• KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
20 September 2026

Viewing results 25 - 30 of 13646

Kyrgyzstan’s High-Wire Act: Sanctions, Compliance, and National Interest

On September 2, the day after the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Heads of State Summit in Bishkek, The Times of Central Asia spoke with Bakyt Sydykov, Kyrgyzstan’s Minister of Economy and Commerce and Special Presidential Representative for Sanctions Policy. He outlined the government’s approach to sanctions compliance and protecting Kyrgyz businesses. Sanctions exposure can affect Kyrgyz banks and businesses, as well as their international partners. U.S. secondary sanctions and EU and UK measures affecting foreign entities operate through different legal mechanisms. Some portions of the text have been edited for clarity.   TCA: The sanctions against Russia adopted by the U.S., EU, and UK are not UN Security Council-mandated. Is it correct that Kyrgyzstan’s compliance policy addresses these measures rather than UN-mandated sanctions? Sydykov: That's correct. Secondary sanctions can affect non-U.S., non-EU, and non-UK entities or persons who knowingly facilitate transactions involving sanctioned parties. Our focus is on establishing better and better mechanisms and frameworks that address this bilateral dimension, that is, Kyrgyzstan's direct exposure through its relations with the sanctioning jurisdictions, in order to mitigate our exposure to potential secondary sanctions. TCA: Kyrgyz citizens and businesses can face sanctions exposure through dealings with sanctioned parties, including the risk of U.S. secondary sanctions. What are Kyrgyzstan’s main challenges in improving its compliance regime, and how are you addressing them? Sydykov: For technical reasons, our compliance regime is moving toward putting in place mechanisms that can flag or be anticipatory. I think you would agree that free markets are complicated and circumvention often comes to light only after it has occurred. We are largely equipped to manage these occurrences. We are moving to put in place firewall-like frameworks which would allow the country to identify and respond to occurrences before the fact. It is a great challenge — and one that every country operating in a free-market economy faces — to develop such a capacity, namely, to anticipate and prevent circumvention before it happens. Despite our best efforts, this remains a structural limitation. TCA: What concrete actions have you taken, or are you planning to take? Sydykov: We have established working groups, task forces, and interagency committees capable of swiftly halting the operations of any company engaged in sanctions circumvention. We are also working closely with commercial banks on these efforts. The banks, for their part, have introduced internal compliance committees and, in some cases, adjusted the composition of their boards of directors to strengthen governance and decision-making around potential circumvention risks. The banks are also developing a joint interbank blacklist of sanctioned entities, so that these entities are unable to operate through the banking system going forward. Those are steps to develop a working forward-looking, predictive approach — one that flags suspicious activity before it materializes – central to the comprehensive framework we are building. TCA: Some foreign investors may be reluctant to invest in Kyrgyzstan because of sanctions exposure. How could the measures you are taking address those concerns? Sydykov: Let me first say that we understand the rationale behind...

