Turkmenistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Middle Corridor

Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan Ties Could Reorient Central Asian Integration

The five Central Asian presidents met with Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev in Avaza on October 8 for the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s participation brings a principal outlet for Central Asian trade into the six governments’ economic deliberations. Within their consultative format, the states can coordinate industrial projects with the transport services through which regional producers reach foreign markets. If Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan connect cross-Caspian transport more closely to industrial cooperation, the corridor could become an organizing axis for regional integration. The Case for Trans-Caspian Integration Closer Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan cooperation would make cross-Caspian transport more dependable if trains reach Kazakhstani ports in time for Caspian sailings and cargo arriving at Azerbaijani terminals connects with onward services through Georgia. A 2023 assessment by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), also called the World Bank, identified trade among Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Europe as a driver of corridor demand, giving regional exporters a place alongside China–Europe transit traffic. Onward connections from the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway now under construction could run through Turkmenistan and across the Caspian to Azerbaijan, providing an alternative to routes through Iran. Conflict involving Iran strengthens Azerbaijan’s position as the more dependable western outlet for Europe-bound exports. Greater predictability could offset the cost of a Caspian crossing by reducing the stocks firms must hold against delays and the losses caused by interrupted deliveries. Extending the operating coordination developed with Kazakhstan to these southern connections could make Azerbaijan commercially preferable for Central Asian exporters serving European markets. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan occupy the principal positions in this prospective reorientation. Together, they represent approximately one-third of the six countries’ population but account for more than three-fifths of their nominal GDP. Yet bilateral merchandise trade amounted to only $470.7 million in 2025. Their combined economic weight is thus disproportionate to the commerce presently linking them. The infrastructure and institutions connecting industrial investment to markets across the Caspian could give the two countries a basis for organizing wider regional integration, provided firms sustain commercial relationships through those connections. The Bilateral Basis for Regional Integration Export commitments depend on the cost and timing of the complete transport service. At Avaza, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev attached “particular importance” to developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor. His Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, advocated joint investment, manufacturing, and entry into foreign markets. For firms undertaking joint production, the commercial viability of Aliyev’s proposal would depend on transport coordinated from departure to delivery. Kazakhstan is developing the Middle Corridor along with the eastern branch of the International North–South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Iran through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. At Avaza, Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov supported the development of North–South corridors in addition to East–West routes. Tokayev also highlighted the continuing importance to Kazakhstan of the North–South route in cooperation with Russia. Kazakhstan’s multi-vector approach thus extends to transport infrastructure: the Middle Corridor strengthens westward access without displacing the commercial connections maintained...

