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Uzbekistan’s Reported Chinese Jet Deal in a Changing Arms Market

China’s J-10CE could become Uzbekistan’s first new combat fighter in decades that was designed neither in Russia nor the Soviet Union. This summer, defense publications and analysts reported that Tashkent had allegedly already received the first aircraft and could eventually acquire 24 jets. Neither Uzbekistan nor China has confirmed the deal. If the reports prove accurate, the purchase would mark a notable shift for a region whose armed forces still rely heavily on Soviet- and Russian-made equipment. For decades, Russia was the natural source of new weapons, spare parts and maintenance. Its position is no longer unchallenged. China can offer combat aircraft and air-defense systems, Turkey has established itself in the drone market, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are developing their own defense industries. Whether or not the reports prove accurate, they point to two broader trends: Central Asian countries are increasingly looking beyond Russia for newer military technology, while some are also trying to produce more equipment at home. Shadow Purchase In July, reports emerged of the alleged delivery of four J-10CEs to Uzbekistan. The aircraft is the export version of the Chinese J-10C multirole fighter manufactured by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. Its export variant has already been purchased by Pakistan. Subsequent reports spoke of a possible contract for 24 aircraft and of Uzbek pilots undergoing training in China. Uzbek news outlet Kun.uz attempted to verify the claims and contacted the country’s Ministry of Defense. The ministry responded that it had no information it could provide on the matter. Chinese authorities and manufacturers have also made no public announcement of a sale. Nevertheless, throughout the summer, reports of Uzbekistan purchasing J-10CEs have refused to die down. Russian Weapons Remain the Backbone of Existing Arsenals Uzbekistan inherited a combat aircraft fleet from the Soviet Union built primarily around MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters. These aircraft were developed in the Soviet era, and after the collapse of the USSR, Russia remained the main source of compatible spare parts, weapons, repairs, and upgrades. The reports about the J-10CE challenge this established model. A new fighter comes with a different weapons, maintenance and training ecosystem. Over time, this creates dependence on a new supplier. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, Russian exports of major arms in 2021–2025 were 64% lower than during the previous five-year period. Russia’s share of global arms exports fell from 21% to 6.8%, leaving it the world’s third-largest supplier after the United States and France. Those figures do not mean that China has replaced Russia as Central Asia’s dominant arms supplier. Russia retains a strong position, above all because of the equipment Central Asian militaries already operate. Kazakhstan is perhaps the clearest example. According to SIPRI data for 2021–2025, Russia accounted for 83% of Kazakhstan’s imports of major arms. Spain accounted for 7.9% and France for 3.6%. Kazakhstan operates Russian Su-30SM fighters, as well as helicopters, armored vehicles and air-defense systems. Any abrupt change in procurement policy would raise questions over the compatibility of ammunition, communications systems, maintenance, and the training of crews...

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Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan Coordinate on Nuclear Plant Safety

Uzbekistan is building its first nuclear power plant and preparing a second, while Kazakhstan intends to build at least three. Central Asia’s two largest economies are entering nuclear power at almost the same time. Even before their first reactors come online, the two countries are beginning to coordinate on safety and environmental monitoring, including potential transboundary impacts. On August 21, representatives of the two countries met in Tashkent and agreed on the main areas of further cooperation, including a road map and follow-up steps. The meeting came four days after a new announcement by Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. On August 17, he said preparations were under way for a second nuclear power plant, although the country’s first nuclear complex in the Jizzakh region is only at the initial stage of construction. The location, capacity, timetable, and technology partner for the new plant have yet to be announced. Uzbekistan’s nuclear project has expanded considerably over the past two years. In 2024, Tashkent and Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom agreed to build a small nuclear power plant with six 55 MW RITM-200N reactors. The configuration was later revised to an integrated plant in the Forish district of the Jizzakh region, comprising two large VVER-1000 units and two small RITM-200N reactors. The complex will have a total capacity of about 2.1 GW. Construction formally began on June 4, 2026, when concrete was poured for the first reactor unit. A technical launch of the first small reactor is planned for late 2029, while the first large unit is expected to begin operating in 2033. The entire complex is expected to be operational by 2035. Official projections of annual generation range from about 15.4 billion to 17.2 billion kWh. Rapidly growing electricity demand is driving discussion of a second plant. Uzbekistan needs more generating capacity as industry and new urban projects grow and the population approaches 40 million. Natural gas remains the backbone of power generation, but the government is also expanding solar and wind energy. Nuclear power is intended to provide baseload electricity around the clock, regardless of weather conditions. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer and has the world’s second-largest uranium reserves, but it currently has no operating commercial nuclear power reactors. In a nationwide referendum in October 2024, voters approved the construction of a nuclear power plant. The country’s first plant is planned near the village of Ulken on the shore of Lake Balkhash, with Rosatom selected to lead the international consortium for the project. A nuclear industry development strategy approved in April 2026 calls for Kazakhstan to have at least three nuclear power plants by 2050. It also covers nuclear science and workforce training, along with the management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. China National Nuclear Corporation has been selected to build Kazakhstan’s second plant; in July 2025, Roman Sklyar, then the country’s first deputy prime minister, said China would also build the third. The April 2026 strategy is less specific, however, and lists small modular...