What Could Come Next in Kazakhstan-South Korea Relations

The first Central Asia-Republic of Korea Summit in Seoul on September 16 will elevate South Korea’s multilateral cooperation with the five countries of the region to heads-of-state level. The Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum has existed since 2007 but until now has remained primarily a ministerial mechanism. Seoul is now seeking to establish a sustainable multilateral framework at the leaders’ level. The summit’s agenda is broad, with a focus on innovation, prosperity, and connectivity. One of its main outcomes is expected to be the Seoul Declaration, setting out a medium- and long-term vision for cooperation in supply chains, emerging industries, and people-to-people exchanges. The economic agenda is already taking more concrete shape. South Korea wants to connect Central Asia’s mineral resources with its technologies for geological exploration and processing, while expanding cooperation in artificial intelligence, digital technologies, and science. Seoul also sees infrastructure, water resources, climate, and industry as potential areas for new projects. On September 16, about 500 representatives of government and business will gather alongside the five leaders. The business summit should offer the first indication of how much of the broad political agenda can be translated into investment, contracts, and joint production. Don’t Copy the Korean Miracle South Korea’s experience inevitably comes up in discussions about Central Asia’s development. But the economy that enabled Korea’s industrial breakthrough in the second half of the 20th century was built in a very different international and historical environment. Professor German Kim, director of the Institute for Asian Studies at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and one of the founders of Korean studies in Central Asia, told The Times of Central Asia that South Korea’s development experience should not be treated as a model that can simply be copied. “South Korea’s accelerated modernization took place under completely different historical and international conditions. Kazakhstan should therefore study not so much the Korean model of the past as today’s mechanisms for supporting talented young people, startups, venture capital, and technological entrepreneurship,” Kim said. From this perspective, the value of the Korean experience lies more in individual mechanisms that work – from financing technology businesses to linking universities, research, and industry. Critical Minerals and Joint Production Critical minerals have become one of the central elements of South Korea’s agenda in Central Asia. South Korean industry needs reliable supplies of raw materials, while the region holds significant reserves of metals used in electronics, batteries, energy, and other high-tech industries. Seoul is already discussing projects individually with countries in the region. In August, South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources held talks with Tajikistan on industrial cooperation and possible critical-mineral projects. The Korean side also proposed making meetings between the industry ministers of South Korea and the five Central Asian countries a regular mechanism. That proposal has since moved forward. On September 14, the six countries held their first C5+1 Industry Ministers’ Meeting in Seoul, agreeing to strengthen cooperation across critical-mineral supply chains. The plan explicitly extends beyond extraction to local refining and smelting, materials processing, and...

Kazakhstan to Receive Maximum Weight in New JPMorgan Bond Index

Kazakhstan will receive the maximum 8% country weight in JPMorgan’s new index for frontier market government bonds, creating an opportunity to attract new foreign buyers of tenge-denominated debt. JPMorgan plans to launch the GBI-EM Edge by the end of September. The maximum weight for any single country is capped at 8%, and Kazakhstan will receive the full quota. Vietnam, Pakistan, and Bangladesh will have the same weight. Other major components will include Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka. The index will cover 26 countries, with nearly $330 billion in bonds eligible for inclusion. GBI-EM Edge is designed for frontier markets, relatively less accessible markets outside JPMorgan’s main emerging market benchmark. Inclusion is a separate development from Kazakhstan’s efforts to join that main index. The index will serve as a benchmark for international asset managers. Some funds seek to replicate its composition, while others use it to compare the performance of their own portfolios. A country’s weight can therefore influence how much money investors allocate to its bonds. However, the nearly $330 billion represents the value of bonds eligible for the GBI-EM Edge, not the amount of future investment. JPMorgan has not yet said how much capital will directly track the new index. That will largely determine how significant the additional demand for Kazakh debt may be. Foreign Investors Have Already Increased Their Holdings Foreign investors began actively buying Kazakhstan’s government debt even before JPMorgan’s decision. According to the Analytical Center of the Association of Financiers of Kazakhstan (AFK), non-resident holdings of government securities reached KZT 2.5 trillion, or about $5.4 billion, by the end of June. During the first half of the year, their portfolio grew by 28.3%, while the share of non-residents in the government securities market increased from 6.2% to 6.9%. In June alone, foreign investors added KZT 185.1 billion, or about $400 million. Just a year and a half earlier, non-resident holdings stood at around KZT 1.1 trillion, or about $2.4 billion. Kazakhstan has maintained a high base rate to combat inflation. This has also kept yields on government bonds high. According to AFK, real yields on government securities – meaning returns above inflation – ranged from 5.7% to 7.4% in the first half of the year. The association’s analysts also linked strong demand to expectations of a gradual reduction in the base rate. For a foreign fund, the trade can look attractive: raise money in a market with lower interest rates, buy tenge, and invest in Kazakh government bonds. If the tenge remains stable or strengthens, the investor benefits both from the high interest rate and from the currency movement. If the tenge falls, some of that return disappears when the investment is converted back into dollars. The tenge’s appreciation has already helped foreign bondholders. It strengthened by 2.6% during August, ending the month at KZT 461.57 per dollar, according to the National Bank. AFK points to another effect of foreign purchases. To buy the bonds, non-residents sell foreign currency and purchase tenge, increasing the supply...

