Multi-vector Foreign Policy - The Times Of Central Asia

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Kazakhstan’s Astana Forum Offers Global South a New Multi-Vector Platform

Kazakhstan will convene the Astana International Forum (AIF) later this month, on May 29–30, emphasizing its profile as an active mediator in the evolving architecture of global diplomacy. The AIF began in 2008 as the Astana Economic Forum, originally conceived as a technocratic venue focused on macroeconomic development, fiscal strategy, and public-sector reform. In its early iterations, it drew regional economists, central bankers, and international development agencies together to discuss Kazakhstan’s integration into global financial institutions. While modest in its geopolitical profile, the Forum reflected Astana’s broader ambitions to participate in the global rules-based order without overt alignment. In 2023, the AIF was reconstituted with its new, broader mandate in response to international demands for such forums, given the evident erosion of consensus in multilateral governance structures. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has invoked Kazakhstan’s unique geopolitical position to advocate for the AIF as a new platform of balanced engagement, to serve as a “bridge between East and West,” reflecting Astana’s accumulated experience in dialogue facilitation and its ambition to ameliorate the deepening fragmentation of the international system. The rebranding of the Forum was more than cosmetic. It marked a deliberate effort by Kazakhstan to reach out beyond its customary Eurasian frame of reference. The Forum aspires to be a diplomatic innovation, seeking to complement existing institutions like the UN or OSCE without replacing them: a more flexible platform that would be more responsive to emergent global dynamics. This aspiration is of a piece with Kazakhstan’s growing participation in multilateral forums, serving different geopolitical functions, such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and its engagements within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Organization of Turkic States (OTS). The AIF is envisioned as a complementary structure that transcends bloc affiliations, facilitating fluid dialogue among ideologically diverse actors. The 2024 edition of the Forum was intended to be larger-scale than the 2023 version, but it was abruptly canceled after catastrophic flooding struck several regions, an event President Tokayev described as the most devastating natural disaster in the country in eight decades. The state redirected its attention and resources toward recovery, and the Forum was deferred. The 2025 iteration, now reactivated, has adopted the banner message, “Connecting Minds, Shaping the Future.” This reflects an underlying logic in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy that privileges "multi-vectorialism" as a structure for autonomy. Within that structure, the AIF is seeking to create space for engagement among actors that often find themselves excluded from the inner circles of traditional diplomacy: the so-called "Global South," mid-sized Western powers, and immediate regional stakeholders. The agenda of the 2025 AIF consolidates four previous thematic streams into three: Foreign Policy and International Security, Energy and Climate Change, and Economy and Finance. This thematic restructuring signals an intention to deepen the Forum’s analytical focus while retaining general breadth across domains characterizing Kazakhstan’s long-term strategic interests. These interests are conditioned by the continuing development of Kazakhstan's economy. Domestic economic growth is projected to reach 4.5 to 5.0% in 2025, driven by...

Central Asian politics International Diplomacy Geopolitics Multi-vector Foreign Policy

