project, which would allow electricity to be exported to South Asia via Afghanistan. The success of such projects depends on stable working relations with Kabul’s de facto authorities.

Moreover, Afghanistan has the potential to significantly enhance regional connectivity, including via the so-called “Five-Nation Corridor” (China–Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan–Afghanistan–Iran). While this initiative exists mostly on paper for now, construction of the Herat–Mazar-i-Sharif railway could serve as a catalyst for its revival. At the very least, it would offer Tajikistan access to the Persian Gulf and the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, which connects through Turkmenistan to Turkey.

In this context, trans-Afghan projects are becoming not just logistical routes, but a tool for regional consolidation. Despite differences in approach, the countries of Central Asia are demonstrating a common desire not to isolate Afghanistan, but to involve it in a sustainable infrastructure system.

The idea of the “Silk and Stone Axis” is no longer a metaphor, but a reflection of the region’s strategic course. Nurtleu’s visit and Kazakhstan’s approach as a whole are not exceptions, but part of a common regional logic.

By helping Afghanistan integrate into regional processes, Central Asia is simultaneously strengthening its own stability, not for the sake of recognition, but out of strategic calculation.

Saida Mirziyoyeva, Uzbek President’s Daughter, Grows Her Authority

Saida Mirziyoyeva, the eldest daughter of Uzbekistan’s president Shavkat Mirziyoyev, will focus on education, business, the judicial and legal system, healthcare, and water resources in her new job as head of the presidential administration.

Mirziyoyev has signed a decree with details about the structure of the office that his daughter took over last month, handing her authority in a wide range of areas that are critical to Uzbekistan’s efforts to modernize its economy and society. The move points to the increasing political influence of Mirziyoyeva, a polished operator who is comfortable interacting with foreign dignitaries and other international partners.

The presidential decree announced the elimination of 284 staff positions and removed redundancies in other roles in the presidential administration, presidential spokesman Sherzod Asadov said Wednesday.

Five deputies have been appointed to “ensure the effective implementation of reforms” in education and the other four areas that Mirziyoyeva’s office will work on, according to Asadov. Uzbekistan also has ministries and other agencies that work in those areas.

Mirziyoyeva, 40, had served as a presidential aide before being promoted to head of the presidential administration. She has spoken in support of freedom of speech and women’s rights, issues that have sometimes run up against conservative culture and tight political controls in Uzbekistan. In a recent post on social media, she also noted that Uzbekistan earned a “BB” rating with a stable outlook from the Fitch Ratings agency, describing it as “the first upgrade since 2018!”

Mirziyoyev, 67, has been president of Uzbekistan since 2016. He was re-elected in a 2023 vote after a constitutional amendment that reset the number of his terms in office and lengthened presidential terms from five to seven years.

Hostage-Taker in Almaty Airport Drama Sentenced to 11 Years in Prison

A knife-wielding man who took a hostage at Almaty International Airport before being disarmed by a former boxer who grabbed the weapon has been sentenced to 11 years in prison, media in Kazakhstan reported on Wednesday.

Mashrapbek Baratov, 67, was sentenced in an Almaty court for the March 7 incident in which he held an airport employee by her hair and made threats as security officials gathered nearby. He let go of the woman after Musa Abdraim offered himself as a hostage, then disarmed the hostage-taker shortly afterward. Several witnesses filmed the scene with their phone cameras, and the images circulated widely on the internet.

Baratov admitted guilt, and his trial was conducted in a relatively short time. He had been charged with hostage-taking, hooliganism, and intentionally making a false report of a terrorist act, according to Tengri News, a media outlet based in Kazakhstan.

Abdraim won praise for his bold action from Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and the World Boxing Council.

Steel Diplomacy: Central Asia’s Southern Push via Afghanistan

The United States and its allies may be uneasy about the Taliban’s return to power, given their extremist history, continued repression, and the collapse of decades-long Western efforts in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Taliban is strengthening ties with the Global South—particularly Central Asia—in search of investment for railway infrastructure. For landlocked Central Asian nations, Afghanistan is a key transit point on the shortest route to the Arabian Sea, offering an alternative to routes through Russia, China, or westward via the Caspian.