Uzbekistan Privatization: Unsold State Assets Relisted With $85 Opening Bids

Uzbekistan has begun putting previously unsold state assets back on the market, with opening bids starting at 1 million Uzbek soums, or about $85. The first lots include stakes in small companies, a district laboratory, vacant buildings, and a former mineral fertilizer warehouse. That figure is the opening bid in an electronic auction, not a valuation of the property. The final price will be determined by bidding. The new rules took effect on September 8 and cover 84 previously unsold assets. They are part of a new privatization package approved by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev on August 28. The government also plans to offer stakes in another 84 companies, 1,242 real estate properties, and about 8,000 hectares of land. The package also calls for 85 enterprises to be liquidated or reorganized. Among the first offerings is a 100% stake in Bukhsu Scientific Biotechnology, a limited liability company registered in Bukhara. Despite its name, the state registry lists its activity as auxiliary services in the field of education. Another lot is a 100% stake in Yangiyo‘l tuman laboratoriya, a district laboratory in Yangiyul District, Tashkent Region. The state had already tried to sell it, offering the stake for about $820 in May 2026, but no buyer emerged. Also for sale are a 100% stake in Iqtisod-Moliya and a 30% stake in Ferula Shifobaxsh. The latter is associated with agriculture and is currently listed in the state registry as inactive. The real estate lots include retail premises, vacant buildings, and a former warehouse used to store and distribute mineral fertilizers. In Samarkand Region, authorities separately announced the renewed sale of five properties in the Narpay, Kattakurgan, Pakhtachi, and Urgut districts. All of the assets have been offered for sale before without success. Uzbekistan has been selling state-owned companies, banks, real estate, and land for years. Large transactions attract international capital. Alongside them, however, is a less visible part of the state economy: small businesses and properties with no obvious buyer. The problem predates the latest decree. As of April 1, 2025, more than 3,600 state assets remained on sale with a combined starting value of about $1.4 billion. Prices had been reduced for 440 assets after they remained unsold for more than three months. In 153 cases, prices had been cut by 70–90%. In 2024, Mirziyoyev criticized slow sales and inflated valuations of some state property. A new privatization program at the time included stakes in hundreds of enterprises and more than 1,000 real estate properties. The latest decree accelerates the process. After three months without a buyer, the price of an asset can be reduced in stages. Some properties can also be sold through a hybrid auction, in which the price falls until a bidder emerges and then rises as participants compete. Payment terms are also changing. Buyers need to make an initial payment of only 15%, with the remainder payable in interest-free installments. If 35% is paid within the first three months, the balance can be spread over up to five...

