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EU-Central Asia Summit Opens New Opportunities for Kazakhstan

The first-ever summit between the European Union and the five Central Asian countries opened on April 3 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The meeting marks a milestone in regional diplomacy, as both sides seek to deepen cooperation amid growing geopolitical shifts. Kazakhstan, in particular, is entering the summit with growing international clout, thanks to its stable economic performance and balanced foreign policy approach. European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen are representing the EU at the summit, which is being chaired by Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. According to official sources, the summit aims to demonstrate mutual geopolitical interest and expand collaboration between Europe and Central Asia across key areas. The agenda includes strengthening multilateral ties, addressing shared security threats, enhancing economic and investment cooperation, and advancing collaboration under the EU’s Global Gateway initiative. Focus areas also include energy, climate neutrality, connectivity, and green transition, along with mobility and cultural exchange. The EU is already the region’s second-largest trading partner, accounting for 22.6% of Central Asia’s total foreign trade in 2023. It is also the largest source of foreign investment, responsible for over 40% of the region’s total inflows. Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is attending the summit, following a bilateral meeting with President Mirziyoyev in Almaty on March 29. Also expected to participate are Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, and Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov. At the summit, the EU is set to unveil a substantial investment package for Central Asia, with priority sectors including transportation infrastructure, critical raw materials, energy transmission, and digitalization. European Commission President von der Leyen emphasized that Central Asia’s significant natural resources and industrial potential align with Europe’s sustainability goals. “Europe aims to create a complete value chain, not merely purchase raw materials. This is vital for generating local employment and upholding high environmental and social standards,” she said. Additional EU funding will be directed toward green energy projects and improvements to Uzbekistan’s water infrastructure. According to Tair Nigmanov, an international relations expert, the EU’s increased engagement stems from heightened geopolitical rivalry. “We are situated between major powers like Russia and China. The EU, as another global player, wants Central Asia to remain neutral and not gravitate toward any single power center,” Nigmanov told Inform.kz. “To that end, it is offering investment, trade opportunities, and political assurances.” For Kazakhstan, the summit presents a strategic platform to attract investment, reinforce its non-aligned stance, and leverage its growing geopolitical relevance in an increasingly multipolar world.

Presidentship Geopolitics Leadership opinion Government Central Asia

Power Shifts in Central Asia: The Unpredictable Path of Leadership

European Union Commissioner for International Partnerships Josef Sikela has concluded his tour of Central Asia, a visit conducted against the backdrop of global geopolitical turbulence. Unlike previous engagements, where European officials often criticized the region’s leadership for a lack of democratic progress, Sikela refrained from making demands on local governments. Historically, Europe has accused Central Asian states of authoritarianism and the entrenchment of long-serving leaders. However, the idea that power is uniquely permanent in the region is increasingly questioned. Critics point to Western examples, such as Angela Merkel’s 16-year tenure as Germany’s chancellor, and alleged electoral manipulation within the EU, such as in Romania, where elections were annulled after an undesired candidate’s victory. Meanwhile, in Central Asia, even presidents once considered “eternal” have eventually left office, sometimes peacefully, sometimes under turbulent conditions. Kyrgyzstan: The Unpredictable Outlier Kyrgyzstan is often described as a "democratic exception" within Central Asia, yet its history is marked by political instability and frequent leadership changes, arguably more so than in many of the world’s most conflict-prone regions. The country’s first president, Askar Akayev, held power from 1990 to 2005. Though re-elected three times, his rule ended in March 2005 when protests erupted over parliamentary election results that heavily favored pro-government candidates. Demonstrators stormed the Government House in Bishkek, prompting Akayev to flee. Reports, though unverified, claimed he was smuggled out wrapped in a carpet. Following Akayev’s ouster, Kurmanbek Bakiyev took power, but his rule ended in 2010 after violent unrest. His downfall was allegedly facilitated by Kazakhstan’s intelligence services, and he later found political asylum in Belarus under President Alexander Lukashenko. Since Bakiyev’s departure, Kyrgyzstan has continued to experience political turbulence. Presidents Almazbek Atambayev (2010-2017) and Sooronbai Jeenbekov (2017-2020) both left office under pressure. Atambayev’s tenure saw a diplomatic fallout with Kazakhstan, while Jeenbekov resigned in 2020 amid protests over parliamentary elections. His successor, Sadyr Japarov, remains in office, but whether he will complete his term is an open question. Uzbekistan: Reform Within Limits Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan’s first post-Soviet leader, ruled for over 26 years before his death in 2016. While he maintained a strictly centralized government, his tenure was also marked by violent crackdowns, most notably the Andijan uprising in 2005, which resulted in a Western diplomatic fallout. His successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has introduced some reforms, loosening restrictions on civil liberties and the economy. However, the fundamental structure of state control remains intact, with opposition movements still tightly monitored. Kazakhstan: From Nazarbayev to Tokayev Kazakhstan’s transition from Nursultan Nazarbayev to Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is often described as managed succession rather than a genuine power shift. Nazarbayev, who led Kazakhstan for nearly three decades, officially stepped down in 2019, yet retained significant influence until the January 2022 unrest, which forced him to relinquish much of his remaining power. These protests, initially sparked by fuel price hikes, rapidly escalated into anti-government riots. While official accounts describe the unrest as an attempted coup orchestrated by figures within Nazarbayev’s inner circle, critics suggest Tokayev used the crisis to consolidate power....

