• KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
16 November 2026

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 625

C5+1 Statement Omits Afghanistan, Prioritizes Trans-Caspian Trade

The United States and the five Central Asian republics have issued a joint statement on economic and security cooperation that makes no mention of Afghanistan, once a central concern of U.S. regional policy. The document followed the October 19 C5+1 ministerial meeting in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Afghanistan's absence from the statement does not mean it has disappeared from negotiations or Washington's strategic interests. Nevertheless, a comparison with earlier C5+1 documents reveals a shift in the published agenda. Where Washington once placed considerable importance on connecting Central Asia with South Asia through Afghanistan, the latest statement focuses on trade across the Caspian Sea and investment in the region's minerals. Afghanistan's Changing Place in C5+1 Talks In July 2021, just weeks before the Taliban retook Kabul, C5+1 participants at a conference in Tashkent explicitly supported closer trade and transport links between Central and South Asia through Afghanistan, as well as efforts to secure peace in the country. That month, the U.S., Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan also announced plans for a quadrilateral platform to support trade and transportation projects linking the two regions. In July 2023, Afghanistan was the subject of a separate C5+1 special session in Astana. Officials called for an inclusive Afghan government that respected women's rights and backed further development of transport and energy links through the country. A joint statement issued by C5+1 leaders that September described Afghanistan as an important factor in Central Asian security. In the 2026 Samarkand statement, Afghanistan goes unmentioned even in the section on border security and terrorism. However, the October 2023 C5+1 connectivity statement had already highlighted the Trans-Caspian Trade Route, which connects Central Asia to Western markets, and also omitted Afghanistan. For Central Asian countries, the Afghan route remains important in practical terms. Uzbekistan is pursuing plans for a railway through Afghanistan to Pakistan, which would give it access to Indian Ocean ports. Kazakhstan is already a major supplier of food to Afghanistan, exporting around $216 million worth of flour and $122 million of wheat in the first seven months of 2026. In September, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also agreed with the United Arab Emirates to study a railway corridor through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan all share borders with Afghanistan. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also face the prospect of reduced water supplies from the Amu Darya as Afghanistan builds its Qosh Tepa Canal. Afghanistan's omission from a joint statement should therefore not be taken as a complete account of the policies of all five Central Asian states. What Constrains Washington One possible explanation lies in the U.S. approach to Afghanistan's current authorities. Washington allows practical contacts with representatives of the Taliban but does not recognize the government it has formed. The movement remains designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, although it is not included in the U.S. Department of State's separate list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The designation restricts dealings with the Taliban, although U.S. sanctions rules permit many commercial transactions involving Afghanistan's governing institutions, including civilian infrastructure and transportation projects....

