• KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
20 September 2026

Viewing results 37 - 42 of 13646

Nearly 100,000 Uzbeks Return From Russia as Labor Migration Slows

Nearly 100,000 Uzbek citizens returned from Russia between August 25 and September 5, as broader figures point to a decline in labor migration from Uzbekistan to Russia amid rising costs and tighter migration controls. According to Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency, 96,415 people returned during the ten-day period. The agency has not published comparable figures for last year or explained why most of them came home, meaning the figure alone cannot be taken as evidence of a mass exodus. There is, however, evidence of a broader slowdown. Between January and June, Uzbek citizens made more than 1.1 million entries into Russia declaring “work” as the purpose of their trip, down 13.2% year-on-year. Across Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, work-related entries fell by about 15%, from more than 2.3 million to 1.9 million. The figures count border crossings rather than individual workers, meaning the same person may appear more than once. But unlike the ten-day return figure, they show a decline sustained over the first half of the year. Alexander Safonov, a professor at Russia’s Financial University, told Vedomosti that “tighter migration policy and the rising cost of work patents” were among the factors behind the decline. Uzbek and Tajik citizens need patents to work legally in Russia. Safonov also pointed to the cost of medical examinations, housing, and travel, which reduce the amount migrants can save or send home. At the same time, Russia has tightened migration controls. Since February 2025, foreign nationals who no longer have legal grounds to remain in the country have been placed on a register of controlled persons. Those listed face restrictions on certain banking transactions, registering property and vehicles, and other activities. Moscow and the Moscow Region have introduced additional controls. Some visa-free foreign workers are required to use the Amina mobile application for migration registration and to provide information about their location. From September 1, 2026, the system was expanded to other categories of adult foreign nationals from visa-free countries staying in the capital region for more than 90 days. The treatment of Uzbek migrants has also become an issue in relations between Tashkent and Moscow. In late August, Uzbek representatives discussed migration checks, the situation of citizens placed on the register of controlled persons, and the possibility of regularizing the status of some foreign nationals with Russia’s Interior Ministry, Prosecutor General’s Office, and Foreign Ministry. Some Uzbek workers who have already left Russia describe a similar calculation. In the spring, Azattyq Asia spoke with Uzbeks who had worked in Russia and returned home. They cited rising living costs, tougher migration rules, inspections, and concerns about their safety. Said, from Samarkand, had worked in Russia for several years before returning and finding a job at home. He said that Russian wages appeared less attractive once rent and the cost of a work patent were taken into account. Human rights advocate Valentina Chupik told the outlet that the return trend had begun before this year. She cited the ruble exchange rate, the war in Ukraine, and concerns...

