Geopolitics - The Times Of Central Asia

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Black Sea Tanker Attacks

Second Malta-Flagged Vessel Hit in Black Sea as Shipping Risks Rise

The Maltese government has officially condemned recent attacks on commercial vessels in the Black Sea after a second ship flying the Maltese flag was damaged in a missile strike. This marks the second such incident within a week involving Maltese-registered ships. A spokesperson for Malta’s Ministry of Transport confirmed that the latest vessel, a Malta-flagged commercial ship, sustained minor shrapnel damage during a missile strike targeting port infrastructure in the Black Sea. The ship remains seaworthy, although one crew member was injured. The earlier incident involved the Matilda, an oil tanker also registered in Malta and chartered by the Kazakh shipping company Kazmortransflot, a subsidiary of state-owned KazMunayGas. On January 13, according to a statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Matilda was struck by two Ukrainian drones. In 2025, Kazmortransflot increased its transport volumes by more than 15% compared to 2024, reaching 51,400 DFE. The growth was attributed to rising demand for shipping along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. Both incidents occurred near the CPC marine terminal outside Novorossiysk. In a statement, Malta’s Ministry of Transport emphasized that attacks on commercial shipping present a serious threat to civilian seafarers, global shipping safety, and the uninterrupted flow of legitimate international trade. The ministry also noted that commercial vessels operating in conflict zones are increasingly exposed to elevated operational and insurance risks, even when transporting cargo fully compliant with international sanctions. The attacks near the CPC marine terminal have already had a measurable economic impact on shipping and energy exports. As of December 2025, insurance rates for merchant ships operating in the Black Sea had risen to 1% of a vessel’s value, up from 0.75% and 0.25% during more stable periods. Ships operating in areas of active military conflict are typically insured per voyage rather than annually, significantly raising operating expenses. Shipping and insurance analysts say the rise in insurance premiums is reducing profit margins on oil and petroleum product exports in the region. Although Kazakhstan’s export volumes have not yet been directly affected, traders and shippers are increasingly factoring geopolitical and logistical risks into their strategies. Repeated disruptions near one of Eurasia’s critical energy hubs are heightening concerns about the reliability of supply routes, especially given limited alternatives. Kazakhstan has already begun restructuring its oil export network due to disruptions at the CPC, its primary crude oil export channel. Authorities have turned to alternative infrastructure to maintain output and avoid production slowdowns.

Oil Exports

Kazakhstan Restructures Oil Exports Amid Disruptions at CPC

Kazakhstan is rapidly restructuring its oil export routes in response to disruptions affecting the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), a critical channel for the country’s crude shipments. To maintain export volumes and avoid production slowdowns, authorities have turned to alternative infrastructure. According to a statement from KazMunayGas, the national oil company, approximately 300,000 tons of oil were rerouted in December 2025 after restrictions limited the CPC’s intake capacity. In coordination with KazTransOil JSC (KTO), the country redirected oil flows to other export corridors. These rerouted volumes were exported to Germany, China, and via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, with shipments also handled through the ports of Novorossiysk and Ust-Luga. As CPC restrictions remained in place into January 2026, the redirection strategy continued. Amid these challenges, Kazakhstan’s use of alternative routes gained momentum. KazMunayGas reported that oil deliveries to Germany’s Schwedt refinery totaled 2.1 million tons by the end of 2025, with projections indicating a rise to 2.5 million tons in 2026. Exports through the port of Aktau to the BTC pipeline reached 1.3 million tons in 2025 and are expected to grow to 1.6 million tons this year. Shipments to China remained stable, with 1.1 million tons delivered by the end of 2025. These developments reflect a gradual shift aimed at reducing Kazakhstan’s dependency on the CPC which has faced repeated operational setbacks. The CPC disruptions stem from a series of security incidents. In February and March 2025, the Kropotkinskaya station was targeted in drone attacks. On 29 November, a strike on the consortium’s remote mooring device caused damage to its marine terminal. Following the November incident, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy stated that the CPC pipeline is an international energy project and warned that “any forceful impact on its facilities poses direct risks to global energy security.” After another attack on 13 January 2026, when drones targeted three oil tankers near the CPC terminal in the Black Sea, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a sharper response. In emergency consultations with European partners, the U.S., and other stakeholders, Kazakhstan called for reinforced protection of hydrocarbon transportation routes and maritime corridors, emphasizing the need for adherence to international law.

