Multi-vector Foreign Policy - The Times Of Central Asia

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How Tokayev’s Kazakhstan Bridges Global Powers

Amid the ongoing reshaping of the global order, Kazakhstan is seeking to enhance its role as an emerging middle power. Preserving strong relations with all key geopolitical actors, strengthening its position as a de facto leader in Central Asia, and developing closer ties with other influential states on the world stage appear to be Astana’s top foreign policy priorities. The largest Central Asian state is one of the few countries that maintains good relations with geopolitical rivals such as China and the United States, as well as Russia and the European Union. At the same time, Astana is actively developing closer ties with the Turkey-led Organization of Turkic States, while firmly upholding its longstanding commitment to international law. It is, therefore, no surprise that, during the recently held EU- Central Asia summit in Samarkand, Kazakhstan, along with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, backed two UN resolution from the 1980s that reject the unilaterally-declared independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and deem all secessionist actions there legally invalid. Such a policy perfectly aligns with Kazakhstan President’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s 2022 statement, in which he affirmed Astana’s non-recognition of Taiwan, Kosovo, South Ossetia, or Abkhazia, and the entities he described as quasi-states, namely Luhansk and Donetsk. “In general, it has been calculated that if the right of nations to self-determination is actually realized throughout the globe, then instead of the 193 states that are now members of the UN, more than 500 or 600 states will emerge on Earth. Of course, it will be chaos,” Tokayev stressed. In other words, Kazakhstan upholds the principle of territorial integrity for all UN-member states, a stance similar to China’s policy. Despite their history of often supporting the right to self-determination over the principle of territorial integrity, Russia and the West do not seem to oppose Tokayev’s approach. As a result, the President of Kazakhstan remains one of the few world leaders who can attend the May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow, regularly meet with EU officials, and participate in China-led initiatives. As the first Central Asian leader to speak with newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump in December 2024, Tokayev is also signaling his intention to deepen relations with the United States. All these actions demonstrate that, for Kazakhstan under Tokayev, the well-known multi-vector foreign policy remains without an alternative at this point. Although it is Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s first president, who initiated this approach, it is Tokayev who has been actively implementing it since he came to power in 2019. That, however, does not mean that "multivectorism" has become Astana’s official ideology. It is rather a tool the energy-rich nation’s policymakers are using to improve their country’s position in the international arena. Nowhere is that more obvious than at the Astana International Forum – an annual summit taking place in Kazakhstan’s capital – where leaders from diverse countries, often with differing goals and values, come together to discuss global challenges, foster dialogue, and seek common ground. The fact that this year Astana will host...

Turkey’s Turkic Gambit: Balancing Influence in Post-Soviet States

Despite its superpower ambitions, which have diminished somewhat since February 24, 2022, Moscow views Turkey’s growing geopolitical influence with increasing concern. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which includes several Central Asian republics, is perceived by the Kremlin as a rival to its regional blocs, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, for Central Asian nations, the OTS is not a political or military alliance but rather a framework for economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. The extent of Turkey’s influence remains limited within these parameters. A Historical Perspective Russia continues to interpret geopolitical dynamics through the lens of century-old concepts, particularly Pan-Slavism and Pan-Turkism, both of which emerged as nationalist movements against the Russian and Ottoman empires. Pan-Turkism gained traction in the Ottoman Empire but lost momentum following its adoption and subsequent rejection by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The ideology was later revived during the Cold War, when Turkey’s NATO membership positioned it as a force for destabilizing Soviet Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Turkic regions within Russia, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Despite Turkish efforts, Pan-Turkic sentiment found limited success, influencing only Azerbaijan, which aligned closely with Turkey after losing the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Azerbaijan formalized this relationship in the early 1990s with the doctrine of “Two Countries, One Nation.” Baku only began to see concrete benefits from its alliance with Ankara after winning the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The Organization of Turkic States: Reality vs. Rhetoric Although the first summit of Turkic states was held in 1992, the OTS’s precursor, the Turkic Council, was only founded in 2009. The agreement, signed in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan, initially included Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan expressed interest in joining in 2018, and officially became a member in 2019, whilst Hungary (2018), Turkmenistan (2021), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (2022), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (2023) hold observer state status. Turkmenistan has frequently been rumored to be considering full membership. Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations in Central Asia have often clashed with the ambitions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan delayed its membership in the Turkic Council until 2019 due to strained relations with Ankara which dated back to the mid-1990s. Turkey, the first country to recognize the independence of the Central Asian republics, expected to leverage its Cold War victory over the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region. While Kazakhstan initially welcomed Turkish economic expansion and Pan-Turkic rhetoric, it became increasingly skeptical in the 2000s. Uzbekistan, however, was cautious from the outset and largely resisted Turkish influence. Kazakhstan’s shift in perspective coincided with Ankara’s increased push for deeper Turkic integration. Turkish-backed initiatives in Kazakhstan revealed clear expectations that Ankara would lead such a union, prompting Astana to resist. Kazakhstan, which balances ties with the West, China, and Russia, rejected the notion of falling under Turkish leadership. The Kazakh government neutralized Pan-Turkic voices by integrating key advocates into political positions, redirecting their efforts toward promoting Kazakh nationalism instead. Turkey’s Role in the...

