• KGS/USD = 0.01153 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09243 0.87%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01153 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09243 0.87%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01153 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09243 0.87%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01153 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09243 0.87%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01153 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09243 0.87%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01153 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09243 0.87%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01153 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09243 0.87%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01153 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09243 0.87%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
03 April 2025

Viewing results 13 - 18 of 197

How Trump’s Trade War on China Affects Central Asia

When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers. U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to impose tariffs on China and the European Union could have severe consequences not only for Brussels and Beijing, but also for economies around the world. Central Asia is no exception, as it could easily be caught in the crossfire. Although no country in Central Asia sees the United States as its major economic partner, Trump’s trade war with the EU and China is expected to impact all Central Asian nations in one way or another. Their strong economic ties with China and the growing EU presence in the region were once seen as a strategic advantage. Now, it seems to represent a double-edged sword.  As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, all Central Asian states have sought to strengthen economic relations with Beijing and Brussels. Their partnerships with China and the EU have grown through trade and investments, but Washington’s tariffs on Chinese and European goods could result in a reduction in demand for various items in Central Asia.  Trump’s tariff policy could also give Beijing certain leverage over Washington in the strategically important region. According to Mark Temnycky, Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council Eurasia Center, as a way to counter the impact of U.S. tariffs, the Chinese could increase their trade and energy relations with the countries of Central Asia. “This would further accelerate China’s relationship with Central Asia, and it could result in the regional states becoming more dependent on the Chinese for trade. Given the proximity of China to Central Asia, this may also result in the regional nations reducing their trade relations with the European Union as well as with the United States, as they favor Chinese prices,” Temnycky told The Times of Central Asia in an interview.  U.S. bilateral trade in the region has never been particularly strong. The exception is Kazakhstan – the region’s largest economy – which is the only country in Central Asia whose trade with the U.S. exceeds one billion dollars. According to official statistics, in 2024 America’s total goods trade with Kazakhstan was estimated at $3.4 billion. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan combined have a lower trade volume with the United States than Kazakhstan. But all that is just a drop in the ocean compared to the $89.4 billion trade China reached with Central Asian in 2023. “Trump’s tariff policy could lead to an even greater Central Asian states’ dependency on China, potentially creating a Chinese monopoly on Central Asian trade and energy. In other words, regional countries would no longer have a diversified economy and market, thus tightening China's control over the area,” Temnycky stressed. That, however, does not necessarily mean that Beijing will, in the long term, benefit from Washington’s tariff policy. According to Tyler Schipper, an economist and Associate Professor at the University of St. Thomas, China is “arguably at one of its economically weakest points in the last several decades,” which means that any trade war with the...

Strategic Cooperation Between Turkey and Turkmenistan Gains Momentum

Turkey and Turkmenistan have accelerated their cooperation in recent years, advancing economic, energy, and diplomatic initiatives that underscore their shared cultural and strategic interests. Their deepening of bilateral ties reflects and expresses both broader regional dynamics and shifts in global energy geopolitics. As The Times of Central Asia reports, the two countries signed a natural gas supply agreement in February 2025 that reinforces Turkey’s ambitions as a regional energy hub while providing Turkmenistan with a new export avenue. Turkmenistan will begin supplying 1.3 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) of natural gas to Turkey on March 1 through a swap agreement. Turkmenistan will send gas to Iran for consumption in the northeast of the country, in return for which Iran will transfer an equivalent amount to Turkey. Various press commentaries and diplomatic declarations touting the “export of Turkmen gas to Turkey” are therefore to be regarded skeptically as political grandstanding, even if such an assessment may be supported from a technical standpoint of how the industry calculates flows. Trade and investment relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan have recently seen steady growth, underpinned by Turkish business engagement in Turkmenistan’s infrastructure and construction sectors. Over 600 Turkish companies are active in Turkmenistan, and Turkish direct investment has surpassed $500 million. Turkish contractors have executed projects worth over $50 billion in Turkmenistan since its independence. In this context, the eighth meeting of the bilateral Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation took place in Ankara on February 25. Following the meeting, a large-scale protocol was signed, including 87 points and covering cooperation over a wide range of issues - areas such as trade and investment, energy, transport and logistics, scientific cooperation, agriculture, and healthcare. The bilateral trade turnover between the two countries reached $2.2 billion in 2024, and Turkey aims to more than double this level to $5 billion. However, reaching that target hinges on further liberalization of Turkmenistan’s economic policies and the expansion of investment-friendly regulations, both of which could be challenging. The two sides also discussed how to integrate Turkmenistan into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, “Middle Corridor”) as well as possible cooperation in the field of transport and logistics toward that end. Ankara has successfully positioned itself as a strategic economic partner, but Ashgabat’s tightly controlled economy presents structural barriers that may slow the desired growth. Ankara’s engagement with Ashgabat thus reflects its broader efforts to enhance connectivity across Central Asia. Turkey’s push to integrate Turkmenistan into the TITR aligns with its own ambition to position itself as a logistical bridge between Asia and Europe, complementing its Middle Corridor strategy, which seeks to create an alternative trade route bypassing Russia. However, Turkmenistan’s rigid economic model and cautious foreign policy limit the pace of integration. Practical challenges include regulatory misalignment, infrastructure bottlenecks, and geopolitical sensitivities. Turkey’s Vice-President, Cevdet Yilmaz, affirmed his country’s intention that Turkmen gas and electricity should reach European markets through Turkey. Turkish state-owned companies such as TPAO and BOTAŞ will also seek to develop hydrocarbon fields in Turkmenistan and...

