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Hungary

Hungary’s Political Shift Puts Central Asia Partnerships Under Scrutiny

Hungary’s political transition following the defeat of Viktor Orbán’s party and his resignation as prime minister is drawing attention not only in the EU and the United States, but also in Central Asia, where Budapest has built growing energy and investment ties. The key question is whether the policy of cooperation with Central Asia developed under Orbán will continue under the new leadership. In recent years, under Orbán, Budapest has actively developed its Central Asian foreign policy, primarily driven by the desire to find alternatives to Russian energy supplies. That push reflects Hungary’s long-standing reliance on Russian oil and gas, which has shaped its search for alternative suppliers beyond Europe. Resource-rich Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan became natural partners for diplomatic engagement. Orbán succeeded in building trust-based relationships with the presidents of the Central Asian republics, grounded in what Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó, described as “sincere friendship” in an interview with Uzbek media. “In Hungary, we have always viewed Central Asia as one of the fastest-growing regions in the world, with enormous potential. Our efforts to build these relations did not begin today, but decades ago,” he said. Hungary became the first Central European country to sign a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan in 2014. Currently, the Kazakhstan-Hungary Business Council is in operation, along with a joint agricultural direct investment fund. In 2024, bilateral trade approached $200 million, and from January to August 2025, it grew by another 22.1%, exceeding $164.6 million. Hungarian investments in Kazakhstan’s economy have surpassed $370 million, while the current investment portfolio includes 16 projects worth about $700 million in engineering, agriculture, and logistics. These links also intersect with wider efforts to expand east–west transport routes through the Caspian region, offering Hungary indirect access to Central Asian energy and trade flows. In May 2025, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held talks with Orbán in Budapest, where both sides highlighted rising trade volumes and a joint investment portfolio of about $500 million. Hungary’s OTP Bank entered into Uzbekistan’s financial market in 2023, acquiring a 73.71% stake in Ipoteka Bank, becoming its principal owner and the majority shareholder of the country’s fifth-largest bank. As early as 2019, Hungary had intensified cooperation with Turkmenistan. After talks at the Turkmen Foreign Ministry, Szijjártó told the media that Hungary views Turkmenistan as an important country from the perspective of European security. “We very much hope that Turkmenistan’s gas resources will be integrated into the overall energy flow of Central Europe,” he said. However, uncertainty remains over whether this policy direction will continue under Orbán’s successor, Péter Magyar. Oil and gas analyst Oleg Chervinsky has suggested that political changes in Hungary could affect cooperation with Kazakhstan’s national company KazMunayGas (KMG). Chervinsky notes that, having secured a constitutional majority in parliament, Magyar has a mandate to “implement reforms in both foreign and domestic policy [which could] reshape the constitutional structure of the right-wing populist authoritarian system built around Orbán.” The analyst points to Hungary’s oil and gas company MOL Group, which in recent...

Hungary

Central Asia Holds Back on Hungary Election as Orbán Era Ends

Central Asian governments have still yet to issue public statements on Hungary’s election, which brought an end to Viktor Orbán’s 16-year tenure. Hungary’s National Election Office published official updates after the April 12 vote, with Orbán conceding defeat after preliminary results indicated a landslide victory for Péter Magyar’s Tisza party. European leaders responded quickly, but no comparable messages have appeared on the main official channels in Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, or Ashgabat. The absence is not a breach of diplomatic protocol. Governments often wait for formal certification or initial contacts before issuing congratulations after parliamentary elections. Yet Hungary occupies a distinct place in Central Asia’s external relations. It is an observer in the Organization of Turkic States, and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev attended the informal OTS summit in Budapest, where Viktor Orbán hosted regional leaders and promoted closer ties. Hungary has presented itself as a bridge between Central Asia and the European Union, with regular high-level exchanges and expanding economic links. Recent precedent underscores the contrast. Following Hungary’s 2022 election, Kazakhstan’s Akorda said Kassym-Jomart Tokayev sent Viktor Orbán a congratulatory telegram on April 4, the day after the vote, and Uzbekistan reported that President Shavkat Mirziyoyev phoned Orbán on April 14, 2022 to offer his congratulations. No similar outreach has been made public so far in 2026. The delay reflects a period of adjustment rather than a clear shift. Orbán’s government had cultivated close personal and political ties with Central Asian leaders, and Budapest played an active role in advancing cooperation through the Turkic framework. A new Hungarian administration may recalibrate those priorities as it seeks to strengthen relations within the EU, creating uncertainty for partners that had relied on Hungary as a consistent advocate in Europe. For now, the silence signals caution. Central Asian governments appear to be waiting for the formal transition in Budapest and for early indications of the new government’s foreign policy. If statements follow in the coming days, the current pause will look procedural. If it continues, it will carry more weight as a sign of recalibration in a relationship that had been unusually close.