Avaza Summit

Avaza Summit Highlights East–West and North–South Trade Routes

On October 8, the presidents of five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan gathered in Avaza, on Turkmenistan's Caspian coast, to discuss closer economic and political cooperation. Hosted by Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, the annual Consultative Meeting included Azerbaijan as a full participant for the first time, extending the forum across the Caspian to the South Caucasus. The six leaders adopted a joint statement recognizing East–West and North–South transport corridors as priorities for regional development. The summit highlighted the region's growing importance in Eurasian trade and international supply chains. Beyond expanding transport networks, the leaders proposed closer industrial cooperation and cross-border investment, seeking to capitalize on their geographic advantages while preserving flexibility in their international economic relationships. Transport Corridors in Multiple Directions Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov said, "I believe it is now important to intensify negotiations and practical steps toward establishing transport and logistics connectivity along the East–West and North–South routes." He added, "The Central Asia–Caspian Sea–South Caucasus–Europe corridor should play a key role here." He also emphasized that cooperation among Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan as Caspian states could help integrate the wider Central Asian region and other countries into these transport networks. Turkmenistan remained prepared to make its Caspian infrastructure available for mutually beneficial projects. Its port at Turkmenbashi and rail connections toward Iran give it a practical role in both East–West and North–South trade. The Turkmen president's emphasis on North–South connectivity also reflects ongoing transport cooperation with Russia. In May 2026, Turkmenistan reported that Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran were working on an agreement to improve freight movement along the corridor's eastern branch. Turkmen officials also outlined preferential railway tariffs and container services linking Turkmenbashi with Russia's Olya port. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev also highlighted growing demand for the Middle Corridor, while emphasizing the continued importance of the North–South route. "For Kazakhstan, the North–South route in cooperation with Russia remains particularly relevant," Tokayev said. The statement is consistent with Kazakhstan's longstanding multivector foreign policy, which seeks to maintain established trade connections while expanding access to alternative transport routes. Kazakhstan, Central Asia's largest economy, occupies a strategic position at the intersection of major East–West and North–South transport routes. For the region’s landlocked economies, a wider choice of reliable routes can improve access to markets and reduce dependence on individual transit connections. Expanding the Middle Corridor Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev emphasized investments on both shores of the Caspian, noting that transit cargo volumes along the Middle Corridor increased by more than 10% in 2025 and by almost 20% during the first eight months of 2026. Azerbaijan has invested in ports, railways, highways and other infrastructure to facilitate trade between Central Asia and international markets. It also serves as a transit route for Kazakh and Turkmen oil exports, giving the country a growing role in connecting Central Asian producers with markets to the west. Tokayev proposed exploring the integration of the Middle Corridor with the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a planned transport link through Armenia connecting mainland Azerbaijan...

Water Security

Central Asia Agrees New Water Limits, but National Quotas Remain Unclear

Water has repeatedly caused friction between Central Asian governments. Uncoordinated releases have flooded communities downstream, while disputes over access have contributed to deadly fighting along contested borders. On October 7, the region's countries agreed on water withdrawals from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya for fall and winter 2026–2027, though published results do not reveal how much water each country will receive. The agreements were reached at the 95th meeting of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) in Avaza, on Turkmenistan's Caspian coast near Turkmenbashi. Participants agreed on national water withdrawal limits and projected reservoir operating schedules, but the figures remain in unpublished annexes to the meeting protocol. Regional cooperation has grown in recent years. In June, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan agreed on water releases and electricity supplies for the 2026 irrigation season, continuing efforts to coordinate reservoir operations across borders. Despite this progress, longstanding tensions remain. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan need water in the winter to generate electricity, while Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan need it in the summer for irrigation. Bishkek has revived proposals for its neighbors to share the costs of maintaining reservoirs, while Afghanistan's Qosh Tepa Canal could put further pressure on the Amu Darya. Countries are also trying to resolve discrepancies in river-flow measurements. [caption id="attachment_58085" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Officials from Central Asian countries attend talks on cross-border cooperation and sustainable development in the Amu Darya basin in Turkmenistan. Image: State News Agency of Turkmenistan[/caption] From Flooded Villages to Border Clashes The competing demands of electricity generation and agriculture are particularly evident in the Syr Darya basin. Kyrgyzstan's Toktogul Reservoir sits on the Naryn River, the Syr Darya's main tributary. In winter, Kyrgyzstan releases water to generate electricity, months before downstream farmers need it for irrigation. When these releases exceed the capacity of reservoirs and canals, the excess water can cause flooding. In February 2004, residents of Kazakhstan's Kyzylorda region experienced the consequences of uncoordinated water releases. The Syr Darya overflowed its banks, forcing the evacuation of at least 200 families. Ice had already restricted the river's flow, worsening the flooding. According to NASA, Kyrgyzstan was releasing more water from its hydropower system than the agreements allowed, with the excess flow entering the Shardara Reservoir. Uzbekistan agreed to divert some of the water into the Arnasay lake system, but it was not possible to divert the entire volume needed. As a result, the river flooded areas farther downstream. In the Amu Darya basin, disagreements developed differently. In 2012, then-Uzbek President Islam Karimov warned that disputes over water resources could lead to war. The source of tension was the construction of the Rogun Hydropower Plant in Tajikistan. Tashkent feared that a large dam on the Vakhsh River, a tributary of the Amu Darya, would allow Dushanbe to influence the volume of water reaching Uzbekistan's agricultural regions. The confrontation was accompanied by interruptions in gas supplies to Tajikistan, transport restrictions, and mutual accusations. Dushanbe linked Tashkent's actions to pressure over the Rogun project, although the Uzbek side disputed that...