EU Sanctions Envoy’s Kazakh Visit Signals Rising Stakes

On January 30, David O’Sullivan, the European Union’s Special Envoy for Sanctions, made his fourth visit to Kazakhstan. Following the visit, he gave a briefing in Astana, where he discussed the new sanctions package, which could theoretically include Kazakh companies that assist Russia in circumventing restrictions. What O’Sullivan Said According to O'Sullivan, only companies with indisputable evidence against them of involvement in violations will added to the sanctions list. “We are currently working on preparing a new, 16th package of sanctions. It is possible that Kazakh companies may be added to the list, but no decision has been made yet. We conduct a detailed analysis of companies, examine their trade relations, and review the goods they have previously traded. Of course, we prefer to work with governments to find a systematic solution rather than simply adding individual companies to the list. However, when there is no other option, we do add them,” O’Sullivan explained. The EU Sanctions Envoy reiterated that the EU remains one of Kazakhstan’s key economic partners, with mutual trade turnover reaching nearly 40 billion euros per annum. The EU accounts for 38% of Kazakhstan’s exports and 55 billion euros in direct foreign investments. Highlighting the importance of economic ties, O’Sullivan stated that the EU fully respects Kazakhstan’s position on sanctions, but urged authorities to take strict measures against third-party entities using the country’s trade channels. “We have concerns that unscrupulous actors may try to use Kazakhstan as a platform to circumvent our sanctions,” O’Sullivan warned, pointing to the import of high-tech goods such as microchips, sensors, and circuits, which have been found in Russian drones, missiles, and artillery shells. O'Sullivan noted that these goods, listed in an open “common high-priority list” of 50 codes, are not produced in Kazakhstan but are allegedly being re-exported from EU and G7 countries through Kazakh intermediaries. While they make up less than 1% of Kazakhstan’s total trade volume, O’Sullivan emphasized that these are “lethal products that kill innocent Ukrainian civilians.” The special envoy recalled that in 2024, the EU blacklisted two Kazakh companies and issued a warning that this list could be expanded. He noted that particular attention is being given to companies that emerged immediately after the invasion of Ukraine and the start of the new sanctions regime. “These are usually not well-established, well-known companies with a long history of trading. The fact that a company was created right after the invasion and the imposition of sanctions suggests that its sole purpose may be to evade sanctions,” he stated while stressing that merely registering after 2022 is not sufficient grounds for inclusion on the sanctions list. Strategically Important Central Asia Given the statistics cited by O’Sullivan, there was no pressing need for his fourth personal visit to Kazakhstan. The blacklisting of two Kazakh companies last year went largely unnoticed by the country’s general public. However, his visit highlights the mechanisms of international politics set in motion following Donald Trump’s return to the White House and the opening gambits of his administration,...