The war-torn country – located at the crossroads of Central and South Asia – serves as a land bridge between the former Soviet republics and the major markets of the region, including India and Pakistan. This strategic position is why regional actors are eager to invest in the construction of the railway network in Afghanistan, fully aware that the new route would help them achieve at least some of their geopolitical and geoeconomics interest.

Kazakhstani Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu’s recent visit to Kabul was, according to reports, primarily focused on Afghan railway infrastructure. The largest Central Asian nation economy is reportedly ready to invest $500 million in the construction of the 115km (71 miles) railway from Towrgondi on Afghanistan’s border with Turkmenistan to the city of Herat.

As Taliban railway officials told The Times of Central Asia, the Afghan and Kazakh delegations, who signed a memorandum of understanding on the project, are expected to finalize new agreements and contracts in the coming months. A detailed construction study is expected to be completed by winter, and Afghan authorities anticipate that construction will begin by the end of the year. 

Meanwhile, Kabul hopes to reach similar deals with neighboring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, as well as with Russia and Pakistan. According to Taliban railway experts, these four nations – along with Kazakhstan – are expected to play a major role in the development of the 700-kilometer (approximately 435-mile) railway network in Afghanistan.

The Taliban political officials, on the other hand, see the project as an opportunity for Afghanistan to increase its geopolitical importance.

“It will help us reduce economic dependence and isolation, allowing Afghanistan to integrate more actively into the regional economy,” Muhammad Rehman, the Taliban-appointed Chargé d’Affaires of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to Kazakhstan, told The Times of Central Asia,

From his perspective, nations investing in Afghan railway infrastructure will become advocates for Afghanistan’s stability. Projects like the construction of the railway, in his view, can transform Afghanistan into a transit hub for regional countries through railway corridors.

“Through the railway, Afghanistan can also import goods at a significantly lower cost, making essential commodities more affordable for its people,” Rahman stressed.

More importantly, the railway opens a route for Central Asian natural resources to reach global markets via the ocean and further enhances the viability of the westward-flowing Middle Corridor. In short, the Afghan rail projects are important for connecting Eurasia. It is, therefore, no coincidence that Kazakhstan – being the richest country in terms of mineral wealth in Central Asia – was the first regional actor to publicly negotiate infrastructure deals with the Taliban.

Fully aware of the importance of Afghanistan as a transit country, Kazakhstan kept its Kabul embassy open under Taliban rule and later accredited Taliban-appointed diplomats to work in Astana. In an attempt to strengthen relations with the new Afghan authorities, in April 2023 Kazakhstan’s Trade Minister Serik Zhumangarin led a delegation to Kabul to discuss trade and deliver humanitarian aid. The following year, Astana removed the Taliban from its national list of banned terrorist organizations, while in June 2025, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev appointed a Special Representative for Afghanistan, veteran diplomat Yerkin Tukumov. He even described Afghanistan’s integration into regional transport and trade as a “strategic priority.”

As a result of Astana’s diplomatic initiative, Kazakhstan is now one of the ten main trading partners of Afghanistan. Last year, the trade turnover between the two nations amounted to $545.2 million, of which the export of Kazakh products reached $527.7 million. 

In the coming months and years, other regional countries are expected to follow Kazakhstan’s path and normalize relations with the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. After Kyrgyzstan, in September 2024, removed Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations, Bishkek began developing closer economic ties with Afghanistan. Uzbekistan – de facto recognizing the Afghan group as the legitimate government in Kabul – has recently applied to join the North-South corridor through Afghanistan, while Turkmenistan remains engaged in talks with the Taliban on the Trans-Afghanistan pipeline, also known as the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline.

The only Central Asian state that openly refuses to do any business with the Taliban, and repeatedly warns of terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan, is Tajikistan. The former Soviet republic’s approach is no surprise, given that militant groups hostile to the government in Dushanbe (like the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan) have found refuge in Taliban-controlled areas. 

The United States and other Western countries also remain skeptical of the Taliban’s regional ambitions. They have not recognized the Taliban government due to its poor human rights record, especially regarding women and minorities. Moreover, on July 8, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution strongly condemning the Taliban’s policies in Afghanistan regarding women and girls. The document was supported by 116 countries, including all Central Asian states. But in spite of critical approach, American envoys have in 2023 met Taliban representatives in Doha and elsewhere to discuss issues like humanitarian aid and security commitments.