Iran

Opinion: Iranian Unrest Creates Opening for U.S., Partners in Central Asia

As protests in Iran enter their third week, nationwide unrest is exerting political strain and societal pressure on the Islamic Republic. The nation’s current escalation reflects a level of sustained mobilization comparable to Iranian demonstrations that erupted in 2022 following the death of Mahsa Amini. While the outcome of these developments remains uncertain, ongoing unrest in Iran is more likely to impact Central Asia’s existing energy, transit, and security dynamics, rather than alter the broader regional landscape. This moment nonetheless offers the United States and its partners a strategic opportunity to advance long-term objectives in Central Asia while supporting regional resilience at a time when geopolitical alignments are rapidly shifting. Combined with ongoing disruptions caused by Russia’s War in Ukraine, the recent protests in Iran may create a heightened sense of uncertainty or risk perceptions in global energy markets. In particular, the current Iranian unrest may raise concerns regarding potential oil supply disruptions and broader geopolitical tensions. For neighboring producers like Kazakhstan, which maintains an oil-dependent economy, this elevated volatility could translate into higher revenues from existing exports. Increased fiscal flexibility from rising oil revenues may therefore provide Astana with the opportunity to expand its scope for economic cooperation with Western partners. The United States, which maintains long-standing bilateral energy ties with Kazakhstan, could draw on these existing partnerships to deepen its bilateral energy and technical ties. Beyond its impact on energy markets, ongoing instability in Iran may also affect regional connectivity initiatives. For example, disruptions could emerge along the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal network connecting India, Iran, and Russia, with branches that involve the Caspian and Central Asia. Although the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway sits along this route and facilitates the transport of energy resources and critical minerals across the region, the corridor currently plays a more limited role in regional transit across Central Asia. This route nonetheless remains of interest to Central Asia because it offers the region an opportunity to enhance long-term economic diversification through access to new markets in the Persian Gulf. Minor disruptions could therefore underscore the corridor’s growing geopolitical value as a connector for trade and energy transport across multiple countries and regions. This context creates a strategic opening for the United States and its partners to contribute to the region’s long-term trade and connectivity landscape. By supporting Central Asian nations in reducing reliance on Iranian transit, the United States can accelerate investment in alternative routes like the Middle Corridor that bypass both Russia and Iran. During an investors' forum in Tashkent late last year, Europe announced it would increase its investment in the Middle Corridor. However, the United States continues to remain on the periphery of this project. By collaborating with European partners to enhance infrastructure along this route during a critical time, the United States can help Central Asian nations position the Middle Corridor as the region’s most resilient and viable alternative for trade and exports. This would ultimately advance shared interests by enhancing Central Asia’s connectivity and facilitating greater U.S....

