• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10508 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10508 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10508 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10508 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10508 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10508 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10508 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10508 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%

Kazakhstan’s Trade with China Is Growing, but the Deficit Is Widening

Kazakhstan’s trade and economic ties with China continue to deepen, yet the expansion in bilateral trade is accompanied by a widening imbalance. By the end of 2025, China had consolidated its position as one of the country’s key trading partners, accounting for nearly a quarter of total foreign trade turnover.

According to data from the analytical centre of the Association of Financiers of Kazakhstan (AFK), bilateral trade reached $34.1 billion, an increase of 13.2% compared with the previous year.

China’s share in Kazakhstan’s foreign trade rose to 23.7% from 21.2% a year earlier. Growth in trade was driven primarily by an increase in imports of Chinese goods. In 2025, imports from China reached $18.9 billion, 23.6% higher than the previous year. China accounted for 29.2% of all imports into the country. The structure of imports indicates growth in shipments of both consumer goods and industrial products. The largest increases were recorded in vehicles (+$3.4 billion), metals (+$645 million), and chemical products (+$412 million).

According to analysts, this reflects expanding investment activity, infrastructure projects, and domestic demand.

In contrast to imports, Kazakhstan’s exports to China showed only moderate growth, rising by 2.1% to $15.2 billion. At the same time, the export structure changed. Shipments of agricultural and chemical products increased, while exports of traditional raw materials declined.

Experts attribute this to cooling industrial demand in China, lower global commodity prices, and growth in domestic production within China itself.

Faster growth in imports led to a sharp deterioration in the trade balance. According to AFK data, the bilateral trade deficit with China increased tenfold, from $370 million to $3.7 billion.

At the same time, price trends for goods imported from China remained largely downward. Declining prices for a number of items are linked to low inflation in China and increased competition from Chinese manufacturers in foreign markets.

This, in turn, is exerting a restraining effect on inflation in Kazakhstan, partially offsetting price increases driven by domestic factors such as tariffs, demand, and budget spending.

In the short term, analysts expect imports from China to remain the main driver of bilateral trade. Kazakhstan’s exports, meanwhile, will depend on commodity prices and the level of industrial demand in China.

High oil prices (above $100 per barrel) could temporarily reduce the deficit by boosting export revenues. However, this effect would be largely price-driven and is unlikely to change the overall structure of trade.

Prototype Driverless Taxi Unveiled in Astana

As part of the Nauryz celebrations in Astana, a demonstration run of a driverless vehicle developed at the Daulet Serikbayev East Kazakhstan Technical University (EKTU) was held. In the future, this prototype could become part of the city’s driverless taxi system.

The presentation took the form of a public demonstration for residents and visitors to Kazakhstan’s capital. According to the Astana City Administration, the vehicle’s software and test route were developed by specialists from the Luban Workshop, which opened at EKTU in Ust-Kamenogorsk in late 2023 with support from China’s Tianjin Vocational Institute.

The project is being implemented as part of an initiative to develop engineering competencies and introduce new technologies, ranging from alternative fuels to AI systems in the transport sector.

At the same time, an agreement was signed to establish the Kazakhstan Engineering Center for the Application and Development of Intelligent Automotive Technologies.

The demonstration run was organised by the Ministry of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development in collaboration with the capital’s city administration and the IT company Astana Innovations.

The test took place at one of the city’s festive venues. Visitors were able to observe the autonomous vehicle in real time and assess its potential for use in an urban environment.

According to the organisers, the prototype demonstrated the potential for integrating AI technologies into Smart City systems, including navigation, data processing, and interaction with infrastructure.

Authorities view driverless transport as one of the key areas in the development of urban mobility. In the future, such solutions may be integrated into Astana’s infrastructure, including the launch of autonomous taxis.

It was previously reported that Kazakhstan plans to launch pilot projects for driverless taxis in the capital as early as 2026.

At the same time, work is under way to prepare road infrastructure. Digital “passports” for highways are being developed, which are expected to enable the future use of driverless trucks.

Tajikistan’s Reliance on External Funding for State Investment Projects Is Growing

Tajikistan continues to implement a large-scale state investment programme. International financial institutions play a key role in financing these projects, however, while the government’s own contribution remains limited.

According to data from the State Committee on Investment and State Property Management, 82 state investment projects are currently under way in the country

The total value of ongoing initiatives is estimated at approximately $4.67 billion. Of these, 55 projects are being implemented on a grant basis, five through loans, and another 22 have mixed financing.