Mars Sariyev, a Kyrgyz political scientist and regional security expert, believes that the US plans eventually to return to Afghanistan – not through a military campaign, but through diplomacy and economy. 

“It is a matter of time. The United States will use Afghanistan and the Taliban movement to shift the balance of geopolitical forces in Central Asia. For instance, to divide Russia and China, and to strengthen its own influence in the region,” Sariyev stressed.

Alternatively, the U.S. may see long-term value in Afghanistan as a stable transit hub linking Central Asia to global markets—a goal it pursued during its rebuilding efforts in the country. Secular, modernizing states like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan could support this vision by promoting economic ties and regional integration, helping reduce Afghanistan’s isolation and enhance stability.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s rulers are expected to focus on developing stronger economic ties with Central Asian states, particularly in the field of railway construction.

“In the near future, we are likely to witness more agreements similar to the Kazakhstan–Afghanistan railway project from Towrgondi to Herat, which will further integrate Afghanistan into regional trade networks,” Rahman concluded. 

But since talks are reportedly underway to initiate direct flights between Afghanistan and Kazakhstan, for the foreseeable future Kabul will almost certainly prioritize its relations with Astana – the Taliban’s major partner in the region.

Central Asia Faces Growing Energy Deficit

Central Asia is heading toward a serious energy crunch. According to the Logistan.info portal, regional demand for imported natural gas is expected to reach 25 billion cubic meters annually by 2030. This looming shortfall is driven by rapid population growth, around one million people per year, industrial expansion, declining domestic production, and the deteriorating state of aging infrastructure. Recent accidents in Bishkek, Tashkent, Dushanbe, and Ekibastuz illustrate the scale and urgency of the problem.

Kazakhstan: Rising Output, Falling Exports

Kazakhstan produced 59.2 billion cubic meters of gas in 2024, representing a 6.4% increase from the previous year. However, nearly half of this was reinjected into oil reservoirs to sustain production. Only 29 billion cubic meters were available for domestic consumption. Soaring internal demand has already led to a sharp decline in exports to China, which fell 40% to 8.7 billion cubic meters.

Uzbekistan: From Exporter to Importer

Uzbekistan’s situation is even more precarious. In 2024, the country produced 44.6 billion cubic meters of gas and 713,400 tons of oil, figures that are in decline, dropping 4.5% and 8.5% respectively. To cover the shortfall, Tashkent has turned to Russia and Turkmenistan, purchasing $1.7 billion worth of gas. Uzbekneftegaz expects to produce just 26.5 billion cubic meters of commercial gas in 2025, far short of projected domestic needs.

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan produce virtually no hydrocarbons and rely entirely on imports of these resources. Meanwhile, demand continues to grow in tandem with their populations, and domestic energy generation falls short of even basic consumption needs.

Turkmenistan remains the region’s top gas exporter, sending 41.3 billion cubic meters abroad in 2024. However, Ashgabat’s ability to increase exports is limited by its own growing domestic consumption, binding long-term contracts with China, and a lack of large-scale infrastructure development.

Investment, Delays, and Structural Challenges

While Central Asian governments have announced plans for new hydroelectric plants, combined heat and power stations, and nuclear power facilities, tangible progress remains slow. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have yet to break ground on any of their proposed nuclear power projects. Key obstacles include a shortage of qualified personnel, water scarcity, environmental concerns, and, above all, insufficient funding. Without substantial foreign investment, modernization efforts are likely to stall.

To ease financial pressures, countries in the region have begun raising gas and electricity tariffs. These price hikes aim to offset upgrade costs but have provoked public backlash and fueled inflation. In Uzbekistan, for instance, inflation accelerated to 15% in May 2025, with energy prices cited as the primary driver.

The Russian Option

Forecasts for regional gas imports remain imprecise, but analysts estimate the need could rise to 20-25 billion cubic meters annually by 2030. Russia appears poised to become the main supplier, though details of supply agreements, including pricing, volumes, and terms, have not been disclosed. Central Asian governments are attempting to keep cooperation with Moscow strictly within the economic sphere, wary of entangling political dependencies.

As a result, the region faces a dual challenge: securing energy stability through technological upgrades and infrastructure investment, while carefully navigating the geopolitical implications of increasing reliance on Russian gas.