Accident CPC Caspian Pipeline Geopolitics Oil refinery

A Blow to the CPC: Geopolitical Intrigue Surrounding the Pipeline

More than a week has passed since Ukrainian drones attacked the Kropotkinskaya oil refinery, part of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) system. However, the incident remains a topic of heated debate in Kazakhstan. What Happened? On February 17, the Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station, located in Kavkazsky district, Krasnodar Krai, was targeted by multiple UAVs carrying explosives and metal fragments. While there were no casualties, the facility sustained damage and was taken out of service. Oil transportation through the Tengiz-Novorossiysk pipeline has since been rerouted via a bypass system, ensuring that shipments from the CPC Marine Terminal continue as normal. On February 20-21, a Kazakh delegation, including Daniyar Berlibayev, special representative for the CPC project from KazMunayGas, and Yerbolat Mendybayev, Director of Transportation and Logistics at KazMunayGas, visited the Kropotkinskaya station alongside CPC Deputy General Director Hakim Kasymov to assess the damage. At a CPC shareholders' meeting in Abu Dhabi on February 25-26, CEO Nikolay Gorban presented a report on the extent of the damage, equipment dismantling progress, and contractor mobilization status. According to the CPC press service, shareholders pledged full support for repair work, which is expected to take approximately two months. Kazakh Debate: Is Ukraine to Blame? While CPC shareholders, including entities from Kazakhstan, Russia, Europe, and the United States, treated the issue as a technical problem, Kazakh public discourse took a different turn, led by Mazhilis deputies. Parliamentarian Nikita Shatalov questioned Ukraine’s motivations on his Telegram channel: “The Ukrainian side could not have been unaware that 90% of the oil transported through the pipeline is Kazakh, extracted from Tengiz, with revenues benefiting Western companies exporting to the EU. The pipeline is international, with KazMunayGas, Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Italy’s Eni as shareholders. This attack was clearly intended to damage Kazakhstan’s economic interests.” Shatalov emphasized Kazakhstan’s neutral stance in the Ukraine-Russia war, pointing out that diplomatic contacts between Astana and Kyiv have continued at the highest levels, including President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s engagement with Volodymyr Zelensky. “Those responsible for this attack on an international consortium must be punished. Kazakhstan must demand accountability from Ukraine for the damage inflicted and the threat to bilateral relations.” His stance was echoed by Mazhilis deputy Marat Bashimov, who called the attack a "direct assault on Kazakhstan’s interests" in a Facebook post: “The Ukrainian side knew exactly how strategically vital the CPC pipeline is for Kazakh oil exports.” Bashimov argued that Kazakhstan has always upheld neutrality, supported diplomatic resolution efforts, and even refused to recognize the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics. Kazakh Debate: Is Russia to Blame? Not all deputies agreed. Mazhilisman Yermurat Bapi strongly rejected demands for Ukrainian compensation, arguing that Kazakhstan has no moral or legal grounds to make such a claim: “For more than three years, Ukraine has been fighting for survival against an aggressor that invaded its territory. As part of this war, Ukraine has the right to choose its defense strategies.” Bapi went further, blaming Kazakhstan’s overreliance on Russian infrastructure for the crisis: “The CPC pipeline was a strategic mistake of...

