In recent months, media attention has increasingly focused on infrastructure projects underway in Afghanistan. Chief among them is the Qosh Tepa Canal, widely seen not only as an irrigation initiative but as a development with significant transboundary implications for the Amu Darya River basin.
The canal draws water from one of Central Asia’s most critical transboundary rivers. For downstream countries, primarily Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the Amu Darya is a vital water source, directly linked to agricultural output and the sustainability of rural communities. As such, the conversation surrounding Qosh Tepa extends well beyond Afghanistan’s domestic agenda.
Concerns voiced by experts and analysts stem from both the scale of the project and the absence of an inclusive, basin-wide mechanism that includes Afghanistan, which is not a party to the main post-Soviet Amu Darya allocation frameworks. As a result, discussions regarding the canal’s potential impacts are taking place largely outside formal multilateral frameworks.
One positive development is the increasing presentation of Qosh Tepa within a broader context, where water flow management is recognized as a factor shaping regional political and economic relations. However, these assessments often highlight not the canal’s stated purpose, but rather the absence of a sustainable mechanism for coordinating discussion of its cross-border effects.
Image: TCATCA
A recurring concern among experts is the lack of a structured multilateral platform that enables early-stage evaluation of such projects before they are perceived as risks. Infrastructure development in the region frequently outpaces the establishment of mechanisms for joint impact assessment and management.
In this light, Kazakhstan’s initiative to establish a specialized structure within the UN system, the International Water Organization, acquires particular relevance. This proposal is not about building a theoretical global agenda but about addressing a specific institutional gap: the lack of a neutral forum for technical and expert discussion of transboundary water projects at an early stage.
The Qosh Tepa Canal, currently a unilateral infrastructure undertaking rather than the result of an international agreement, could serve as a test case for such a preventive mandate. While the project is already underway and its transboundary implications are actively being discussed among experts, it has not yet escalated into a regional dispute. This creates an opportunity for professional dialogue, without entanglement in political or status-related debates.
The present situation can be summarized as one of “transboundary implications without a transboundary mechanism.” The project, while entirely within Afghan territory, objectively affects the interests of downstream states, yet it remains disconnected from any multilateral framework for consultation or agreement.
Is it in Afghanistan’s interest to engage in multilateral formats? Though the question is often left unanswered, the answer is a clear “yes.” Such engagement would help dispel suspicion not only among Central Asian states, but also in Iran and Pakistan, both of which have voiced concerns over shared water resources.
First, it would reduce negative external rhetoric. Currently, Qosh Tepa is largely discussed via external media with alarmist scenarios and with little to no Afghan participation. This reinforces the image of Afghanistan as a unilateral actor, whose intentions are open to interpretation.
Second, involvement in regional dialogue would help the Islamic Emirate legitimize its flagship project, even in the absence of formal political recognition. This could help mitigate the risk of diplomatic or political pressure.
Third, multilateral engagement would enhance the long-term sustainability of the canal. Without regional coordination and an international mechanism, the risk of water disputes and broader politicization of water will rise, making the Qosh Tepa project itself increasingly vulnerable.
Some may ask whether this would amount to a “water for recognition” deal. The answer is, most likely not. The Taliban has generally rejected framing recognition as something to be traded for concessions. But Kabul must understand that water is a strategic resource, not a bargaining chip. The more likely outcome is a pragmatic calculation: reducing external risk surrounding the canal project while maintaining a firm stance on sovereignty.
Ultimately, the Qosh Tepa situation calls not for media dramatization, but for institutional dialogue rooted in technical cooperation and involving Afghanistan in regional water governance.
For the countries of Central Asia, Afghan participation in multilateral water frameworks could help reduce risks, not create new ones. Strengthening Afghanistan’s food and water security serves the interests of the entire region. Within the C5 format, a stable Afghanistan is not an end in itself but a prerequisite for long-term development, deeper connectivity, and a stronger, more autonomous regional position in a shifting global landscape.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
