• KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
25 August 2026

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 892

What Do Former Presidents Do? From Akayev to Nazarbayev, the Fates of Central Asia’s Ex-Leaders

Central Asia has produced remarkably few former presidents who simply retired from public life. In Kyrgyzstan, former leaders have been driven from office, prosecuted, imprisoned, or forced into exile. Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev has followed a different path, largely withdrawing from public view after losing much of his political influence. Elsewhere, some of the region’s founding presidents died in office, leaving no post-presidential career to examine. The Times of Central Asia has previously examined how political succession has developed across the region. The fate of leaders after they leave office reveals another side of that political tradition. The architect of Kyrgyzstan’s early post-Soviet political model was its first president, Askar Akayev, who remained in office until 2005. Akayev introduced democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan, but gradually tightened the pressure on his opponents as his presidency progressed. His rule was badly shaken by the Aksy shootings in 2002, which followed the prosecution of opposition lawmaker Azimbek Beknazarov and a territorial dispute with China. Akayev’s government had agreed to transfer disputed border territory to China, a decision fiercely criticized by the opposition. In March 2002, demonstrators in southern Kyrgyzstan demanded Akayev’s impeachment. Security forces opened fire during the unrest, killing several people. The shootings became one of the defining political crises of his presidency. In a 2003 referendum, Akayev significantly strengthened presidential powers at parliament’s expense. Economic hardship, unemployment, widespread corruption, and allegations of fraud in the 2005 parliamentary elections eventually helped trigger the Tulip Revolution in March of that year. Akayev had to flee, with rumors at the time claiming that he was smuggled out in the trunk of an official car, wrapped in a carpet. Criminal cases involving corruption were opened against him and members of his family in Kyrgyzstan. The authorities repeatedly sought his extradition from Russia, but were unsuccessful. After leaving Kyrgyzstan, Akayev lived in Moscow and taught at Moscow State University. In 2006, he became a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In August 2021, Akayev reappeared in Bishkek. He unexpectedly flew into the country and was immediately questioned as part of the criminal investigation into corruption surrounding the Kumtor gold mine. Afterward, he said he had come to Bishkek for a week and was prepared to assist investigators. “I came to speak honestly and sincerely about how we built Kumtor, why we built it, and what mistakes may have been made. The investigation will continue,” he said. In 2023, Kyrgyzstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office announced that the criminal prosecution of Akayev had been terminated because the statute of limitations had expired. Tajikistan’s former president Rahmon Nabiyev was also forced from power. The former Soviet politician lost power amid the country’s civil war in 1992. He died at his home in Khujand the following year, at the age of 62, reportedly from a heart attack. According to his wife, Nabiyev spent his final months in Khujand in conditions resembling house arrest and received a pension of just five rubles. While Tajikistan did not repeat the experiment of violently...

Central Asian Music Takes the Stage in Berlin

Young Central Asian musicians have featured at the ongoing Young Euro Classic festival in Berlin. Since its beginnings in 2000, the festival has brought youth orchestras from around the world to the German capital, while the later addition of the Future Now series as a “festival within the festival” opened it to smaller experimental ensembles. It was not the first time that orchestras and smaller groups from Central Asia had performed at Young Euro Classic. Kazakh musicians had appeared before, including at the 2024 festival. Turkmen musicians also performed in Berlin later that year as part of the separate FUTURE NOW – Central Asia festival. However, this year’s performances introduced two new groups to Young Euro Classic audiences. On August 1, Mohiron from Dushanbe opened the Future Now series. The six Tajik musicians played traditional Tajik melodies, their own compositions, and arrangements of Western music at their sold-out concert. Their interpretations of Vivaldi’s “Escala Palladio” and Zequinha de Abreu’s “Tico-Tico” drew particularly enthusiastic responses from the audience. On August 9, the Youth Symphony Orchestra of Turkmenistan made its Young Euro Classic debut in Berlin. The orchestra traces its roots to a chamber ensemble founded by conductor Rasul Klychev in 2007, which had previously performed elsewhere in Germany. Klychev and his musicians introduced the audience to Turkmen orchestral classics alongside contemporary works by American composer Aidan Gold and French composer Pierre Thilloy, both receiving German premieres. Highlights included the demanding piano concerto by Turkmen composer Chary Nurymov, performed by the young pianist Shaislam Komildjanov, and the final “Danzón No. 2” by Mexican composer Arturo Márquez. The audience gave the performance a standing ovation. As much of Central Asia remains relatively unfamiliar to many German audiences, the concerts offered a chance to introduce the region and its musical traditions. The appearances may also create further opportunities for the musicians to represent their countries elsewhere in Germany and Europe.