Football

Tajikistan Didn´t Qualify for World Cup, But Its Young Players Are Winning

Uzbekistan have qualified for this year's FIFA World Cup, while Tajikistan didn’t make it to the tournament. But their fortunes were reversed in a Central Asian junior event, suggesting that Tajik football is poised for a brighter future. Coached by Jafar Akhmedov, Tajikistan’s team won the Central Asian Football Association U17 championship on Monday, securing the title with a 0-0 draw with second-placed Uzbekistan in Tashkent. Tajikistan was top of the field with 10 points, while Uzbekistan had eight. Previously, Tajikistan’s team beat Turkmenistan (5-1), Kyrgyzstan (4-0) and Afghanistan (3-2). Two players on the Tajik team were recognized individually by the tournament. Bihisti Rajabzod was awarded the prize of most valuable player, or MVP, and the top scorer was Sioyosh Nazarov with four goals. The headquarters of the Central Asia Football Association, a sub-group of the Asian Football Confederation, is in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Its six members are Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan has been a member of the Union of European Football Associations, or UEFA, since 2002. Uzbekistan will compete in the World Cup for the first time this year and faces Colombia, Portugal and Democratic Republic of Congo in Group K. Uzbekistan’s team is led by coach Fabio Cannavaro, captain of Italy’s winning team in the 2006 World Cup in Germany. Tajikistan turned in some solid performances in World Cup qualifying games, including a 1-1 draw against Saudi Arabia and a 3-0 win over Pakistan. Although Tajikistan didn’t manage to qualify for this year’s expanded tournament, it has qualified for the AFC Asian Cup in Saudi Arabia next year.

Iran

Central Asia Recalculates as the Iran War Enters a New Phase

Central Asia’s first response to the Iran war was public and urgent. Governments organized evacuations, welcomed a ceasefire, and watched the Strait of Hormuz because the region’s trade routes, fuel costs, and food prices were already under pressure. The next phase looks different. Following the April 12 collapse of U.S.-Iran talks in Islamabad, Washington moved to block maritime traffic entering and leaving Iranian ports. That step does not formally close Hormuz to all shipping, but it pushes the crisis into a more serious phase for any country or company still treating Iran as a viable corridor. That distinction is important in Central Asia because the region does not need a formal legal closure of Hormuz to feel the shock. It only needs insurers, banks, freight forwarders, airlines, and traders to decide that the southern option has become too risky for routine planning. That process was already underway. The route through Iran had come under strain in southern corridor traffic, food systems, and in the wider pricing of regional connectivity. A U.S. move against Iranian ports is likely to reinforce that view. Official statements across Central Asia still reflect the ceasefire moment more than the latest escalation. On April 8, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev welcomed the truce and said he hoped it would support global trade and prosperity. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the ceasefire and praised efforts to reduce tensions. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry did the same, calling the truce an “important step toward de-escalating tensions,” and stressing that it should serve as a pathway to a broader political settlement. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the ceasefire agreement between Iran and the United States. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, had already taken a practical line, saying on March 4 that it was keeping all international checkpoints open and providing passage for foreign citizens, vehicles, and rail stock across the Turkmen-Iranian border. Since then, public messaging has lagged behind the latest escalation. By April 13, Qazinform’s foreign news flow had shifted to the failed Islamabad talks and Trump’s blockade order, while the latest publicly visible official positions elsewhere in the region still reflected the April 8 ceasefire. That does not mean backchannel diplomacy has stopped, but it does suggest that Central Asian governments prefer caution in public as the conflict shifts from direct strikes to pressure on shipping and trade. For the region, the economic logic is now clearer than the politics. Approximately 20% of global oil supplies and one-third of global fertilizer trade move through the Strait of Hormuz, while urea prices surged by almost 46% between February and March 2026. The World Bank’s April Europe and Central Asia Economic Update said growth in the developing economies of Europe and Central Asia is expected to slow to 2.1% in 2026, down from 2.6% in 2025, as the Middle East conflict, wider geopolitical tension, and trade fragmentation weigh on the region. Those pressures were already significant. The collapse of the main post-ceasefire diplomatic effort, followed by oil rising back above $100 a barrel, has made them harder...