Women, Cinema and Changing Kazakhstan at QYZQARAS 2026

From August 20 to 30, Almaty hosted the third edition of QYZQARAS, an independent international film festival dedicated to women directors’ voices and the female gaze in cinema. Held this year at the Tselinny Center of Contemporary Culture, the festival presented 21 feature films, including five notable works from Central Asia, among them Kristina Mikhailova’s widely discussed River Dreams. River Dreams had its world premiere in the Berlinale Forum Special section in 2026 and received the Prize of the Ecumenical Jury in the Forum program. The screening marked an important milestone: the film became the first Kazakh documentary feature to premiere at the Berlinale. After a run of international festival appearances, the film returned home: on August 20, it opened QYZQARAS at the Tselinny Center of Contemporary Culture. River Dreams “This epic helped me believe in myself and feel at peace. I believe every frame,” Kristina said after the long applause that followed the final scene. Opening with a striking metaphysical orange river, River Dreams explores the inner lives of women in Kazakhstan. Constantly balancing between dream states and startlingly candid confession, the documentary immerses viewers in a wide range of themes – love, trauma, resistance, and survival – as women reflect on their pasts beside moving water. Grounded in a deeply humanist perspective, Mikhailova’s film presents tenderness as a sustained act of courage. Kristina’s presence behind the camera and the atmosphere of trust on set create an unpretentious portrait of contemporary Kazakhstan. It explores how the image of women is changing in this context, and how women directors themselves are shaping that change. Mikhailova begins with a simple question: “What kind of river are you?” From there, she builds the film around the personal stories of women of different ages and social backgrounds in Kazakhstan. This initial impulse encourages them to compare socially constructed ideals of femininity with what actually exists inside each of them. The most unexpected aspect of the film is the amount of humor. The protagonists’ wry, self-aware voices form an uncompromisingly honest agenda for contemporary Kazakh society: corruption, impunity, language, violence against women, and decolonization. “Decolonization is not only about one’s native language; it is about hierarchy. We look down on one another – it is a slave mentality: ‘I am better than you, so I will discriminate against you,’” says one of the young women featured in River Dreams. The director takes a transparent approach to the sensitive issue of language: in her view, what matters most is not which language we speak, but whether we are speaking about what truly matters. [caption id="attachment_56247" align="aligncenter" width="1024"] Image: Azhar Utezhan[/caption] “The girls did not resist or struggle with the concept of radical vulnerability; it is a very simple idea,” Mikhailova said. The Aksai River, where Kristina grew up and where her father taught her as a child to be stronger, becomes an embodiment of the socio-political whirlpool into which women in Kazakhstan have been drawn over the past 30 years. Unpredictable weather and shifting water levels carry...

Kyrgyz Court Upholds Ex-Security Chief Tashiyev’s Conviction but Changes Charge

On September 10, the Bishkek City Court upheld convictions against former security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev and seven others, but changed the offense from plotting to overthrow the government to interfering with electoral rights. All eight had been convicted in July of plotting the violent overthrow of the government. They received four-year prison sentences, replaced by three years of probation. The change has added to the confusion surrounding the alleged plot. On September 14, Tashiyev’s lawyer asked the Prosecutor General’s Office to investigate the appeal judges’ actions, saying the defense had received no warning of the new charge. The Letter of 75 The saga started in February, when a group of 75 prominent figures in Kyrgyzstan released an open letter calling on President Japarov to call for an early presidential election. The group argued that Japarov was elected in January 2021 under the terms of the previous constitution, which allowed a president one six-year term in office. Several months after Japarov was elected, the country approved a new constitution that gave an individual the right to be elected to two five-year terms as president. Within hours of the letter’s publication, the authorities started rounding up some of the authors of the letter, and President Japarov dismissed his long-time friend Tashiyev as security chief. Japarov said he dismissed Tashiyev to “prevent a split in society,” and for weeks after that, the Kyrgyz president was evasive about the exact reason for sacking a man Japarov continued to call his close friend. In an interview in late April, parliamentary deputy Elvira Surabaldiyeva was the first Kyrgyz official to clarify that Tashiyev was being charged with planning a coup. The trial opened on June 15. Tashiyev’s co-defendants were former Prosecutor General Kurmankul Zulushev, former Parliamentary Speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu, former Deputy Interior Minister Kursan Asanov, former Deputy Prime Minister Aaly Karashev, and politicians Emilbek Uzakbayev, Bekbolot Talgarbekov, and Kurmanbek Dyykanbayev. On July 2, all eight were found guilty of plotting the violent overthrow of the government. The court imposed four-year prison sentences and ordered confiscation of their property, but replaced imprisonment with three years of probation. Most of the defendants and the prosecution appealed the court decision, setting the stage for the court ruling on September 10. Still Guilty, but of Something Different The prosecution sought to have the sentences increased to nine years in prison for all the defendants. The defendants, of course, wanted to be exonerated. On September 10, the Bishkek City Court rendered its verdict. All eight defendants were declared guilty, but not of attempting to overthrow the government. They were guilty of “interfering with exercising voting rights.” The court retained the four-year prison terms but again allowed all eight defendants to serve probation instead. It reduced probation from three years to two and lifted the property confiscation order. Zulushev’s lawyer has said he will appeal to the Supreme Court. Tashiyev’s lawyer has separately asked prosecutors to investigate the appeal judges’ actions, arguing that his client was convicted on a charge the...