Turkmenistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Architectural Heritage

Ashgabat’s Postwar Architecture Is Disappearing One Building at a Time

In July, UNESCO added ten examples of Tashkent’s modernist architecture to the World Heritage List, recognizing the buildings and urban complexes that helped reshape the Uzbek capital after the devastating 1966 earthquake. In neighboring Kazakhstan, prominent Soviet-era buildings in Almaty are protected through national and local heritage registers. Turkmenistan has also gained international recognition for ancient sites such as Merv and Nisa, along with traditions of carpet weaving and horse breeding. Yet Ashgabat’s 20th-century architecture remains largely absent from this system of recognition. This has taken on added urgency because some of the buildings that tell the story of modern Ashgabat are already disappearing. [caption id="attachment_56051" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] In August 2026, turkmen.news reported the demolition of several buildings near Ashgabat’s 30th microdistrict. Some were residential blocks. Although some occupants received replacement apartments, other families objected to the relocation terms. In February, the former building of the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography on Azadi Street was also demolished. At different times, it had housed a court and the Cultural Heritage Center. An additional floor and marble cladding had already changed its appearance, although some neoclassical elements survived. Once a building has been demolished, its architecture can be studied only through archives and photographs. For Ashgabat, this is particularly significant because much of the city visible today emerged from one of the worst disasters in its history. The City After the Earthquake The 1948 Ashgabat earthquake struck on the night of October 6, destroying or severely damaging much of the city. The capital had to be largely rebuilt. Architectural historian Ruslan Muradov writes that postwar reconstruction began with two-story brick apartment buildings designed to meet higher seismic standards. Their facades featured decorative plasterwork and carved wooden elements on the loggias, or recessed balconies. New residential blocks were organized around shared courtyards and greenery. In the 1950s, the Academy of Sciences, the railway station, Turkmen State University, theaters, administrative buildings, and new housing transformed the city center. From the 1960s through the 1980s, hotels, public buildings, and residential districts added another architectural layer. Behind this architecture was the everyday life of several generations. Courtyards became extensions of apartments, while institutions and shops occupied the ground floors. The postwar city gradually became an ordinary, lived-in urban environment. Its surviving buildings still offer clues to how Ashgabat recovered after 1948. They show how seismic risk changed construction, how the climate influenced housing design, and how planners used the spaces between buildings. But unlike some neighboring capitals, Ashgabat has no publicly available inventory identifying the most significant examples of its postwar architecture. The time available to document them is shrinking. [caption id="attachment_56053" align="alignnone" width="1774"] Image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Turkmenistan’s Heritage Focus Turkmenistan has five properties on the World Heritage List. Ancient Merv, Kunya-Urgench, and the Parthian Fortresses of Nisa make up three of them. The other two are transnational properties, the Silk Roads: Zarafshan-Karakum Corridor and the Cold Winter Deserts of Turan. Another nine sites are on the country’s Tentative...

Landlocked Developing Countries

Turkmenistan to Chair Group of Landlocked Developing Countries

Turkmenistan’s mission to the United Nations says the country has been elected the next chair of the Group of Landlocked Developing Countries, which consists of 32 countries facing particular trade and transit challenges because of their geography and reliance on neighboring nations. Turkmenistan will begin its two-year term as chair on January 1, 2027, after receiving unanimous support from all members of the group in a meeting at U.N. headquarters in New York on September 3, the Turkmen diplomatic mission said. Azerbaijan will become vice-chair of the group of landlocked developing countries. The current chair and vice-chair are Bolivia and Kyrgyzstan, respectively. The new leadership will be endorsed at a ministerial-level meeting at the U.N. on September 24, according to the Turkmen mission. It said that Turkmenistan will take the lead in coordinating the group’s activities on pressing issues such as “energy and transport connectivity.” A key priority for the group is implementation of the Awaza Programme of Action for 2024–2034, a U.N.-backed plan that promotes infrastructure investment, deeper integration into global trade networks and other measures to help the countries overcome their geographical disadvantages. The United Nations says that the group of countries often face difficulties such as reduced foreign investment, limited export options, and slower economic growth. “Without direct access to coastal ports, landlocked developing countries must rely on transit countries to connect them with international markets. This can lead to increased transportation trade costs, delays in the movement of goods, and susceptibility to political and economic instability in transit countries,” the U.N. says. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are also in the group. While Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have coastlines on the Caspian Sea, they are still classified as landlocked countries by the United Nations because the Caspian, an enclosed body of water, doesn’t have direct access to the world's oceans.