A First for Kyrgyzstan – Japarov’s Historic Visit to Armenia

For the first time, a Kyrgyz head of state has made an official visit to Armenia. President Sadyr Japarov arrived in Yerevan on October 15 at the invitation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and called the three-day trip “historic.” Talks remained firmly bilateral and produced ten signed agreements, a joint commitment to protect Lake Issyk-Kul and Lake Sevan (Armenia), and a stated interest in expanding transit links. Nothing in Japarov’s statement framed cooperation as directed against any third country. He presented it in terms of trade, cooperation, and friendly relations, with dialogue and peace underpinning regional stability. Japarov opened his remarks by noting that Pashinyan had visited Kyrgyzstan twice this year, including the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council session in Cholpon-Ata in August. Pashinyan, for his part, said Japarov’s first official visit to Armenia would open a new page in bilateral relations. Kyrgyzstan and Armenia have been independent since 1991, and both belong to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a five-nation bloc with a common market for goods, services, capital, and labor. Even so, their leaders have mostly met on the sidelines of multilateral summits. Quiet to Active Diplomacy Under Japarov, Kyrgyzstan has abandoned its quiet diplomacy and begun taking a more active role in international affairs. This year, Japarov has traveled to Armenia (October 15-17), Azerbaijan (October 14-15 and May 17), Turkmenistan (October 8-9), the United States (from September 19), South Korea (September 15-18), Kazakhstan (July 29, May 28-29, and May 15) and Russia (April 23). He reached Armenia fresh from the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Baku, where Central Asian leaders linked trade and security issues. Bishkek’s shift in foreign policy emphasis owes less to geopolitics than to economic necessity and a practical, non-ideological pursuit of national interests. Its commitment to dialogue, regional stability and good-neighborliness is central to a foreign policy aimed at win-win results. Biodiversity Diplomacy In Yerevan, Japarov attended the opening of the Leaders' Summit within the 17th UN Conference of the Parties on Biological Diversity (COP17). On October 16, he addressed the plenary, presenting initiatives on glacier melt and biodiversity in Central Asia, and met UNESCO Director-General Khaled El-Enany. Among the specific proposals, Japarov recommended a special mountain program within the Global Environment Facility at the World Bank to fund environmental projects in mountain regions, and a UN-backed trust fund for Issyk-Kul, to which Kyrgyzstan proposed an initial $10 million contribution from its state budget. He also called for a Global Center for Mountain Region Resilience in Bishkek, where countries could share knowledge and experience on environmental protection. Japarov further backed a debt-for-nature swap mechanism, which would let countries use financial resources more effectively to protect ecosystems, and urged stronger regional cooperation to protect rare animals and birds. The Yerevan Declaration followed the usual diplomatic template, restricted mainly to high-level language. Japarov invited Pashinyan to attend “Bishkek+25,” the Second Global Mountain Summit, on 21–23 October 2027, to mark the culmination of Kyrgyzstan’s Five Years of Action for Mountain Development. Transport at...

SCO Economic Ambitions Outpace Agreement

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) renewed calls for a development bank at its October 20 heads of government meeting in Dushanbe, but the institution remains under negotiation more than a year after members reached political agreement on its creation. Participants adopted a joint communiqué and decisions on economic cooperation, including joint manufacturing and transportation. Financing those ambitions remains a central challenge. Members backed the bank at their September 2025 summit in Tianjin. A year later, the Bishkek summit ended without a founding agreement or capital commitments, and no launch date was set. The SCO brings together ten countries whose economic priorities differ sharply. China and India are among the world's largest economies, while Russia and Iran face Western sanctions. For Central Asian members, the organization offers another route to investment, but agreement on shared goals has yet to produce a common financing institution. Different Priorities Tajik Prime Minister Kohir Rasulzoda reported that SCO countries accounted for 70% of Tajikistan's foreign trade turnover in January–August 2026. Meanwhile, foreign direct investment from member states amounted to just $350 million for the whole of 2025. "These figures demonstrate the enormous untapped potential of our investment cooperation, which significantly lags behind the dynamics of trade relations," Rasulzoda said. Iran has different concerns. First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref called for wider use of national currencies in trade, alongside export insurance and investment protection. Tehran has long sought to reduce its foreign trade dependence on Western financial infrastructure. Sanctions make this an urgent priority, but Iran's interests in international settlements differ considerably from those of India or China, for example. Beijing and New Delhi conduct extensive trade with Western countries, so a single financial model for all SCO members is unlikely to satisfy everyone. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin encouraged joint manufacturing projects using Russia's special economic zones and investment protection agreements. Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, is seeking investors for the Tamchy special investment and financial territory, established in July 2025 in the Issyk-Kul region. First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Daniyar Amangeldiev invited SCO partners to develop joint projects there. Financing the Bank A development bank could provide a common source of funding for such projects. In Dushanbe, Belarusian Prime Minister Alexander Turchin renewed calls to accelerate its establishment. "We consider it fundamentally important that this institution become a multilateral development bank with a unique mandate, providing access to long-term investment financing without political conditions," he said. Kyrgyzstan also supported establishing the bank. Amangeldiev urged members to draw on existing financing channels, including the SCO Interbank Consortium, while negotiations continue. Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov confirmed Astana's willingness to host the bank's headquarters. Bishkek had already put forward its candidacy at the September summit. Choosing a headquarters is only part of the task. Members must agree on their financial contributions and how the bank will operate, including who decides which projects receive loans. China has far greater financial resources than most of its SCO partners, giving it the potential to become the bank's principal...