Breaking Old Ties: Central Asia’s Delicate Dance Between Russia and the West

Central Asian countries are increasingly asserting their independence in foreign policy, distancing themselves from traditional centers of global influence. Recent developments highlight a nuanced balancing act as states in the region navigate growing tensions between Russia and the West. Kyrgyzstan Pushes Back In Kyrgyzstan, the recent arrest of Natalya Sekerina, an employee of the Russian House in Osh, marked a notable assertion of sovereignty. Sekerina was detained under Part 1 of Article 416 of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, which pertains to the recruitment, financing, and training of mercenaries for armed conflict or attempts to overthrow state authority. Earlier, Sergei Lapushkin, an employee of Osh city hall, and two others were also detained in connection with the case. All suspects were later placed under house arrest. Nevertheless, the arrests are seen by observers as a clear signal that Kyrgyzstan is not simply aligning with Russian policy, despite its economic dependence on Moscow, particularly due to labor migration. The move was reportedly a response to the April 17 detention of over 50 Kyrgyz nationals in a Moscow bathhouse, where Russian security forces allegedly used excessive force. The Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal note of protest. Russia later stated that the detainees were in the country illegally and some were suspected of links to radical groups. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan is scrutinizing Western influence as well. In February, U.S. President Donald Trump announced funding cuts and a wind-down of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The announcement triggered debate in Kyrgyzstan, where some voices argued that while USAID had supported civil society, it also fostered instability and economic dependency. Critics claim the agency promoted Western values and helped establish a network of NGOs that played outsized roles in the country’s politics. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Seek Equilibrium In Kazakhstan, USAID also came under fire. Parliamentary Deputy Magherram Magherramov criticized the agency for promoting what he described as values alien to Kazakh society, referencing controversial events such as women’s rights marches and LGBTQ+ parades in Almaty. He called for a formal review of foreign-funded NGOs. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan witnessed a diplomatic rift during an April visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to the “Grieving Mother” memorial in Samarkand. Lavrov commented on the absence of a Russian-language inscription, provoking widespread backlash on Uzbek social media. Sherzodkhon Kudratkhodzha, rector of the University of Journalism and Mass Communications, responded sharply: “We are not their colony.” He also cited ongoing discrimination against Uzbek migrants in Russia, which, he argued, has been met with silence from Russian officials. A More Independent Foreign Policy Central Asian nations are increasingly holding intra-regional and international meetings, often excluding Russia. On April 25, intelligence chiefs from the region gathered in Tashkent to coordinate on regional security threats. The following day, a meeting of foreign ministers from Central Asia and China took place in Almaty. It was attended by Kazakh Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and counterparts from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and a...

Astana International Forum Central Asia-EU Summit EU Middle Powers U.S. Multi-vector Foreign Policy Middle Corridor China Russia

How Tokayev’s Kazakhstan Bridges Global Powers

Amid the ongoing reshaping of the global order, Kazakhstan is seeking to enhance its role as an emerging middle power. Preserving strong relations with all key geopolitical actors, strengthening its position as a de facto leader in Central Asia, and developing closer ties with other influential states on the world stage appear to be Astana’s top foreign policy priorities. The largest Central Asian state is one of the few countries that maintains good relations with geopolitical rivals such as China and the United States, as well as Russia and the European Union. At the same time, Astana is actively developing closer ties with the Turkey-led Organization of Turkic States, while firmly upholding its longstanding commitment to international law. It is, therefore, no surprise that, during the recently held EU- Central Asia summit in Samarkand, Kazakhstan, along with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, backed two UN resolution from the 1980s that reject the unilaterally-declared independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and deem all secessionist actions there legally invalid. Such a policy perfectly aligns with Kazakhstan President’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s 2022 statement, in which he affirmed Astana’s non-recognition of Taiwan, Kosovo, South Ossetia, or Abkhazia, and the entities he described as quasi-states, namely Luhansk and Donetsk. “In general, it has been calculated that if the right of nations to self-determination is actually realized throughout the globe, then instead of the 193 states that are now members of the UN, more than 500 or 600 states will emerge on Earth. Of course, it will be chaos,” Tokayev stressed. In other words, Kazakhstan upholds the principle of territorial integrity for all UN-member states, a stance similar to China’s policy. Despite their history of often supporting the right to self-determination over the principle of territorial integrity, Russia and the West do not seem to oppose Tokayev’s approach. As a result, the President of Kazakhstan remains one of the few world leaders who can attend the May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow, regularly meet with EU officials, and participate in China-led initiatives. As the first Central Asian leader to speak with newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump in December 2024, Tokayev is also signaling his intention to deepen relations with the United States. All these actions demonstrate that, for Kazakhstan under Tokayev, the well-known multi-vector foreign policy remains without an alternative at this point. Although it is Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s first president, who initiated this approach, it is Tokayev who has been actively implementing it since he came to power in 2019. That, however, does not mean that "multivectorism" has become Astana’s official ideology. It is rather a tool the energy-rich nation’s policymakers are using to improve their country’s position in the international arena. Nowhere is that more obvious than at the Astana International Forum – an annual summit taking place in Kazakhstan’s capital – where leaders from diverse countries, often with differing goals and values, come together to discuss global challenges, foster dialogue, and seek common ground. The fact that this year Astana will host...

