• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
05 December 2025

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 92

U.S. Waiver of Sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port is Good News for Central Asia

U.S. sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port on the Gulf of Oman have been on again/off again since 2013, when the U.S. Congress passed the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA) to curb Iran’s regional influence and strategic capabilities through targeted economic pressure, aka sanctions. In the decade following IFCA’s passage, Washington’s sanctions on Chabahar had a negative impact on Central Asia, largely by complicating its efforts to deepen economic ties with South Asia and the Gulf. But geopolitics are shifting. Washington is increasing its involvement in Central Asia and India, and is doing the same in Afghanistan. These factors may well induce the U.S. Department of State to keep the waiver in place. Washington first waived its sanctions on Chabahar in 2018—a strategic move to support India's role in Afghanistan's post-war development and to provide a crucial trade route for that landlocked country. Six years later, India's Indian Ports Global Limited secured a 10-year deal with Iran to manage Chabahar port, in part, to offset Pakistan’s Gwadar port at the end of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a mere 100 miles from Chabahar. For all the fanfare, Central Asia held little real priority in Washington in those years. Seven years later, the U.S. changed course. It announced on September 16, 2025, much to Central Asia’s surprise and concern, that “the State Department has revoked the sanctions exception issued in 2018 under the IFCA”, making individuals involved in Iran’s Chabahar port operations subject to penalties, resulting in another snag in Central Asia’s desire for a southern breakout route. And then, in a swift reversal, the U.S. restored India’s sanctions waiver some six weeks later, on October 30. Whatever might explain the sudden change, Central Asia breathed a sigh of relief, and, by all accounts, now feels confident that the waiver will be evergreened. Time will tell if this confidence is justified. The U.S. waiver enables India to work to enhance Chabahar’s infrastructure and functionality, offering Central Asian exporters a more direct and profitable trade route than those via China, Russia, or the Middle Corridor, which stretches from East Asia to Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. As a result, goods like minerals, cotton, and energy products can reach regional and global markets faster. Central Asian capitals are quietly reveling in Washington’s flexible realpolitik in the face of convulsive U.S.-Iranian relations and heated Indo-Pakistan tensions. Without fear of punitive measures, India can now continue its work at Chabahar.  To be sure, the waiver affirms India’s rising global presence and accelerates New Delhi’s drive into Central Asia, including Afghanistan. Washington’s decision signaled to traders, investors, and think tankers that it has no intention of spoiling India’s export ambitions and Central Asia’s desire for north-south economic integration. The waiver shows Washington’s pragmatism—and is welcomed by those who have little or no use for Washington’s penchant for foreign policy moralism. Chabahar Port complements not only the Trans-Caspian corridor—a multimodal trade route connecting Asia and Europe by linking China to Europe through Central...

Turkmenistan Included as Trump Tightens U.S. Immigration Ban After D.C. Shooting

President Donald Trump has announced a sweeping crackdown on immigration following a deadly shooting near the White House this week, placing new scrutiny on immigrants from certain countries – including Turkmenistan. Trump vowed to “permanently pause migration” from what he called “Third World” countries after two National Guard members were shot in Washington, D.C., one of them fatally. In response, U.S. immigration authorities are re-examining green cards and visa approvals for people from 19 countries deemed “countries of concern,” a list that features Turkmenistan alongside nations in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. New Immigration Review Follows D.C. Attack The policy shift comes in the wake of an ambush-style attack on Wednesday in which an Afghan national allegedly opened fire on U.S. service members outside the White House. Army Specialist Sarah Beckstrom, 20, died from her injuries, and another Guardsman was critically wounded. Authorities arrested Rahmanullah Lakanwal, a 29-year-old Afghan man who arrived in the U.S. in 2021, as the suspect. Trump condemned the shooting as “an act of terror” and highlighted that the suspect entered under a Biden-era Afghan resettlement program. By Thursday, Trump directed U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to conduct a “full-scale, rigorous reexamination” of all current green card holders from every “country of concern.” USCIS Director Joseph Edlow said the review was ordered “at the direction of the President” and stressed that “American lives come first.” When pressed on which nations fall under the “countries of concern,” USCIS officials pointed to Trump’s June 4, 2025, presidential proclamation on foreign entry restrictions, which identified 19 countries with deficient security vetting or high visa overstay rates. It imposed a full travel ban on 12 nations and partial visa bans on 7 others. Turkmenistan’s Status in Trump’s Travel Ban Turkmenistan is one of seven countries under partial U.S. travel restrictions, meaning certain visa categories for Turkmen nationals have currently been suspended or tightened. According to the Trump administration, Turkmenistan was flagged due to security screening gaps and a high rate of U.S. visa overstays by its citizens. U.S. officials noted that about 15.35% of Turkmen visitors on tourist visas overstayed their permitted time in recent years. Turkmenistan has also been cited for limited cooperation on repatriating its citizens who are deported from the U.S. Under the June proclamation, Turkmen nationals were barred from obtaining immigrant visas or tourist and student visas for the U.S., though other travel may be allowed on a case-by-case basis. By invoking what he called a “permanent pause” on migration, Trump signaled that even more sweeping immigration restrictions could be ahead. He wrote on social media that anyone who is “not a net asset to the United States, or is incapable of loving our Country” will be removed. For Turkmenistan, inclusion in the U.S. ban list marks a rare spotlight on the country in American immigration policy. Turkmenistan, where emigration is tightly controlled, sees low numbers of its citizens entering the U.S. Department of Homeland Security data for Fiscal Year 2023 indicates that the...

