• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
08 December 2025

South Korean Firm to Launch EV Charging Station Production in Kyrgyzstan

A new partnership between Kyrgyz and South Korean stakeholders aims to bring electric vehicle (EV) charging station manufacturing to Kyrgyzstan. The Public-Private Partnership Center under the National Investment Agency of Kyrgyzstan, OJSC Chakan HPP, and South Korea’s BLUE NETWORKS CO., LTD., a company specializing in EV charging infrastructure, have signed a memorandum of cooperation to jointly implement the project.

The agreement, reached under a public-private partnership (PPP) framework, outlines plans to establish a local manufacturing facility and roll out a nationwide EV charging network in major cities and regions across the country.

According to the PPP Center, the initiative is designed to support sustainable and environmentally friendly transport infrastructure, localize high-tech production, and create new employment opportunities. It also reflects Kyrgyzstan’s broader goals of modernizing its energy and transport sectors and strengthening international cooperation in green technologies.

In a related move, Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Economy and Commerce signed a memorandum of understanding in June with South Korean firms EVSIS, NGS, and the Korea Automobile Environment Association. That agreement focuses on developing EV charging infrastructure in Bishkek.

The broader partnership also includes plans to collaborate with the Kyrgyz State Technical University to offer technical training and internship programs. Emphasis will be placed on building local expertise through industry-academic cooperation, particularly in the operation and maintenance of EV charging networks. The aim is to support the employment of young professionals and foster sustainable growth in the green tech sector.

These initiatives are aligned with the Kyrgyz government’s strategy to promote eco-friendly transport alternatives and reduce air pollution in Bishkek and other major urban centers.

Kazakhstan Establishes Center for Countering Disinformation

Kazakhstan has announced the creation of a new Center for Countering Disinformation under the presidential administration. According to official statements, the center aims to protect citizens from false information and provide “objective, verified data.” The initiative, housed within the President’s Central Communications Service, is being presented as a measure to identify and debunk falsehoods and promote “responsible information consumption.”

Kazakhstan’s geographic location – bordering both Russia and China – makes information control a particularly sensitive issue. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Astana has refused to recognize Russia’s annexations and generally observes Western sanctions. Much of Kazakhstan’s population consumes Russian-language media, however, which remains a source of governmental concern.

Questions over how “disinformation” is defined remain, however. A 2023 law on online platforms and advertising, which penalizes the spread of false information, prompted warnings from Reporters Without Borders and others about potential state overreach.

Kazakhstan has increasingly found itself on the frontline of regional information warfare, as waves of disinformation target its foreign policy and internal stability. Recent campaigns have sought to undermine the country’s relations with China, Russia, and the United States, exploiting its position between major powers. Officials in Astana have pointed to anonymous Telegram channels and coordinated online networks as sources of destabilizing narratives, ranging from economic panic to conspiracy theories about national security. In response, the government has intensified its efforts to counter these threats, including public awareness campaigns and new monitoring initiatives. Analysts note that operations like “Spider Web” highlight both the scale of the problem and the geopolitical sensitivities involved. While Kazakhstan is working to address disinformation, the challenge lies in balancing security concerns with the need to preserve media freedom.

Falling Exports Undermine Kazakhstan’s Economic Stability

Kazakhstan’s export revenues fell by 9.2% in the first five months of 2025 compared to the same period in 2024, dealing a fresh blow to the country’s economy. According to data compiled by Finprom.kz, total goods exports dropped to $29.8 billion, down from $32.8 billion, a loss of more than $3 billion.

Commodity Dependency Drives Decline

The steepest decline was recorded in the fuel and energy sector, which saw a shortfall of $2.4 billion. Total exports of oil, gas, and related raw materials amounted to $16.9 billion from January to May, a 12.6% decrease year-on-year.

The downturn also extended to Kazakhstan’s manufacturing sectors: metallurgical exports fell by 6.5%, the chemical industry by 17.7%, and machine building by 21.7%.

While the share of fuel and energy products in Kazakhstan’s export structure dropped to 56.9% in January–May 2025, down from the 65–67% range seen between 2019 and 2024, this shift was not driven by a rise in high value-added goods. These accounted for just 13.5% of total exports.

Oil and Metals Lead Revenue Losses

Oil was the primary source of lost export revenue. The volume of crude shipments declined by 6.6%, from 31.2 to 29.1 million tons, while export earnings fell by 13.9%, costing the country $2.6 billion.

