• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10877 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10877 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10877 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10877 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10877 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10877 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10877 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10877 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
16 December 2025

What Bank Loan Data Can Tell Us About Kazakh Business in 2023

After being severely tested by the pandemic in 2020-21, several thousand companies in Kazakhstan closed due to decreased demand and supply chain disruptions. Though the problems of local businesses began long before the pandemic, the two years of lockdown wiped out many good players and made those that survived more dependent on government orders and projects.

Overall, Kazakhstan has a primarily commodity-driven economy (crude oil, metals and petrochemicals account for the majority of export earnings), and the country’s economic fortunes have tracked the prices of a short list of major commodity exports.

Thus, the government finds it hard to diversify the economy. Oil price volatility affects the national currency, and the ups and downs in the tenge exchange rate versus hard currencies make it difficult to be in a business with an investment cycle longer than one and a half to two years, as you have lower revenues amid dollar investments. This is one of the reasons why launching long-term projects in the country is difficult when there are no guarantees of sales, while currency risks can hit any project.

The government has been active in attracting foreign investment, offering state support and protection, but only relatively recently did it begin to pay the same attention to the demands of domestic investors. However, this is only the beginning of a very long journey towards reducing dependence on imports and expanding the range of exports to stabilize the economy.

 

A debt-driven economy

The share of the private sector in Kazakhstan is difficult to measure. If we take SMEs (small to medium-sized enterprises) as the core of private business, in different years it fluctuates between a range of 20-30% of GDP. However, since state capitalism is entrenched in the country, even among SMEs there are contractors working for state and quasi-state structures, receiving funds from state companies and agencies.

One-hundred-percent private companies that do not depend on government contracts finance their operations from their own or borrowed capital. This is why, in a transparent economy like Kazakhstan’s, looking at loan data can reveal the main trends in business and which niches have not yet been occupied and could be interesting for investment by both foreign and local players.

It is best to look at the country’s economy through the loan portfolio of banks that are subject to international banking regulation, whose indicators meet an easily understandable standard.

There is a caveat: in Kazakhstan there is also the Development Bank of Kazakhstan, which is not included in the table below. It is technically not a bank, but rather a development institution financed from the quasi-public sector by Baiterek National Management Holding, which receives budgetary funds.

In addition, most extractive-industry companies in Kazakhstan – due to their high capital expenditures and the shallowness of the country’s financial market – raise funds in the U.K., Switzerland, the U.S. and Russia. Chinese banks rarely lend to 100%-Kazakh companies, limiting themselves to trade credits (in the form of equipment) or loans to joint ventures with Chinese participation. Thus, even though up to 80% of foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan goes to the extractive industry, it is not reflected in the below table.

The table below shows data from the central bank on the loan portfolio of the country’s banks, reflecting changes over the course of 2023.

Note: a USD/KZT exchange rate of 450 is used in this table

Loans issued by Kazakh commercial banks in 2023 Jan 1, 2024 ($ bln) Jan 1, 2023

($ bln)

y-o-y change

($ bln)

y-o-y change (%)
Loans 66.3 53.9 12.4 23.1%
Inter-bank loans 0.3 0.2 0.1 24.9%
Reverse repo 1.2 0.5 0.7 139.7%
Loans to non-bank legal entities and individual entrepreneurs (including nonresidents), excluding SMEs that are residents of Kazakhstan, incl.: 10.7 9.7 1.0 10.7%
For the acquisition and construction of real estate 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0%
Other loans 10.5 9.4 1.0 11.0%
Loans to non-bank legal entities and individual entrepreneurs – SMEs that are residents of Kazakhstan, incl.: 17.0 14.2 2.8 19.9%
For the acquisition and construction of real estate 0.8 0.6 0.1 23.5%
Other loans 16.2 13.6 2.7 19.7%
Loans to individuals (including nonresidents), excluding loans to individual entrepreneurs for business purposes, incl.: 37.1 29.3 7.8 26.7%
For the construction and purchase of housing, incl.: 12.1 10.7 1.4 13.1%
mortgage loans 11.8 10.3 1.5 14.2%
Consumer loans 22.9 17.1 5.8 34.2%
Other loans 2.1 1.5 0.6 37.5%