Turkey Proposes Turkmenistan Join the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries

Turkey has proposed that Turkmenistan join the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries (TURKPA). The initiative was put forward by Turkish Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş during a meeting with a Turkmen parliamentary delegation in Ankara. During the talks, both sides discussed inter-parliamentary cooperation and ways to strengthen bilateral ties. One of the key topics was Turkmenistan’s initiative to declare 2025 the International Year of Peace and Trust, which was previously approved by the United Nations General Assembly. The Turkmen delegation expressed gratitude to Turkey for its support of this initiative. Following the discussions, the delegations held a press conference, where they emphasized the importance of their accumulated experience in cooperation and the potential for deepening diplomatic relations. As part of their visit, the Turkmen delegation toured several historical sites in Ankara. The cultural program included visits to Turkey’s first parliament building and museum, the Ankara Fortress, and the Hamamönü district. They also participated in a flower-laying ceremony at Anıtkabir, the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first President of Turkey. TURKPA is a parliamentary organization that aims to strengthen inter-parliamentary ties among Turkic-speaking states. Its objectives include harmonizing political positions, facilitating the exchange of information and experience, and implementing joint projects in politics, economics, and culture. Turkmenistan has so far remained outside of TURKPA, but its potential membership could further strengthen cooperation among Turkic-speaking nations.

Eduards Stiprais Appointed New EU Special Representative for Central Asia

The Council of the European Union has appointed Eduards Stiprais as the new EU Special Representative for Central Asia. Stiprais will assume his duties on March 1, 2025, with an initial two-year mandate, succeeding Terhi Hakala. According to the European Council, Stiprais will be responsible for promoting EU-Central Asia relations based on shared values, strengthening regional stability and cooperation, and supporting democracy, the rule of law, good governance, and human rights. A seasoned Latvian diplomat, Stiprais previously served as Latvia’s Permanent Representative to the EU and as Deputy State Secretary - Political Director at the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 2016 to 2020, he was Head of the EU Delegation to Uzbekistan and has also served as Latvia’s ambassador to the United Kingdom and France. The European Council recently announced that the first-ever EU-Central Asia summit will be held in Uzbekistan on April 3-4. The summit will be attended by European Council President António Costa, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. As EU-Central Asia relations gain strategic significance, the upcoming summit presents a key opportunity for the EU to deepen its engagement in the region. The European Council stated that discussions will focus on enhancing cooperation in transport and digital connectivity, critical raw materials, economic and security collaboration, and energy transition. The EU adopted a new Strategy on Central Asia in 2019. The EU remains Central Asia’s second-largest trading partner and the leading investor, accounting for over 40% of foreign investment in the region.