Russia Azerbaijan Disaster Response Multi-vector Foreign Policy Middle Powers AZAL Plane Crash Aktau Plane Crash

Kazakhstan’s High-Stakes Balancing Act in the Aktau Crash Investigation

The Aktau crash of the Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 aircraft, which killed 38 people on 25 December, was a tragic event with significant international repercussions. This devastating accident not only claimed lives but also raised critical questions about aviation safety and the handling of sensitive investigations. As investigators sought to determine its cause, Kazakhstan faced an important decision regarding the handling of the flight recorder. Ultimately, the country chose to transfer the recorder to Brazil, the manufacturer of the aircraft, rather than to the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as Russia had proposed. This decision reflected both technical and diplomatic considerations, marking a crucial moment in the unfolding investigation. By taking this decision, Kazakhstan adhered to established industry procedures for aviation safety investigations. Such a step highlights the country's commitment to transparency and global norms in aviation. The move is typical of the country's foreign policy under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, whose long diplomatic experience leads him to emphasize a rules-based approach over political considerations and to act in accord with established procedural norms. This choice ensured that the investigation would follow established international practices, thereby lending credibility to the process and reassuring global aviation stakeholders. This behavior is also in line with Kazakhstan's broader commitment to international law and a rules-based global order. Another notable example of this approach was its endorsement of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity through its refusal to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea or the independence of the Donbas regions. These decisions were not necessarily easy ones, given Kazakhstan’s economic and security ties with Russia, but they reinforced its commitment to global standards. While some observers might frame decisions like the Aktau recorder transfer as a “snub” to Russia, such characterizations would miss the point. Like Kazakhstan’s refusal to recognize Donbas as independent and its efforts to prevent the flow of military components in violation of Western sanctions, its actions are not meant to be about rejecting one partner in favor of another. Rather, acting in its own autonomous interests, Kazakhstan seeks to "do the right thing," because this maintains a consistent international profile with a steady foreign-policy course grounded in international law and practice. Kazakhstan’s mediation efforts extend beyond formal multilateral forums, showcasing its active engagement in regional and global diplomacy. The country provided a neutral platform for discussions between opposing factions in the conflict over Syria; and it has also worked to ease tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, hosting purely bilateral consultations and thus demonstrating its capacity to engage constructively in regional conflicts without taking sides. These efforts are in line with Kazakhstan’s larger foreign-policy strategy to act as a principled and impartial intermediary on the global stage, fostering dialogue and reducing hostilities. Similarly, Kazakhstan’s leadership in the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) reflects its dedication to multilateralism and peaceful conflict resolution. Kazakhstan exemplifies the rising middle-power archetype also through its significant contributions to global nuclear non-proliferation. Its foreign policy operates on...

British Think Tank: Kazakhstan is a Key Strategic Partner for the UK

On December 10, the British think tank the Henry Jackson Society presented its research report, “Understanding Kazakhstan’s Strategic Importance: A Middle Power Partner for the UK in Central Asia,” in the UK Parliament. The event was attended by members of both houses of the British Parliament and featured speeches by prominent figures, including Nusrat Ghani MP, Principal Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons; Magzhan Ilyassov, Ambassador of Kazakhstan to the United Kingdom; Darren Spinck, the report’s author and associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society; Ekaterina Miroshnik, Director for Eurasia Infrastructure at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); and Enzo Satkuru-Granzella, business analyst at the UK Critical Minerals Association. Exploring Kazakhstan’s Strategic Role Darren Spinck emphasized that the report examines Kazakhstan’s evolving role as a middle power on the international stage, highlighting its advancements in political reforms and sustainable economic development. It also explores opportunities for enhancing trade and investment between the UK and Kazakhstan, particularly in critical minerals and transit-transport routes. The report includes recommendations for the British Government and Parliament to strengthen this partnership. Nusrat Ghani MP shared her personal efforts to deepen UK-Kazakh relations during her time as Business and Trade Minister (2022–2024) and Minister of State at the Foreign Office (2024). She expressed confidence that the report would provide members of Parliament with valuable insights into Kazakhstan’s importance as a global actor and as a key partner for the UK in Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s Global Diplomacy and Strategic Partnerships Ambassador Magzhan Ilyassov highlighted Kazakhstan’s balanced, multi-vector foreign policy, which aims to safeguard national interests while promoting global security and dialogue. He provided updates on Kazakhstan’s international initiatives, including efforts on nuclear non-proliferation, the proposal to establish an International Agency for Biological Safety (IABS), and the creation of a UN Regional Hub for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Ekaterina Miroshnik from the EBRD underscored Kazakhstan’s role in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor. This trade route connects China with Europe and strengthens economic ties between Europe, Central Asia, and China. She highlighted the EBRD’s involvement in Middle Corridor projects, which are key to improving regional trade infrastructure. Enzo Satkuru-Granzella of the UK Critical Minerals Association noted Kazakhstan’s vast potential to contribute to the global supply chain of critical minerals. With its rich resource base, well-developed infrastructure, and skilled workforce, Kazakhstan is poised for long-term collaboration. He pointed to the Roadmap on critical minerals, signed between Kazakhstan and the UK in March 2024, as a solid foundation for mutual cooperation. Strengthening Bilateral Relations Participants at the event acknowledged Kazakhstan’s increasing geostrategic importance as a middle power and explored new avenues for strengthening ties between the two nations. A significant milestone in the bilateral relationship was the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed by Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu and the UK’s David Cameron in Astana on April 24, 2024. Great Britain remains one of Kazakhstan’s top foreign investors. Since 2005, the UK has invested...