Regional Trade

Central Asia and Azerbaijan Discuss Trade Expansion at Turkmenistan Summit

The leaders of Central Asia and Azerbaijan met in Turkmenistan on October 8, with expanding trade between their countries high on the agenda. Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for trade among the six countries to rise to at least $20 billion, up from approximately $13 billion in 2025. The eighth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan was held in the resort of Avaza, with Azerbaijan participating as a full member of the grouping for the first time. According to Tokayev, trade between the six countries accounted for just 8% of their combined trade turnover last year. He proposed that governments develop a joint action plan to increase that share. Other leaders put forward proposals for closer economic ties. Uzbekistan's President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for greater cooperation in manufacturing and a Central Asia-Azerbaijan Business Forum in 2027, while Kyrgyzstan's President Sadyr Japarov proposed creating a shared e-commerce platform to make regional products more accessible. One problem is the insufficient integration of national markets. Even where countries share a border, trade is hampered by logistical constraints and differences in business operating conditions. Tokayev proposed bringing existing and planned cross-border trade and logistics complexes and industrial centers into a single network. The idea is to enable businesses from different countries to sell finished products to one another and produce them jointly. However, Kazakhstan's major transport projects are not designed solely for its neighbors. Astana is investing in railways and highways to increase freight transit between China, Central Asia, and Europe. The projects include the Moyynty–Kyzylzhar, Darbaza–Maktaaral, and Bakhty–Ayagoz railway lines, as well as the Aral–Caspian highway project. The Middle Corridor holds a particularly important place in these plans, running from China through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to Europe. It allows freight to bypass Russian territory and is viewed as an alternative to traditional northern routes. Kazakhstan is now proposing to explore linking the Middle Corridor with the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a transport project through Armenia intended to connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan. Plans for the route were outlined during talks in Washington in August 2025, and Armenia and the United States signed a framework agreement in June 2026. The route is to remain under Armenian sovereignty and jurisdiction. Astana has already established a technical group to assess its potential participation in TRIPP. For now, Tokayev is proposing that the integration of the two transport initiatives be discussed only at the expert level. At the Avaza summit, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov emphasized the importance of developing North–South transport corridors alongside East–West routes. Turkmenistan also supports the eastern branch of the International North–South Transport Corridor, which connects Russia with Iran through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. However, an increase in freight traffic through Central Asia does not in itself mean that trade among its countries will grow. For that to happen, local producers need access to neighboring markets. The summit also addressed cooperation over shared water resources, with Tokayev proposing a regional framework...

Book Launch

Farewell to Russia: An Interview with Joe Luc Barnes on Central Asia’s Changing Role

