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Kazakhstan’s North Aral Recovery Anchors Broader Environmental Push

After decades in which the Aral Sea became a global symbol of ecological collapse, Kazakhstan has achieved a measurable recovery in its northern basin. Built over two decades, the turnaround is now being linked to expanded restoration plans and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s broader Taza Kazakhstan, or “Clean Kazakhstan,” environmental agenda. According to the government, the North Aral’s volume rose from 18.9 billion cubic meters at the end of 2022 to 23 billion by the end of 2025. In July 2026, TCA reported that the Water Resources Ministry had put the volume at approximately 23.5 billion cubic meters. The recovery reflects work centered on the Kokaral Dam, completed in 2005, and management of the Syr Darya. The first phase raised water levels, reduced salinity, and helped restore fishing. Kazakhstan’s Water Resources Ministry and the World Bank have developed plans for a second phase of the restoration program. The proposed project calls for the reconstruction of the Kokaral Dam and aims to increase the sea’s volume to approximately 34 billion cubic meters and expand its surface area to around 3,900 square kilometers. The recovery described here is confined to the North Aral in Kazakhstan. The South Aral remains severely depleted, while further progress in the north depends on Syr Darya flows and cooperation with upstream states. An August 22 government review places the North Aral alongside waste management, reforestation, and environmental education under Taza Kazakhstan. Launched by Tokayev in April 2024 as a nationwide cleanup campaign, the initiative is increasingly being used as a framework for a broader environmental program. Waste Infrastructure Illegal dumping is the clearest area of reported progress. The number of identified dumping sites fell from approximately 8,600 in 2018 to 2,600 in 2026, according to the government. Satellite monitoring is being combined with public reporting through eGov Mobile and TazaQazBot. Public reports have been processed through the two services since 2024. Local authorities have been given responsibility for cleaning public areas, while penalties for illegal disposal have been strengthened. Because the 2018 baseline predates Taza Kazakhstan, the longer-term decline also reflects measures taken before the initiative. The share of municipal waste sorted or processed increased from 25.8% in 2024 to 30.6% in 2025, according to the government. Kazakhstan still faces a serious infrastructure deficit. At the end of 2024, only 20.4% of the country’s municipal waste landfills had the required documentation, while major sites in Astana and Zhezkazgan were at or beyond capacity. A 2023 plan called for 100 new landfills, but a December 2025 government update said only eight had been commissioned. The August 2026 review provided no newer landfill total, but said upgrades were planned for existing sites and additional waste sector projects were moving into operation. Large waste-processing and utilization facilities are also under development in Astana, Almaty, and the Zhambyl region. TCA has previously reported that headline processing rates do not show how much waste becomes reusable material. Only about 1.1% of municipal waste generated in 2024 was converted into secondary raw materials. The...

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Kazakhstan Rolls Out AI Tools Across Its Transport Networks