Turkmenistan Tightens Diesel Limits as Fuel Shortages Persist

Turkmenistan has halved the amount of diesel that vehicles may carry in their tanks when leaving the country, cutting the limit from 300 to 150 liters from August 10. The charge for every liter above the limit has also risen from 20 manat (about $1) to 30 manat (about $1.50). The move is the second tightening of the rules in several months. According to Chronicles of Turkmenistan, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov signed the relevant decree on August 5. At the beginning of April, vehicles leaving Turkmenistan were limited to 300 liters of diesel in their tanks, with a charge of 20 manat, or about $1 at the market exchange rate, for every additional liter. Enforcement was assigned to the border and customs services, as well as the state-owned concern Turkmenneft, The Times of Central Asia reported. The large price difference between Turkmenistan and neighboring markets creates an incentive to take fuel across the border. In April, The Times of Central Asia reported that diesel in Turkmenistan cost around $0.05 per liter, compared with approximately $1 in Uzbekistan, $0.60 in Kazakhstan, and $0.90 in Russia. Low regulated prices extend beyond diesel. In July, petrol in Turkmenistan cost around $0.43 per liter, placing the country among the world's cheapest markets. By comparison, AI-95 petrol cost about $0.68 in Kazakhstan, approximately $1.02 in Kyrgyzstan, and around $1.34 in Uzbekistan, according to Chronicles of Turkmenistan. Independent media have also reported persistent shortages of petrol and diesel inside Turkmenistan, particularly outside Ashgabat. In July, Turkmen.news reported large queues at filling stations and shortages of both petrol and diesel in the regions. The outlet also published documents indicating problems with aviation kerosene supplies at Ashgabat International Airport. One document from June 2024 said the airport had 2,500 tons of kerosene available, enough for only two to three days at prevailing consumption levels. By December 2024, another document showed reserves had fallen to 728 tons, less than one day's supply. Turkmen.news reported that problems with kerosene allocations continued into 2026. The situation is notable because Turkmenistan produces and refines its own oil. The country has two major refining centers, the Turkmenbashi oil refinery complex on the Caspian Sea and the Seydi refinery in the east. Petroleum products are supplied to the domestic market and also exported. Fuel shortages have occurred repeatedly. In 2024, eastern regions of Turkmenistan experienced serious petrol shortages. Drivers in the Lebap and Mary regions waited for hours at filling stations, while some stations imposed purchase limits. The shortage also disrupted public transport and contributed to higher food prices, The Times of Central Asia reported. The latest border restrictions add another element to this picture. Independent outlets have linked the limits to the wide gap between heavily regulated domestic fuel prices and prices abroad, which creates opportunities for cross-border resale. Halving the diesel allowance to 150 liters further restricts the amount that can leave Turkmenistan in vehicle tanks as reports of domestic shortages continue.

Central Asia and Azerbaijan Extend Cooperation Across the Caspian

Central Asia’s presidential forum now spans both shores of the Caspian. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan anchor the principal Caspian crossing at the center of the Middle Corridor, the rail-and-sea network linking Central Asia to European markets through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. Azerbaijan’s full participation brings the corridor’s eastern and western Caspian gateways into the same regular political setting. The six governments can use it to coordinate the transport, energy, digital, and investment links already developing across the Caspian, even though Georgia and Türkiye remain essential to the route’s westward operation. On July 31, 2026, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan signed the Cholpon-Ata Declaration at an informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan in Kyrgyzstan. The Declaration gave formal political expression to cooperation that had already been developing. Official accounts said the leaders emphasized expanded regional cooperation, including trade, transport and logistics, and energy. The full text has not been released, so those priorities come from official accounts rather than the declaration itself. Proposed by Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in 2017 and first convened in Astana in March 2018, the Consultative Meetings brought together the five Central Asian states in an informal presidential format. They expanded in November 2025 with Azerbaijan’s admission as a full-fledged participant, while retaining their consultative character. Azerbaijan attended in 2023 and 2024 as a guest; Cholpon-Ata was its first informal meeting in the new capacity. Official documents continue to call the format “Central Asia and Azerbaijan.” C6 is analytical shorthand for the enlargement, not the name of a new bloc or formal organization. Azerbaijan’s admission follows several years of practical cooperation. At a ministerial meeting in Aktau on November 25, 2022, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye signed a 2022–2027 roadmap for the simultaneous elimination of bottlenecks and development of the Middle Corridor. At its 2023 Baku summit, the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) adopted a digitalization roadmap and established a multi-partner trust fund, followed by work on digital data exchange and port-to-port cooperation. The transport roadmap includes Georgia and Türkiye, while SPECA also includes Afghanistan; neither is institutionally identical to C6. The enlarged format gives the six governments a regular political setting in which to coordinate existing transport, digital, and investment mechanisms. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route Association reports that freight through the seaports of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan reached 3.3 million tons in 2024, 20% above the 2023 level, while container traffic within the same scope rose 176% to 56,500 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU). Freight remains the principal basis of integration. Oil transit, prospective electricity links, and joint investment instruments are extending cooperation into adjacent sectors. Kazakhstan's use of the route for oil exports is also rising: according to KazMunayGas reports, Kazakhstani oil shipments from Aktau through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan route increased by 34% to 1.4 million tons in 2024. At COP29 in Baku on November 13, 2024, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan signed a strategic-partnership agreement on producing and transmitting green energy,...