Other key raw material categories also recorded substantial losses: refined copper exports fell by 20.6%, copper ores and concentrates by 26.8%, iron ore by 16.4%, aluminum by 10.4%, and uranium by 24.2%.

Only a few sectors posted gains. Exports of ferroalloys rose by 8.1%, wheat and meslin by 58.3%, and rolled iron by 13.1%. One standout performer was heat-generating assemblies for nuclear power plants produced in Ust-Kamenogorsk, their exports nearly doubled and are supplied exclusively to China.

Trade Imbalance Worsens

The export slump contributed to a broader contraction in Kazakhstan’s foreign trade. Total trade turnover from January to May stood at $53.5 billion, down 4.5% from the previous year. Imports, however, increased by 2.2%, further widening the trade gap.

Kazakhstan has recorded lower export volumes each month of 2025 compared to 2024. In January, exports were down nearly 14%. Although the gap narrowed slightly in subsequent months, May figures remained below last year’s levels.

Italy continues to be Kazakhstan’s largest export market, accounting for 23.1% of total exports. Despite an 11% decline in volume, Italian purchases totaled $6.9 billion. China is the second-largest destination, increasing its share from 17.4% to 17.6%, with $5.2 billion in imports. Russia ranks third, importing $2.9 billion in goods, including automobiles, chemical products, and metal ores.

Analysts warn that Kazakhstan’s continued reliance on raw materials and its low share of high-tech exports represent systemic risks. Without substantial industrial modernization and entry into new markets, the country remains vulnerable to global commodity price fluctuations, endangering long-term macroeconomic stability.

China’s CNNC to Build Third Nuclear Power Plant in Kazakhstan

China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), which previously secured the contract for Kazakhstan’s second nuclear power plant, will now lead the construction of a third facility, according to First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar.

In October 2024, Kazakh citizens voted in a national referendum in favor of nuclear energy development. Following the vote, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced the need to construct at least two, and ideally three, nuclear power plants. In June 2025, Russia’s Rosatom was selected to build the first plant near the village of Ulken, on the western shore of Lake Balkhash, approximately 400 kilometers northwest of Almaty.

Simultaneously, CNNC was announced as the builder for the second facility. Potential locations for this project include Kurchatov, near the former Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in eastern Kazakhstan, and Aktau, the former site of the Soviet-era BN-350 fast neutron reactor in the west. The identity of the third project’s contractor remained unclear until now. Alongside Rosatom and CNNC, South Korea’s KHNP and France’s EDF had been shortlisted.

“The third nuclear power plant will also be built by China,” Sklyar confirmed during a press briefing. When asked whether this referred to CNNC specifically, he replied in the affirmative.

Kazakhstan’s Atomic Energy Agency and Kazakhstan Atomic Power Plants LLP are currently evaluating potential sites for the second and third nuclear plants. “Work is underway, and I believe the locations will be announced later this year,” Sklyar said. “Each plant requires a permanent source of water and electricity, and the exact districts must be carefully selected.”

Meanwhile, negotiations on the intergovernmental agreement for the first nuclear plant, being developed by Rosatom, are ongoing with Russian officials. “Once finalized, the agreement will be submitted to parliament for ratification,” Sklyar added.

The first nuclear power plant is planned to have two units with a combined capacity of 2.4 gigawatts and is expected to be operational by 2035. The project is intended to help offset Kazakhstan’s growing electricity deficit, which reached 5.7 billion kWh in January 2025, up from 2.4 billion kWh a year earlier.

To meet its current energy needs, Kazakhstan imports electricity primarily from Russia and recently signed an agreement with Tajikistan to purchase additional power from the Rogun Hydroelectric Power Plant.

Uzbek Migrants Coerced to Fight in Russia’s War

Russia has recruited at least 902 citizens of Uzbekistan to fight in its war against Ukraine since the beginning of 2025, including individuals as young as 19, according to the “I Want to Live” (Хочу жить) project, which cited sources within the Russian armed forces.

Despite heightened scrutiny in Uzbekistan following earlier reports of its nationals joining the conflict, recruitment efforts have continued to expand. “These are people who no longer belong to themselves,” the project stated, adding that the recruitment methods remain largely unchanged.

The group reported that Uzbek labor migrants arriving in Russia are often lured by promises of lucrative employment, typically in construction or rear-echelon military units. A key incentive remains the promise of expedited Russian citizenship. Meanwhile, Uzbek nationals serving prison terms in Russia are reportedly pressured into enlisting through threats and psychological coercion.