CSTO Russia Turkey Multi-vector Foreign Policy EAEU Organization of Turkic States Geopolitics

Turkey’s Turkic Gambit: Balancing Influence in Post-Soviet States

Despite its superpower ambitions, which have diminished somewhat since February 24, 2022, Moscow views Turkey’s growing geopolitical influence with increasing concern. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which includes several Central Asian republics, is perceived by the Kremlin as a rival to its regional blocs, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, for Central Asian nations, the OTS is not a political or military alliance but rather a framework for economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. The extent of Turkey’s influence remains limited within these parameters. A Historical Perspective Russia continues to interpret geopolitical dynamics through the lens of century-old concepts, particularly Pan-Slavism and Pan-Turkism, both of which emerged as nationalist movements against the Russian and Ottoman empires. Pan-Turkism gained traction in the Ottoman Empire but lost momentum following its adoption and subsequent rejection by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The ideology was later revived during the Cold War, when Turkey’s NATO membership positioned it as a force for destabilizing Soviet Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Turkic regions within Russia, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Despite Turkish efforts, Pan-Turkic sentiment found limited success, influencing only Azerbaijan, which aligned closely with Turkey after losing the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Azerbaijan formalized this relationship in the early 1990s with the doctrine of “Two Countries, One Nation.” Baku only began to see concrete benefits from its alliance with Ankara after winning the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The Organization of Turkic States: Reality vs. Rhetoric Although the first summit of Turkic states was held in 1992, the OTS’s precursor, the Turkic Council, was only founded in 2009. The agreement, signed in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan, initially included Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan expressed interest in joining in 2018, and officially became a member in 2019, whilst Hungary (2018), Turkmenistan (2021), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (2022), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (2023) hold observer state status. Turkmenistan has frequently been rumored to be considering full membership. Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations in Central Asia have often clashed with the ambitions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan delayed its membership in the Turkic Council until 2019 due to strained relations with Ankara which dated back to the mid-1990s. Turkey, the first country to recognize the independence of the Central Asian republics, expected to leverage its Cold War victory over the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region. While Kazakhstan initially welcomed Turkish economic expansion and Pan-Turkic rhetoric, it became increasingly skeptical in the 2000s. Uzbekistan, however, was cautious from the outset and largely resisted Turkish influence. Kazakhstan’s shift in perspective coincided with Ankara’s increased push for deeper Turkic integration. Turkish-backed initiatives in Kazakhstan revealed clear expectations that Ankara would lead such a union, prompting Astana to resist. Kazakhstan, which balances ties with the West, China, and Russia, rejected the notion of falling under Turkish leadership. The Kazakh government neutralized Pan-Turkic voices by integrating key advocates into political positions, redirecting their efforts toward promoting Kazakh nationalism instead. Turkey’s Role in the...