U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations

Kazakhstan Elevates U.S. Ties to Presidential-Level

Kazakhstan’s relationship with the United States is entering a more explicitly strategic phase under Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, marked by a shift in how Astana manages its most consequential external partnerships. As economic ties deepen and geopolitical coordination expands across energy, investment, and Eurasian connectivity, engagement with Washington is increasingly being treated as a presidential priority rather than a routine diplomatic file. In this context, Kazakhstan has formally elevated its engagement with the United States by appointing a presidential representative to steer bilateral negotiations on priority issues. By presidential decree, Ambassador Yerzhan Kazykhan—Kazakhstan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office in Geneva and a veteran diplomat with prior postings as ambassador to the United States and the United Kingdom—has been designated as the President’s Representative for negotiations with Washington. The appointment places key aspects of the U.S. relationship under direct presidential oversight from the Akorda, the presidential office. Kazykhan has previously served as foreign minister and assistant to the president, and has held senior roles within both the Foreign Ministry and the presidential administration. His experience in Washington and in multilateral settings provides institutional continuity as the bilateral agenda broadens to encompass investment, energy security, and regional connectivity, while day-to-day execution remains within established diplomatic channels. Drivers Behind the Elevation of U.S.–Kazakhstan Engagement The decision reflects how rapidly the scope of U.S.–Kazakhstan engagement has expanded and how Kazakhstan is positioning itself as a major investment and strategic connectivity hub. The United States is Kazakhstan’s largest source of foreign direct investment, with hundreds of American companies operating across the economy. Chevron, Kazakhstan’s single largest foreign investor, has invested more than $50 billion over time, anchoring long-term U.S. corporate presence in the country’s energy sector. This investment relationship gained further momentum in 2025. At the C5+1 leaders’ summit in Washington, Kazakhstan and U.S. partners announced nearly $17 billion in new commercial agreements and investment commitments across energy, transport, and industrial cooperation. The package was publicly highlighted by U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, underscoring senior-level U.S. political backing for deeper economic engagement with Kazakhstan. Beyond investment, the bilateral agenda has expanded into strategic and geopolitical domains. Kazakhstan’s decision to join the Abraham Accords marked a notable political alignment with a U.S.-led diplomatic initiative, extending the framework’s reach beyond its original Middle Eastern focus. Connectivity has become central to U.S. policy thinking. The Middle Corridor is increasingly viewed as an eastward extension of the post-Azerbaijan–Armenia Caucasus transit framework, also called the ‘Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity’, aimed at reopening and securing east–west routes across the South Caucasus. Extending it through Kazakhstan links Central Asia to Europe while reducing reliance on Russia or Iran. Trade and energy ties reinforce this trajectory. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer and a major supplier to the United States, making the U.S. one of its most important export markets for nuclear fuel. As U.S. policy places greater emphasis on secure and diversified supply chains, Kazakhstan’s role in critical energy inputs and transit infrastructure has taken on added strategic...

Iran

From Tehran to Tashkent: How Iran’s Crisis and U.S. Tariffs Reverberate Across Central Asia

At the end of 2025, Iran once again emerged as a flashpoint on the global political map. Mass protests erupted across the country, fueled by spiraling inflation and economic hardship. At present, the Iranian rial has plummeted to the point where it is effectively worth less than the paper it's printed on. The current wave of unrest, already the largest and deadliest nationwide unrest Iran has seen since 2022, is not occurring in isolation. U.S. President Donald Trump has renewed what his administration describes as a policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran, and his administration is now pursuing what observers have characterized as a strategy of “pushing the falling,” a move aimed at reshaping the political order of the Middle East. What might this mean for neighboring Central Asia? Tajik political analyst Muhammad Shamsuddinov argues the crisis must be viewed within a broader geopolitical context. “The situation in Iran is directly tied to Trump’s second-term pressure campaign,” Shamsuddinov said, referencing a string of destabilizing events. “These include the 12-day U.S.-Israel war against Iran and the reimposition of U.N. sanctions in September 2025," he added, referring to the 12-day June 2025 conflict between Israel and Iran, during which U.S. forces also struck Iranian nuclear facilities. "All of these have deepened the domestic crisis in Iran.” In a further escalation, on January 12, Trump announced 25% tariffs on countries conducting trade with Iran. The move appears targeted primarily at Russia, China, and India - Iran’s largest international partners, but also has implications for Central Asian economies. In the first nine months of 2025, trade between Kazakhstan and Iran grew by nearly 45%, reaching $310.8 million. Tajikistan, which maintains the closest economic ties to Tehran among Central Asian states, reported trade worth $430.7 million in the first eleven months of 2025, an increase of 28% over the same period in 2024. Uzbekistan, while less directly exposed to Iran than Kazakhstan or Tajikistan, has also moved cautiously in recent years to expand trade links with Tehran, making it sensitive to further sanctions pressure. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, faces its own exposure through gas swap arrangements involving Iran, which could become collateral damage of escalating regional tensions. Iranian investments in Tajikistan are also substantial. Among the most prominent projects is the Sangtuda-2 hydroelectric power plant, estimated at $256 million. The Iranian government contributed approximately $180 million, with an additional $36 million from an Iranian contractor. The remainder was financed by Tajikistan. According to official data, roughly 160 companies with Iranian capital are currently operating in Tajikistan across multiple sectors. In Kazakhstan, around 650 Iranian companies are registered, with over 350 operational, primarily in manufacturing, infrastructure, and agriculture. By contrast, trade between Iran and Russia, a strategic partner since the signing of a bilateral cooperation agreement in January 2025, increased by only 8% in the first nine months of 2025, according to official figures. Despite modest growth, Russian analysts view the figures optimistically. “Growth is happening under challenging geopolitical conditions, with sanctions, logistical restructuring, and financial hurdles,” said...