CSTO Signs New Security Roadmap in Bishkek Amid Armenia Boycott and Putin Ukraine Remarks

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) reaffirmed its commitment to regional security and political coordination during its annual summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on November 27. Leaders from five of the bloc’s six members - Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan - attended the event and signed off on a series of military, security, and strategic cooperation agreements. Armenia, the sixth CSTO member, boycotted the summit for the second year running, continuing its protest against the alliance’s refusal to intervene during Armenia’s conflict with Azerbaijan, and marking another low in Armenia’s engagement with the CSTO after months of public grievances against the bloc. Despite Yerevan’s absence, the other members adopted a wide-ranging joint declaration reaffirming the alliance’s collective defense commitments and outlining new initiatives to modernize its security framework. Notably, Armenia did not oppose the adoption of the summit documents in its absence. The CSTO, founded in 2002 and led by Russia, has a charter that guarantees mutual defense among members, though the bloc has often struggled to act decisively during regional crises. Still, it remains the only formal security alliance connecting Russia with post-Soviet Central Asian republics. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov hosted the summit, marking the end of his country’s chairmanship. Japarov handed over the role to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who announced that Russia will lead the CSTO in 2026 under the motto “Collective Security in a Multipolar World: Common Goal—Shared Responsibility.” The bloc also appointed Kyrgyzstan’s Taalatbek Masadykov as the next Secretary General. The former deputy head of Kyrgyzstan’s Security Council will begin his three-year term on January 1, 2026. In remarks during the summit, Putin also addressed global concerns about the war in Ukraine, stating that a 28-point peace plan proposed by former U.S. President Donald Trump could serve as a “basis for future agreements.” He added that Russia has no intention of attacking Europe, seeking to dispel fears of escalation while reaffirming Moscow’s security agenda. The summit ended with the adoption of a large number of documents. Among them were a strategy to combat drug trafficking and plans to improve border security, peacekeeping readiness, and anti-terrorism efforts. Russia used the summit to offer CSTO members a rearmament initiative. Putin proposed supplying allies with modern Russian-made weapons that had “proven their effectiveness” in recent conflicts. The offer included expanded cooperation in joint production and training. Military exercises will continue under the newly adopted five-year cooperation plan. In 2025, the CSTO held drills in Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Tajikistan under the banner “Indestructible Brotherhood.” The plan outlines regular future training, integration of air defense units, and enhancements to peacekeeping logistics. The alliance also adopted an Anti-Drug Strategy for 2026–2030 and signed a joint resolution to intensify Operation “Kanal,” which targets drug routes through Central Asia. The CSTO committed to upgrading its counterterrorism strategy and enhancing cyber defense capabilities, with Russia proposing broader coordination on information security and biosecurity. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, meanwhile, used the summit to urge partners to accelerate border security aid along Tajikistan’s porous southern frontier...