 

The total loan portfolio grew 23.1% from KZT24,254.7 trillion to KZT29,853.7 trillion in 2023, which could indicate higher risks related to the quality of banks’ assets amid the expansion in lending. The president and the government have persistently tried to force banks to expand lending to businesses, but this is often impossible, otherwise banks could find themselves in violation of prudential regulation. Moreover, as long as banks can make a risk-free profit of 1-2% through treasury operations with government securities, an expansion of business lending is unlikely. Moving forward, in an attempt to boost risk appetite and awaken animal spirits, the regulator (in Kazakhstan this is the Agency for Regulation and Development of the Financial Market) plans to limit banks’ access to risk-free assets.

The growth of banks’ loan portfolio in 2023 was driven mostly by two lines: unsecured loans in the form of consumer loans and corporate loans to SMEs subsidized by the state fund, Damu, which subsidizes half the amount of at least half these loans. At the current corporate interest rate of 15-20% (in tenge), a business receiving a subsidized loan pays only 6-8%.

The growth in inter-bank loans and reverse repo, meanwhile, reflects heightened activity between banks and the use of tools for liquidity management, as they prefer to borrow locally rather than in the international capital market due to the high currency risks.

Finally, loans to legal entities and individuals (including consumer loans) rose significantly, especially in the retail segment, where mortgage and consumer loans increased by more than 35%.

There are obvious risks related to the rise in loans to individuals amid slow real income growth:

  • If the creditworthiness of borrowers does not correspond with the rapid growth in consumer loans, this could lead to more nonperforming loans.
  • The increase in mortgage loans may make the banking system more sensitive to market fluctuations, in particular to real estate price dynamics. Excessive state involvement in the mortgage market, especially through preferential mortgages, could eventually cause pain for households in the form of a shortage of free funds and therefore make retail lending more attractive for banks.

Banks have yet to release local earnings, meaning we still do not have a sector breakdown of loans, but in previous periods most loans went to the trade sector (retail and wholesale trade) – usually import distributors (distributing everything from consumer goods to food products) – while working capital loans to producers ranked second. Mortgages and loans to other spheres usually come in third and fourth, respectively.

The main sector that banks lend to – directly and indirectly (through consumer loans) – remains trade. Against this backdrop, in 2022-23 the president and the government promised cheap raw materials and subsidies to local producers, as well as special support measures for those who invest in the processing of commodities (oil and gas, metals, agriculture, etc.). For this reason, in 2024 banks’ loan portfolio will most likely swing toward production and processing, for which the government is ready to allocate billions of dollars in subsidies.

For this and other purposes, in August 2023 the Kazakh state pension fund allocated KZT1.5 trillion (about $3 billion) so that construction of new production facilities could commence in 2024. Of the Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan spends the most money (in relative and absolute terms) to support local production, and this year we should see the first results.

 

Rassul Rysmambetov

Rassul Rysmambetov is an Almaty-based expert in distressed assets. 

Uzbekistan to Increase Production and Export of Agricultural Produce

At a government meeting chaired by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev on March 18th, it was reported that in 2023, Uzbekistan produced 23 million tons of fruit and vegetables, but exports reaped just $2 billion, far short of the anticipated $5 billion.

Over the past year, over ten new markets have opened for Uzbek agricultural exports, including Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Colombia, and Indonesia, raising the number of countries importing agricultural products from Uzbekistan to 85.

There are however, shortfalls in the sector. The potential of one million hectares of land previously used for grain and earmarked for the cultivation of fruit and vegetables is yet to be exploited. The same applies to 508,000 hectares of household plots plus a further 260,000 hectares of land lying barren.