Kazakhstan Hijab Debate Exposes Divide Over Secularism

Kazakhstan’s long-running controversy over hijabs in schools has collided with a wider public argument about religion, exposing sharp differences among prominent public figures and institutions over the boundaries of the country’s secular model. The latest religious controversy in Kazakhstan’s social media space was triggered by two statements made within the span of a week. On September 3, well-known Kazakhstani film and entertainment producer and former television host Bayan Alaguzova wrote on Threads that she was “tired of religion and its propaganda.” “I’ll say this right away,” she added. “There’s no need to frighten me with hell – it doesn’t exist for me. Not a single person in the world can claim to have seen hell, or heaven for that matter. Now that is reliable information! The same goes for the 72 virgins thrown into the bargain.” She went on to sarcastically ask how a disembodied spirit was supposed to deprive the heavenly maidens of their virginity. The deliberately provocative tone used by the prominent film and entertainment figure stirred debate among social media users. Soon afterward, another Threads user posted a screenshot of an official complaint submitted through Kazakhstan’s eOtinish system against the producer, calling for Alaguzova’s posts to be examined for possible incitement of religious discord. There have so far been no official reports of further action on the complaint. Even so, Kazakhstanis on social media began joking about how the complainant intended to prove the existence of heaven and hell. Journalists and other users also spoke out in support of Alaguzova. On September 8, in response to the backlash, Alaguzova acknowledged on Instagram that her “words had hurt believers” and offered her “sincere apologies,” explaining that she respected “every person and every faith, as long as it does not harm others.” She then said her remarks had been misunderstood. “All those accusing me of ‘offending the feelings of believers,’ read carefully: I said that I am against the imposition of dogmas alien to our people, against radical and fanatical propaganda, not religion itself... Do you want girls to be married off at the age of nine? To be denied education or medical care? To be beaten supposedly ‘as a preventive measure against the influence of shaitan’? To be taken as wives without anyone assuming responsibility for them? To be easily abandoned simply by loudly saying ‘talaq’ three times? Do you want your daughter or sister not to be an individual in her own right, but simply an appendage to someone else? To be unable to appear in public or speak without permission? To be unable even to protect herself and her children? I am categorically against this!” the producer said. That same day, journalists at a government briefing asked Kazakhstan’s Education Minister Zhuldyz Suleimenova about reports that some private schools had allowed pupils to wear hijabs. Each new school year in Kazakhstan has brought renewed disputes over hijabs in schools. Some Muslim parents, particularly in western Kazakhstan, require their teenage daughters to wear hijabs to school. This conflicts...

South Korea and ADB Expand Central Asia Critical Minerals Push

Two days before South Korea hosts its first summit with all five Central Asian countries on September 16, Seoul held a series of talks with the Asian Development Bank over how Korean technology and financing could be used in critical-mineral projects in the region. On September 14, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung met ADB President Masato Kanda in Seoul, where they agreed to work more closely on critical-mineral supply chains, artificial intelligence, and energy. Kanda later held separate talks with South Korean Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol. More specifically, the two discussed combining ADB financing with the technology and expertise of South Korean companies for projects in Central Asia. The talks build on a financing mechanism that was already in place. ADB formally launched its Critical Minerals-to-Manufacturing Financing Partnership Facility at its annual meeting in Samarkand in May. It is designed to support critical-mineral supply chains across ADB’s developing member countries in Asia and the Pacific. The facility has two components. The first is a grant window that pays for early-stage work, including feasibility studies, environmental and social assessments, and technical assistance. At its launch, ADB announced a $20 million contribution from Japan and $1.6 million from the United Kingdom to this part of the facility. The second is designed to mobilize additional capital and share risk. This is where South Korea comes in. Korea Eximbank and Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (K-SURE) each signed a memorandum covering up to $500 million in potential financing, giving the two South Korean institutions a combined potential cofinancing commitment of up to $1 billion. The facility is intended to support projects across the value chain, from mining and processing to manufacturing and recycling. ADB is already working on critical-minerals initiatives in Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, the bank is supporting the development of a critical-minerals strategy, while in Uzbekistan it is working on AI-driven critical-metals production and circular approaches to raw materials. At an ADB seminar launching the facility during the bank’s annual meeting in Samarkand, Kanda said the aim was to ensure mineral-producing countries benefited from more than extraction. “Asia and the Pacific should be more than a source of raw materials. The region should also capture the jobs, technology, and value these minerals provide,” Kanda said. Central Asia's Critical Minerals Play Kazakhstan is already a major producer of uranium and chromite and also produces or processes titanium, beryllium, tantalum, zinc, and other strategic materials. In July, Kazakhstan and South Korea began establishing a joint research center for rare and rare-earth metals at Satbayev University in Almaty. The center is expected to work on processing technologies and specialist training. Ahead of the summit, Kazakhstan said it wanted to expand cooperation with South Korea beyond the already established automotive industry into AI, advanced technologies, and critical minerals. Astana is interested in deeper processing of raw materials and producing higher-value-added goods. Uzbekistan is moving in the same direction. The country has a $4.2 billion critical-minerals program for 2026–2030 comprising 120 projects. Tashkent plans to increase industry...