Economic Growth

ADB Growth Forecast Points to Strong Expansion in Tajikistan

Asian Development Bank (ADB) forecasts that Tajikistan’s economy will maintain strong growth over the next two years, driven primarily by industrial expansion and the services sector. In its latest Asian Development Outlook (April 2026), the bank projects that gross domestic product will grow by 7.3% in 2026 and 6.8% in 2027. This follows an estimated 8.4% expansion in 2025, indicating a slight moderation but continued robust performance. ADB attributes the outlook to improving industrial competitiveness and rising value-added production, which are expected to support long-term economic development and job creation. “Tajikistan’s strong growth opens up opportunities to accelerate job creation,” said Ko Sakamoto, ADB country director for Tajikistan. “By developing competitive, value-adding industries from food processing and textiles to mineral products, the country can translate growth into more and better jobs.” At the same time, inflation is projected to rise to 4.0% in 2026 and 4.5% in 2027. According to ADB, this increase will be driven by stronger consumer lending, remittance inflows, higher public sector wages, supply chain pressures, and adjustments to utility tariffs. The bank noted that the outlook remains subject to revision given the uncertain regional environment. Despite recent gains, ADB cautioned that Tajikistan’s economic structure remains vulnerable. While industrial output has grown, the country continues to depend heavily on a narrow range of products. Exports are dominated by raw materials and low- to mid-level processed goods, with higher value-added manufactured products accounting for less than 10% of total merchandise exports. To address these challenges, the report recommends a broader, ecosystem-based industrial policy. This would involve support for specific sectors, along with improvements in infrastructure, workforce skills, access to finance, and the overall business environment. ADB’s earlier assessments highlight mixed socioeconomic trends. While poverty has declined significantly from 30.9% in 2020 to 19.9% in 2024, inequality and structural constraints continue to pose challenges to long-term development.

CIS

Moldova Moves to Leave CIS as Post-Soviet Bloc Loses Another Member

Moldova’s parliament approved, in final reading on April 2, the country’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with 60 deputies voting in favor. President Maia Sandu then promulgated the denunciation decrees, which were published in the Official Journal on April 8 and entered into force, with the Foreign Ministry set to notify the CIS. If Moldova’s withdrawal takes full legal effect after notification and the relevant notice period, eight CIS member states would remain: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The CIS was created immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a framework to manage the breakup and maintain post-Soviet cooperation among former republics. Moldova’s denunciation concerns a structure originally formed by 11 former Soviet states, not all 15 Soviet republics. Moldova’s exit further weakens the CIS politically, though the bloc will continue to exist if the remaining member states stay in place. Moldova has already approved the denunciation of the 1991 Agreement on the Establishment of the CIS, the related Protocol, and the 1993 CIS Statute. The Moldovan authorities say the CIS’s core values and principles are no longer being respected, especially the recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. They cite Russia’s war against Ukraine, acts of aggression against Georgia, and the illegal military presence of Russian troops on Moldovan territory. Chisinau says the move is consistent with Moldova’s European path, while the European Union remains its main economic partner. Economic ties with the Commonwealth have significantly declined: in 2025, CIS countries accounted for 5.9% of Moldova’s exports, while the European Union accounted for 67.5%. Moldova’s final withdrawal from the CIS may not, therefore, come as a surprise to its other members. On January 19, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi announced the start of the process to denounce the three core CIS agreements underpinning Moldova’s membership. “We are already in the process of getting approvals for the denunciation of three agreements with the CIS. They are the agreements that form the basis of our affiliation to the CIS, namely: the CIS Statute, the CIS Founding Agreement, and the Annex to this agreement,” Popșoi said. He added that this would mean Moldova was no longer a CIS member legally, while participation had already been suspended de facto. Moldova set a course toward breaking its remaining ties with its Soviet past after the 2020 presidential elections, when new president, Maia Sandu, announced a path toward EU integration and refused to participate in CIS summits. Moldova has spent the past several years unwinding CIS-linked agreements. As of January 2026, Moldovan officials said the country had signed 283 CIS agreements, of which 71 had already been rescinded, and about 60 more were in process. On December 12, 2025, Moldova’s parliament approved the denunciation of the 1992 Bishkek agreement on visa-free travel for CIS citizens. For Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and several other states, visa-free travel with Moldova remains in place under bilateral agreements. Moldovan authorities said the denunciation of the Bishkek agreement would affect...