At the meeting, the head of state expressed his readiness to consider any steps necessary for increasing agricultural and food exports in the coming year: “Controlling inflation and ensuring currency stability are directly related to exports. If we do not expand the conditions for export along with an increase in production, the result will not meet expectations.”

To that end, the head of state supported the proposal to boost agricultural exports by opening Uzbekistan’s trading houses in major port cities such as Nagoya, Mersin, Rotterdam, Qingdao, Klaipeda, and Doha.

One of the most vital issues is the certification of Uzbek agricultural produce for export. Following the launch of the first private laboratory with international accreditation at the Agricultural Services Centre in Yukorichirchik, $8 million will be invested in similar modern laboratories in Zangiata, Fergana, and Samarkand this year. A reference laboratory will also be opened in Tashkent to ensure that private laboratories comply with international standards.

Creation of Kazakhstan–Azerbaijan “Supreme Interstate Council” Marks New Era of Cooperation

Diplomatic relations between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have developed dynamically since they were first established in August 1992, and have increased over the past 20 years, and grown especially since 2017. Over the last decade, the number of high-level visits in both directions have been rising to the point where they are now regular occurrences at an inter-ministerial level. That said, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s state visit to Baku on March 11–12 represents yet another new phase in the two countries’ strategic partnership with a focus on trade, economic investment, and international cooperation.

This new era is marked by the creation of their bilateral Supreme Interstate Council (SIC), a qualitatively recent development that will institutionalize and drive cooperation in new ways. (Readers should note here that the connotation of “Supreme” in this case signifies “high-level” rather than “having sovereign or autonomous power”. This is exactly the difference, respectively, between the Russian-language adjectives vysshii – literally “high-level” or “highest” – and verkhovnyi – the USSR’s Supreme Soviet, its highest legislative body, was verkhovnyi. This is a matter of choice of terms for translation. “Supreme” has been adopted following the usage of the countries concerned in their English-language public discourse, but it should not be misunderstood.)

Although the Kazakhstan–Azerbaijan SIC has only just held its first meeting and is not yet fully institutionalized, it would seem from diplomatic indications that its activity is likely to resemble that of the Strategic Partnership Council (SPC) between Turkey and Azerbaijan. This latter forum was created in 2019 to subsume the two countries’ bilateral Strategic Cooperation Council, which was founded in 2010. Cooperation organized by this bilateral SPC broadly covers four issue areas: military-political and security issues, military and military-technical cooperation, humanitarian issues, and economic cooperation.

These areas are listed in order of priority, meaning that the SPC and the SIC’s first focus is on cooperation related to military and security issue areas, plus other relevant issues that these may indicate. Nevertheless, cooperation in the humanitarian and economic spheres, which has been ongoing for some time, is sometimes folded into these top-priority areas within the existing consultative structures.

The agreements signed at the November 2021 presidential summit between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had foreseen the formation of a bilateral SIC between them as well. Now that both these parties have ratified their Treaty of Allied Relations, also signed at that time, this SIC’s first meeting is scheduled for August of this year. Following the pattern of what is known about the SIC with Azerbaijan, it will be formally chaired by the two heads of state and organized by their respective foreign ministries.

The speakers of their parliaments’ lower houses and representatives of security councils may join in the work as necessary. Thus, security and foreign-policy issues will be the main concern in the first instance. Nevertheless, like the SIC between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, the one between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is likely in the medium term to develop organizationally along the lines of the Turkish-Azerbaijani Strategic Cooperation Council, eventual transformation into their bilateral Strategic Partnership Council, as explained above.

It is worth mentioning that Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan also agreed in 2023 to create a bilateral SIC, which has not yet held its first meeting. It would be interesting to speculate whether this might be held along with the Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan SIC meeting planned for August 2024.

Whether that happens or not, the potential exists in the future for such trilateral meetings to take place. Indeed, along with the fact that the various SICs focus in the first instance on security issues makes such trilateral meetings likely in the medium-term, at least in an ad hoc or intermittent format. It is also possible that the SICs become an instrument for facilitating Uzbekistan’s participation in the Trans-Caspian International Trade Route (TITR). At present, no private or public entity from Uzbekistan participates in the TITR (also known as the “Middle Corridor”), whether as a regular member, associate member or partner.