Kazakhstan is turning to artificial intelligence to help decide where its airlines should fly and which roads need repair, while other systems aim to move freight across its borders faster. The projects are part of a series of government digital systems intended to increase the country’s role as a regional transport hub. Air One of the most prominent projects is Echelon Alpha. The platform analyzes passenger demand and competition between aviation hubs to assess the economics of individual routes. It has already identified around 30 promising routes that could generate additional direct or transit passenger traffic for Kazakhstan. The full list has not been made public, although its developers have cited a potential Hyderabad–Astana–Moscow connection as an example of a route modeled by the system. Kazakhstan’s favorable location between China and Europe does not automatically turn Astana and Almaty into international aviation hubs. They have to compete for transit traffic with airports in Baku and Istanbul, as well as those in the Gulf states. According to Kazakhstan’s Transport Ministry, the model processed data covering around 200 million flights over the past five years, along with approximately 170 airline reports. It also combines geomarketing data with information from open and commercial sources. Its claimed forecasting accuracy is up to 90%. “Echelon Alpha uses artificial intelligence to analyze market dynamics in real time and provide a basis for fast, accurate solutions,” said Echelon Alpha founder Rakhman Asambayev in an interview with Forbes Kazakhstan. The system assesses the commercial viability of new routes and their potential effect on the economy. Its developers estimate that the proposed network could have an annual economic impact of around $153 million, although the figure has not been independently verified. Kazakhstan is also introducing biometric Q-Gate terminals at its airports. They verify passport data against facial biometrics in 15 to 50 seconds, four to five times faster than standard checks, according to government estimates. Road Launched around two months ago, e-Joldar uses AI to track road conditions and repair spending, while also collecting data on the quality of construction materials. More than 25,000 miles of national roads have already been digitized. By the end of the year, monitoring is expected to cover the country’s entire road network of around 115,000 miles. Smart Cargo may have a more immediate effect on international freight operators. The platform combines data from 58 information systems in a single digital portal. Authorities say operators can access cargo information through a QR code. AI checks documentation and identifies the necessary permits, while the platform helps determine routes and tracks shipments. The government says Smart Cargo has increased border-crossing speeds by 30% and cut carrier waiting times by a factor of 10. These figures are based on government estimates. Rail On the rail network, digitalization is being paired with major capacity expansion as Kazakhstan pursues its transit ambitions, including through the Middle Corridor. KinetiX performs contactless diagnostics of rolling stock. Government figures indicate that it has reduced technical inspection times by 30% and manual measurements...

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August 14 Blackout: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Continue to Dispute Its Cause

The blame game over Central Asia’s August 14 blackout continues. Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov says the large-scale blackout began with the shutdown of two generating units at the Toktogul Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) in Kyrgyzstan. Bishkek does not dispute that the failure occurred but rejects the claim that it was the direct cause of the subsequent outages across several countries. Akkenzhenov identified the events in Kyrgyzstan as the starting point of the emergency. According to him, the initial disturbance occurred on August 14 at 2:37 p.m. Kazakhstan time, or 3:37 p.m. in Kyrgyzstan, when generating units No. 1 and No. 2 at the Toktogul HPP went offline. The loss of generation altered operating conditions in Central Asia’s interconnected power system and led to a redistribution of power flows in southern Kazakhstan. A government commission in Kazakhstan is expected to make the final determination. Kazakhstan’s grid operator KEGOC had earlier provided a more detailed chronology. At 2:37 p.m., three 500 kV transmission lines tripped, separating southern Kazakhstan and the Central Asian grid from the rest of Kazakhstan’s power system. About 2,810 MW of consumer load was temporarily cut off. KEGOC later said that immediately beforehand, two generating units at the Toktogul HPP, with a combined capacity of about 600 MW, had gone offline. The resulting changes in power flows overloaded Kazakhstan’s North–East–South transmission corridor, triggering emergency protection systems. Akkenzhenov said the protection systems had worked effectively and praised KEGOC’s response. Kazakhstan’s power system was restored in approximately 2.5 hours. Kyrgyzstan acknowledges that the two units went offline. The country’s Energy Ministry described the incident as the “initial disturbance” in the interconnected power system, but stressed that the first event in an emergency sequence cannot automatically be considered the cause of all subsequent outages. According to its account, by 3:55 p.m. Kyrgyzstan time — 2:55 p.m. in Kazakhstan — the frequency in the interconnected power system had returned to the normal 50 Hz. At that point, Kyrgyzstan was also supplying neighboring power systems with about 250 MW. Bishkek maintains that the outage affecting the Almaty power hub occurred after normal frequency had already been restored. Kyrgyz energy officials therefore consider it premature to directly attribute all subsequent events to the failure at the Toktogul HPP. The disagreement, therefore, is less about what happened first than about the causal link between the initial failure and the chain of outages that followed. Why the Regional Grid Is Vulnerable The vulnerability is rooted in the architecture of the region’s power system itself. During the Soviet period, its power plants and high-voltage transmission lines were designed to operate as a single interconnected system rather than around today’s national borders. Energy ties weakened after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but in recent years the countries have again expanded parallel operation of their power systems. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan are connected through the Integrated Power System of Central Asia. Cross-border power flows are coordinated by the Energia Coordinating Dispatch Center in Tashkent. Hydropower in Kyrgyzstan and...