Central Asian States Plan Automated Water Monitoring on the Syr Darya

Central Asian countries have agreed to prepare a plan for automated water monitoring on the Syr Darya, one of the region’s main transboundary rivers. The system is intended to provide the countries with more accurate data on water volumes and distribution across the basin, where irrigated agriculture in several countries depends on river flows. The cost of weak coordination across Central Asia is already measured in billions: the World Bank estimates the region’s annual economic losses at more than $4.5 billion. The agreement was reached on August 7 in Turkistan, Kazakhstan. A working group to prepare the plan is expected to be established by the end of September. The decision was made at a meeting of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination, a regional mechanism for coordinating the use of shared water resources. The Syr Darya is formed in the Ferghana Valley by the confluence of the Naryn and Kara Darya rivers, flows through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, and ends in the North Aral Sea. The Naryn originates in Kyrgyzstan, meaning that management of the basin involves four countries. The Syr Darya supplies major agricultural areas, while a cascade of reservoirs and hydropower plants links the distribution of river flows with electricity generation. The countries’ interests have not always coincided. In the upper reaches of the basin, water is used for hydropower generation, while farther downstream demand peaks during the summer irrigation season. Accurate monitoring and timely data exchange help countries plan water withdrawals and reservoir operations during months with the highest demand. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are already developing part of the future system. The two countries are automating ten hydrological monitoring stations on the Syr Darya, five on each side of the border. Sensors are expected to record water flow and transmit the data online. At the meeting in Turkistan, the two sides agreed to accelerate efforts to secure grant financing and consider expanding the system to other parts of the basin. Kazakhstan already has experience with automated monitoring. On parts of its irrigation network, sensors remotely transmit data on water levels and pressure. Over the past decade, more than 800 kilometers of lined canals have also been rehabilitated in four regions, while irrigation system upgrades have covered more than 100,000 hectares of farmland. Uzbekistan is also seeking to reduce irrigation losses. Agriculture accounts for about 90% of the country’s water consumption. One project provides for the reconstruction of 259 kilometers of major canals and the installation of automated water-flow monitoring systems. The World Bank estimates the expected water savings at around 540 million cubic meters a year. The current season on the Kazakh section of the Syr Darya has so far been favorable. Since April 1, around three billion cubic meters of water have flowed into the Shardara Reservoir in southern Kazakhstan. This volume is higher than both last year’s figure and the long-term average. The region received additional funding for water projects in July. The World Bank allocated a $20 million grant to improve the management of...

Afghan Traders in Ashgabat Discuss Proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan Transit Corridor

A delegation from the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Investment was in Turkmenistan in recent days as the two countries explore ways to boost trade and develop transit corridors, according to Afghan state media. Mawlawi Fazal Mohammad Saber, Afghanistan’s chargé d'affaires in the Turkmen capital of Ashgabat, met the group of Afghan traders during their visit, the National Radio and Television of Afghanistan, also known as RTA, reported on Thursday. The Afghan delegates and their counterparts in Turkmenistan discussed a proposal to create a new transit corridor from the Turkmen city of Turkmenabat to the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif, according to TOLOnews, a news organization based in Kabul. It said the Afghan side had invited Turkmenistan to send a delegation of 100 traders and investors to Afghanistan. Turkmenabat is an economic hub in eastern Turkmenistan that is close to the border with Uzbekistan. Mazar-e-Sharif is the biggest city in northern Afghanistan and is a significant transit point for trade in Central Asia. Mazar-e-Sharif is closely linked to Uzbek trade and transport networks, though Turkmenistan has also been working to expand its economic presence in the city. The latest outreach between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan reflects a wider policy among Central Asian countries to expand economic ties with Taliban authorities in Kabul and increase access to South Asian and other markets, adding to the landlocked region’s options for trade at a time of geopolitical uncertainty. The leadership of those countries retains concerns about the security situation in Afghanistan, but hopes that engagement will help to stabilize their southern neighbor. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are key drivers of Central Asia’s growing relationship with Afghanistan. One of the high-profile projects featuring Ashgabat’s involvement is the planned 1,800-kilometer Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, which has faced years of delays and challenges, including heightened Afghan-Pakistani tensions.