There is an analogous precedent for trilateral intergovernmental security cooperation in the “Weimar Triangle” established in 1991 between France, Germany and Poland. This cooperation forum declined in significance after around 2015, only to be reinvigorated following the February 2022 outbreak of renewed Russian military hostilities against Ukraine.

Given that Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are also affected by the post-2022 situation surrounding the Russia–Ukraine conflict, the likelihood of some trilateral security cooperation being regularized among them in the medium term is heightened.

The creation of SICs between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, as well as between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – and the prospect of a similar council between Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan – represents a significant evolution in the Caspian Sea region’s diplomatic and security landscape. These developments signify not only a strengthening of interstate relationships, but also indicate a strategic decision, taken in parallel, to address mutual security and regional stability concerns in the face of evolving geopolitical challenges.

The emphasis on high-level and comprehensive cooperation frameworks, driven by Kazakhstan’s diplomacy and modelled somewhat on the Turkish-Azerbaijani partnership, suggests a concerted effort to elevate collaboration beyond traditional bilateral formats, addressing shared Caspian Sea interests while seeking to foster a more cohesive and resilient regional order. The eventual adoption of a quasi–Weimar Triangle cooperation model is an intriguing perspective.

In whatever way these patterns may materialize in the future, these councils offer a promising avenue for addressing shared challenges and leveraging the collective strength of Central Asia.

Uzbekistan Starts Exporting Copper Products to the U.S. and Mexico

Exporters in Uzbekistan have begun sending products made of Uzbek copper to Mexico and the U.S., according to the Nigoh Telegram channel. In January and February, Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Combine exported goods valued at $82 million dollars, fulfilling 101.3% of their forecasted capacity.

Among the various products there were 7,300 tons of copper products, 4,600 tons of zinc metal, and 132 tons of molybdenum products.

Items from the Almalyk plant are exported to more than 20 countries, and the geographic reach of their exports is expanding. In 2023 the company added two new markets for copper products in the Americas — the U.S. and Mexico — as well as a new European buyer, Finland.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan Agree to Further Border-Demarcation Protocol

From 12 – 17 March, Tajik and Kyrgyz topographic working groups and legal groups serving under the respective government delegations convened to in Tajikistan’s Sughd region.

According to a report by the Tajik State Committee for National Security, discussion in Buston focused on the demarcation and delimitation of Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s state borders.

During the meeting, an agreement was signed by topographical working groups to codify 10.76 kilometres of the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan state border. The two parties then voted to continue working on defining the remaining portions of the common state border at a subsequent meeting to be held in Kyrgyzstan.

Back in February, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan Sirojiddin Mukhriddin said that almost 200 kilometres of the common line of the Tajikistan-Kyrgyz state border had been agreed upon, leaving roughly 100 kilometres of the area under dispute.

EU Allocates $49 Million to Tajikistan for Energy Projects

The European Union has given Tajikistan €91 million ($99 million) for priority projects in the country under the first phase of the EU Multiannual Indicative Program (MIP) from 2021 to 2024. This was reported by Tajikistan’s Ministry of Economic Development and Trade.

At a recent meeting,
the EU representatives announced that they are prepared to give Tajikistan a €45 million ($49 million) grant for energy projects. 

Under the direction of the EU’s ambassador to Tajikistan Raimundas Karoblis and Tajikistan’s deputy minister for economic development Ashurboy Solehzoda, the parties “stated that they were ready to increase their mutually beneficial cooperation” at the meeting. By the end of 2023, trade between Tajikistan and the EU was valued at $401.5 million ($437 million), according to the economy ministry.

The department had previously stated that Tajikistan-EU trade was valued at $490 million in 2022, meaning that volumes fell by 22% in 2023.