About $3 billion has already been allocated for procurement, works, and services related to the implementation of these projects. However, more than 70% of the funding is provided by just three international institutions. The World Bank remains the largest donor, contributing $1.725 billion (36.9%). It is followed by the Asian Development Bank with $914.7 million (19.5%) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) with $658.1 million (14.1%).

Other investors include the Islamic Development Bank ($207.9 million), the Chinese government ($194.9 million), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ($142.5 million), the German Development Bank ($129.3 million), and the European Investment Bank ($114.8 million).

Against the backdrop of extensive external financing, Tajikistan’s own contribution remains small. The state is investing approximately $151.2 million, accounting for only 3.2% of the total. This means that the implementation of key infrastructure and social projects largely depends on international donors and lenders.

At the same time, in 2025 Tajikistan managed to significantly increase capital inflows. Foreign investment reached approximately $7 billion, rising by nearly $2 billion (35.1%) compared with the previous year.

The authorities hope to sustain this momentum by improving the investment climate, including through legislative updates.

A key step was the adoption on May 14, 2025, of a new version of the law “On Investments and the Promotion of Investment Activity,” aimed at increasing the country’s attractiveness to international partners.

The current development model allows Tajikistan to implement large-scale projects that would be difficult to carry out relying solely on domestic resources. However, this financing structure also increases dependence on external sources, making the economy more sensitive to the conditions set by international institutions and the global financial environment.

Over Half of People in Kyrgyzstan Use Russian Information Sources – New Survey

The Russian Eurasian Center for Sociology and Analytics has conducted a survey examining which information sources are used by citizens of Kyrgyzstan. The study involved face-to-face interviews with 1,900 residents aged over 18.

The survey found that 52% of respondents use Russian or Russian-language information sources. One third use Kyrgyz and Russian or Russian-language sources equally, while 43% use Kyrgyz sources more often.

Young people were identified as the main audience consuming information in Russian.

The primary sources of information for residents of Kyrgyzstan are public pages and groups on social media (63%). YouTube ranks second (47%). Respondents also cited conversations with friends (41%) and group chats on WhatsApp, Viber, and other messaging platforms (37%) as common sources of news and information. For 40%, television remains a relevant source. Only 10% mentioned Telegram channels.

Among men, the most popular sources of information are YouTube, television, and radio, while women tend to use social media more frequently.

The main social media and online platforms used regularly (at least three to four times a week) are YouTube (71%) and Instagram (67%), followed by Facebook (23%) and TikTok (22%). Russian social networks such as VKontakte (5%) and Odnoklassniki are less popular. Seven percent of respondents said they do not use social media or online platforms at all.

YouTube is the most popular platform across almost all age groups up to 64 years old.

Online audiences show the greatest interest in political (48%) and entertainment (45%) content. Other areas of significant interest include leisure programmes (38%), sports (37%), social issues (34%), and economic news (33%). Political news is more likely to attract residents of the country’s north (55%) than those in the south (44%).

Russian remains widely spoken in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the north and in the capital, Bishkek. Under the Constitution, Russian has official status, while Kyrgyz is the state language.

How the Container Hub in Aktau Is Changing the Game on the Trans-Caspian Route

The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) is experiencing rapid growth. Against the backdrop of geopolitical shifts and the restructuring of global supply chains, it is increasingly seen as a reliable alternative to traditional maritime routes.

The next major step in its development will be the launch in 2026 of Kazakhstan’s first container hub in the port city of Aktau. The project is expected to accelerate cargo handling, create a full container infrastructure, and strengthen the competitiveness of the route as a whole.

But will it be enough to elevate the corridor to the level of the world’s key transport routes? The Times of Central Asia sat down to discuss these important regional developments with Damir Kozhakhmetov, CEO of KTZ Express, the transportation and logistics subsidiary of Kazakhstan Railways (KTZ).

TCA: The launch of the container hub at the Port of Aktau is scheduled for 2026. What stage is the project currently at? Are there already forecasts for handling volumes?

DK: Construction of the container hub is proceeding according to schedule. The first phase of the project has already been completed: on December 25, 2025, the facility entered pilot industrial operation.

The design capacity of the first phase is 140,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) per year. As part of the project, a rail-track complex approximately three kilometers long has been built, a container yard covering 19,300 square meters has been created, and two modern rail-mounted gantry cranes with a lifting capacity of 41 tons each have been installed. The main loading and transport equipment has also been procured and commissioned.