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Final Results Give Adilet 110 Seats in Kazakhstan’s Kurultai

Kazakhstan has announced the final results of the first election to its new unicameral parliament, the Kurultai. Adilet, a party created only a few months ago, won more than 71% of the vote. Four other parties cleared the 5% threshold, while two failed to enter parliament. According to the Central Election Commission, Adilet received 6,528,948 votes, or 71.17% of the vote. Auyl came second with 6.26%, followed by Respublica with 5.56%, Aq Zhol with 5.21%, and the Nationwide Social Democratic Party (OSDP) with 5.11%. The People’s Party of Kazakhstan received 3.11%, while the green Baytaq party won 1.07%. Another 2.51% of voters selected the “against all” option. The new Kurultai has 145 seats, with all deputies elected through party lists. Under the final allocation, Adilet receives 110 seats, Auyl 10, Respublica nine, and Aq Zhol and the OSDP eight each. A total of 9.35 million people voted, putting final turnout at 74.08%, compared with 54.19% in the 2023 parliamentary elections. The regional differences were substantial: official turnout reached 92.16% in the Turkestan region, but just 43.23% in Almaty. Low turnout in Kazakhstan's largest city is not new — Almaty also recorded the country's lowest figure in 2023. In its preliminary assessment, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights described the election as technically well prepared and said opening and voting largely followed established procedures. It also cited limited political pluralism, discrepancies between observed voter activity and official turnout figures, and procedural violations during the vote count. The election was the first held under Kazakhstan’s new constitutional system. The new Constitution was approved in a referendum on March 15. It was supported by 87.15% of those who voted, with turnout at 73.12%. The document entered into force on July 1, abolishing the previous Senate-Mazhilis structure and replacing it with the 145-seat Kurultai, elected entirely through party lists. Although Adilet itself is new, the party inherited much of the structure of the country’s former dominant party, Amanat. Adilet was established at a founding congress on May 7 and registered on June 1. It is led by Aibek Dadebay, a former head of the Presidential Administration. In June, Amanat – the country’s largest political party and the successor to the ruling party of the Nursultan Nazarbayev era – voted to merge into Adilet. The merger gave the new organization an extensive regional network and much of Amanat’s party apparatus. Pre-election polling had already shown Adilet with a commanding lead. In early August, a survey by the Institute of Eurasian Integration put its support at 65.1%. For the other parties, the main uncertainty was not who would win the election, but which of them would clear the 5% threshold. The People’s Party accepted the preliminary result. Baytaq initially took a different position, alleging violations and saying it would seek to establish the “real results.” However, on August 24, Baytaq leader Azamatkhan Amirtayev said he had no confirmed evidence that would give him grounds to question the voters’ choice, canceled a planned press conference,...

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Uzbekistan’s Reported Chinese Jet Deal in a Changing Arms Market