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Badakhshan Fighting Raises Risks for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

In Nusay district, Badakhshan province (northeast Afghanistan), fighting began around August 11 between Taliban forces and followers of Juma Khan Fateh, a local Taliban commander of ethnic Tajik origin who had resisted efforts to disarm his network. The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project (ACLED) identifies the immediate trigger as an attempt to remove military equipment and vehicles from areas under Fateh’s control, amid longer-running tensions over disarmament, local authority, and control of gold mining. Similar disputes over gold mines have repeatedly produced clashes between local commanders and Taliban forces since 2021. Fateh surrendered on August 17 after nearly a week of fighting. By August 22, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said his case was being prepared for trial. Post-surrender reporting also indicated weapons seizures and disarmament activity around Fateh-linked sites and associates, although the scale of the reported seizures and disarmament remained incompletely verified. The Fateh episode came amid a broader increase in armed instability in Badakhshan during 2026. ACLED recorded 22 anti-Taliban armed-opposition events in the province from January through July, compared with four from June through December 2025. In July, one opposition group temporarily seized the Yaftal-e Sufla district headquarters, while the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) reportedly fought Taliban forces in Zebak. The Yaftal-e Sufla and Zebak operations were separate from the Fateh confrontation, and there is no credible evidence of coordination with Fateh’s network. Fateh’s surrender ended the immediate confrontation, while separate armed-opposition activity in Badakhshan continued. The fighting has already had a direct cross-border consequence for Tajikistan. Nusay lies opposite Tajikistan’s Darvoz district. On August 13, gunfire from the Afghan side crossed into Darvoz, killing a 21-year-old woman inside her home and damaging residential property. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry lodged a formal protest, saying the fighting had violated the country’s airspace and demanding respect for the state border and measures to prevent a recurrence. The Afghan Foreign Ministry acknowledged the death and expressed regret while blaming “disruptive and opportunistic elements.” The one confirmed limited incident does not show that the conflict has extended into Tajikistan on a sustained basis, but it makes the cross-border dimension more than hypothetical. Tajikistan shares a 1,374-kilometer frontier with Afghanistan, much of it facing Afghan Badakhshan. Dushanbe had already treated this border as a persistent security problem. In late November 2025, two attacks launched from Afghanistan’s territory killed five Chinese nationals and wounded five others in Tajikistan, which then instituted tighter border measures, while the Taliban pledged to cooperate on security and investigations. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is also implementing a program to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan frontier with weapons, equipment, and other border-protection means. Its 2026–27 implementation phase antedates the present fighting. A 2026 Security Council monitoring report said Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was active mainly in northern Afghanistan, particularly Badakhshan, and was developing cells capable of projecting a regional threat, with Central Asia remaining a key focus. It also reported concern in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the role of their nationals in the organization and the possible...

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Can Kazakhstan Power Its AI Ambitions?