Learning Korean

The Language Gap: Why the Korean Language Is Outpacing Japanese in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

Two weeks ago, Kazakhstan officially joined South Korea’s Employment Permit System (EPS), becoming the 18th country admitted to the program. Even before the change, thousands of Kazakhstani nationals were working in South Korea, many without legal status. Kazakhstani authorities estimated the total at around 15,000 in 2025, including 11,000 without legal documentation. To work legally in South Korea under the EPS, applicants must pass the EPS-TOPIK, a standardized Korean-language test. In this context, learning Korean has become a direct route to better-paid work for many young people in Kazakhstan. Japan, however, has generated no comparable rush. A Widening Gap, By the Numbers The contrast is also evident in language-learning trends. In 2022, Jang Ho-jong, a professor at the Kazakh Ablai Khan University of International Relations and World Languages, told The Korea Times that Korean ranked alongside English and Chinese among Kazakhstan’s three most popular foreign languages and was taught at 15 to 20 universities. About 400 students were taking Korean courses at his university, compared with just three or four when the program opened 20 years earlier. South Korea has also expanded teaching and testing infrastructure. In July 2026, the King Sejong Institute at Akhmet Baitursynuly Kostanay Regional University became Kazakhstan’s first official center for the Sejong Korean Language Assessment (SKA), allowing candidates to take the exam without traveling abroad. Official enrollment data from the King Sejong Institute Foundation show that 1,320 students were enrolled at its institutes in Kazakhstan in 2025, down slightly from 1,481 in 2024. The picture is very different for Japanese. The Japan Foundation counted 581 learners across eight institutions in Kazakhstan in 2024, compared with 1,569 learners in 2006. In Uzbekistan, Korean-language education has expanded even faster. The country recorded the largest increase worldwide in 2025, adding 68 schools offering Korean classes. Sri Lanka placed second with 43. Enrollment at King Sejong institutes in Uzbekistan rose from 1,873 in 2021 to 7,931 in 2024. It eased to 6,308 in 2025, according to the same official dataset. Japanese-language study has also grown in Uzbekistan, but more slowly. The same Japan Foundation survey counted 4,201 learners across 19 institutions in 2024, up from 3,579 at 18 institutions in 2021. Although the two datasets cover different types of institutions, the nationwide Japanese total remained below enrollment in Uzbekistan’s King Sejong network that year. A More Complicated Picture Next Door Across the rest of Central Asia, however, the comparison is less clear-cut. The Japan Foundation’s 2024 regional survey recorded 1,708 Japanese-language learners at 14 institutions in Kyrgyzstan, taught by 50 teachers. That was almost three times Kazakhstan’s total, even though Kyrgyzstan’s population is roughly one-third as large. Among the learners in Kyrgyzstan, 411 were in primary or secondary education. A 2020 account by a Japan Foundation specialist described young people learning through anime and the internet, while Japan International Cooperation Agency volunteers introduced Japanese in rural schools. Some later traveled to Bishkek for more formal study. This points to demand developing from the ground up alongside institutional support. Korean-language...

Nuclear Disarmament

Central Asian States Call for New Arms Controls as Nuclear Framework Weakens

Foreign ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have called for new, verifiable arms control mechanisms to prevent a nuclear arms race, warning that international disarmament efforts are losing ground. In a joint statement issued on September 8 to mark 20 years since the signing of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, the five governments expressed concern over stalled disarmament, the end of key agreements, and the modernization of nuclear arsenals. They urged nuclear powers to resume negotiations. The statement comes seven months after New START, the last U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms treaty, expired on February 5. UN Secretary-General António Guterres said its expiration left the two countries without binding limits on their strategic nuclear arsenals for the first time in more than half a century. President Donald Trump has criticized New START as a “badly negotiated deal” and called instead for a new, modernized arms control treaty that would include China. The ministers also cited the failure of the Eleventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which ended without a consensus outcome on May 22. Kazakhstan had already advanced a similar position. As TCA reported, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev used the August 29 anniversary of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site’s closure to call for negotiations among nuclear powers, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and renewed multilateral action to reduce nuclear risks. Kazakhstan’s connection to the issue extends beyond diplomacy. The Soviet Union conducted 456 nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk between 1949 and 1989. Kazakhstan closed the site in 1991 and subsequently relinquished the nuclear arsenal it had inherited after the Soviet collapse. The regional treaty was signed in Semipalatinsk on September 8, 2006, and entered into force in 2009. It established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone located entirely in the Northern Hemisphere, directly bordering two nuclear-weapon states, Russia and China. That history gives Kazakhstan a distinctive place in regional nuclear diplomacy. Uzbekistan originated the proposal for the zone, presenting it at the UN General Assembly in September 1993. The September 8 statement explicitly acknowledges Uzbekistan’s initiative while crediting all five countries with establishing the zone. The statement also recognizes Kyrgyzstan for initiating the International Day for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Awareness, observed annually on March 5, and Turkmenistan for chairing the December 2024 anniversary meeting in Ashgabat. Kazakhstan has also helped coordinate cooperation beyond Central Asia. In August 2024, it hosted a conference in Astana with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs to strengthen cooperation among nuclear-weapon-free zones, following an earlier meeting in 2019. The five states also renewed their appeal for the United States to ratify a protocol providing security assurances to the region. In May 2014, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States signed the protocol on negative security assurances, committing not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the five Central Asian treaty members. The other four signatories have ratified it. Washington has not. The request is longstanding. The five governments made the same appeal...