Central Asian Women Journalists Set Regional Priorities Through 2029

The Coalition of Women Journalists of Central Asia is preparing a multi-year program. At a conference that opened in Tashkent on September 14, more than 100 media professionals from across Central Asia are discussing common priorities through 2029 and developing a regional guide to gender-sensitive journalism. For the coalition, the program is an attempt to move from periodic conferences toward a permanent professional network. The Second Central Asian International Conference of Women Media Professionals runs from September 14 to 15 under the theme “Regional Solidarity, Digital Security and an Inclusive Future for Journalism.” The event is organized by Uzbekistan’s Modern Journalism Development Center, with the National Coalition of Women Journalists of Tajikistan serving as its regional partner. The coalition emerged after the first such meeting in Dushanbe. On May 3, 2024, participants signed a memorandum establishing it. A planned follow-up conference in Dushanbe in May 2025 was abruptly canceled after two venues declined to host it. No official explanation was given. Participants are now discussing a program for 2026–2029 covering mutual support and exchanges of experience. It would also provide for coordinated responses to threats against journalism. Digital security is a major focus of the Tashkent program. The agenda covers online harassment and how deepfakes are used to spread disinformation. Separate sessions address the psychological toll on journalists and ways to protect personal data and newsroom systems during a digital attack. Those concerns reflect a wider problem for women working in journalism. According to a report published by UNESCO in May 2026, 45% of surveyed women journalists and other media workers said they self-censored on social media because of online violence, up from 30% in 2020. About 22% reported self-censorship in their professional work. Roughly a quarter had been diagnosed with or treated for anxiety or depression linked to online violence, while 13% reported post-traumatic stress disorder. Regional newsrooms are also working to improve reporting on violence against women. On September 8–9, just days before the Tashkent conference, journalists from across Central Asia gathered in Almaty for training on ethical reporting of gender-based violence. The event, held with the participation of UN Women, focused on professional and ethical standards for covering such cases. The Tashkent meeting is also intended to make regional solidarity more practical. Participants are discussing ways to provide rapid professional support when journalists face online attacks or other pressure. Another expected outcome is a unified regional guide to gender-sensitive journalism. It is intended to bring together recommendations for reporting on gender-related issues in a responsible and balanced way. Tashkent will also host the Women Media Awards Central Asia, a regional award for women working in the media. The program includes an audiovisual performance, “Echo: The Power of Invisible Voices,” addressing hate speech and digital attacks involving bots and deepfakes. After Tashkent, the test will be whether the network works between conferences, when journalists are separated by national borders and a colleague may need help that same day.