In Moscow, before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Joe Luc Barnes met residents who distrusted their government but believed its assurances that war was not coming. The shock that followed opens his book, Farewell to Russia: A Journey Through the Former USSR. Barnes, a journalist, editor and contributor to The Times of Central Asia, has visited all 15 former Soviet republics since February 2022. His book explores how people have built their lives since independence, and how deeply Russia remains woven into them. Speaking to TCA, Barnes recalls meeting rural residents in Central Asia who were more supportive of Russia than their urban, Russian-speaking counterparts. He also reflects on why Russia remains a destination for young people seeking opportunities, despite the discrimination many face there. TCA: At the start of the book, you describe Muscovites’ conviction that Russia would not invade Ukraine. What sustained that certainty, and how did people respond when events shattered it? Joe Luc Barnes: I think it was mainly down to people not wanting to believe it. The amazing thing is that Muscovites (and Russians at large, in my experience) are fully aware that their government is full of crooks whom they wouldn’t trust with anything, but simultaneously most of them are in lockstep with the Kremlin’s foreign policy position. The war started just as Russia was trying to get the country vaccinated against Covid. In the end, the government struggled to persuade even 50% of people to have a single dose of the vaccine, but meanwhile those same people were sure the Kremlin was telling the truth when it said that its soldiers were massing on Ukraine’s borders as part of “routine exercises”. When the war did begin and that illusion collapsed, the main reaction was shock. For the first few days, there was a kind of numbness over the city. Many people had friends or relatives in Ukraine; others were stunned that something they had been denying had actually come to pass. Many in their 20s or 30s were disgusted with their government and began to look for a way out of the country. But people were generally focused on looking after themselves – worrying about things like finances, getting money out of their bank accounts, things like that. I think there was also a belief among many that it would be a short war. When I left Russia in March 2022, I don’t think I, or anyone around me, expected the war to still be raging four and a half years later. [caption id="attachment_58058" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Lenin still stands in Bishkek, though not on his original plinth. Image: Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] TCA: Your title suggests a departure from Russia. Where in Central Asia did that feel most real, and where did everyday life complicate the idea? Joe Luc Barnes: I think in urban Central Asia, you can often feel like you’re in a Russian city. People speak Russian, you get around using Yandex Taxi, your mobile provider is Beeline, and architecturally you still...

Migrants in Russia

They Went to Russia for Work and Ended Up at War: How Central Asians Enter the Russian Military

Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. Relatives of other young Kazakh men say they had taken jobs at a sausage factory and a poultry farm. But according to reports aired in early October on Kazakhstan’s KTK television channel, the men later ended up in or near the combat zone in Ukraine. Some appeared in videos wearing Russian military uniforms and asked Kazakhstan to help bring them home. On October 7, relatives of Kazakh citizens who had reportedly ended up in Russia’s military visited the Foreign Ministry in Astana to seek help bringing them home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied the families, said his list had grown from eight to 21 people as more relatives contacted him. The same day, ministry spokesperson Zhanbolat Ussenov said officials were checking appeals and would send Russia a list of citizens after verification. Negotiations over their return were underway, he said. Exactly how the men ended up in the Russian military remains unclear. One family said their relative had already been wounded, while KTK reported that the circumstances surrounding the signing of the military contracts have not been independently established. For now, much of what is known comes from the men themselves and their relatives. Their stories raise a broader question that neither Moscow nor the capitals of Central Asia have fully answered: how many people from the region have ended up in the Russian military, and under what circumstances did they get there? Nearly 13,000, According to a Ukrainian Database Russia does not publish comprehensive statistics on foreign contract soldiers. Central Asian governments have only fragmented data from criminal cases, consular appeals, and reports from relatives. The most detailed country-by-country breakdown comes from the Ukrainian government project I Want to Live. By May 2026, the project said it had identified 12,919 citizens of the five Central Asian states who had signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense: 4,955 citizens of Uzbekistan, 3,489 of Tajikistan, 2,420 of Kazakhstan, 1,474 of Kyrgyzstan, and 581 of Turkmenistan. These figures cannot be regarded as complete or independently verified. I Want to Live operates within Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and Ukraine is a party to the war. In addition, 12,919 is a cumulative figure, not the number of Central Asians currently at the front. Some may have been killed or captured, completed their service, returned home, or obtained Russian citizenship. Another major estimate comes from the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Truth Hounds, and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law. Their report estimates that Russia recruited at least 27,000 foreign nationals from more than 130 countries after February 2022. More than 10,000 of them, according to the study, came from Central Asia. The study is based on open sources, consultations with Ukrainian authorities and experts, and interviews with 16 prisoners of war and former Russian servicemen. There are no comparable publicly available Russian statistics, meaning it is impossible to...