For now, it is only a vast construction site lost in the steppe, a few kilometers from Ekibastuz, a mining city in northern Kazakhstan. Cranes move behind fences in the shadow of a Soviet-era power station. It is hard to imagine that, from 2027, this site is supposed to become the first piece of a giant artificial intelligence campus. Known as Data Center Valley, the project is eventually expected to reach one gigawatt. At full capacity, it could consume as much as 8.8 terawatt-hours a year, Kazakh media Qyzyq estimated, around 7% of Kazakhstan’s current electricity generation. Development will be gradual, with an initial 50-megawatt facility scheduled to enter service in June 2027. U.S.-based Firebird.ai and state-controlled Kazakhtelecom are leading the industrial project. Yet the futuristic bet collides with a more prosaic reality. “Economic and industrial growth in Kazakhstan is currently outpacing the rate of commissioning and modernization of generating capacity,” the Ministry of Energy acknowledged in a response to The Times of Central Asia. In 2025, the gap between domestic generation and consumption reached 1.5 terawatt-hours, forcing the country to import electricity, mainly from Russia. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has acknowledged the scale of the challenge. At the National Kurultai in January, he said data centers consume electricity on a scale comparable to metallurgical plants and that Kazakhstan’s existing generation was “clearly insufficient” for its development plans. He called energy self-sufficiency a key state priority and ordered an expansion of generating capacity, including new coal-fired power. How, then, can Kazakhstan power a campus that could consume almost six times that shortfall? More strikingly, when the government prepared its 2026 electricity forecast, neither Data Center Valley nor any other AI or data-center project was included. The ministry says they will enter its calculations from 2027 - the same year the first facility is due to start operating. [caption id="attachment_54529" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] The mine of Bogatyr is expanding to increase production[/caption] From Coal to Algorithms In Ekibastuz, the answer comes down to one word: coal. “In essence, Kazakhstan is turning Ekibastuz coal into export digital revenue,” Kazakhtelecom chairman Bagdat Musin has said. Electricity generated locally would be converted into computing services sold internationally. No major named customer contract has been announced, although Firebird says it holds guaranteed service contracts with global players. Amazon and G42 have been named as companies entering the ecosystem, while Kazakhstan has also held talks with Microsoft and OpenAI. The landscape appears built for that ambition. Nearby lies Bogatyr, one of the world’s largest open-pit coal mines. From the observation deck, terraces of rock descend 300 meters into the earth. Excavators and haul trucks look like toys at the bottom. “Ekibastuz is a very smart choice: energy is abundant and cheap here, while proximity limits transmission losses between the power station and the consumer,” Yevgeny Masternak, CEO of mine operator Bogatyr Komir, told TCA. To keep pace with anticipated demand, the company plans to raise annual production from 42 million tonnes in 2024 to more than 56 million...

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Kyrgyzstan Drafts $419 Million Plan to Curb Rising Prices

Kyrgyzstan has drafted a plan worth about $419 million to curb rising prices in 2026–2027. The authorities aim to increase food production and build reserves, but fuel imported primarily from Russia remains a major source of inflationary pressure largely beyond the government’s control. The draft was presented to the Cabinet on August 21. During the first seven months of 2026, consumer prices and tariffs in Kyrgyzstan rose by 6.7% from their December 2025 level. Average annual inflation over the same period was 10.7%. Food prices rose particularly sharply, with fresh fruit up 16% and meat products 14.5%. Lamb recorded the largest increase at 23.1%. Horse meat rose by 16%, while beef increased by 14.2%. The authorities have already intervened directly in the meat market. In March, Kyrgyzstan introduced a six-month ban on livestock exports. Temporary state controls on beef and mutton prices also applied earlier this year but expired on May 2. The plan calls for increasing the productive livestock population by at least 20,000 head. Agribusinesses will be eligible for preferential loans, while the dairy and poultry sectors will receive subsidies. Storage facilities with a combined capacity of 18,000 metric tons are planned in all seven regions. Farmers are to receive 68,000 metric tons of seed and the necessary amounts of mineral fertilizer. The government also intends to ensure sufficient wheat supplies for the domestic market and purchase another 20,000 metric tons from local producers for state reserves. The draft would establish direct supply channels for agricultural products and expand the network of retail outlets operating without intermediaries. Kyrgyzstan relies on imports for almost all of its petroleum products. Deputy Energy Minister Nasipbek Kerimov said in July that Russia had supplied about 95% of the country’s annual fuel needs in recent years, with total consumption of around 2 million metric tons. This summer, Russia’s fuel shortages worsened amid refinery outages following Ukrainian drone attacks, high seasonal demand, and transport problems. Moscow tightened restrictions on fuel exports and turned to imports to support domestic supplies. For Kyrgyzstan, the decline in Russian supplies quickly became a problem. According to the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, the average price of AI-92 gasoline reached 88.24 soms per liter by August 12, around 6% above the July average. AI-95 rose by 12% to 109.24 soms, while diesel increased by 5% to 102.08 soms. The government has already raised its year-end inflation forecast to 14–15% from an earlier projection of 9%, citing rising fuel costs as one reason. The National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic kept its policy rate at 12% on July 27. Among the external inflation risks, the central bank cited volatile global food prices and possible disruptions to petroleum-product supplies through the Strait of Hormuz. Its medium-term inflation target is 5–7%. Kyrgyzstan cannot quickly replace Russian fuel, but importers have begun seeking supplies farther afield. Kanatbek Eshatov, president of the Association of Oil Traders of Kyrgyzstan, said on August 12 that reduced supplies from Russian refineries had prompted deliveries from...