Geopolitical Posturing or Genuine Partnership? Key Takeaways from Putin’s Trip to Kazakhstan

On November 27, Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in Astana for a state visit. He was met at the airport by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. The streets of Astana, along Putin’s motorcade route, were adorned with Russian flags, creating a ceremonial backdrop for a meeting touted as a symbol of strategic partnership between the two nations. At the Akorda Presidential Palace, Tokayev hosted a reception for Putin that blended official decorum with cultural displays. The program featured children reciting poetry and participation in a collaborative painting led by renowned Kazakh artist Assol (Asel Sabyrzhankyzy), who named the artwork Bridge of Friendship and presented it to Putin. However, not all Kazakhstanis welcomed the visit with enthusiasm. Some citizens, concerned by Russia’s imperial overtones or sympathetic to Ukraine, expressed their dissent through an online flash mob. A banner at Astana Airport referring to Putin as “Your Excellency” sparked outrage among critics, who viewed it as excessive deference. Political analysts later clarified that the term has been consistently used for other high-level visitors to Kazakhstan. Putin’s state visit, described as a rare diplomatic event typically occurring once per presidential term, was notably proposed by Kazakhstan. During a press briefing, Putin remarked, “At your suggestion, this visit was given the status of a state visit, but I want to note that the solemn protocol did not prevent us from working productively, as is characteristic of our meetings.” Heightened Security Amid Geopolitical Tensions The visit came against the backdrop of growing geopolitical instability. Less than a week earlier, on November 21, Tokayev had instructed government agencies to heighten security following Russia’s test of the Oreshnik ballistic system in Ukraine. This context, paired with the substantial security measures surrounding the state visit, led observers to speculate that Russia’s own security concerns may have influenced the format. The official discussions were framed by frequent references to “strategic partnership” and the “geopolitical situation.” These themes culminated in a joint declaration entitled “Joint Statement of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the President of the Russian Federation on Deepening Strategic Partnership in the New Global Order.” The statement, structured in three main sections, outlined bilateral cooperation in political, economic, and security domains. Ambiguities in Counter-Terrorism and Political Statements The declaration’s political section raised some eyebrows, particularly the clause condemning recent “terrorist acts” in Russia and pledging closer intelligence cooperation to combat such threats. Questions remain over whether Kazakhstan considers only incidents like the Crocus City Hall attack on the outskirts of Moscow as terrorism, or whether the term extends to military actions tied to the Ukraine conflict. Another noteworthy point was the denunciation of “irresponsible statements” by public figures that undermine mutual respect between the two nations. This has been a sensitive issue for Kazakhstan, which has frequently faced provocative rhetoric from Russian propagandists and certain lawmakers. Tokayev himself rebuffed such remarks at the 2022 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, firmly rejecting recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. Economic Vision and Strategic Transport The economic...