Taxing the Gig Economy in Kazakhstan
Beginning in 2026, Kazakhstan plans to introduce enhanced oversight of citizens’ mobile transfers. Officially, the measure is framed as part of efforts to combat tax evasion. In practice, however, it represents a large-scale fiscalization of the gig economy, which employs hundreds of thousands of taxi drivers and couriers.
The primary focus of the campaign is workers on digital platforms, including ride-hailing and delivery services. The authorities classify them as individual entrepreneurs who underreport or conceal income. Yet the economic reality is more complex: for many, this is less a shadow economy than a form of concealed unemployment operating under the label of “self-employment.”
Hidden Unemployment Rather Than a Shadow Economy
In recent years, the gig economy in Kazakhstan has become structurally significant. Industry estimates suggest that hundreds of thousands of people now work through digital platforms, and the number continues to rise.
For most drivers and couriers, this is not supplementary income but their principal, and often only, source of earnings. The drivers of this trend are well known: limited job opportunities in many regions and a persistently high household debt burden. Elevated levels of consumer lending have compelled many citizens to seek fast, accessible sources of income, even where margins are thin.
At the same time, tax authorities treat these workers as entrepreneurs who deliberately avoid taxation. However, they lack core characteristics of independent businesses: they do not set tariffs, generate demand, or accumulate capital. Their status more closely resembles digitally mediated wage labor without corresponding social protections.
Tax on Turnover, Not Profit
Platform-based work is highly sensitive to additional costs. Digital aggregators typically retain commissions of 20-25% on each order. The remainder is not net profit but gross turnover, from which drivers must cover fuel, maintenance, depreciation, and other operating expenses.
Industry assessments indicate that a taxi driver’s net income after expenses rarely exceeds 40-50% of the order value. It is from this turnover that taxes are now expected to be withheld.
Under the proposed model, platforms would act as tax agents, automatically deducting payments from each transaction. Options under discussion include a flat 4% rate or a system combining fixed social contributions with a 1% income tax. These measures are presented by officials as simplifying compliance and reducing administrative burdens.
The central issue, however, is that taxation would occur before expenses are accounted for. For businesses with substantial profit margins, this may be manageable. For drivers operating on minimal profitability, it could prove critical.
Digital Control as a Point of No Return
Previously, some workers partially offset costs by accepting direct mobile transfers, operating in what officials describe as a “gray zone.” This avenue is set to narrow significantly.
Under the current financial monitoring framework, if an individual receives transfers from 100 or more different senders over three consecutive months, the information is automatically transmitted to tax authorities.
For taxi drivers, this threshold may be reached within days of active work. As a result, opportunities for informal adjustment are effectively disappearing.
Who Ultimately Bears the Cost
Digital platforms are unlikely to absorb the additional fiscal burden by lowering commissions. Their business models are tightly calibrated, leaving little room for voluntary margin reductions.
Consequently, the burden is likely to be redistributed in two primary ways: some drivers and couriers may exit the market, while prices for end consumers may rise. Both trends have been observed during previous periods of regulatory tightening.
Dynamic pricing algorithms respond to supply shortages by increasing fares. When the number of available drivers declines, prices tend to rise sharply rather than proportionally. In practical terms, this can make a standard trip or delivery one-and-a-half to two times more expensive.
Social Risks of Fiscalization
The social profile of gig workers heightens potential risks. Many are men aged 18-35, often with higher education, who have relocated from economically depressed regions to major cities. For them, platform work functions as a critical social and economic buffer.
A significant decline in real incomes among this group could accelerate marginalization. Previous instances of courier strikes, and driver protests demonstrate that these communities are capable of rapid mobilization.
Formalizing the gig economy is, in principle, a logical and necessary step. However, in its current configuration, the reform risks functioning as a tax on subsistence-level earnings.
Aggregators retain their commissions. Workers operating on minimal margins may leave the market. The ultimate costs may be borne by consumers through higher prices and inflationary pressure in the service sector.
Absent a more calibrated tax model that accounts for actual expenses and profit levels, fiscalization may generate socio-economic consequences that outweigh the anticipated budgetary gains.