Venezuela

Opinion: Central Asia and the Venezuelan Crisis

For Central Asian countries, the central challenge in international politics is no longer choosing alliances, but coping with external shocks and global turbulence that originate far beyond the region. The unfolding crisis in Venezuela is a case in point. At first glance, the situation concerns Latin America and the global oil market, but its implications extend well beyond, directly affecting Central Asia’s strategic interests. The core issue is not oil per se, but the reemergence of force as a legitimate instrument for altering political and economic conditions. For a region positioned at the crossroads of major power interests and reliant on external stability, this shift is profoundly consequential. The Venezuelan crisis should be understood as a precedent, one that signals how global power centers may act as established norms erode. For Central Asia, this heralds a more unpredictable international environment in which regional states must navigate competing interests without the benefit of stable rules. While Venezuela is often reduced to an oil story, the broader economic stakes involve control over the architecture of strategic resource flows. This resonates with the situation in the C5, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, where resources such as oil, gas, uranium, and rare earth metals are also of significant external interest. The logistics and transit of these resources are increasingly entangled in geopolitical bargaining. The Venezuelan example reinforces a growing trend: the nexus of economics and security is tightening, and access to resources is increasingly secured through political leverage. In this context, Iran holds particular relevance. For Central Asia, Iran is not an abstraction; it represents transit routes, energy corridors, access to southern seas, and a component of regional balance. Heightened pressure on Tehran directly affects both the opportunities and risks facing the region. When viewed through the lens of Iran, developments in Venezuela serve as a psychological and political precedent, broadening what appears acceptable within Washington’s strategic calculus. While a direct replication of the Venezuelan scenario in Iran is unlikely, given the vastly different military, political, and regional risks, the mere lowering of the threshold for force-based solutions is significant. The cost of direct confrontation with Iran would be far higher, with potential repercussions for the entire Middle East security architecture. Operation Absolute Resolve has objectively increased the confidence of those who favor the use of force against Iran. This confidence is likely to grow if United States actions in Venezuela carry minimal international consequences, avoid triggering uncontrollable regional escalation, and are perceived as domestically successful. In either case, Venezuela’s “success” has already lowered psychological barriers to coercion, strengthening arguments for hardline scenarios and re-legitimizing force as a policy tool, rather than a measure of last resort. Broadly speaking, the Venezuelan crisis highlights a global shift from rules to precedents. For the five, and increasingly for the emerging six that includes Azerbaijan, the fragmentation of international norms raises costs and leaves each country more vulnerable to external pressure. In this environment, coordination and consistency on issues such as transit, security, and sanctions are...