Opinion: How Europe Balances Conditions and Interests in Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan has enjoyed preferential access to the EU market under GSP+ since 2021. The program removes tariffs on thousands of products for countries that commit to implementing international conventions on human rights, labor standards, environmental protection, and governance. Uzbekistan is one of two Central Asian countries, alongside Kyrgyzstan, participating in GSP+. Tajikistan receives the less generous standard GSP preferences, while Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are outside the scheme because they are classified as upper-middle-income economies. Uzbekistan makes extensive use of the program. In 2024, its preference utilization rate, the share of eligible exports entering the EU duty-free, was 92.2%. EU imports from Uzbekistan nearly doubled between 2021 and 2024. Those benefits come with conditions. The European Commission assesses whether Uzbekistan is implementing the conventions required under GSP+. It must consider findings from the UN and International Labour Organization monitoring bodies, but it can also use evidence from governments, international organizations, civil society groups, and other sources. If the Commission has “reasonable doubt” that Uzbekistan is meeting its commitments, it can open a withdrawal procedure. Uzbekistan can respond and provide evidence of compliance. The Commission then decides whether to close the case or withdraw preferences from some or all products. The system gives Brussels a formal role in assessing whether Uzbekistan continues to meet the conditions attached to preferential market access. It also requires the Commission to decide how different evidence should be interpreted and when shortcomings are serious enough to justify action. There is no automatic formula that produces that decision. The EU–Uzbekistan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, or EPCA, creates a separate mechanism. It makes respect for human rights an essential part of the partnership, and a serious breach can lead to partial or full suspension of the agreement. The European Parliament’s May 2026 resolution called for implementation of the agreement’s human-rights and rule-of-law commitments and for those commitments to be assessed within three years. The EU’s own report records setbacks in media freedom, civil society, and judicial independence. It also recognizes progress on labor standards and protections for women and children. The Commission must assess compliance with each required convention; progress in one area does not remove obligations in another. That means the Commission must decide how much weight to give different evidence and when concerns are serious enough to affect trade preferences. Decisions on Uzbekistan’s domestic reforms, however, remain with the Uzbek government. Concurrently, cooperation between the EU and Uzbekistan has expanded. Brussels is pursuing closer ties with Uzbekistan on transport connectivity and critical raw materials. Uzbekistan’s position on regional transport routes, critical raw materials, and access to a growing Central Asian market also gives Tashkent leverage in its dealings with Europe. The new GSP rules apply from January 2027, raising the number of required conventions from 27 to 32. Existing beneficiaries retain their preferences during a transition period and must reapply by the end of 2028. The EPCA has applied provisionally since March 1, 2026, while full ratification remains pending. The next GSP+ review will show how...

Why Uzbekistan Is Losing Women Engineers

A young graduate of an energy college in Uzbekistan’s Syrdarya Region spent two years working with Acwa, one of the country’s largest foreign energy companies. When the company offered her a permanent job in Tashkent, her parents were reluctant to let her move to the capital. Company representatives invited the family to see where she would be working and eventually persuaded her parents to change their minds. Stories like this help explain why women with technical training do not always make it to Uzbekistan’s power plants and other energy facilities. A study commissioned by Acwa and the American Chamber of Commerce in Uzbekistan examined the barriers facing women in energy, particularly in the transition from technical education to employment. Gender researcher and legal scholar Kamola Alieva interviewed women and employers in several parts of Uzbekistan, including Tashkent and Karakalpakstan. She told The Times of Central Asia that the aim was to understand why women trained in technical fields often leave their professions or move into other roles. [caption id="attachment_56144" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: Alieva, Acwa[/caption] “We wanted to understand where and why women drop out of the profession, rather than count their numbers,” Alieva said. Two figures appeared in the presentation, around 40% for women in STEM education and around 12% for women in the energy sector. Alieva clarified that the study itself did not calculate either figure. According to the International Labour Organization, 40.2% of female university graduates in Uzbekistan had studied STEM subjects in 2021, up from 32.6% in 2017. The figure represents the share of female graduates who studied STEM, not women’s share of all STEM students. In some engineering programs, the number of women is far lower. At one energy college Alieva visited during the research, only 16 of more than 100 students admitted were women. “Already at the education stage, the number of girls drops significantly,” Alieva said. The reasons often lie outside the college or university. Parents may regard engineering as a male profession or object to their daughters moving to another city. The work itself can involve shift schedules and travel to remote energy facilities. After graduation, some women move into procurement, administrative work, or social projects instead of engineering and operational positions. Employers told researchers that women submit almost no applications for some technical vacancies. Women are particularly scarce in equipment maintenance and plant operations. Few hold managerial positions. This comes amid a significant employment gap between men and women across Uzbekistan’s economy. The World Bank estimated the labor-force participation gap at 28 percentage points in 2021. Unemployment among young women stood at 15.5%, compared with 10% among young men. Women earned 34% less than men on average. At industrial sites, the barriers can be more basic than career policy. “Conditions at industrial sites often make it clear themselves that women are not expected there,” Alieva said. She noted that many sites lacked separate toilets and showers, as well as accommodation for women. Questions about marriage and children, including whether a husband permitted...