Multi-vector Foreign Policy Sanctions Diplomacy European Union

EU Sanctions Envoy’s Kazakh Visit Signals Rising Stakes

On January 30, David O’Sullivan, the European Union’s Special Envoy for Sanctions, made his fourth visit to Kazakhstan. Following the visit, he gave a briefing in Astana, where he discussed the new sanctions package, which could theoretically include Kazakh companies that assist Russia in circumventing restrictions. What O’Sullivan Said According to O'Sullivan, only companies with indisputable evidence against them of involvement in violations will added to the sanctions list. “We are currently working on preparing a new, 16th package of sanctions. It is possible that Kazakh companies may be added to the list, but no decision has been made yet. We conduct a detailed analysis of companies, examine their trade relations, and review the goods they have previously traded. Of course, we prefer to work with governments to find a systematic solution rather than simply adding individual companies to the list. However, when there is no other option, we do add them,” O’Sullivan explained. The EU Sanctions Envoy reiterated that the EU remains one of Kazakhstan’s key economic partners, with mutual trade turnover reaching nearly 40 billion euros per annum. The EU accounts for 38% of Kazakhstan’s exports and 55 billion euros in direct foreign investments. Highlighting the importance of economic ties, O’Sullivan stated that the EU fully respects Kazakhstan’s position on sanctions, but urged authorities to take strict measures against third-party entities using the country’s trade channels. “We have concerns that unscrupulous actors may try to use Kazakhstan as a platform to circumvent our sanctions,” O’Sullivan warned, pointing to the import of high-tech goods such as microchips, sensors, and circuits, which have been found in Russian drones, missiles, and artillery shells. O'Sullivan noted that these goods, listed in an open “common high-priority list” of 50 codes, are not produced in Kazakhstan but are allegedly being re-exported from EU and G7 countries through Kazakh intermediaries. While they make up less than 1% of Kazakhstan’s total trade volume, O’Sullivan emphasized that these are “lethal products that kill innocent Ukrainian civilians.” The special envoy recalled that in 2024, the EU blacklisted two Kazakh companies and issued a warning that this list could be expanded. He noted that particular attention is being given to companies that emerged immediately after the invasion of Ukraine and the start of the new sanctions regime. “These are usually not well-established, well-known companies with a long history of trading. The fact that a company was created right after the invasion and the imposition of sanctions suggests that its sole purpose may be to evade sanctions,” he stated while stressing that merely registering after 2022 is not sufficient grounds for inclusion on the sanctions list. Strategically Important Central Asia Given the statistics cited by O’Sullivan, there was no pressing need for his fourth personal visit to Kazakhstan. The blacklisting of two Kazakh companies last year went largely unnoticed by the country’s general public. However, his visit highlights the mechanisms of international politics set in motion following Donald Trump’s return to the White House and the opening gambits of his administration,...

Aktau Plane Crash AZAL Plane Crash Middle Powers Multi-vector Foreign Policy Disaster Response Azerbaijan Russia

Kazakhstan’s High-Stakes Balancing Act in the Aktau Crash Investigation

The Aktau crash of the Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 aircraft, which killed 38 people on 25 December, was a tragic event with significant international repercussions. This devastating accident not only claimed lives but also raised critical questions about aviation safety and the handling of sensitive investigations. As investigators sought to determine its cause, Kazakhstan faced an important decision regarding the handling of the flight recorder. Ultimately, the country chose to transfer the recorder to Brazil, the manufacturer of the aircraft, rather than to the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as Russia had proposed. This decision reflected both technical and diplomatic considerations, marking a crucial moment in the unfolding investigation. By taking this decision, Kazakhstan adhered to established industry procedures for aviation safety investigations. Such a step highlights the country's commitment to transparency and global norms in aviation. The move is typical of the country's foreign policy under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, whose long diplomatic experience leads him to emphasize a rules-based approach over political considerations and to act in accord with established procedural norms. This choice ensured that the investigation would follow established international practices, thereby lending credibility to the process and reassuring global aviation stakeholders. This behavior is also in line with Kazakhstan's broader commitment to international law and a rules-based global order. Another notable example of this approach was its endorsement of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity through its refusal to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea or the independence of the Donbas regions. These decisions were not necessarily easy ones, given Kazakhstan’s economic and security ties with Russia, but they reinforced its commitment to global standards. While some observers might frame decisions like the Aktau recorder transfer as a “snub” to Russia, such characterizations would miss the point. Like Kazakhstan’s refusal to recognize Donbas as independent and its efforts to prevent the flow of military components in violation of Western sanctions, its actions are not meant to be about rejecting one partner in favor of another. Rather, acting in its own autonomous interests, Kazakhstan seeks to "do the right thing," because this maintains a consistent international profile with a steady foreign-policy course grounded in international law and practice. Kazakhstan’s mediation efforts extend beyond formal multilateral forums, showcasing its active engagement in regional and global diplomacy. The country provided a neutral platform for discussions between opposing factions in the conflict over Syria; and it has also worked to ease tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, hosting purely bilateral consultations and thus demonstrating its capacity to engage constructively in regional conflicts without taking sides. These efforts are in line with Kazakhstan’s larger foreign-policy strategy to act as a principled and impartial intermediary on the global stage, fostering dialogue and reducing hostilities. Similarly, Kazakhstan’s leadership in the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) reflects its dedication to multilateralism and peaceful conflict resolution. Kazakhstan exemplifies the rising middle-power archetype also through its significant contributions to global nuclear non-proliferation. Its foreign policy operates on...