Gas

Gazprom Central Asia Gas Supplies Rise Nearly 70% in 2026

Gazprom has increased gas supplies to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan by nearly 70% so far in 2026. Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller announced the increase on September 4 but did not disclose how much gas each of the three countries received. The most significant changes are taking place in Uzbekistan. Until recently, the country was a major gas producer and exporter, but in 2023 it became a net importer. Since then, Tashkent has increased purchases from Russia and Turkmenistan. In 2025, Gazprom supplied Uzbekistan with 6.48 billion cubic meters of gas, 15% more than a year earlier. Russian gas reaches the country through Kazakhstan via the Central Asia–Center pipeline system. Built during the Soviet era to carry Central Asian gas northward to Russia, part of the system now operates in reverse. Supplies continue to rise. The International Energy Agency expects Russian gas supplies to Uzbekistan to exceed ten billion cubic meters in 2026. The reason is evident in Uzbekistan’s own production figures. The country produced 18.3 billion cubic meters of natural gas in the first half of 2026, down 16.4% from a year earlier. Gas imports reached $971.7 million. Russia and Turkmenistan remain the main external suppliers. Tashkent is trying to reverse the decline. Uzbekneftegaz has ordered new wells to be brought online and 16 existing wells to be overhauled, measures intended to add a combined 4.36 million cubic meters per day to production. Kazakhstan is in a different position. It produced 68.2 billion cubic meters of gas in 2025, but marketable gas production was only 27.4 billion cubic meters. Kazakhstan has also become the transit link between Russia and Uzbekistan. Part of the increase reported by Gazprom also reflects direct supplies to Kazakhstan, although the company has not provided a breakdown among the three countries. Kyrgyzstan’s gas market is considerably smaller. The country consumes around 500 million cubic meters a year and is more dependent on imports. Bishkek has signed long-term agreements with Gazprom for gas supplies to the planned CHP-2 and Bishkekselmash power plants through 2040. The increase in Central Asian sales comes as the geography of Russian gas exports has changed dramatically. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the sharp decline in deliveries to Europe, Gazprom has been looking for more customers to the east and south. China remains Russia’s largest gas market outside the former Soviet Union. Russia expects to supply China with around 50 billion cubic meters of gas this year. Power of Siberia is already operating at around its design capacity, while another route from Russia’s Far East is scheduled to begin deliveries in January 2027. Moscow and Beijing are also discussing a major new pipeline from Western Siberia through Mongolia. Central Asia, however, is not becoming an exclusively Russian gas market. Turkmenistan remains a major supplier to Uzbekistan, while Uzbekistan in particular is rapidly adding solar and wind generation, helping limit gas demand for power generation. But the direction of gas flows has already changed in a literal sense. The Central Asia–Center system was once built to carry...

Central Asia Water Cooperation

Water in Central Asia: Can the Five States Reach an Agreement?

Central Asia is entering a period of growing water stress, as climate change makes supplies less predictable while demand continues to rise. Populations are growing, economies require new energy and industrial capacity, glaciers are shrinking, and agriculture continues to consume most of the available water. The region’s two main rivers – the Amu Darya and Syr Darya – cross national borders, making it impossible for any one country to solve the problem on its own. After decades of disputes, Central Asian states are increasingly trying to manage water jointly. In 2026, that cooperation has produced further practical steps, from plans for automated water accounting in the Syr Darya basin to new proposals for reforming regional mechanisms. The question now is whether the five countries can agree on rules when their water needs remain different. Water and Energy: An Old Conflict The structural conflict is rooted in the region’s geography. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are upstream states and use water in part for hydropower generation, particularly in winter. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are downstream and need large volumes in summer during the irrigation season. During the Soviet period, a centralized exchange system was in place: upstream republics stored water in winter and released it in summer, receiving energy resources in return. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, that unified mechanism disappeared. Interstate agreements preserved a degree of coordination but did not eliminate the tension between upstream energy needs and downstream agricultural interests. Climate change is now adding another layer to the problem. Retreating glaciers in the Pamir and Tien Shan mountains are altering the timing and reliability of river flows, while populations and consumption are increasing. Countries across the region are planning new power plants, industrial facilities, mining projects, and data centers, while agriculture remains the largest consumer of water. From Seasonal Quotas to Joint Management The main formal mechanism for coordinating river allocations remains the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia (ICWC), established in 1992. Through it, countries coordinate water withdrawal limits and reservoir operating regimes in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins. In late 2025, the countries agreed on water allocations for 2026: for the Amu Darya, the total withdrawal limit for the water-management year from October 2025 to October 2026 was around 55.4 billion cubic meters, while the Syr Darya allocation for the non-growing season was approximately 4.2 billion cubic meters. The five-state framework does not, however, cover every major user of the Amu Darya. Afghanistan is outside the regional allocation system, while its Qosh Tepa Canal, now under construction, has added another source of uncertainty over future downstream flows. Such agreements keep the shared system functioning, but many decisions are still made ahead of each new season. Climate change and rising demand require a longer-term model. In February of this year, Kazakhstan proposed developing a Central Asian Framework Convention on Water Use, while joint infrastructure projects, including Kyrgyzstan’s Kambarata-1 hydropower plant with the participation of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are gradually adding shared economic interests...