Ukraine Says More Than 20,400 Central Asians Signed Russian Army Contracts

More than 20,400 Central Asian citizens have signed contracts with Russia’s armed forces since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, according to the Ukrainian government’s “I Want to Live” project. The new figures come as families in Kazakhstan secure the return of young men who say they went to Russia for civilian work and were forced into military service. The project’s October figures identify 8,207 Uzbek citizens and 5,308 Tajiks, together accounting for about two-thirds of the regional total. Kazakhstan accounts for 3,819. A further 2,219 are from Kyrgyzstan, and 884 from Turkmenistan. The count covers identified contract signers as of October 1, rather than the number currently fighting, and excludes ethnic Central Asians with Russian citizenship. The figures have not been independently verified. “I Want to Live” is a Ukrainian state project that helps Russian servicemen surrender. For some Kazakh families, the immediate struggle has been to get their sons out of the Russian army. Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. As TCA reported, he and other young Kazakh men later appeared in appeals for help, with some wearing Russian uniforms in or near the combat zone. On October 7, relatives went to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry in Astana to demand help bringing the men home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied them, said he knew of at least 21 cases. Families said their relatives had accepted civilian jobs before being pressured to sign military contracts. Keldibek has now returned to Kazakhstan. His sister told RFE/RL’s Kazakh service that he arrived in Shymkent on the evening of October 21. She said others were still waiting to return. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry had earlier asked Moscow to help repatriate the men and opened a hotline for their families. Their accounts fit a pattern documented by the International Federation for Human Rights. Its April study found that migrants in Russia had been offered military contracts as an alternative to detention or deportation. Others were recruited abroad with promises of civilian work, only to find themselves sent to the front. “Many of these men knew in some capacity what they were signing up for. But some were also deceived or coerced,” FIDH President Alexis Deswaef said. The war has also drawn Central Asians to Ukraine’s defense. TCA’s earlier reporting on both sides described volunteers who regarded Ukraine as home and saw Russia’s invasion as a threat to their families. Kazakh national Zhasulan Duysembin joined Ukraine’s armed forces in 2021 after settling there. In a 2022 interview, he told Ukrainska Pravda: “I had two children in Ukraine, and for the first time I started to think that they might be in danger.” Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency has warned citizens that offers of work or help with immigration papers can lead to recruitment into armed conflicts. It has also reminded them that joining foreign armed forces can bring criminal liability at home. For other families, there has been no homecoming. Kiril Nysanbaev went to Russia for work after completing his military...