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Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan Target $1 Billion in Trade as Investment and Transit Links Expand

Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have set a target of increasing bilateral trade to $1 billion by 2030, as economic ties expand from a relatively low base into vehicle manufacturing, oil and gas, investment, and transport across the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s state visit to Uzbekistan on August 23–24 added new projects to that list. The two presidents signed a Treaty on Eternal Friendship and a program aimed at increasing bilateral trade to $1 billion by 2030. Political relations, meanwhile, have been moving faster than economic ties. In 2023, the two countries established the Supreme Interstate Council, and a year later they signed a Treaty on Allied Relations. The latest trip was Aliyev’s third state visit to Uzbekistan in five years and his seventh visit overall. Aliyev said ahead of his trip to Tashkent that bilateral trade more than tripled in 2025 to reach $795 million. Uzbekistan’s Center for Economic Research and Reforms, however, reported a much lower total of $307.3 million for the same year. Neither side has explained the discrepancy, which may reflect different definitions of trade. Sustaining growth toward the $1 billion target will require broader trade and more joint production, including goods aimed at markets beyond the two countries. From Trade to Investment The Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan Investment Company is intended to help turn some of these plans into operating businesses. Established in 2023 with $500 million in capital, the company finances projects in both countries. Some areas of cooperation have already reached the production stage. Azerbaijan’s Azermash CP works with Uzbek manufacturers to produce Chevrolet and Isuzu vehicles in Azerbaijan. By July, more than 10,700 Chevrolet vehicles and 275 Isuzu buses had been produced. More than 130 commercial entities with Uzbek investment are registered in Azerbaijan. During the latest visit, the two sides opened a gypsum plant. They also laid foundations for five SOCAR filling stations and a silver-ore enrichment plant. For Baku, the interest in Uzbekistan is understandable. With a population of more than 38 million, Uzbekistan is Central Asia’s most populous country. The Uzbek economy is growing rapidly, while the authorities are opening more sectors to private and foreign capital. For Azerbaijani companies, this offers access to a market considerably larger than their own as well as a foothold in Central Asia. For Tashkent, Azerbaijan offers investment and expertise in the oil and gas sector. SOCAR, the Azerbaijani state oil company, has been operating in Uzbekistan for years. A joint venture between Uzbekistan’s O‘ZLITINEFTGAZ and the Azerbaijani company’s research institute has been operating since 2016. Cooperation is now gradually moving from engineering services toward much larger exploration and potential production projects. The main project is on the Ustyurt Plateau in western Uzbekistan. BP joined the project in May 2026 with a 40% stake, while SOCAR, which is the operator, and Uzbekneftegaz each hold 30%. Total investment could reach around $2 billion if commercially viable reserves are found and the project proceeds to development. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the project envisages extensive seismic...