At the same time, supporting infrastructure has been developed, including roads, administrative and auxiliary buildings, engineering and utility networks, lighting systems, and perimeter security.

Comprehensive testing of the process equipment is currently underway, and the terminal’s digital control systems are being configured. At the same time, the hub’s IT systems are being integrated with the digital infrastructure of the Port of Aktau to ensure operational transparency and reduce container processing times.

Staff training and the refinement of production processes are also continuing during the trial-operation phase. Overall, the facility is steadily moving toward commercial operation, with commissioning work scheduled for completion by the end of March 2026.

As for throughput, a phased ramp-up to design capacity is expected in 2026, with utilization increasing gradually.

TCA: How will the launch of the container hub affect capacity utilization at Aktau itself?

DK: We expect a significant synergistic effect. The project is primarily aimed at attracting additional container traffic, particularly within the TITR framework. This will allow for fuller and more efficient use of the port’s infrastructure.

It is important to note that the development of port capacity is already aligned with projected cargo growth. Dredging work is underway in the port basin, while additional berths are being reconstructed and developed. Combined with the modernization of transshipment equipment, this creates the infrastructure reserve needed in advance.

The container hub will operate in close cooperation with existing terminals, expanding the port’s logistics capabilities. This will enhance its appeal as a transit hub and increase the regularity of vessel calls. As a result, both capacity utilization and operational efficiency should improve.

TCA: The project will serve as a key link between maritime and land transport. What technologies will enable faster cargo handling?

DK: The hub is equipped with modern handling equipment, including 41-ton RMG cranes manufactured by ZPMC, a global leader in port equipment. For Kazakhstan, these are unique solutions in terms of automation, productivity, and technical specifications.

The infrastructure also includes reach stackers, forklifts, rail sidings, container yards, and warehouse space.

Digitalization plays a key role. The hub has implemented an automated container tracking and control system, digital document management integrated with government agencies, and a real-time container tracking system.

This allows for the simultaneous processing of multiple trains, reduces cargo dwell time at the terminal, speeds up multimodal operations, and ensures transparency in logistics processes between maritime and land transport.

TCA: Is further expansion of the hub under consideration?

DK: Yes. We are currently working with our Chinese partner, the Port of Lianyungang, on the second phase of the project.

This phase involves increasing throughput capacity to 240,000 TEUs per year by expanding container yards, increasing warehouse space, and developing access infrastructure.

TCA: You mentioned staff training. Could you elaborate on the staffing plans for the hub?

DK: The organizational structure and staffing levels have already been approved. The model is designed to integrate related functions, optimize processes, and reduce redundant management layers, which is especially important during the launch phase.

Initially, the staff will consist of about 100 people, taking shift work into account. The structure includes an engineering and technical unit, production and operations personnel, crane operators, reach stacker operators, container truck drivers, stevedores, riggers, and dispatchers, as well as administrative departments and occupational safety and environmental services.

Systematic staff training is being carried out in parallel. Training covers work with modern transshipment equipment, digital systems, including the terminal operating system, container-handling procedures, equipment maintenance, industrial safety requirements, and interaction with customs authorities.

Both specialized training centers and practical sessions involving equipment manufacturers are being used. If necessary, international experts will be brought in. Priority is being given to Kazakhstani specialists.

TCA: What measures are being taken to develop container transport along the TITR?

DK: Today we are seeing steady growth in container transport along the route. At the same time, a comprehensive roadmap is being implemented to improve service efficiency and eliminate bottlenecks.

One of the key results is a reduction in delivery times. Whereas in 2023 transport between Xi’an and Poti, Georgia, took about 30 days, by 2025 that figure had fallen to 15 to 18 days.

On the infrastructure side, plans include dredging operations in the Caspian Sea on both the Kazakh and Azerbaijani sides, fleet expansion, and the development of the railway network in Georgia. This will increase the capacity of the maritime segments of the route.

TCA: What role does digitalization play?

DK: It delivers one of the most tangible benefits. We are developing a Single Digital Window platform that integrates document management, access to services, and cross-border data exchange.

Integration with the railways of Azerbaijan and Georgia has already been completed. In Georgia, for example, the time required for customs inspection of container trains has been reduced from eight to nine hours to about 40 minutes.