From Washington to Samarkand: Mirziyoyev Proposes Hosting Next C5+1 Summit

Uzbekistan's President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has been participating in the U.S.-Central Asia Summit in Washington, D.C., this week. Mirziyoyev was received at Andrews Air Force Base by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, American-Uzbek Chamber of Commerce Chairperson Carolyn Lamm, and other officials. The visit included high-level bilateral meetings and participation in the C5+1 summit alongside Central Asian leaders. On November 5, Mirziyoyev met with U.S. Representatives Bill Huizenga, Carol Miller, and Sydney Kamlager-Dove. The two sides discussed strengthening the strategic partnership and expanding interparliamentary cooperation. The Uzbek delegation highlighted the active role of the Congressional Caucus on Uzbekistan, which organizes annual “Uzbekistan Days” in the U.S. House of Representatives. That same day, the Mirziyoyev also met Senator Steve Daines, co-chair of the Central Asia Caucus in the U.S. Senate. According to the Uzbek presidential press service, both sides noted the “unprecedented level” of bilateral cooperation, including a surge in trade and joint projects involving American companies. They emphasized the importance of congressional support in implementing recently signed agreements, many of which have reached record volumes. The two sides also agreed to organize a business delegation from Montana to Uzbekistan. [caption id="attachment_38893" align="aligncenter" width="300"] @president.uz[/caption] On November 6, Mirziyoyev held a series of business-focused meetings. He met with John Jovanovic, head of the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), to discuss financing major projects in energy, critical minerals, transport, agriculture, IT, and other sectors. Special attention was given to Eximbank’s potential role in modernizing Uzbekistan’s aircraft fleet and supplying Boeing aircraft. Both parties agreed to develop a long-term cooperation plan. Later that day, Mirziyoyev met with Ben Black, CEO of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which mobilizes private capital for global development initiatives. According to the Uzbek side, discussions focused on energy, critical minerals, finance, transport, agriculture, and IT. The two sides agreed to accelerate the creation of a joint investment platform to support priority projects and small businesses. Uzbekistan also proposed opening a DFC regional office in Tashkent. Mirziyoyev also held talks with Shilpan Amin, global executive director of General Motors International. The discussion centered on long-term cooperation in the automotive sector. Over the past five years, GM has produced 1.6 million vehicles in Uzbekistan, which has become Chevrolet’s second-largest market after the United States and now leads sales in Central Asia and the CIS. Mirziyoyev then met with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick. They discussed trade, investment, and joint economic projects. According to the Uzbek presidential press service, bilateral trade turnover has quadrupled in recent years, nearing $1 billion. Over 300 American companies are now operating in Uzbekistan. The sides noted expanding cooperation in agriculture, including contracts for soybean and cotton supplies and the introduction of U.S. drip irrigation technologies. At the conclusion of his business program, Mirziyoyev met with representatives of leading American companies, investment funds, and financial institutions. He emphasized that trade turnover with the United States had increased fourfold in eight years and outlined priority cooperation areas, including energy, critical minerals, transport infrastructure, and...