High Methane Emissions May Hinder Turkmenistan’s Gas Exports to Europe

High methane emissions could pose a significant obstacle to Turkmenistan’s entry into the European gas market, according to an updated report by the U.S. Department of Energy, published on February 6. The main findings of the study were summarized by Eurasia Review on February 19. The report, which examines oil and gas production in the Caspian region, notes that four countries, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, account for 3% of global energy production. Turkmenistan’s Gas Reserves and Export Ambitions According to the report, Turkmenistan ranks fifth worldwide in natural gas reserves, estimated at 400 trillion cubic feet in 2025. In 2023, the country set a record by producing 3.0 trillion cubic feet of dry natural gas, the highest level since official statistics began in 1992. Currently, Turkmenistan’s primary gas exports are directed to China, but Ashgabat is seeking to expand its market reach, including potential supply routes through Afghanistan. However, the U.S. Department of Energy warns that excessive methane emissions from Turkmenistan’s fields could complicate access to the European market via the Trans-Caspian pipeline. In terms of oil reserves, Turkmenistan holds a relatively modest 600 million barrels, with an average daily production of 275,000 barrels in 2024. Diversification Efforts and New Export Deals Meanwhile, Turkmenistan is taking steps to diversify its export destinations. Gas supplies to Turkey are set to begin on March 1. During a phone call on February 10, Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov informed Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian that an agreement had been reached to transit gas through Iran under a swap supply arrangement with Turkish energy company BOTAŞ. Efforts to Reduce Methane Emissions Turkmenistan has also been actively engaging in international initiatives to curb methane emissions. On December 1, 2023, the country joined the Global Methane Pledge (GMP), an initiative aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In November 2024, Bloomberg reported that the state-owned Turkmengaz plans to hire specialists to measure methane emissions more accurately and is preparing a tender for emission monitoring. That same month, the U.S. Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) released satellite data showing that methane leakage from oil and gas fields in Turkmenistan, the U.S., and Venezuela is significantly higher than official ground-based measurements suggest.

Right Place, Right Time: Central Asia Basks in Russia’s Eastern Energy Pivot

On January 1, with the closure of pipelines through Ukraine, deliveries of Russian gas to Europe came to a virtual standstill. Prices across the continent have ratcheted up in the first six weeks of 2025 and have now hit two-year highs. In Central Asia, the effects of the Russo-European decoupling have also been profound. In 2024, Kyrgyzstan posted a 48% year-on-year increase in Russian gas imports, while Uzbekistan’s inbound gas purchases soared over 142% to $1.68 billion. But while Gazprom’s reorientation has been a boon to Central Asia’s economies, this phenomenon appears to be more than short-term supply dumping due to the war in Ukraine. Rather, it is part of a lasting trend that could define the region’s, and the world’s, energy map. Russia’s Supply Glut In 2018, Russia exported a record 201 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to Europe. The closure of the Yamal and Nord Stream pipelines had already brought these supplies down to 49.5 bcm by 2024 and will be further impacted by the cut in supplies via Ukraine. Despite some gas supplied via Turkstream and a steady trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG), Russian gas supplied to Europe is a fraction of what it once was. The Central Asian market offers both short and long-term solutions to this. “Most likely, Gazprom views its expansion into Central Asia as a partial and immediate solution to the challenge of finding new markets for its gas,” said Shaimerden Chikanayev, a partner at GRATA International, a law firm. “While the region cannot fully replace the volumes or profit margins previously achieved in Europe, it offers a readily accessible and stable outlet for Russian gas exports.” Central Asia is accessible due to old Soviet pipelines that link the region to Moscow. These pipelines, known as Central Asia–Center, were originally built to take gas from Turkmenistan, via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia. This system has now been engineered to run in reverse. The pipeline has a capacity of around 50 bcm per year, but there are ongoing efforts to increase it. Still, this is only a quarter of what was once supplied to Europe, nor are the revenues as lucrative. In 2023, the average rate charged by Gazprom to Uzbekistan for gas was $160 per thousand cubic meters (tcm), this compares to European prices that fluctuated between $200-400tcm throughout the 2010s. For Stanislav Pritchin, head of the Central Asia sector at the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, the price is not a major factor. “Russia of course sells gas to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan lower than the market price. This is a politically motivated decision. And this is not just because it is struggling with [selling to] Eastern Europe. Russia could sell it to Central Asia at market prices, but this is the Russian approach towards its allies in the region,” he said. Central Asian Serendipity For Central Asian states, these new supplies have come at a good time. Countries such as Kyrgyzstan are trying hard to...