Integration has also been carried out with Chinese partners, including the Xi’an Free Trade Port Group and the Yiwu trading platform. This has reduced the time required to process transit declarations at the Altynkol crossing from 24 hours to about 30 minutes. Integration with China Railway Container Transport Corp. is planned for 2026, which should further improve the synchronization of operations on the Chinese section of the route.

TCA: How is cooperation with other market participants structured?

DK: The effective operation of the TITR is impossible without coordination among all participants. The container hub in Aktau was designed from the outset as part of a single logistics ecosystem. The main areas of focus are synchronizing vessel-call and container-train schedules, exchanging data, and introducing unified standards for container handling.

We are also working on the compatibility of information systems, the implementation of end-to-end container tracking, and the exchange of advance information. This helps reduce the risk of delays and improve planning accuracy.

TCA: When will the hub reach full capacity, and what KPIs have been set?

DK: Reaching design capacity will be a phased process, likely taking around two to three years after commissioning.

The key KPIs include container throughput, average processing time, capacity utilization, the degree of digitalization, and financial efficiency.

But our goal is broader: to create a sustainable, predictable, and competitive container logistics model that will be in demand internationally.

Kyrgyzstan Braces for Showdown Between President Japarov and Former Security Chief Tashiyev

When Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov suddenly dismissed his long-time friend Kamchybek Tashiyev as head of the country’s State Committee for National Security (GKNB) on February 10, he cryptically said it was “in the interests of our state, in order to prevent a split in society.”

Less than two months later, that split could be coming, and there is a possibility the country is headed for a confrontation between the two men and their supporters.

The Gathering Clouds

Tashiyev returned to Kyrgyzstan on March 19 after being outside the country for more than a month amid a widening corruption investigation targeting Tashiyev and people close to him.

On the day he arrived, Tashiyev went to the Interior Ministry’s investigative department, where he was questioned about state-owned company Kyrgyzneftegaz.

On March 17, the head of the State Tax Service, Almambet Shykmamatov, said that “Kyrgyzneftegaz was under the complete control of the GKNB.” The State Tax Service is looking into allegations that Kyrgyzneftegaz sold crude oil to private companies connected to Tashiyev’s relatives or associates who then sold the oil back to Kyrgyzneftegaz at a profit.

These accusations are not new.

Bolot Temirov, the host of the investigative news program Temirov Live, reported about this exact topic in January 2022. Two days after the report was posted on YouTube, police raided the office of Temirov Live, detaining Temirov on narcotics possession charges that were later dropped. Instead, Temirov was convicted of having a fake Kyrgyz passport and using false documents to cross in and out of Kyrgyzstan.

At an appeals trial in November 2022, a judge ordered Temirov deported from Kyrgyzstan, and he was taken from the courtroom to the airport and put on a plane to Russia. Several journalists connected to Temirov Live have been detained, and some, including Temirov’s wife, have been imprisoned since Temirov’s expulsion from Kyrgyzstan. The State Tax Service has resurrected the Temirov Live accusations, while insisting that the evidence it collected has no relationship to the Temirov Live report.

Tashiyev’s nephew, Baigazy Matisakov, who was the head of the Kyrgyzneftegaz refinery since 2021, was detained on March 18. Tashiyev’s son, Tay-Muras, who is connected to Moko Group, one of the private companies involved in purchasing oil from and then reselling it to Kyrgyzneftegaz, was questioned at the Interior Ministry.

An article from March 16 states that the State Tax Service also connected Tashiyev’s brother, Shairbek, to illegal activities in the oil business. Reports about Tashiyev being questioned at the Interior Ministry on March 19 stressed that he was called in as a “witness.”

Japarov Goes on the Offensive

On February 10, the reason for sacking Tashiyev, who was out of the country at the time, was unclear. In the days that followed, it gradually became apparent that this was more than just a disagreement between two friends who had governed Kyrgyzstan together for five years.

Japarov also dismissed top officials in the GKNB, which Tashiyev had headed since October 2020. Officials in the Interior Ministry, the prosecutor general’s office, several ministers, the mayors of Kyrgyzstan’s second and third largest cities, Osh and Manas (formerly Jalal-Abad), respectively, and eight newly-elected members of parliament were fired or suddenly resigned.

Tashiyev’s brother, Shairbek, received some 56% of the votes in his district in the November 30, 2025, parliamentary elections, the biggest percentage received by any candidate in the 30 electoral districts.

