At a time when the European Union, China, and Turkey are seeking to strengthen their presence in Central Asia, the United States administration is consumed with bilaterally implementing a seismic shift in its trade policy with the entire world. Although this region of post-Soviet space is widely seen as a new front of rivalry between Washington and Beijing, in many aspects, American influence in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan lags far behind that of other actors.
Culture (soft power) has always played an important role in the foreign policy of every great power. The Soviet Union was no exception. As a result, even today, Russian, rather than English, is still the lingua franca in Central Asia, although Moscow, following its invasion of Ukraine, has had a hard time preserving remnants of its former dominance in the region.
Russian cinema, however, maintains a notable presence in most, if not all, Central Asian states. While Hollywood movies have a strong global presence, Russian films in Central Asia often act as a link between Western content and the region’s cultural traditions. Millions of Central Asian migrants working in Russia also serve as a bridge between their nations and the Russian Federation, facilitating cultural exchange, economic ties, and the spread of the Russian language.
However, Russia’s fiasco in Ukraine has created space for the EU to assert its influence in a region that has traditionally been in Moscow’s geopolitical orbit. Nevertheless, although Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, are Tajikistan are members of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, they have remained neutral in the Ukraine conflict.
For Central Asian nations, the EU serves as a counterweight they can use to balance their relations with Moscow. The EU, however, faces strong economic competition from China. With a trade volume of $94.8 billion with Central Asian states, Beijing is positioning itself as the major economic power operating in the five regional nations.
Although the European Union’s influence in Central Asia is expected to continue to grow in the coming years, if investment trends from recent years persist, the balance in the region will likely tilt towards China, which will increase its presence and influence at the expense of Russia. But where does the United States fit into this dynamic?
Even though the U.S. is the largest economy in the world, with which almost everyone wants to engage, American bilateral trade with the region has never been particularly strong, with the exception of Kazakhstan. Interestingly enough, it is Astana that is expected to suffer the most among Central Asian actors due to U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to impose tariffs – 27% on Kazakhstan compared to 10% on all other nations in the region.
Exceptions may be made for Kazakhstan’s critical minerals, however, which are now the third largest in the world based on a recent discovery, with reports suggesting that some goods, including “certain minerals that are not available in the United States,” as well as energy, will not be subject to the tariffs. According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade and Integration, the core of the country’s exports to the U.S. consists of crude oil, uranium, silver, ferroalloys, and other minerals, which account for 92% of shipments.
In spite of this, the Kazakh Government is reportedly initiating consultations with the Trump administration to discuss the possibility of exempting Kazakhstan from additional tariffs, which means that Astana is very unlikely to follow the EU’s approach and respond to Trump’s move in a retaliatory fashion. Some experts, however, argue that Trump’s tariff policy could result in Kazakhstan, as well as other regional states, becoming more dependent on China for trade.
The verdict is still out on whether the new U.S. tariff policy will push Central Asia deeper into Beijing’s geoeconomic orbit. However, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has repeatedly stated that Astana is seeking to replace the Great Game – a rivalry between the 19th-century British and Russian empires over influence in Central Asia – with “Great Gain for all in the heart of Eurasia”.
But while in the 19th century there were two major rivals, this time it remains unclear who could be Beijing’s major opponent in Central Asia. The U.S. under Trump has demonstrated less of a desire to influence the region and the rest of the world, as indicated through the practical shuttering of USAID.
In Ukraine, Trump has also aimed to pull back resources while staying committed on the condition of gaining access. However, in energy-rich Central Asia, Washington seems to behave rather ambivalently.
It is the European Union, rather than the United States, that is eyeing Central Asia’s critical minerals, while Turkey, mainly through the Organization of Turkic States, is also attempting to strengthen its role. China is doing this largely through economic means, which is why some authors claim that Beijing has emerged as the “primary Eurasian power in the new age of multipolarity that is upon us.”
The United States, on the other hand, seems to have chosen a new path, focusing on pragmatic, non-ideological diplomacy in the region. The Trump administration, unlike most of its predecessors, is unlikely to pressure regional actors to follow Western values, human rights, and various principles of liberal democracy, which could yet make the U.S. a desirable partner.
Thus, in the long-term, the United States might emerge as China’s rival in the so-called New Great Game in Central Asia. For the time being, however, the region will likely remain in a multipolar competition for influence.