Russia NGOs Geopolitics United States Trump Administration

A Central Asian Perspective: Look Out for Ourselves as World Shifts

Kazakhstan must focus on its own interests at a time of uncertainty over the Trump administration’s global relations and alliances as well as pending appointments to key U.S. diplomatic posts for Central Asia, according to the head of a non-governmental group based in Almaty. The comments by Karla Jamankulova, head of the free speech group Adil Soz, reflect a wider sense of vigilance in Central Asia. The region’s governments are monitoring and engaging Washington as the new U.S. administration moves to implement major, even stunning policy shifts, including warnings of tariffs on key trading partners, disruption of the longstanding U.S.-Europe alliance and a possible rapprochement with Russia after years of hostility. It’s a critical time for Central Asian states that have generally sought to balance their relationships with big powers since independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, rather than side with any one faction at the expense of another. The war in Ukraine put that approach to the test as those countries did not express support for Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 but maintained vital trade ties with it even as the West tried to isolate Moscow with economic sanctions. President Donald Trump has significantly shifted U.S. priorities, prompting other nations to reassess their own geopolitical strategies. “Given the current uncertainty surrounding U.S.-Russia economic relations and the increasingly anti-China stance, it is now crucial to understand the contours of U.S.-Kazakhstan relations moving forward,” Jamankulova said on Facebook on Tuesday. Her NGO has received funding for projects from the U.S. Embassy in the past, though such support appears to have ended since the Trump administration announced a freeze on nearly all foreign aid and took steps to dismantle the U.S. Agency for International Development. Jamankulova didn’t comment on a debate within Kazakhstan about whether such foreign funding benefits civil society, or is a tool of interference by foreign governments, or both. Nor did she talk about whether there might be differing views within Kazakhstan about national interests. There are positive signs for Kazakhstan, specifically indications that the Trump administration would support bipartisan efforts to scrap the Jackson-Vanik amendment, a 50-year-old law that imposes some restrictions on trade with several countries in Central Asia. During his confirmation hearings for the post of secretary of state in January, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio described the amendment as “a relic of an era that’s passed.” As secretary of state, Rubio spoke by telephone on Feb. 21 to Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov of Uzbekistan about increasing trade and expanding the strategic partnership between the two countries, according to an Uzbek readout. The U.S. State Department made similar comments. In her Facebook post, Jamankulova said she was unaware of any similar discussions involving Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu of Kazakhstan, though acknowledged that doesn’t necessarily mean there is a shift in U.S. priorities. “The Atlantic Council has long advocated for Trump to be the first U.S. president to visit Central Asia. Kazakhstan appears to be on the radar. At the last C5+1 summit in 2023,...

Geopolitics Russia Turkey CSTO Organization of Turkic States EAEU Multi-vector Foreign Policy