On February 16, less than a week after his brother was fired as head of the GKNB, Shairbek said his brother’s dismissal “did not cause a stir in our family.” He commented about posts on social networks that were calling for him to step down, saying that only the people who voted for him had the right to take away his deputy’s mandate.

But on March 13, the Interior Ministry’s Investigative Department called Shairbek in for questioning, and the next day, he signed a declaration officially relinquishing his seat in parliament.

The Border Guard Service was subordinate to the GKNB, but Japarov transferred it under the control of the president’s office, and also created a state security service and an investigative committee that report directly to the president.

All the while, Japarov insisted he and Tashiyev were still friends.

Shortly after Tashiyev was dismissed, the head of the presidential press service, Dayyrbek Orunbekov, warned there was a fake campaign to discredit Tashiyev, and later, Syrgak Berdikozhoyev, the chairman of the newly created State Security Service, stated that Tashiyev would continue to receive government security.

An Ominous Silence

Tashiyev was in Germany when Japarov announced his dismissal. Japarov said he had spoken with Tashiyev before the announcement, but Tashiyev said the move was unexpected.

The apparent reason for firing Tashiyev was an appeal a group of 75 former government officials and prominent public figures released on February 9, calling for President Japarov and then-speaker of parliament Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu to set a date for an early presidential election.

Japarov was elected president in January 2021 under a previous constitution that stipulated a six-year term for the president. A new constitution approved in a national referendum in April 2021 reduced the presidential term to five years, so there was some ambiguity about Japarov’s time in office. Hours after the appeal was made public, information appeared claiming that some of its authors were contacting members of parliament and other people, and urging them to “go over to the general’s (Tashiyev’s) side” when an early presidential election was held.

The timing was strange. Tashiyev departed Kyrgyzstan on February 6 for a medical check-up in Germany, something he has done regularly since undergoing heart surgery there in February 2021. He returned on February 13 and met briefly with Japarov on February 15, then left Kyrgyzstan again on February 17.

Tashiyev did not make any comments to the media during his short stay in Kyrgyzstan. After the meeting, President Japarov said Tashiyev would not be returning to any government position and hinted that perhaps the discussion had not gone well.

“Of course, he (Tashiyev) won’t say thank you now; he’ll be upset,” Japarov said, adding, “But years from now, he’ll say, ‘Friend, you did the right thing back then.’”

Tashiyev remained in Kyrgyzstan after being questioned by the Interior Ministry, and on March 20, attended prayers in Bishkek marking the end of Ramadan.

“If I made a mistake and offended anyone, I ask for forgiveness,” he told the media. But, he added, “I have forgiven everyone who spread rumors and slandered during the holy month… I hope next time they won’t do this and spread information that is not true.”

Next Move?

Most of the people in government whom Japarov has sacked since February 10 are connected to Tashiyev. The investigation involving Kyrgyzneftegaz seems to be the next step in disassembling Tashiyev’s support base, but this is a dangerous move.

While there is almost surely “kompromat” on Tashiyev and his family, the same is true of Japarov.

One example is Japarov’s sister, Raykul, who fled Kyrgyzstan in 2014 just before she was convicted of laundering illegal proceeds and sentenced to seven years in prison. In 2015, she was convicted of involvement in the 2007 illegal takeover of Investbank Issyk-Kul and was sentenced to ten years in prison. Raykul Japarova has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing. A warrant was issued for her arrest, and as of May 2020, she was reportedly seeking political asylum in Poland.

Then came the October 2020 revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Sadyr Japarov was in prison, three years into an 11.5-year sentence for kidnapping a local official during protests in Issyk-Kul in October 2013, charges which Japarov denies. Sadyr Japarov initially fled Kyrgyzstan, but was arrested and convicted after returning in March 2017.

Japarov was freed from prison by supporters during the October 2020 revolution and, with help from Tashiyev and others, was catapulted into the presidency in less than two weeks.

In January 2021, Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Court overturned the convictions of Raykul Japarova. The Supreme Court had already overturned Japarov’s conviction shortly after he was freed from prison in October 2020.

There are more recent allegations that members of Japarov’s family and their friends have also been involved in unethical or illegal business activities. As head of Kyrgyzstan’s security service for more than five years, Tashiyev probably has his own kompromat material on the Japarov family and their acquaintances.

Loyal supporters of Japarov and Tashiyev are likely on edge already and preparing for a potentially volatile period in the coming weeks.