China’s J-10CE could become Uzbekistan’s first new combat fighter in decades that was designed neither in Russia nor the Soviet Union. This summer, defense publications and analysts reported that Tashkent had allegedly already received the first aircraft and could eventually acquire 24 jets. Neither Uzbekistan nor China has confirmed the deal. If the reports prove accurate, the purchase would mark a notable shift for a region whose armed forces still rely heavily on Soviet- and Russian-made equipment. For decades, Russia was the natural source of new weapons, spare parts and maintenance. Its position is no longer unchallenged. China can offer combat aircraft and air-defense systems, Turkey has established itself in the drone market, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are developing their own defense industries. Whether or not the reports prove accurate, they point to two broader trends: Central Asian countries are increasingly looking beyond Russia for newer military technology, while some are also trying to produce more equipment at home. Shadow Purchase In July, reports emerged of the alleged delivery of four J-10CEs to Uzbekistan. The aircraft is the export version of the Chinese J-10C multirole fighter manufactured by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. Its export variant has already been purchased by Pakistan. Subsequent reports spoke of a possible contract for 24 aircraft and of Uzbek pilots undergoing training in China. Uzbek news outlet Kun.uz attempted to verify the claims and contacted the country’s Ministry of Defense. The ministry responded that it had no information it could provide on the matter. Chinese authorities and manufacturers have also made no public announcement of a sale. Nevertheless, throughout the summer, reports of Uzbekistan purchasing J-10CEs have refused to die down. Russian Weapons Remain the Backbone of Existing Arsenals Uzbekistan inherited a combat aircraft fleet from the Soviet Union built primarily around MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters. These aircraft were developed in the Soviet era, and after the collapse of the USSR, Russia remained the main source of compatible spare parts, weapons, repairs, and upgrades. The reports about the J-10CE challenge this established model. A new fighter comes with a different weapons, maintenance and training ecosystem. Over time, this creates dependence on a new supplier. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, Russian exports of major arms in 2021–2025 were 64% lower than during the previous five-year period. Russia’s share of global arms exports fell from 21% to 6.8%, leaving it the world’s third-largest supplier after the United States and France. Those figures do not mean that China has replaced Russia as Central Asia’s dominant arms supplier. Russia retains a strong position, above all because of the equipment Central Asian militaries already operate. Kazakhstan is perhaps the clearest example. According to SIPRI data for 2021–2025, Russia accounted for 83% of Kazakhstan’s imports of major arms. Spain accounted for 7.9% and France for 3.6%. Kazakhstan operates Russian Su-30SM fighters, as well as helicopters, armored vehicles and air-defense systems. Any abrupt change in procurement policy would raise questions over the compatibility of ammunition, communications systems, maintenance, and the training of crews...

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Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan Coordinate on Nuclear Plant Safety

Uzbekistan is building its first nuclear power plant and preparing a second, while Kazakhstan intends to build at least three. Central Asia’s two largest economies are entering nuclear power at almost the same time. Even before their first reactors come online, the two countries are beginning to coordinate on safety and environmental monitoring, including potential transboundary impacts. On August 21, representatives of the two countries met in Tashkent and agreed on the main areas of further cooperation, including a road map and follow-up steps. The meeting came four days after a new announcement by Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. On August 17, he said preparations were under way for a second nuclear power plant, although the country’s first nuclear complex in the Jizzakh region is only at the initial stage of construction. The location, capacity, timetable, and technology partner for the new plant have yet to be announced. Uzbekistan’s nuclear project has expanded considerably over the past two years. In 2024, Tashkent and Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom agreed to build a small nuclear power plant with six 55 MW RITM-200N reactors. The configuration was later revised to an integrated plant in the Forish district of the Jizzakh region, comprising two large VVER-1000 units and two small RITM-200N reactors. The complex will have a total capacity of about 2.1 GW. Construction formally began on June 4, 2026, when concrete was poured for the first reactor unit. A technical launch of the first small reactor is planned for late 2029, while the first large unit is expected to begin operating in 2033. The entire complex is expected to be operational by 2035. Official projections of annual generation range from about 15.4 billion to 17.2 billion kWh. Rapidly growing electricity demand is driving discussion of a second plant. Uzbekistan needs more generating capacity as industry and new urban projects grow and the population approaches 40 million. Natural gas remains the backbone of power generation, but the government is also expanding solar and wind energy. Nuclear power is intended to provide baseload electricity around the clock, regardless of weather conditions. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer and has the world’s second-largest uranium reserves, but it currently has no operating commercial nuclear power reactors. In a nationwide referendum in October 2024, voters approved the construction of a nuclear power plant. The country’s first plant is planned near the village of Ulken on the shore of Lake Balkhash, with Rosatom selected to lead the international consortium for the project. A nuclear industry development strategy approved in April 2026 calls for Kazakhstan to have at least three nuclear power plants by 2050. It also covers nuclear science and workforce training, along with the management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. China National Nuclear Corporation has been selected to build Kazakhstan’s second plant; in July 2025, Roman Sklyar, then the country’s first deputy prime minister, said China would also build the third. The April 2026 strategy is less specific, however, and lists small modular...