Opinion: China’s Regional Strategy Meets Central Asia’s National Bargains

The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway spent decades on the drawing board. Disagreements over its route and financing held it up long after the three governments endorsed the project. In 2024, a Kyrgyz parliamentarian asked railway officials a simple question: “Where will we find $1 billion?” A financing agreement signed in Bishkek on December 16, 2025, cleared a major obstacle. The railway is estimated to cost $4.7 billion. Chinese banks will lend about $2.3 billion to the joint project company over 35 years. China holds 51% of the company, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5%. The partners will provide the remaining funding as equity. In June 2026, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament approved in the first reading a separate $304.5 million loan from China’s Export-Import Bank to help fund its own contribution. That loan has a 25-year term. The joint company’s debt and Kyrgyzstan’s borrowing for its stake are different obligations, but both affect how much value the country will need to earn from the line. Kyrgyzstan wants business around the railway, including terminals and freight services; Uzbekistan gains a direct rail link toward China, while Beijing gains another route west. The governments agreed to build the line, but tariffs and terminal operations will help decide how the returns are shared. The same division between shared goals and separate deals runs through China’s C+C5 relationship with the five Central Asian states. At the second China-Central Asia summit in Astana in June 2025, the six countries signed a treaty on eternal good-neighborliness. The Chinese Foreign Ministry also published a list of 55 cooperation documents. The first 14 cover the regional China-Central Asia framework. The other 41 involve Chinese institutions and counterparts in individual Central Asian countries, including local authorities and companies. The count reflects how the agreements are organized rather than their financial weight. The regional documents cover road permits, customs procedures and green minerals. The country-specific agreements extend into particular industries and investment relationships. Customs cooperation shows how regional talks can lead to bilateral action. At a meeting on May 21–22, 2025, customs chiefs from China and Central Asia agreed to joint border inspections. The next day, Chinese and Kazakh officials conducted an inspection of Nur Zholy-Khorgos. They agreed to accept more trucks from Kazakhstan and recognize each other’s X-ray inspection images to reduce repeat checks. Kazakhstan’s customs authority explicitly linked the inspection to the regional meeting. The agreement illustrates how governments can address a shared concern through negotiations at an individual crossing. The Astana investment agreements reflected different national priorities. Kazakhstan pursued investment protection and applications for China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, while Kyrgyzstan signed documents on an AI application center and processing industries. These were country-specific arrangements within the wider regional framework. The railway illustrates why some projects require only a few governments to agree. After recurring disagreements over its route and funding, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan reached a financing settlement in 2025. They did not need all five Central Asian governments to negotiate a single position. Kazakhstan already has direct rail links...

Central Asian States Set Out Priorities After Rubio Talks in Samarkand

Central Asian governments backed closer cooperation on mineral processing and transport at the October 19 C5+1 meeting in Samarkand. Separate talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio covered possible aircraft purchases for Kyrgyzstan and further diplomatic engagement with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan announced a $12 billion package of agreements and prospective initiatives during the visit. For the other four Central Asian participants, the published accounts centered largely on cooperation priorities and follow-up discussions. The gathering followed the November 2025 White House summit and accompanied Uzbekistan’s signing of the Artemis Accords. It brought Rubio together with all five Central Asian foreign ministers, combining regional discussions with separate bilateral meetings. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi discussed implementation of earlier presidential agreements with Rubio. The talks addressed attracting American investment and technology, with energy and critical minerals among the priorities. Washington also expressed interest in cooperation on artificial intelligence and communications infrastructure. According to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry, Rubio expressed interest in visiting Kazakhstan after the December G20 summit in Miami. Kyrgyzstan’s talks included immediate obstacles to closer relations. Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev raised sanctions policy and visa restrictions with Rubio, alongside opportunities for American investment. The Kyrgyz side sought solutions that would facilitate educational and business exchanges. Presidential special representative Bakyt Sydykov briefed the U.S. delegation on Kyrgyzstan’s sanctions-related efforts, with Bishkek reaffirming its willingness to work with Washington to prevent sanctions circumvention. In a separate meeting, Kulubaev discussed possible Boeing aircraft deliveries to Kyrgyz airlines with company vice president Michael Schnabel. Financing options included possible involvement by the U.S. Export-Import Bank. The discussions also covered aircraft maintenance and aviation infrastructure. Tajikistan’s Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin discussed expanding trade and investment with Rubio. The ministry’s account also described an exchange on regional security and stability in Central Asia. Turkmenistan reported a more specific diplomatic follow-up. Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov and Rubio outlined a schedule of further meetings and political consultations. U.S. special envoy Sergio Gor also attended the talks. The shared C5+1 statement set out the broader economic agenda. The six governments supported further development of the Trans-Caspian Trade Route and more closely aligned customs procedures. They also backed stronger industrial cooperation within Central Asia. On minerals, the statement envisaged expanded extraction and processing, alongside more production of higher-value goods within the region. It also supported exchanging expertise on geological data. These were collective policy intentions, without country-by-country financing allocations or project completion dates. Security commitments covered stronger border protection and counterterrorism cooperation, alongside efforts against transnational crime. The governments also supported practical cooperation on nuclear security and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.