Deals, Not Declarations: U.S.–Central Asia Cooperation at Summit Crossroads

A landmark summit between the United States and the five Central Asian republics is scheduled for November 6 in Washington, D.C., bringing together the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. It will be the second leaders-level C5+1 meeting with a U.S. president—the first took place on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in 2023—and the first time the format is hosted in the U.S. capital. The gathering also marks the 10th anniversary of the C5+1 diplomatic platform that connects Central Asia with Washington. The summit comes at a pivotal moment geopolitically; Russia remains consumed by its war in Ukraine, whilst China continues to expand its Belt and Road footprint across Eurasia. As the region’s strategic importance grows, both the United States and the Central Asian states see an opportunity to recalibrate their relationships, each approaching the meeting with distinct priorities and expectations. Washington’s Agenda: Critical Minerals and Connectivity For the United States, this summit is about converting diplomatic engagement into tangible deliverables. Officials want to see results in three main areas: critical minerals, regional connectivity, and security coordination. Congress and the administration view the region’s reserves of antimony, tungsten, uranium, and rare earth elements as essential to securing U.S. supply chains. During his October 2025 visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau emphasized expanding cooperation on critical minerals and trade diversification. The Trump administration has prioritized these resources as part of a broader effort to reduce dependence on China. Trade routes are also in focus. The U.S. supports the Middle Corridor, a trans-Caspian route that links Central Asia with the South Caucasus and Europe. Infrastructure investments that bypass Russia are strategically important, and Washington wants to help harmonize customs and logistics to make that corridor more viable. These priorities form part of a wider push to anchor the region in transparent, market-based supply chains that connect Central Asia more directly with Western markets. Kazakhstan: Trade Normalization and Resource Investment Central Asia’s largest economy, Kazakhstan is expected to push for permanent normal trade relations with the U.S. The country still faces Cold War-era restrictions under the Jackson-Vanik amendment – as do Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan - with Astana long having viewed its repeal as a key milestone. That push has taken on new importance after Washington imposed a 25% tariff on Kazakh imports in mid-2025 - though Kazakh exports were exempted shortly thereafter - a move viewed by officials in Astana as inconsistent with efforts to expand economic cooperation. Kazakhstan is also looking to the U.S. for support in developing its mineral wealth. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s government is actively mapping new rare earth deposits, and Washington has recently backed a private American bid to reopen Kazakhstan’s long-idle tungsten mine at Upper Kairakty, underscoring growing U.S. interest in Central Asia’s critical minerals sector. The two sides are also expanding industrial ties: in September 2025, Astana signed a $4.2 billion deal with U.S. rail manufacturer Wabtec to modernize Kazakhstan’s locomotive fleet and develop regional transport corridors...

Opinion: A Trump Visit to Central Asia Would Deliver Results and Anchor a Corridor Strategy

On November 6, Washington will host the C5+1 leaders’ summit, marking the format’s 10th anniversary and signaling a rare alignment of political attention and regional appetite for concrete outcomes. The date is confirmed by regional and U.S.-focused reporting, with Kazakhstan’s presidency and multiple outlets noting heads-of-state attendance in the U.S. capital. This timing is decisive. Russia’s bandwidth is constrained by the war in Ukraine, China’s trade weight in Central Asia has grown, and European demand for secure inputs and routes has intensified. All these developments together create a window where a visible United States presence can meaningfully alter the deal flow. A visit sequenced off the November C5+1 will attach U.S. political attention to minerals, corridors, and standards that regional governments already prioritize, confirming the conversion of the summit's symbolism into leverage. Washington already has the instruments but has lacked a synchronized presence. Development finance, export credit, and C5+1 working groups exist, yet announcements have too often outpaced commissioning. A targeted tour could unveil named offtakes, corridor slot guarantees, and training compacts. This would move from the dialogue to bankable packages if paired with financing envelopes, posted schedules, and third-party verification. Deals, dates, and delivery would make operational signals clear to partners and competitors alike. Strategic Rationale and Operating Concept The United States has three clear goals. These are to diversify critical minerals away from single-point dependency on China, de-risk trans-Eurasian routes that connect Asian manufacturing to European demand, and reinforce the sovereignty of the states in the region without pressuring them to choose sides in great-power competition over other issues. These imperatives already guide the national-security strategies of Central Asian governments, which implement them according to multi-vector doctrines. A presidential visit that treats minerals, corridors, and standards as a single package would show that Washington is prepared to move forward on the same problem set that the region has defined for itself. The ways to do that are through finance-first diplomacy and an end-to-end corridor approach, including the Caspian crossing. Finance-first diplomacy pairs every political announcement with insurance, offtake letters, and term sheets (short non-binding summaries of key commercial and legal terms for a proposed deal). These signal the intention to convert declarations into commissioning. An end-to-end corridor approach accepts the physical reality that Central Asian outputs move west through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and across the South Caucasus, with Azerbaijan functioning as the hinge that makes Europe reachable at scale. Each element of the “minerals–corridors–standards” triad reinforces the others when the whole is pursued as a single program. Reliable customs and traceability raise corridor credibility, which raises project bankability, which in turn attracts the private capital required for mineral processing. The instrumentalities for this already exist. The C5+1 framework can be tasked to track deliverables; the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) can cover risk and long-term debt; aid and technical programs of the Department of State and Commerce can align standards, procurement integrity, and traceable supply chains; U.S. universities and labs can...