The project also highlighted the use of blackmail, especially targeting migrants who recently obtained Russian citizenship. Alexander Bastrykin, head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, recently acknowledged that more than 5,000 raids had been carried out, during which 90,000 people were “caught”, a term he used himself. Of those, 30,000 signed contracts and were sent to the front lines, reflecting the coercive nature of the campaign.

The report added that prisoners of war from 33 countries are currently held in Ukraine, with Uzbekistan reportedly having the highest number of foreign nationals among them.

Separately, on June 5, 2025, a delegation from Uzbekistan’s Defense Ministry, led by Deputy Minister Colonel Alisher Narbaev, visited the “Postoyalye Dvory” military training ground in Russia’s Kursk region. The visit has raised questions amid ongoing concerns about the recruitment of Uzbek citizens into Russia’s war effort.

“Every signed contract is a one-way ticket,” the “I Want to Live” project warned, urging the Uzbek government to take a stronger stance in protecting its citizens from being drawn into the conflict.

Earlier this year, The Times of Central Asia reported that Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Service accused Russia of coercing Central Asian citizens, particularly labor migrants from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, into military service. Many of those recruited under the guise of volunteering are sent directly to high-risk front-line positions, where survival chances are slim.

Turkmen Migrants Face Deportations as Russia Escalates Crackdown

Russian authorities are intensifying their deportation of foreign nationals under a sweeping crackdown on irregular migration, with Turkmen citizens increasingly targeted, according to Turkmen News.

Deportation Without Trial

Under new rules introduced in February 2025, Russian police and migration officials can summarily expel foreign nationals without awaiting court decisions. The measures coincide with a significant uptick in Turkmen migration: nearly 90,000 Turkmen citizens entered Russia in 2023, triple the number recorded in 2022.

Now, reports of deportations are mounting. In July alone, media outlets across several Russian regions reported hundreds of foreigners, many of them from Turkmenistan, being forcibly removed. Key figures include:

  • Astrakhan Region: 200 people
  • Nizhny Novgorod Region: 518 people
  • Republic of Dagestan: 260 people
  • Stavropol Krai: 127 people

Raids have also been carried out in other areas, though officials often refrain from disclosing detainees’ nationalities. For example, in early July, Moscow police raided hostels and prayer houses, detaining over 500 foreigners. More than 30 were later expelled for immigration violations, according to Kommersant.

A recent case in Saratov Region highlighted the situation. On July 30, the Federal Bailiff Service (FSSP) announced the deportation of three Turkmen citizens for violating migration laws. Among them: a 27-year-old former student who overstayed his registration in Kazan, a 55-year-old man whose legal stay had expired in 2024, and a 47-year-old businessman who failed to obtain a work permit. All three cited lack of funds to return home. They were escorted to a Moscow-area airport and deported, receiving five-year re-entry bans. According to Turkmen News, they will also be placed on a “no-exit” list upon return, barring them from leaving Turkmenistan in the near future.

Tougher Migration Regulations

Millions of Central Asians live and work in Russia, forming the backbone of the country’s migrant labor force. Official figures indicate that nearly 4 million citizens of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan currently reside in Russia. An additional 670,000 foreigners are believed to be in the country without legal status.

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan account for the largest share of migrant laborers. In 2023, over one million Tajik citizens entered Russia for work. However, the overall number of Central Asian migrants has been declining, driven by tighter restrictions, growing xenophobia, and fears of forced conscription. In 2024 alone, Russian authorities expelled around 15In 2025, Moscow introduced a new set of migration regulations aimed at curbing irregular migration. These measures authorize law enforcement to carry out deportations without judicial review, establish a centralized registry of undocumented foreigners, and set a deadline of September 10, 2025, for migrants to legalize their status. Those who fail to comply will face deportation and multi-year bans on re-entry.

These efforts build on previous policies, including mandatory fingerprinting and photographing of all incoming migrant workers, reducing visa-free stays from 180 days to 90, and expanding the list of deportable offenses.

The crackdown intensified following the March 2024 terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall in Moscow, which was allegedly carried out by suspects of Central Asian origin. The incident sparked a wave of anti-migrant sentiment and led to a flurry of legislative activity. Since then, the government has reportedly passed at least 15 new laws aimed at “combating illegal migration.”