Turkey’s Turkic Gambit: Balancing Influence in Post-Soviet States

Despite its superpower ambitions, which have diminished somewhat since February 24, 2022, Moscow views Turkey’s growing geopolitical influence with increasing concern. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which includes several Central Asian republics, is perceived by the Kremlin as a rival to its regional blocs, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, for Central Asian nations, the OTS is not a political or military alliance but rather a framework for economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. The extent of Turkey’s influence remains limited within these parameters. A Historical Perspective Russia continues to interpret geopolitical dynamics through the lens of century-old concepts, particularly Pan-Slavism and Pan-Turkism, both of which emerged as nationalist movements against the Russian and Ottoman empires. Pan-Turkism gained traction in the Ottoman Empire but lost momentum following its adoption and subsequent rejection by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The ideology was later revived during the Cold War, when Turkey’s NATO membership positioned it as a force for destabilizing Soviet Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Turkic regions within Russia, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Despite Turkish efforts, Pan-Turkic sentiment found limited success, influencing only Azerbaijan, which aligned closely with Turkey after losing the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Azerbaijan formalized this relationship in the early 1990s with the doctrine of “Two Countries, One Nation.” Baku only began to see concrete benefits from its alliance with Ankara after winning the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The Organization of Turkic States: Reality vs. Rhetoric Although the first summit of Turkic states was held in 1992, the OTS’s precursor, the Turkic Council, was only founded in 2009. The agreement, signed in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan, initially included Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan expressed interest in joining in 2018, and officially became a member in 2019, whilst Hungary (2018), Turkmenistan (2021), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (2022), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (2023) hold observer state status. Turkmenistan has frequently been rumored to be considering full membership. Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations in Central Asia have often clashed with the ambitions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan delayed its membership in the Turkic Council until 2019 due to strained relations with Ankara which dated back to the mid-1990s. Turkey, the first country to recognize the independence of the Central Asian republics, expected to leverage its Cold War victory over the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region. While Kazakhstan initially welcomed Turkish economic expansion and Pan-Turkic rhetoric, it became increasingly skeptical in the 2000s. Uzbekistan, however, was cautious from the outset and largely resisted Turkish influence. Kazakhstan’s shift in perspective coincided with Ankara’s increased push for deeper Turkic integration. Turkish-backed initiatives in Kazakhstan revealed clear expectations that Ankara would lead such a union, prompting Astana to resist. Kazakhstan, which balances ties with the West, China, and Russia, rejected the notion of falling under Turkish leadership. The Kazakh government neutralized Pan-Turkic voices by integrating key advocates into political positions, redirecting their efforts toward promoting Kazakh nationalism instead. Turkey’s Role in the...

opinion Middle Powers Geopolitics Global Diplomacy

Middle Power Policy in Global Confrontation Environment

The current polycrisis fundamentally damaged the whole architecture of the Modern World Order, in particular, the Economics and Global Governance. Global tensions peaked during the 2019 pandemic crisis, and the 2022 war in Ukraine not only reduced the post-Cold War dynamics of international cooperation but changed its very nature. The Global Risks Report, issued by the 2023 Davos World Economic Forum, explains that a polycrisis dominated by the cost-of-living crisis, climate crisis, and political instability threatens to reverse hard-fought gains in development and growth, “The biggest turmoil is geopolitical... We have already entered a multipolar world in which each region has its own issues and role in global politics” (Jeffrey Sachs, The New World Economy, January 10, 2023). The era of a favorable climate for international trade, investment promotion in emerging markets, and the liberalization of international cooperation—beginning with the breakdown of the socialist bloc—is likely coming to an end. We have now entered a polycrisis in which multiple risks exert force equally. The increasing number and dynamics of these crises are of deep concern for global governance actors, as unresolved old threats are now compounded by new ones, creating additional difficulties. What is essential is the widening imbalance between crisis management and development in global governance. Global management today focuses primarily on crisis regulation while playing a diminishing role in development programs. This is evident in the financial resource allocation for the Ukrainian crisis and UN funds for sustainable development: total bilateral aid from the US and EU for Ukraine between January 24, 2022, and June 30, 2024, amounts to $75.1 billion and $39.38 billion, respectively. In contrast, as of January 2017, only 22 joint UN programs had been approved with a total budget of $69.36 million. Global governance priorities are increasingly skewed toward security, while the socio-economic component steadily declines due to rising global conflicts. We have entered a fragmented, polarized world that lacks consensus on many critical international issues. Globalization is taking on features of deglobalization. The war in Ukraine has divided the world into two camps—the Global North (Western nations) and the Global South (Eastern nations)—each with differing visions for the contemporary world order. This division now permeates nearly all aspects of international and national life. The return of President Trump’s Administration in January 2025 raises several new questions and expectations regarding the future status of global partnerships. The updated American strategy urgently requires a deep and comprehensive political and academic analysis. This includes recent US actions such as withdrawing from certain UN institutions (e.g., the UN Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization, with UNESCO possibly following), imposing trade tariffs among major global trading partners, and introducing other new initiatives. These changes have already become a reality. At the same time, we observe a decline of the United Nations' effectiveness in resolving the acute problems of Global Security and Sustainable Development. Consequently, new global development initiatives have emerged, spearheaded by the United States and the European Union (PGII), as well as China (GDI, GSI,...